ISLAMIC NATIONHOOD AND COLONIAL INDONESIA

The umma below the winds

Michael Francis Laffan
This book argues that Indonesian nationhood rested to a large degree on a pre-existing sense of Islamic ecumenism. This ecumenism was heightened both under colonial rule and through the experience of life in the Hijaz, where Southeast Asians were simultaneously co-believers in Islam and foreigners to Arabia. The author contrasts the latter experience with life in modern Cairo, where Southeast Asians were drawn to the ideas of Islamic reformism and nationalism.

Laffan also shows how this Cairene experience had an influence on an Indonesian nationalism defined in religious terms. However, rather than leaving the discussion at this point, this book shows how developments in the Middle East – and particularly the Saudi takeover of Mecca in 1924 – continued to have a profound impact on Indonesia.

Michael Laffan obtained his doctorate from the University of Sydney, 2001. He is currently a research fellow with the International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden University, working within a project examining the development of religious authority in twentieth-century Indonesia.

This book evolved from the author’s doctoral thesis, which won the 2001 Asian Studies Association of Australia President’s award.
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*Michael Francis Laffan*
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The umma below the winds

Michael Francis Laffan
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This study is a revised version of my doctoral dissertation, submitted to the University of Sydney in 2000. Whilst preparing this manuscript I became increasingly aware of the interactive process connecting informants and orientalists that lies behind the discursive screens which are the subject of this book, being questions of community, nation, religion, and modernity. Peter van der Veer has discussed this nexus most eloquently in his *Imperial Encounters* (2001). Unfortunately I was not able to take that work into account in this study, but it will, I believe, have an influence on any that might follow it. In time too I hope to be able to take up Bill Roff’s (2001) challenge to answer how C. Snouck Hurgronje has affected Indonesian Islam in the twentieth century. For now I have sketched but the opening scene, and I hope to use my time as a research fellow within the IIAS project on ‘the dissemination of religious authority in twentieth-century Indonesia’ to flesh out the continuing contestations and convergences between reformists and traditionalists.
It is impossible to pay adequate thanks to the many people who have guided me on the path to the completion of this book, but I will try. I am especially indebted to my supervisors at the University of Sydney, Tony Day, Ahmad Shboul, and Peter Worsley, and then to my unofficial mentors at the Australian National University, Ann Kumar and Ian Proudfoot. Financial support to carry out my research was made possible by the Office of Research and Scholarships at the University of Sydney, which also helped secure additional resources for my jaunts to Egypt, Indonesia, and The Netherlands. In such places, and through the ether, I have also profited greatly from the insights and suggestions of Tony Johns, Nico Kaptein, Bill Roff and Merle Ricklefs. Special thanks go to Merle Ricklefs for giving me the opportunity to assist his own research in a small way, and indeed for keeping the itinerant Laffans clothed and fed in 2001 through a position with the Melbourne Institute for Asian Languages and Societies. The last touches to this book – including the images – were made at the International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden University. I am particularly thankful to Jan Just Witkam and Hans van der Velde for help in accessing the photographic collection of the Oriental Manuscripts Section of the Leiden University Library. Permission to reproduce these images, and those found in other works held by Leiden University, is gratefully acknowledged.

Our time abroad and between cities was also made all the more enjoyable by virtue of the strong friendships we forged, and which played their part in the completion of this work. Here I should mention George Miller, Kus Pandey, Sean Robey, Linda Poskitt, Greg Fealy, Sarah and Richard Slattery and Rita Soebardi of Canberra; Jaap and Karla Pluge, Jos van Lent and Luitgard Mols in Holland; Faridah and Kamat of Kuala Lumpur; the Jayusman family, Henri Chambert-Loir, and Debbie Tomasowa in Jakarta; and, of course, the Cairo gang – Basil Kiwan, Beth Seymour, Victor Brunsden, Hussam Barakat and Mokhtar Diallo. If I have forgotten anyone, please forgive me.

Finally I wish to thank Judy for putting up with everything, and our children, Faridah and Daniel, whose constantly being moved around must
have been a trial. Still I hope that our peregrinations will make them far more interested in the world than might have been the case had I stuck to being a bicycle mechanic or had I been dragged into the government bureaucracy.
Indonesianists are often plagued by problems of transliteration. Many older Dutch-influenced spellings have since been reformed to make way for a more simplified phonetic system. Thus /oe/ is now /u/, /tj/ has become /c/, /dj/ is /j/, /sj/ is /sy/, and /j/ is /y/. The Indonesianist dealing with the languages of the Middle East, where many Southeast Asians have lived and worked, is doubly cursed, as many of the sounds not vocalized or irrelevant in Southeast Asian contexts still carry meaning with reference to their shared religious system. These include the long vowels /¯a/, /¯u/ and /¯ı/; the palatals /d./, /s./, /t./, and /z./; and the glottal stop /'/. For the purposes of this book I have given all place names their modern spellings where the same name is used, or I have retained the older name when context decrees that we are speaking of Batavia and Buitenzorg and not Jakarta and Bogor. Personal names have proven far more problematic. In general I have followed two rules. First, to follow the spelling employed by the people themselves wherever possible, and second, to apply the orthography relevant to the context in which they lived and worked. This is further complicated by issues of script as Malay was also written in the Arabic script. But as the long vowels, emphatics, and palatalizations often make little difference to speakers of Austronesian languages, I have opted either to leave them off or use the contemporary European spelling when speaking of the Indies context. To a degree this aids in the identification of individuals. For example Aḥmad Dāhlān of Mecca and Achmad Dachlan of Yogyakarta may be easily differentiated, and we can see that ‘the Hadrami’ Said Oesman had strong connections with the Netherlands Indies. Nonetheless, for terms deriving from the shared Arabo–Islamic tradition I have maintained the fully marked Arabic renderings and ignored the Southeast Asian duplication of words to form plurals. Thus I shall write about the ‘ulamā’ (religious scholars), and such shared practices as ṣalāt (prayer), zakāt (alms) and the Ḥajj to Mecca.

Finally, I have opted to give most dates in their Common Era equivalents. This is, once again, for the sake of ready comparison between regions, times and cultures.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ar.  Arabic
ARA  Algemeen Rijks Archief, The Hague
BKI  Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
CSI  Centraal Sorekat Islam
Du.  Dutch
IAIN  Institut Agama Islam Negeri
IG  De Indische Gids
IJMES  International Journal of Middle East Studies
INIS  Indonesia and Netherlands Institute for Scientific Cooperation
IPO  Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chinese Pers
ISEAS  Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
JAAMES  Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle East Studies
JAOS  Journal of the American Oriental Society
JAS  Journal of Asian Studies
Jav.  Javanese
JMBRAS  Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSBRAS  Journal of the Singapore Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSEAS  Journal of South East Asian Studies
KITLV  Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden
KIZ  Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken
KT  Koloniaal Tijdschrift
LP3ES  Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial
Mal.  Malay
Mr.  Mailrapport
NINO  Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, Leiden
NZ  Nederlandsch Zendingstijdschrift
<table>
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<tr>
<td>OLG</td>
<td>Oostersch Letteren en Geschriften, Universiteits-Bibliotheek, Rijks-universiteit Leiden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMA</td>
<td><em>Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAP</td>
<td>South East Asia Press, Cornell University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sk.</td>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td><em>Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsche Indië</em></td>
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The very idea of Indonesia is currently in crisis. Indonesian news broadcasts speak of the process of national disintegration or the Balkanization of the homeland. Yet it is clear that many disagree as to what the homeland is. The long-suffering and unwilling province of East Timor has been begrudgingly relinquished. Insurgents in West Papua and Sulawesi continue to press their claims for independent statehood. Interethnic conflict has flared in Borneo.

There is indeed a very real fear that the Indonesia of tomorrow will not be that of today. As a response to the crisis some Muslims have begun to recall the supposedly Islamic tradition that ‘Love of the homeland is a part of faith’, while members of the para-military Laskar Jihad have travelled to join the Muslims of Ambon in a vicious war against their Christian rivals. By the same token, though, members of the Acehnese resistance have on occasion used Islamic imagery in their fight with the central government, implying that they do not share the same style of Islam with the people of Java, who indeed ascribe to the Acehnese a degree of fanaticism from which they believe they are immune.

The euphoria of the newly independent nation under Soekarno (1901–70) is indeed lost but, with the passing of time, the failures of his own regime have become outweighed by the memories of the good times – of the hopes for justice that bound many in the republic, whether Muslims, nationalists or communists. Robert Cribb has recently suggested that ‘the idea of Indonesia has withered not because it failed to deliver justice and prosperity, but because many people have lost hope that it may do so’. Other observers are more diffident. Many agree that Indonesia is no more than a container for Indonesians. Goenawan Mohamad, for example, prefers to see it as ‘an unfinished world’ whose boundaries may well change in the coming years.¹

Among those dismayed by the prospects of even the partial disintegration of Indonesia is Benedict Anderson, whose musings on nationalism were inspired in part by his very exclusion from that country. From his spiritual exile Anderson long raged against Soeharto’s regime and championed the voice of imprisoned writers like Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Yet, in the vacuum
of Indonesia after Soeharto, Anderson has apparently shifted from observer and spokesman for the oppressed Left, to perhaps an over-zealous advocate of the idea of the nation-state. When he made his recent triumphant return to Indonesia, he even pleaded in Indonesian for ‘a real revival of the common project which was initiated almost a hundred years ago’, having declared that the modern world had ‘shown us sufficient examples of nations that have broken up because too many of their citizens have had shrivelled hearts and dwarfish minds’ (as quoted by Sherman: 2001).

Yet, in invoking the heroism of a project inaugurated some 100 years ago, Anderson was not speaking of a project that identified in any substantial way with the faith of the majority of the inhabitants of the archipelago. There is a real need for a re-examination of the place of religion in guiding the footsteps of some of Anderson’s heroes and, had they remained alive today, men who would have been his enemies. This book is thus an attempt to evaluate the place of Islam in early Indonesian nationalism. I hope to demonstrate how Muslim reformists, whose activities were focussed on the peoples and concerns of the Netherlands Indies, expressed their sense of imagined community above all else as a function of Islam. Through their activities pre-existing ideas of alterity founded in people (European v. Asian) and religion (Christian v. Muslim) were fused and contextualized within newly formed colonial boundaries which of themselves had no inherent validity. Such a fusion, I argue, was important for a pan-ethnic nationalism to be developed and propagated among the largely Muslim peoples of the archipelago.

In order to describe Southeast Asian constructions of Islam as people (bangsa), and thereafter nationality or love of nation (kebangsaan), I describe how some Indonesians have expressed their Islamic identity in terms of their history of connectivity with the wider Muslim world. More particularly, I examine the activities of Indonesians-in-the-making at the sites of the leading ‘universities’ of Islam – first at Mecca’s sacred precinct, the Haram, and then at Cairo’s most famous teaching-mosque, al-Azhar. In the case of the Hijaz, I contend that the experience of the Hajj and of the wider Muslim world was crucial in shaping the very imagined notion of Southeast Asia as a category. I then move to a discussion of Cairo as an alternate destination and examine the roots of a new Islamic reformism and the debates over modern nationhood which seem to have accompanied it. In this way I show that the seeds of what would become Indonesian nationalism germinated in two of the Central Lands of Islam as much as in Leiden or Batavia. Thereafter I shall examine this variant of Indonesian nationhood that was embedded in vigorous debates about religion, modernity, and identity in the Netherlands Indies.

As I discuss the shift to modern shared nationhood by a diverse assortment of Muslim peoples, I do not claim to represent them as having no communal sense before the arrival of ‘the West’ from the end of the fifteenth century. In his important study of colonial India (1996: Empire and Information), C.A. Bayly has shown how one can approach a complex and diverse web of
societies as a single community of thought, exchange, and communication; namely as an *ecumene*. Originally used to describe the world of the Greeks (the *oikumene*), a variant of this term has been applied to the Christian world: hence we have the ecumenical dialogue between the Eastern and Western churches. It was also used by Marshall Hodgson to map out the geographical parameters of his own civilizational epic, *The Venture of Islam* (Chicago: 1974). For my own purposes, however, I wish to argue that Indonesian nationhood had deeper roots in an Islamic ecumenism within archipelagic Southeast Asia made more tangible through contact with both other Muslims beyond that world and non-Muslims within it.

Once abroad, members of the ecumene would have felt a heightened sense of their ‘situational ethnicity’ as the image of ‘home’ became more strongly imprinted upon them. Yet, co-existing with the opportunity for intense immersion in local society, residence abroad would have created an altered sense of self, and many Southeast Asians – like Indonesians abroad today – maintained their own community and a sense of difference (see Abaza: 1994; Poeze: 1986). The majority of Southeast Asians resident in Arabia, such as the community of Javanese goldsmiths and tailors in Mecca, for example, were born in Southeast Asia and maintained a strong attachment with that part of the (Muslim) world. Still, in discussing such expatriate communities I am not dealing so much with these Southeast Asians who had made their permanent homes in Mecca or Cairo. Rather I shall be concerned with the ‘*ulamā*’ and their students who moved back and forth across the Indian Ocean to institute Islamic reforms among their fellow believers (see Azra: 1992, 1999).

The mirror image of such diasporic identification may be seen in the emergence, and later submergence, of Hadrami communities in the archipelago, studied most recently by Mandal (1994) and Mobini-Kesheh (1999). In the late nineteenth century many Hadramis – officially termed ‘Arabs’ (Arabieren) by the Dutch – asserted their Arabness, and identified with a world beyond their immediate surroundings. However over time some did assimilate, while others chose to direct their attentions to their distant homeland. Indeed it was the impact of the activities of these Hadramis in Java which came to accentuate differences in Hadramaut itself (see Kostiner: 1984; Riddell: 1997; Mobini-Kesheh: 1999). Here a special resonance will be demonstrated with reference to the impact of Southeast Asians empowered abroad in the form of the political and reformist ideas they brought back to the archipelago. Such impulses lead in part to the formation of a key division among the Muslims of the universally acknowledged nation of Indonesia.

**Studies of Islamic nationalism in Indonesia and the contribution of this book to the field**

I am not seeking here to propose any new theory for explaining the formulation of Islamic nationalism, or indeed of nationalism itself. I see the
relevance of what I present to be squarely addressed to Indonesia. Certainly
the connections and tensions between Islamic activism and nationalism have
long attracted the attention of scholars in the field. Indonesia is, after all, the
world’s most populous Muslim nation, and the first true mass-organization
on Java, Sarekat Islam (founded in 1912), identified itself explicitly as an
organization for Muslims. Naturally too the Dutch were always concerned
by such political manifestations of Islam that threatened their colonial
sovereignty. Once their slice of the East Indies was lost to the Japanese in
1942, those specialists trained by the Dutch system ruminated on the passing
of empire.

In West Sumatra in 1927, B.J.O. Schrieke mentioned the emergence in
Mecca of a religious reformist movement that threatened the Minangkabau
traditional elite, and in turn the Dutch power that supported them (see
Schrieke 1955). Schrieke also noted the links between that movement and a
new mercantilist class that had capitalized on the changing colonial economy,
and that now sent its sons to Cairo for a modern education. In this way
Schrieke highlighted the organic link between Indies reformism and the
emergence of a new middle class. This observation remained a feature of the
majority of analyses to follow, such as those of Benda (1983 [1958]) and
‘crucial, yet complex place . . . in the history of both Indonesian nationalism
and Indonesian Islam’, he felt that its real significance was social, and not
ideological. That is, Sarekat Islam created a space in which social change
could be enacted by natives as a class, yet it did not contribute new ideas about
political sovereignty or indeed religious change to that society. Benda (1983:
56–57) also sought to differentiate the styles of activism in the Indies by
delineating a social middle class on Java (under Dutch tutelage) and an
economic one on Sumatra.

So it was that class, rather than faith, was shown to have formed the
boundaries of Indonesian activism and nationhood. But when Benda (1983:
54–55) concluded that, by 1927, religious and political activities in the Indies
were separated he neglected to note that up to that point activists from both
spheres had accepted the very idea of Indonesia. By comparison, Wertheim
(1959: 204) did describe the cohesive force of Islam as ‘protonationalism’.
Still, Islam – as the historical legacy of foreign traders – remained connected
to networks of capital and social mobility first and foremost. Wertheim (1959:
198, 207) even saw Islamization as a means of escaping first the indigenous,
and then the colonial, caste systems. Following the work of Cantwell-Smith
on Indian reformism, he saw that the reformist movement of the early
twentieth century constituted a ‘bourgeois current’ introducing revised
Western concepts of individualism and rationalism. In Wertheim’s estimation,
that current had little to contribute to the national movement other than
providing ‘a pre-nationalist unifying ideology’. Wertheim (1959: 318–26) then
preferred to tell the story of nationalism in a different chapter from his
discussion of Islam. Herein he recited the rise of the Dutch-educated elite, who borrowed their ideas from the West and who could then ‘turn against the foremost exponents of Western civilization’. In this turn Islam was divorced from nationalism.

A significant contribution to an understanding of reformism in Indonesia and its connection with the national movement is Deliar Noer’s *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900–1942* (Kuala Lumpur, 1973). With detailed attention to key periodicals, movements, and individuals, Noer charts the emergence and decline of ‘Islamic modernism’ between 1900 and the Japanese occupation. Yet this study, despite its wealth of information, does not always disclose its sources clearly and relies at times on hearsay. At times Noer repeats without criticism much of the material and assertions found in Hamka’s hagiography *Ajahku* (My Father, 1958). And although Noer (1973:7) commences his work with the observation that ‘it can be said that nationalism in Indonesia started with Muslim nationalism’ his verdict on the ultimate political impact of his subjects – and particularly those who sought out political Islam in Cairo – is dismissive.

It is in some sense ironic that by his concentration on the press networks of reformist Islam, Noer anticipated the line of thought among some America-based social scientists; best enunciated in Anderson’s persuasive *Imagined Communities* (1983). This is a narrative of national inspiration following Western models, developed through increased access to Western-style education. In the Indonesian case, nationalism was born of the so-called Ethical Policy inaugurated by the Dutch government in 1899. Anderson also links the subjects of Western intellectual discourse to the wider tendency (in Southeast Asia for example) for pilgrimages of Western-educated ‘creole’ functionaries to the bureaucratic centres of colony or motherland. There they formed cultural associations under the shared experience of Western modernity. This was in turn communicated via a roman-script ‘print capitalism’, whereby the swelling readership of the daily presses conceived of an ‘imagined community’ as they learned of the wider world and their distinctly national place within that world. Such communities are imagined as their members never have the chance to meet or know every other member of that community, yet they become capable of shared visions about a corporate future.

Ahmat b. Adam has echoed this emphasis on Western-guidance and print modernity with his excellent survey *The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness* (1995). Nonetheless, with the exception of Noer, this press-focussed narrative still ignores Islam and is repeating the core explanation of Indonesian nationalism put forward by Dutch historiography. According to Vlekke (1959: 360–61):

> Usually the movements started among non-Javanese living on Java from where they spread to the home districts of the peoples
concerned. This indicates that the nationalist activities originated from the contact with the western world and that more especially they found their first adherents among men cut loose from their traditional surroundings... But however great the differences might be [between these groups] a feeling of national unity, based not only upon common interests but also upon common historical fate, steadily developed. The Netherlanders had built the framework of this unity; through them the different tribes and peoples... had become one single body politic; and this is an achievement of their European rulers which the Indonesian nationalists were determined never to surrender.

Thus the field has, until now, concentrated upon the emergence of a middle class, Western education, and moreover Western-script literacy as the engines of modern nationhood. I do not wish in any way to deny that such processes had a significant impact on many of the peoples of Indonesia. Such a narrative works well to describe the rise of such leaders as Soekarno and Hatta (1902–80) and serves to highlight the failure of Islamic activists to achieve the political leadership of Indonesia.

Yet whilst it is true that political Islam failed, by the 1930s, to hold the initiative in the Indonesian movement, this failure obscures what may have been in the 1920s. For although many of the individuals studied by Noer did sink into the background, or eventually challenged the validity of the Indonesian nation in their writings (Federspiel 1977) and rebellions (van Dijk 1981), they nonetheless served as channels for the transmission of Islamic ideas of nationhood. This book will address such ideas in the same contexts described by Noer and Ahmat b. Adam, but with closer attention to the terminologies they employed, and how precisely they may be sourced to contemporary movements in the Middle East.

As I have already indicated, the politics of Islamic reformism in the Indies is moreover obscured by the standard start-date for the story of Indonesia’s national struggle. And although C. Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 215–92) wrote at length about a very active Southeast Asian communalism in Mecca in the 1880s, it has largely been consigned to a footnote in the literature. I will reconnect that communalism by continuing to consider the Indies movement with reference to the contemporary development of the wider Muslim world as they impacted on Southeast Asians. In this way it will be clearer, for example, as to why Agoes Salim (1884–1954) went to a Sarekat Islam meeting, was converted to the movement’s cause, ‘and brought with him a commitment to Pan-Islam and Modernism as the proper basis for political activity’ (Ricklefs 1993: 173). It also demonstrates more clearly why such journals as al-Imam and al-Munir (discussed by both Hamka and Noer) need to take their place in a national history of Indonesia. In this way the broad vision of Islam as ‘no more and no less than the signifier of the yet nameless
nation of natives', attributed to O.S. Tjokroaminoto (1883–1934) by Shiraishi (1990: 61), may be better understood, if not corrected.

**Typologizing Islam in Southeast Asia**

Indonesian Muslims have often been classified according to Clifford Geertz's (1960) paradigm of fracture in Javanese society. In East Java, from 1951 to 1953, the anthropologist Geertz observed a division between a majority of nominal believers (*abangan*), the traditional elite ostensibly hostile to Islam (*priyayi*), and scripturalists maintaining a strong commitment to normative piety (*santri*). Geertz was not the first to notice such divisions, but the formulation of their typologies, as published in his seminal *The Religion of Java* (1960), has generally been ascribed to him. Despite his own assertion that the three sub-groupings did not encapsulate ‘pure types’ (Geertz 1960: 355), they have been taken on by the field as a convenient shorthand for contrasting styles of religiosity in Indonesian societies. This is despite the fact that the divisions he extrapolated ignore an over-arching unity in Islam. Ricklefs (1979, 1997) has furthermore made the case that the identification of the *priyayi* as being a group concerned purely with the maintenance of pre-Islamic tradition is anachronistic before the nineteenth century. And as Bachtiar (1973: 88) once pointed out, Geertz’s stress on culture, which he termed religion, ignores the economic relationship between the *abangan* peasantry and the *priyayi* elite.

In this book then I shall be dealing primarily with those Muslims Geertz identified as *santri*. These are Muslims concerned with the normative practice of Islam, its five principal obligations, and the academic tradition of the Qur'ānic sciences. I also recognize that such Muslims – variously described as ‘scripturalists’, or ‘Sharī’a-minded’ – seldom constitute the majority in any Muslim society. Their failure to win elections in Indonesia is a testament to this. Nonetheless it has been their dominance of the public institutions of Islam that has led some observers, like Geertz, to equate pure Islam with their pronouncements (cf. Asad: 1986).

Scripturalist Muslims are seldom of a united voice in defining the details of Islamic practice and there has been a long history of disputation over the practice of their shared faith between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘reformists’. In his pioneering study of Malay nationalism, Roff (1967) discussed a version of such debates which lead to a stratification among those Malays who identified either with tradition as embodied by ‘the old generation’ (*kaum tua*) or the radical reformism advocated by ‘the young generation’ (*kaum muda*). As this terminology was common to most of Islamic Southeast Asia at the time, I shall also employ it in this book. And although the Kaum Muda are often termed by observers as ‘modernist’ (i.e., Noer 1973; Ricklefs 1993) such terminology is problematic – at least until its adoption by the Kaum Muda themselves. No Kaum Muda ever claimed to be trying to modernize the
Islamic faith. Muslim activists, such as the Egyptian Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), more usually described themselves as working for the ‘reform’ (iṣlāḥ) of its popular practice with the aim of leading to a ‘renewal’ (tajdīd) of the Muslim community as a whole. These activists presented Islam, as revealed in the Qurʾān and enacted in the behaviour (sunna) of Muḥammad, as valid for all times and places. The apparent modernism of their activities lies in the fact that they sought to enact reform with an emphasis on the rational, and personal, rediscovery of a pristine Islamic past, and the employment of all forms of modernity compatible with this ‘pure’ Islam. The disputation between the Kaum Muda and the Kaum Tua in the 1900s was often concerned with the Western symbols of this modernity; from whether it was permissible to wear trousers or even to take photographs. Nonetheless, matters also became confused in the public sphere in the 1920s as modernity – if one takes this contentious phenomenon to include the use of such ‘Western’ imports as cars or reading newspapers – was ultimately shared by Muslims of all persuasions. Hence I have attempted to describe the development of Kaum Muda reformism with closer reference to contemporaneous events in Cairo in order to try and unravel this confusion.

Knowing Islam

The previously widespread acceptance of Geertz’s typology underlines a gap in informed knowledge of Islam in Southeast Asia as it relates to West Asia. As Roff (1985) once remarked, the study of Islam had then been long ‘obscured’ when compared with the region’s anthropology, economies, and especially its pre-Islamic civilizations. In the case of Indonesia, such a line has its heritage in colonial discourse and may be traced from Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles’ (1781–1826) classic History of Java (1817) to Cornelius van Vollenhoven’s (1874–1933) compendia on indigenous tradition in the Netherlands Indies (Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië, Leiden, 1931–33, 3 vols). Perhaps the obfuscation of Islam has been because Islam’s history was already bound to the Western imagination, from Crusades to colonialism, and hence already ‘known’ (cf. Said 1978). Meanwhile early Western understandings of Indonesian societies, whether in the dilettante articles of missionaries, or the ruminations of colonial officials, often presented Islam as an alien accretion whose true practice remained confined to the Central Lands of Islam (see Boland and Farjon 1983: 5–7). Despite Snouck Hurgronje having challenged this misperception as early as 1883, and indeed despite Indonesia’s substantial Muslim population, standard works on Islam have often failed to address the region in a manner commensurate with its physical presence in the Muslim World (e.g., Lewis 1993). In one telling slip, Kramer infers that the Muslim World was bounded by Afghanistan at one end and by Morocco at the other, whilst later referring to ‘the Indo-Malay periphery’ (see Kramer 1986: 55–56, 95). Nonetheless this view reflects the perceptions of
many of the Muslim activists whose congresses were the subject of Kramer’s study. Certainly a popular perception of Southeast Asians as imperfect (or merely unorthodox) Muslims remains today. And while it should not be said that Islam in Southeast Asia is practised in exactly the same way as contemporary Arabia, it should still be remembered that Islam has been reformulated by every community which has ever embraced it. In the process they have added their own particularisms to the Muslim world and compounded the multiplicity of the living forms of religion (cf. Goldziher 1981; Meuleman 1997).

Despite a current trend in the social sciences addressing Southeast Asian Islam seriously, both in the West (Bowen 1993, 1994; Gibson 1994, 2000; Hefner 1997) and at the Indonesian State Islamic Institutes (IAIN), the recent historical links with West Asia are still poorly understood. And apart from Azra’s (1992, 1999) work on scholarly networks, Snouck Hurgronje’s foray into the Hijaz in 1884–85, and Abaza’s field work in Cairo in the 1980s, few studies pay attention to developments in those external Muslim contexts in which Indonesians continue to live and work. Such a lack betrays one weakness in Area Studies as a whole given that scholars seem disinclined to consider work done in geographic fields outside their own purview. Such inflexibility has compromised the study of Islam with its diverse manifestations. Moreover Indonesianists have been too eager to summarize the influence of Muhammad ‘Abduh based on the classic, but dated, works of Adams (1968 [1933]) or the polemics of Hamka (1961).

Islam’s marginalization in the field of Southeast Asian studies may be seen as connected to the concept of centre and periphery, Islam being supposedly peripheral to Southeast Asia, and Southeast Asia peripheral to Islam (cf. Hefner 1997: 8–18). Hence an emphasis remains on a transmission of ideas from the Middle East to Southeast Asia reinforced by statements of religious ‘superiority’ (von der Mehden 1993: 2) or yet ‘purity’ (Benda 1983: 13; Abaza 1994: 71). Conversely some anthropologists appear happy to depict an Indonesia without reference to Islam and privilege the local over the global (cf. Gibson 2000). Nevertheless Hefner (1997), Azra (1999), and Bowen (1993) have done much to recognize again Islam’s role in nation creation. In this they are following on the work of Roff (1967), Abdullah (1972), and Yunus (1979).

As I have already noted, I am questioning aspects of Anderson’s work on the imagined community. For whilst I seek to test Andersonian theory by examining aspects of the press networks so important to his discussion, his argument of modular nationalism ignores religion, which, following Habermas, he posits as of declining importance in the modern world. An Andersonian reading of Indonesian nationalism disregards the role of religious pilgrimage, both within the archipelago and to Mecca, and even Islam’s ‘creole’ ambassadors born of parents from either shore of the Indian Ocean. It is also interesting to see that Ariffin (1993) too, whilst critiquing Anderson’s formulation of the linkage between print capitalism and the
imagined community, has not questioned Anderson’s assertion of the decline of religion for the Malay case in the late 1940s. Still, in the margins of his work on Malay concepts of community and democracy it is clear that the forces of Indonesian nationalism in Sumatra were fully supported by such religious groups for whom Islam and the national community had become indivisible. Anderson illustrates his view of religion on the wane with the overwhelming of once-sacred scripts by new Western-script languages of the print-media, allied not to communities of faith but to networks of capital. In order partially to rethink this view I shall show that there was an alternative religious-print network in Southeast Asia which, from c.1900, was bound to a religious centre, Cairo, where politics had firmly entered the realm of the popular Muslim imagination. Indeed links between Southeast Asia and the Middle East did not stagnate after the imposition of European control and were even strengthened. Through this heightened contact political and religious ideas continued to be exchanged and redefined by Southeast Asian Muslims, in the Hijaz and Egypt, and in ‘the lands below the winds’, as Southeast Asia was once known by virtue of the monsoons that governed trade within and beyond its archipelago.
AN ECUMENE IN ‘THE LANDS BELOW THE WINDS’

The foundations of a Muslim ecumene: the Islamization of the bilād al-jāwa

In his history of the sultanates of Maluku, Leonard Andaya (1993: 23) recalls that the European worldview once rested on the Greek paradigm of centre and periphery. This was also a view once shared by the Arabo–Islamic geographical tradition. Schrieke (1957: 267) observed that descriptions of the archipelago were often ‘shrouded in the mists of para-geography’. (A good example of this vague cartographic knowledge of Southeast Asia is exemplified by the map of al-Idrīsī, made between 1154 and 1192, which shows the archipelago as a random assortment of blobs.) These ‘para-geographies’ of Southeast Asia were usually included in treatises on India (al-Hind), China (al-Ṣīn) or Sri Lanka (al-Sarandib). One example is al-Ramhurmūzī’s ‘Ajā’ib al-hind (The Wonders of India, compiled c.1000).1 Such works often described Southeast Asia as a unitary region under the cultural influence of India. It is perhaps for this reason that dispatches sent from the court of Ala al-Din Riayat Shah al-Qahar of Aceh (r.1540–67) to the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman (r.1520–65) were long filed – and long lost – among the correspondence from India (Farooqi 1986: 267).

In a similar manner classical Chinese texts delineated Southeast Asia as a distinct (if somewhat mythical) region under the influence of Indianized civilization (Coedès 1968: 9). At the same time though Southeast Asians conceived of an overarching geographical unity for their domains, often terming them ‘the lands below the winds’ due to the monsoons that swept across them (Reid 1988, 1993c). For example, in 1612, Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh (r.1607–36) described himself in a letter to King James I of England as ‘the lord in power here below the winds who holds the throne of Aceh and Samudra and all the countries adjacent’ (see Schrieke 1957: 254–55).

The Islamization of the lands below the winds should be seen as a process of negotiation between rulers, their subjects (consisting both of local and foreign peoples), and Islamic scholars; the ‘ulamā’ . It seems likely that international trade reinforced the conversion process, though it would be a
mistake to see trade itself as the sole mechanism or rationale behind con-
version itself. After all, Muslim traders – including Arabs, Indians, and
Persians – had probably lived in the archipelago since the early years of Islam.
Furthermore, as Southeast Asian waters facilitated the trade between India
and China (where there was an established Muslim presence in Canton
from the ninth century) there is some evidence of the involvement of Chinese
Muslims in the process. Perhaps there was even an additional impulse from
Muslim communities in Champa (present-day Southern Vietnam), a kingdom
with a long history of connections with Java, and remembered in the Javanese
epics as the homeland of the first Muslims on that island (De Graaf and
Pigeaud 1976: 5).

Some of the earliest outside visions of Southeast Asia’s Islamization are
found in the observations of Marco Polo (1254–1324), who visited the region
in 1292, and Ibn Batūṭa (1304–77), who followed him in 1345–46. Both
observed Islamic centres surrounded by as yet unconverted kingdoms. Monta-
tana (1997) believes that the first evidence which backs up their observations
is to be found in the tomb stone, seemingly dated 1211, of Sultan Sulaiman
bin Abdullah al-Basir at Lamuri on the northern tip of Sumatra. Harder
proof of the gradual Islamization of the island is to be seen in the stone of
Sultan Malik al-Salih of Samudra (Pasai), dated 1297, and in the coinage
of his successors (Schrieke 1957: 233–34; Drewes 1968: 436–50; Reid 1993c:
100). Further Islamization was observed in the sixteenth century, when the
Portuguese apothecary Tomé Pires (c.1468–c.1540) described the ongoing
process of sultans and rajas asserting their control over the once animistic or
Indianized archipelago (see Cortesão 1944).

At times Southeast Asian Muslims may have felt an orientation to the wider
community of believers and at others more specifically to their own rulers.
Perhaps many of the peoples of Southeast Asia first joined the Muslim
world in a process Levtzion (1979: 19) – following Knock (1930) – calls
‘adhesion’. Hereby a people accepts Islam yet does not adhere absolutely
to its prescriptions. Southeast Asian adhesion may have taken the form of
forsaking pork, widely consumed in traditional Austronesian societies; the
destruction of idols; cutting men’s hair short; circumcision; and the adoption
of Arabo–Islamic names (Reid 1993c: 141–43; Azra 1999a: 51). In such cases
the behaviour of the monarch would have set the standard to be followed. But
once this adhesion occurred, Muslim communities began the slow process of
incorporation within the fold of religious orthodoxy. This incorporation
could have been through the media of translations of Arabic manuals for
converts (Drewes 1978), or indeed by the further active support of rulers
(Ricklefs 1979; Reid 1993c; Azra 1999a: 68). Such would have served to more
deply implant an Islam defined by the centre above the winds.

Ongoing conversion in the archipelago was also a process driven primarily
by local peoples, as in West Africa and East Bengal. Levtzion (1979: 207) has
proposed that Islamization in West Africa proceeded as a ripple through a
chain of different peoples and vernacular languages. Similarly the conversion
myths of several ‘Indonesian’ states, whilst emphasizing a divine connection
between the Prophet and local ruler, or the role of Indian and Arab divines,
hint at the transmission of Islam within the archipelago by local Muslim
peoples (see Jones 1979). And unlike in the Fertile Crescent or Mediterranean
World, the Islamization of Southeast Asia did not accompany an Arabic
conquest and was not identified with the acceptance of Arabic culture (see
Levtzion and Voll 1987; Azra 1999a). This is not to say that Islam was never
spread in the peripheries by conquest, as the wars of the West African Jihādist
states of the nineteenth century (Levtzion 1987) or the forced conversion
of the Buginese by the Makassarese in 1610 demonstrate (Reid 1993c: 150).
Neither should the vernacular spread of Islam suggest that the Qurānic and
Arabic sciences were not adopted by an emerging body of local ʿulamāʾ.
Rather the civilizational models of West Asia began the same process of
assimilation undergone by all peoples in the Muslim world (Goldziher 1981;

These increasingly Muslim ‘lands below the winds’ had long been known
to Arabic speakers as either jāwa, a synecdoche for Southeast Asia derived
from the insular toponym ‘Java’, or the bilād al-jāwa (The lands of ‘the Jawa’
people collectively). In a similar manner the Chinese and their homeland
were known as al-Sīn and Indians al-Hind. And when Marco Polo visited
Southeast Asia in 1291, he called Sumatra ‘Java Minora’ (Coedès 1968: 203).
I would suggest that this most likely reflected the usage of the Muslim crew of
the vessel on which he sailed. Certainly such terminology also finds an echo in
the writings of both Chinese visitors (Reid 2001: 297) and later European
travellers. Tomé Pires, following ‘Moorish charts’, called the Eastern islands
of Indonesia ‘the Javas’ (Cortesão 1944: lxxxi) and an English sailor, Ralph
Fitch, used the same term for the entire archipelago (c. 1591) (Schrieke 1957:
259).

Further, among Arabic speakers, individual Southeast Asians and
Southeast Asian products were referred to adjectivally as jāwī, as distinct from
things Indian (hindī) or Chinese (sīnī). It was for this reason that when
Ibn Baṭṭūṭa landed in Sumatra he remarked that the island was the source of
benzoin, known as lubān jāwī; that is ‘Jawi incense’ (Tibbetts 1979: 64). On the
basis of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s statement, Roolvink (1975) has identified the toponym
Jawa with the ancient empire of Śrīvijaya. But in all likelihood Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s
usage simply reflects the ambiguity in Arabic describing Southeast Asia and
Java as geographic entities.

As a term applied wholesale by outsiders ‘Jawa’ itself was not initially used
by Southeast Asian peoples to denote their home world below the winds, or
indeed themselves in a wider sense. The use of the word could only cause
confusion given that it signified the island Java in both Malay and Javanese.
Indeed, when Prapañca, poet laureate to King Ayam Wuruk of Majapahit
(r.1350–89), composed the Nāgarakṛtāgama in 1365, he differentiated ‘the
land of Java’ (Yawabhūmi) from the rest of the archipelago (Supomo 1979: 73–74). If a Southeast Asian visiting Yemen or the Hijaz acknowledged that he was, like the famous incense, Jawi, he would not have been claiming any connection with the princely court of Majapahit. Rather he would have been affirming a relationship with the ecumene viewed by outsiders – whether West Asian, Chinese or European – as unitary. Still, it was an ecumene that others could join if they became Muslims, much as it has become possible to speak of becoming a Malay by converting to Islam, although I would suggest that, as a meta-ethnic term, Malayness has devolved from an older sense of Jawiness.² Indeed, in his discussion of the term Melayu, Reid (2001: 299) has put forward evidence that I believe points to a process by which foreigners within the archipelago could mix in and become Jawi – whether their parents were Javanese, Chinese or Arab. This ascription remained well into the twentieth century, when the locally-born children of Indian Muslims in Singapore were known as the jawi peranakan.

External ascription or birth alone were not the only significations of being jawi. Although the Acehnese scholar ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf al-Sinkīlī (c.1615–c.93), who spent nineteen years in Arabia (1642–61), was often specified – like his predecessors Ḥamza al-Faṁṣūrī and Shams al-Dīn of Pasai (d.1630) – as being of the people of Pansur (al-Faṁṣūr) and further a Jawi person (Jawī); he defined another part of his identity as jawī. This was the language in which he wrote, being Malay in the Arabic script, the Sumatran Jawi language (al-lughat al-jawīya al-samatra’īya) (Snouck Hurgronje 1906: II, 19, 129 n. 2).³

But Malay, known locally as bahasa jawi, was not merely confined to Sumatra. As the lingua franca of the archipelago, it was also the natural vehicle for the spread of Islam. Hence Shams al-Dīn, writing in his Mir’at al-mu’min (The Mirror of the Believer, 1601), had declared that he had written his work ‘in the Jawi language (dengan bahasa jawi) in order to render words of theology (perkataan usul al-din) for those people who do not understand Arabic or Farsi’ (quoted in Werndly 1736: ii). Malay as the key Jawi language of Southeast Asia also made an impression on many Western travellers. These included Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605–89), who was told once in Isfahan that the languages of the cultured world included:

Latin, Greek, High-German, English, Dutch, Italian, Portuguese, Persian, Arabic, Indian (sic), Syriac and Malay . . . which is the language of educated people, from the flooding Indus to China and Japan, and in most of the Eastern isles, much like Latin in our Europe.

(quoted by Werndly 1736: xxxvii)

Francois Valentijn also paid tribute to this same fact when he wrote c.1725 that Malay could be understood ‘from Persia to the Philippines’
Malay was thus imagined by outsiders, both Western and Muslim, as the language of educated people in an archipelago united by an Indic tradition that had accommodated the recent advent of Islam.

The consequent usage of an ascriptive nomenclature based on common appearance, geography, and use of a lingua franca is by no means unique to Southeast Asia or the Muslim world. People in West Asia made much the same assumptions about the Franks (al-Ifranj) as the Europeans did for the ‘Saracens’. This process of cultural blurring can also be seen in John Lewis Burckhardt’s (1784–1817) observations regarding West African Muslims arriving at the Red Sea coast in the early part of the nineteenth century.

[W]e had with us eighteen or twenty Takayrna, or Negro pilgrims. Takruri, the singular of this name, is not derived from a country called ‘Takrur,’ as is generally supposed in the East, and which has misled all the Arabian geographers, but from the verb takarrur, to multiply, renew, to sift, to purify, to invigorate, i.e. their religious sentiments, by the study of the sacred book, and by the pilgrimage. The appellation is bestowed on all Negroes who come [from the] west . . . [despite the fact that] they do not call themselves by this name of Takruri, which many assured me they had not heard of till they reached the limits of Darfur.4

If the peoples of the Hijaz imagined that the Takrūrī came from the land of Takrūr, then, as I have noted above, the Malay-speaking Jawa were just as readily imagined to have come from a unitary land. Once abroad then, and like the Takayrna, the Jawa resorted to a cultural definition imposed on them by others, whether subject of Sultan Agung of Java or Sultan Mahmud Shah of Melaka (r.1488–1511).

Whilst the Jawi kingdoms – and there were many – had a long heritage as a unitary region with strong local traditions (cf. Reid 1988 etc.), perceptions of Islamic orthodoxy among the Jawa were nevertheless tied to West Asian models; especially in terms of script, language, and regal terminology. Johns (1988: 260–61) has shown that the great Ḥamza al-Fānsūrī demonstrated remarkable fluency and adaptability with his use of Arabic in his mystical poetry. Schrieke (1957: 24, 54), when speaking of Aceh in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, observed that official correspondence with foreign states was conducted in Arabic as well as Malay. And in Aceh in 1602, Sir James Lancaster noted that the ‘chiefe bishope’ of that city, perhaps Shams al-Dīn Pasai, spoke with another nobleman in ‘the Arabicke tongue’ (see Ito 1984: 250 f.; Azra 1992: 348). Still, this does not mean that many Southeast Asians were as fluent in Arabic as Ḥamza al-Fānsūrī or Shams al-Dīn. Indeed a contemporary letter, sent from the court of Banten to
James I in October 1605, exhibits Arabic that is far from correct, if comprehensible (see Gallop n.d.: 22).

Tomé Pires had already watched as the web of these Jawi sultanates adopted the calligraphy, literary traditions, and titles of Islamic statecraft. The most common title assumed was that of sultan (Ar. sultān) (Cortesão 1944). According to classical Islamic political theory, the office of the sultanate (Ar. saltāna) is confirmed by the Caliph (Ar. Khalīfa), he being the ‘successor’ to the Prophet as head of the Muslim community (ummat al-islām) (see Lambton 1981). In return the sultans, as the real power in the Muslim lands, pledged an oath of allegiance (bay’a) to the Caliph. This had evolved from the days of the earliest Caliphs whereby the Muslims were required to give their personal pledge to Muhammad’s successors (Madelung 1998). However not all Southeast Asian rulers followed the lead of Sultans Sulaiman of Lamuri or Malik al-Salih of Pasai; Tomé Pires indicates that the rank of sultan was generally accorded to major kings with their lesser neighbours taking the older Indic form raja (Cortesão 1944: 214). Fewer still went to the trouble of pledging allegiance to a distant Caliph. Indeed, given that most Southeast Asian courts were Islamized well after the murder of the last Abbāsid Caliph of Baghdad at the hands of the Mongols in 1258, it is not surprising that the Caliph did not loom large in Southeast Asia. The Portuguese seizure of Malacca in 1511 even saw the vanquished Sultan Mahmud direct complaints to his suzerain in Peking rather than the Ottoman Sultan (Cortesão 1944: xxxviii–xlv).

Azra (1999a: 91–92) suggests that the use of such titles as Sultan and Caliph, as well as in some cases terming Jawi sultanates Islamic territory (dār al-islām), symbolized the commitment of Jawi sovereigns to a wider Muslim world. Yet this was a world without a clear political centre. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was generally little mutual interest in the caliphate, or indeed in political unity among the Muslims of Southeast Asia. The continuing rivalries of the great Sultans of Turkey, India and Persia were mirrored by the contests between the sovereigns of Aceh, Banten and Mataram. Of course Southeast Asia’s rulers knew about the Ottomans; the ‘Raja Rum’ is often mentioned in the Malay epics (hikayat). Three Acehnese sultans of the sixteenth century – Ala al-Din Riayat Shah al-Qahar (r.1537–71), Mansur Shah (r.1577–88) and Ala al-Din Riayat Shah (r.1588–1604) – even addressed the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman (r.1520–65) as Caliph in official correspondence, although they were seeking aid as much as recognition. And whilst they placed great store in their relationship with Rum, this did not stop them also taking the title of Caliph, or caliphal epithets, for domestic consumption (see Farooqi 1986: 267; Azra 1992: 110–15). By way of further regional comparison, we may note that in the following century Abd al-Qadir of Banten (r.1626–51) and Agung of Mataram (r.1613–46) sent emissaries to Mecca, in 1638 and 1639 respectively. However, this was to gain symbols of investiture from the Sharīf as descendant of the Prophet and
Ruler (Amīr) of Mecca. It was far more important, for these rulers at least, to connect with the legitimacy of the descendants of the Prophet than to pledge themselves as vassals to the Ottoman state with the hope of gaining an edge over the Portuguese, or their own local rivals.

As in West Asia, Southeast Asian rulers were often styled ‘God’s shadow on earth’ (Lambton 1981: 121; Milner 1981, 1983: 34–39) with their inviolability enshrined in court texts (Santoso 1971: 16; Raja Ali Haji 1982), or the palace architecture that separated them from the populace (Reid 1993c: 82–83). Yet whereas a sultan may once have relied on the spiritual legitimacy of a connection with Mecca and the counsel of key ‘ulamā’, in the emerging colonial context the European interlopers needed to be considered. The pattern was first set in places like the spice-producing sultanates of Maluku in the sixteenth century, where local rulers were forced to balance the ‘advice’ of a European ally or ‘older brother’ against that of the ‘ulamā.

Given the rise of European influence in Southeast Asia, Schrieke (1957: 230–67) argued that Islamization began to take the form of a race for conversion with Christianity. The principle of broad oppositional sentiment is found in a history written by Raja Ali Haji of Riau, who has the Malays referring to the Malaccan allies of the Dutch as kaun nasrani (‘the Nazarenes’ or ‘Christians’) (Raja Ali Haji 1982: 108). Furthermore several Southeast Asian terms for the Portuguese or for Europeans in general – in Thai (farang), Burmese (barang), and Malay (feringgi) – all derive from the Arabic word for the Franks (al-ifranj) (Reid 1994: 281). Such polarization between Christianity and Islam could only reinforce the ongoing generation of the idea of a wider Muslim ecumene.

The impression of the ‘lands of the Jawa’ (bilād al-jāwa) as a distinctly Muslim ecumene was also reinforced by the interaction in Mecca and Medina of significant numbers of Jawi ‘ulamā’. They included the aforementioned ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf and Shams al-Dīn. This heightened awareness is underlined in the seventeenth century by a number of important works composed in Medina by one of the teachers of ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf. These were the treatises addressed to a Jawi audience by Ibrāhīm bin Ḥasan al-Kūrānī (1616–90), a disciple of Ahmad al-Qusṭashī (1583–1661), the head of the Shatṭariya order. Al-Kūrānī’s Jawi-focussed works included the Masā’il al-jāwīya (The Jawi Questions); the Jawābāt al-ghirāwiyya ‘an al-masā’il al-jāwīya al-jahrīya (The Binding Answers to the Spoken Jawi Questions); and his commentary on the popular al-Tuhfa al-mursalā ilā rūḥ al-nabī (The Gift Addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet) (Azra 1992: 260–61; Johns 1995: 178). This last work was composed by another Indian scholar, Muhammad ibn Fadl Allāh al-Burhānpūrī (d. 1620). Based on evidence in al-Burhānpūrī’s Fawā’id al-irtihāl wa al-safar (The Benefits of Journeying and Travel), and in al-Kūrānī’s commentary itself – the Ithāf al-dhakī bi sharḥ al-tuhfa al-mursalā ilā al-nabī (The Presentation of the Clever Man on the Gift Addressed to the
Prophet) – this was a work composed specifically for those Jawa who read the Tuhfa and who debated its meaning. These Southeast Asian readers were variously described as ‘some of our Jawi fellows’ (ba‘d ašhābinā al-jāwīyīn), ‘a group of Jawi people’ (jamā‘at al-jāwīyīn), or the ‘people’ (ahl) of ‘the lands of Southeast Asia’ (bilād Jāwa) (see Azra 1999b: 667–68).

Through their continuing tradition of interaction with the scholars resident in Arabia, the Jawa inhabiting the scattered sultanates below the winds existed as a category within the Muslim world alongside their co-believers from the more established ecumenes of Central Asia, North Africa, and India. Given the long process of Islamization in the bilād al-jāwa, it is a central aim of this book to determine the origin and parallel process by which, in the twentieth century, a jawi person might adopt a new corporate distinction with reference to both the Dutch colonizers and his or her fellow Muslims from the emergent nation-states of Turkey, the Hijaz and Egypt.

The ecumene underlined by networks of Jawi ‘ulamā’ and texts

The first evidence of Islamization in Southeast Asia is, as we have seen, shown by the existence of Muslim rulers. However they were but one source of authority in Islamic societies. Beside them, the ‘ulamā’ have always played a leadership role. They are the recognized authorities on religious practice whilst rulers are the enforcers of Islamic norms (Hourani 1991: 113–15, 133). This symbiosis was manifested in the many cities of the archipelago where the principal mosque often abutted the enclosure of the palace (Reid 1993c: 82–85). Indeed many rulers were often at pains to seek Islamic legitimacy for their actions and attract ‘ulamā’ to their courts. With this affirmation of Islam as the religion of state the ‘ulamā’ emerged as an elite in the societies of the archipelago. Further they were often empowered to issue religious orders and even direct policy, as did the Indian-born Nūr al-Dīn al-Rānirī (d.1656) when in Aceh from 1637 under the patronage of Sultan Iskandar II (r.1636–41) (Snouck Hurgronje 1906: I, 4, 7). Their pervasive power is also demonstrated by the fact that in Java ten years later, Sultan Agung’s successor, Amangkurat I (r.1646–77), felt obliged to massacre a large body of the ‘ulamā’, and their families, in order to retain control over his kingdom.6

Nevertheless, the ‘ulamā’ are also advised by ḥadīth to keep their distance from their overlords. One report relates that ‘The worst of scholars is he who visits princes’ (Robinson 1986: 11). But if they were advised to keep their distance from ‘God’s shadows’, the ‘ulamā’ could still supplant them in times of emergency; as did the Acehnese ‘ālim Teungku di Tiro (Shaykh Samman, 1836–91), when he helped lead resistance against the Dutch after the collapse of the sultanate in 1874. One Acehnese epic, the Hikayat Prang Sabil (The Epic of Holy War), even presented Teungku di Tiro as Muḥammad’s representative on Earth who could thus claim the authority of the Sunna as
one of ‘those in authority’ deserving the obedience of the faithful (Alfian 1992: 41; Qurʾān 4: 59).

If the ‘ulamāʾ’ are the class respected by kings and resorted to by the people in times of emergency, this also highlights the everyday importance they hold in times of peace as they communicate Islamic knowledge to their ecumene. The ‘ulamāʾ’ are the very glue binding the Muslim world together, being concerned with enhancing and communicating Islamic knowledge, beginning in the mosques and Qurʾānic schools of their own regions and perhaps culminating at the key ‘universities’ of Islam like Mecca’s Masjid al-Ḥarām or Cairo’s al-Azhar. At all such centres individual students were free to join or leave the circles of the various teachers. Indeed traditional education, which lacked formal classes divided by age or reading ability, emphasized the personal relationship between teacher and student. A student would copy the work taught by his master, often filling in the voweling to aid in its recitation. (It is important to remember that most texts were intended to be read aloud.) Permission to transmit that knowledge, the ijāza, – recounting the chain of permissions connecting the reciter to the original author – was granted only after evidence of its faithful recitation (cf. Messick 1993: 26–27).

Students would often travel to be with a particular teacher to gain mastery of a key text or facet of learning, such as grammar (nahw), jurisprudence (fiqh) or mysticism (taṣawwuf). Muslim tradition emphasizes the importance of travel in the search for knowledge, and often an ‘ālim is only considered truly learned if he has left his own domicile. Jawi examples of such scholarly peregrinations are established practice. In the seventeenth century Banten held a special place in Southeast Asian Islam under the guidance of a Jawi outsider, the Sulawesi-born Yusuf al-Maqassārī (1627–99) (Azra 1992: 416–447). At that time too, Aceh – long famous as ‘the verandah of Mecca’ (serambi Mekka) – continued to attract scholars from the wider Malay world and the Indian Ocean. In the 1630s that state was even the site of famous controversies regarding the mystical writings of Ḥamza al-Fanṣūrī and Shams al-Dīn, when Nūr al-Dīn al-Rānīrī sought to root out teachings he believed propagated the controversial doctrine of the Unity of Being between God and man. Under the sultan’s protection, al-Rānīrī saw to it that their works were committed to the flames, their followers executed, and that the Sunni tradition as interpreted by al-Ghazālī (1058–111) was reasserted.

With the decline of regional powers like Banten and Aceh, other centres assumed their places as scholarly metropoles. Both Riau and Patani were especially famous in the nineteenth century (Raja Ali Haji 1982; Matheson and Hooker 1988). Furthermore, the impulse to travel in search of knowledge remained. For example, van Ronkel (1942: 316) noted in the twentieth century how Sundanese, from the Priangan in West Java, would often journey to Central Java to study jurisprudence and then on to the island of Madura for advanced grammar. After extended periods of study and teaching in such
centres, often using distinctive Malay and Javanese interlinear translations of Arabic works, many elite (and well funded) students would – in the footsteps of ‘Abd al-Ra‘ūf al-Sinkilī and Yūsuf al-Maqqasārī – make the scholarly pilgrimage to the Hijaz. Here they would connect with the Muslim world in its broadest form through the didactic system that did not differ greatly in form from that of their own ecumene, save in terms of the methodology by which elementary students acquired a knowledge of Arabic.

I have already remarked on the potential for creating a united vision of a Jawi ecumene abroad. But one should not lose sight of the fact that such visions would also be experienced in tandem with the idea that the Jawi ecumene formed a component of the wider Muslim world. From the time Southeast Asians first ventured to the Central Lands of Islam, Jawi ‘ulamā’, with personal experience of these lands above the winds continued to return home to assert more orthodox modes of their faith, establishing their own circles in their local mosques. And by their teaching and example, the Muslims of the bilād al-jāwa were made more aware that their heritage lay in Cairo, Baghdad, and Medina as much as in Melaka, Pasai, and Demak.

It is clear then that an active scholarly tradition lay at the core of the relationship between the Muslim students of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. As an aspect of the increasing pace of Islamization, many of the texts they used were increasingly concerned with jurisprudence – although these tended to coexist with mystical teachings. Indeed many authors of manuals of fiqh were themselves mystics. Nonetheless, the importance of jurisprudence should not be understated. Sunnī Muslims follow one of four juridical schools (madhāhib sg. madhhāb) for guidance in understanding the religious law (Sharī’a) and the Sunna. Both bodies of knowledge – juridical and normative – ultimately trace their inspiration to the Qur’ān. Yet the revealed text of Islam is not universally comprehensible, although it evokes very similar and intense emotional reactions from Muslims in every part of the world. The Qur’ān remains a text requiring explication for all believers – including native speakers of Arabic. And whilst the Qur’ān is the symbol of Islamic textual unity, the scholarly works of exegesis written, translated, and expounded upon by the ‘ulamā’, supply another thread of continuity for the believers of various regions and juridical schools. In the key regions of interest in my discussion: Southeast Asia, Hadramaut, the Hijaz and Egypt, the Shāfi‘ī madhhāb predominated – although there is evidence that Southeast Asian Islam was perhaps once more heterogenous in sectarian terms (see Wieringa 1996). Once increasing numbers of Jawi scholars encountered life in Mecca, where the Sharīf himself was a Shāfi‘ī, and where that madhhāb enjoyed the greatest popular support, many Southeast Asians may have actively chosen to follow its recommendations. In any case, with the intensification of links with Arabia, it was this very Shāfi‘ī commonality that would continue to facilitate the movement of scholars via such centres as Banten in Java, Aceh in Sumatra, or Zabid in Yemen.
As we have seen, from the sixteenth century, the Jawi participants within this global system – al-Kūrānī’s ‘Jawi fellows’ – began to form a distinct community in the Hijaz. From the seventeenth century, manuals of Shāfī‘ī jurisprudence began to make their appearance in the languages of the bilād al-jāwa. These manuals were often composed by the same scholars who had sat in the circles of al-Qushāshī and al-Kūrānī or who traced their intellectual heritage back to those circles. They included ‘Abd al-Ra‘ūf al-Sinkilī, Yūsuf al-Maqqassārī and ‘Abd al-Ṣāмad al-Fālimbānī (1704–c. 1789) (cf. Azra 1999b: 670). And despite their separation from the lands below the winds, in the nineteenth century, this expatriate community, with its core of respected teachers and long-term residents (known as the Muqīmūn, Mal. Jawi Mukim), remained the authoritative centre of the Jawi scholarly ecumene. Over time this community would grow and diversify. By the 1850s, the Jawi ecumene was led in Mecca by men from such diverse parts of the archipelago as ‘Abd al-Ghānī Bīmā of Sumbawa, Ahmad Khaṭīb Sambās of Borneo (1802–72) and Ismā‘īl al-Minankabawī of West Sumatra.

Until the rise to prominence in the 1870s of scholars from West Java, and principally from the former sultanate of Banten (cf. Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 215ff.), the Jawi community of Mecca was largely guided by Malay-language scholarship. The specifically Southeast Asian works produced by this scholarship were known, not surprisingly, as kitāb jawi. And although in Arabic kitāb simply means ‘book’, in Malay the term often implies a religious text. And whilst it should not be forgotten that Javanese was an important language for the dissemination of Islam, particularly in the islands within its cultural orbit, it is noteworthy that, until the beginning of the twentieth century, the corpus of Malay and Javanese literatures were, to an extent, complementary. Locally composed Javanese works often concentrated on theology whilst Malay kitāb were devoted to jurisprudence (fiqh) (Proudfoot and Hooker 1996: 59–60).

This was the situation when the Dutch orientalist Snouck Hurgronje visited the Hijaz in 1884. At that time he had dealings with a Jawi teacher called Ahmad, then Imam to the Sultan of Bacan (in Maluku; see fig. 1). This Imam Ahmad supplied Snouck Hurgronje with a list of the works he said were ‘read by the peoples below the winds’ (Ini nama-nama kitab yang dibaca oleh orang yang di bawah angin). He specified these lands as ‘the polities of Ternate, Tidore, and Bacan’ (yaitu negeri Ternate dan Tidore dan Bacan) and the list he compiled represents a continuum in the kitāb jawi tradition that focussed primarily on fiqh. For the sake of explanation, most of the list may be reordered and divided into three categories: the first being the standard Arabic works of jurisprudence; the second, those works produced with a Jawi audience; and the third being redactions of works by Jawi ulama, largely from the Malay-speaking lands.7

So it was that Imam Ahmad listed many standard works. These included the Muharrar (Writings), a compilation of three of al-Ghazālī’s works on
fiqh assembled by al-Rāfi‘ī (d.1226) (Juynboll 1930: 374); the *Unm al-barāhīn* (*The Mother of Signs*), a book on dogma by Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad bin Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d.1490) (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 194, 286); *al-Masā’il al-sittīn* (*The Sixty Questions*), a book of basic doctrine by Abū ‘l-‘Abbās Aḥmad al-Miṣrī (d.1415) (van Bruinessen 1990: 249); and al-Malaybarī’s exegesis of the Qur’ān, the *Fath al-mu’īn* (*The Victory of the Helper*, composed c.1567).8

Of the works written primarily for a Jawi audience, Imam Ahmad included the *Ṣīrāt al-mustaqīm* (*The Straight Path*), a Malay compendium on Shāfī‘ī fiqh compiled by al-Rānirī (Snouck Hurgronje 1906: II, 5; see fig. 2). Then there was the *Safīnāt al-najā* (*The Vessel of Salvation*), a work of fiqh attributable to another Hadrami, Sālim bin ‘Abd Allāh bin Sumayr (d.1854).9 Ibn Sumayr had arrived in the Indies in 1851 and, like his predecessor al-Rānirī, he had conducted a rigorous crusade against the local branches of the mystical orders – particularly the Naqshbandiyya (van den Berg 1886: 168–69; Azra 1995: 9). Imam Ahmad also referred to a work entitled simply

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8 Figure 1 ‘Pilger aus Batjan (Malukken): Sohn des Sultans, Oheim des Prinsen und ein Priester.’ Taken from the proofs for the albums of C. Snouck Hurgronje (1888–89), no. XXXI. (NINO 2.65)
the Tuhfa. This was perhaps a reference to the widely read Malay and Javanese renderings of the Tuhfa of al-Burhānpurī, so avidly discussed by the Jawa in the seventeenth century (see above). However it may well have been a work of either the first or second category: namely the Tuhfa of Ibn Ḥajar al-Ḥaytamī (1504–67) or the Tuhfat al-muḥtaḥ ilā sharḥ al-minhāj. The first is a standard Arabic work of fiqh still widely cited in Southeast Asia whilst the second, written by yet another Hadrami, ʿUthmān bin ʿAbd Allāh bin ʿAqīl of Batavia (1822–1913; see Chapter 4), was a commentary on the great Nawāwī’s (d.1277–78) Minhāj al-tālibīn (The Seekers’ Plan).

Still, many of the books cited by Imam Ahmad are from the indigenous Jawi tradition. These include ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Sinkīlī’s Mirʾat at-tullāb (The Mirror of the Students). This was a Malay rendering of al-Anṣārī’s Fath al-wahhāb (The Victory of the Giver) which was intended as a counterpart to al-Rānirī’s Sirāt. However this was not the first Malay work mentioned by Imam Ahmad. That was a book called al-Durr al-thamīn (The Precious Pearl), though it is uncertain as to whom the honour should go. Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 286–87) indicates that a work of this name, composed by Muḥammad Naḥī al-Banjārī (b.1735) in 1786, was then extremely popular in the Hijaz. Al-Banjārī’s works had even enjoyed the distinction of being banned by the Dutch due to his anti-colonial activities (Azra 1992: 512). Still, the popularity...
of his *Durr al-nafīs* in the 1880s was most likely engendered through its being printed on the nascent Meccan press supervised by the Jawi scholar Ahmad bin Muhammad Zayn’s grandfather, Dā‘ūd bin ‘Abd Allāh bin Idrīs al-Faṭānī (c. 1740–c. 1845). The latter scholar had lived in Mecca between 1809 and 1843, and had composed his *Durr al-thamīn* there in 1816 (see Winstedt 1969: 153). Indeed Dā‘ūd bin ‘Abd Allāh al-Faṭānī is the most prominent Jawi author to feature in Imam Ahmad’s list, as the composer of two other works of *fiqh*: the *Fara‘id ghāyat al-taqrīb fī al-īrth wa al-tansīb* (*The Duties with Respect to Inheritance and Attribution*) and the *Idāh al-bāb li mūrid al-nikāh bi al-ṣawāb* (*An Elucidation of the Passage for Whom Desires Valid Marriage*). His grandson is also mentioned, with Ahmad bin Muhammad Zayn’s *Masā’il al-muhtadī li ikhwān al-mubtadī* (*Questions of the Guided One to the Brothers of the Novice*, Mecca 1884) taking its place in the Jawi corpus.


It is somewhat surprising to find that Imam Ahmad made a point of noting that some works, including al-Ghazālī’s classic *Ihyā‘ ulūm al-dīn* (*The Revival of the Religious Sciences*) were rare. This text, which represents an accommodation between inner mystical knowledge and normative piety, is still regarded by many as one of the most influential works of Islam. Jawi translations by al-Fālimbānī and Dā‘ūd al-Faṭānī had been available since 1789 and 1824 respectively (Winstedt 1969: 152–53). Nevertheless, as we have seen above, the learning of al-Ghazālī was represented in Imam Ahmad’s list with the *Muharrar* and *Hidāya*.

Of course Imam Ahmad’s list should not be taken as being a comprehensive survey but rather it is indicative of the type of works favoured below the winds. Johns (1997: 8) has remarked that the Jawi ‘ulamā‘ responsible for these redactions had no desire to augment the texts they presented but were rather concerned with the wider transmission, preservation, and representation of knowledge. Van Bruinessen (1990: 276) even regards the later Bantenese scholar Nawāwī (see below) as ‘a populizer of, rather than a contributor to, learned discourse’. Nevertheless there is nothing distinctively Jawi about this attitude, and Azra (1992), echoing the work of Voll, argues that the life and works of these scholars represent a conscious effort, stemming from Mecca and Medina in the eighteenth century, to reinvigorate Islam throughout the whole Muslim world.
Bowen (1993: 7) stresses that such a reinvigoration was ‘through the media of historically specific languages, idioms and institutions’. Yet change was in the air in the 1880s. When Snouck Hurgronje visited the Hijaz there were an increasing number of scholars who argued that the centrality of Arabic scholarship needed to be reasserted over unorthodox indigenous interpretations of Islamic knowledge. Indeed one key scholar, Muḥammad Nawāwī (or Nawawī) bin ʿUmar al-Jāwī al-Bāntinī (1813–97) marks a distinct break in the tradition of nineteenth century jawi activity in Mecca, and a return to the example of Yūsuf al-Maqassārī, as he wrote in Arabic. Nevertheless his works – like those of al-Maqassārī – were targeted at a Jawi audience (cf. Johns 1965: 19). Furthermore, more and more Jawa were adopting the Meccan methodology for Arabic instruction, either in the Holy City, or at key centres like Semarang and Surabaya, where returned Jawa or Hadrami ‘ulamā’ like Bin Sumayr were increasingly active (see van den Berg 1886; Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 265).

This shift to greater fluency in Arabic appears to signal a desire among many Jawa to get to the heart of their faith. Nevertheless, and despite becoming more available through the increasing use of print technologies, the works of men like Nawāwī – mostly printed in Cairo – would still only have been fully accessible to the most advanced students. Malay was by no means dead as a language of instruction. There was even a bloom in Malay publishing in Mecca with the establishment there in 1884 of a printing press that issued a proportionately large number of Malay works in its first year (twelve in all). This was most likely due to its being under the supervision of a Patani Malay. Still, the sort of Malay books that he saw to the presses were perhaps changed in the process. Whereas the older manuscript tradition allowed for great individual variety in orthography and presentation, the printing press must have seen a shift to the greater standardization of fonts. In this form of redaction then the distinctly Jawi cursive version of the Arabic script would have blended with that of the Arabic text it elucidated.

Of course Arabic has never been Southeast Asia’s lingua franca. That role was still performed by Malay. I would suggest that, in the lands below the winds, the kitab jawi continued, for the moment, to serve as a means of symbolizing the ecumene’s common Malayo–Islamic tradition, representing in turn the unity of Islam as a revealed religion and an expression of a Jawi identity. They were indeed the books ‘read by the peoples below the winds’, and not just Imam Ahmad’s home islands of Maluku. I would furthermore suggest that, in the case of Indonesia, this traditional Jawi textual network prefigures Anderson’s model of national imagining bounded by colonial print-capitalism. For whereas Anderson concentrates on the role of the newspaper in creating the very ‘imagined’ aspect of communality, the scholarly texts of Islam, tailored to suit the specific needs of their target audiences, continue to serve a similar role in binding both the Muslim world as a whole and its component ecumenes. They do to this day. Still, there was not quite the
immediacy of newsprint. As we have seen, for these texts to serve such a function they required an educated readership and a body of qualified interpreters.

We have already seen that the Mecca-based Jawi ‘ulamā’ were concerned with jurisprudence, demonstrating a desire to assert the Greater Tradition of Islam over indigenous practices in their homelands (cf. Azra 1992). Indeed these ‘ulamā’ were the practical arbiters of the Sharī’a for their distant countrymen. Letters thus came from every part of the Jawi ecumene where local ‘ulamā’ had already tried to resolve matters of import and either felt unqualified to give a juridical opinion (fatwā pl. fatāwā) or sought confirmation (tashīḥ) of one already issued (Kaptein 1997b). In his report of 18 December 1882, the Dutch consul in Jeddah listed several of these deliveries and their couriers. They included ‘Saëed and Joesoef Katan with letters for the oelama of Mecca from the panghoeeloes of Batavia; [and] Mohamed Said Mehebat and Sjech Abdul Wahab with letters as per above from Semarang’.12

One result of such letters can be seen in a novel sort of Jawi-oriented text, the *Muhimmāt al-nafā’is fī bayān as’ilat al-ḥadīth* (The Precious Gems Expounding Questions of the Day). This was a compendium of fatāwā produced in Arabic and Malay. It was first published in Mecca in 1892 and remained in print until the 1920s or 1930s (Kaptein 1997: 17). That it remained available for so long is a testament to the continuing relevance of issues resolved by ‘ulamā’ consulted in the 1870s and 1880s. In many respects though it is a transitional text, appearing in the space between the old laborious process of writing to the ‘ulamā’ of Mecca, and the twentieth century phenomenon of the Islamic journal, when readers wrote to the editors to clarify questions of religious practice. I shall return to this point in Chapter 7 below.

Kaptein (1997: 10–13) notes that although the *Muhimmāt al-nafā’is* shows evidence of Acehnese authorship, the issues discussed related to the entire archipelago; from disputes concerning marriage (nikāḥ) to the Ḥajj and inheritance (īrth). There were also issues relating to the conflict between local custom (adat – from the Arabic ‘āda, pl. ‘ādāt) and the Sharī’a. But whereas many of these Jawi questions were set against a colonial backdrop, resistance to (established) Dutch rule was not a marked feature of the *Muhimmāt*. This was due, perhaps, to fears of reprisals by the nervous Ottoman authorities (Kaptein 1997a: 5). For example, in one of the volume’s fatāwā, Shaykh Ahmad bin Zaynī Dāhlān (1826–86) maintained that the key determinate for the validity of prayers performed in recently subjugated territory was not Islamic sovereignty but rather the presence of a quorum able to carry out the congregational prayer (Kaptein 1997: 194). And the validity of any decision given by a Muslim in authority, even where that authority derived from appointment by [Dutch] infidels, was not disputed as long as it did not contravene the Sharī’a (Kaptein 1997: 193, 198).

Despite the absence of overtly anti-Western sentiment in the *Muhimmāt*, the Dutch feature prominently as causes of some disputes and remain the
clear and infidel (kāfir, pl. kuffār) Other. This was was emphasized in another of Aḥmad Dahīlān’s fatwā stating that Muslims should avoid wearing any article of dress which pertained specifically to kuffār (i.e., Kaptein 1997: 71–72, 199). (Often such items were rejected for practical reasons: a brimmed hat or tight trousers impeded performance of the salāt for example.) Further the political silence of the Muhimmāt does not imply a tradition of quiescence. Azra (1992: 435–56) points out that the quietism of the writings of the mystic Yūsuf al-Maqassārī was completely at odds with his consistent ‘anti-colonial’ activities. Viewed by the Dutch as ‘the most influential high-priest’ in Banten, al-Maqassārī supported the war of Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa (r.1651–83) (Azra 1999a: 131). And after Sultan Ageng’s capture in 1683, al-Maqassārī briefly led the resistance. He was captured later that year and exiled to Ceylon where he continued in writing and teaching. Living among the sizeable community of exiles al-Maqassārī was still viewed as a realistic threat. He was even suspected of being in communication with the Moghuls and was thus sent even further away to the Cape of Good Hope in 1693, where he died six years later.13 Regardless of the threat of such punishments, Jawi ‘ulamā’ remained active in support of Jawi rulers in their personal lives and teaching. In the 1770s we find that al-Fālimbānī devoted a text to The Virtues of Jihād (Faḍā’il al-jihād) it was naturally banned by them. Nonetheless copies did circulate within the ecumene, especially in regions outside Dutch control. Parts of the Faḍā’il al-jihād were even reworked in Aceh in the nineteenth century as the anti-Dutch Hikayat Prang Sabil. This widely copied, rhymed text promised eternal rewards for martyrdom in the form of beautiful houris (bidadari) and threatened hell-fire for all who worked with the Dutch (Snouck Hurgronje 1906: I, 179–81; Siegel 1969: 74–77; Alfian 1992). As I shall show in Chapter 3 below, in the nineteenth century the Jawa of Mecca were extremely interested in the affairs of their Muslim brethren in Aceh and the opinions of Jawi ‘ulamā’ in Mecca continued to shape the course of the anti-colonial struggle.

The foundations of anti-colonial activism: Islamic reformism

‘Off he went to the holy land, home he came to the wasteland.’
Makassarese oral tradition as quoted by Rössler (1997: 293)

It is still important to remember that, in the mid-nineteenth century, there was no clear Jawi nation but rather an ecumene joined by a common faith and its

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scholarly networks. At first Batavia and, later, Singapore were but semi-autonomous European centres of power competing with rival Jawi sultanates (see Reid 1997a). In this regard they resembled the indigenous Southeast Asian form of *mandala*-polity (Wolters 1999). Although the Dutch East India Company had been steadily encroaching on Javanese territory in the eighteenth century, the stage was set for the realization of colonial ambitions once the agenda was being decided by European states rather than commercial interests. This was particularly the case after the absorption of Banten and the total conquest of Java in the war of 1825–30. Thereafter European power began strangling the old ecumene, as the Dutch and British tightened their grip on the key commodities and natural resources of the entire archipelago. In so doing they started to trace the borders of the future entities of the Netherlands East Indies and, by degrees after the Pangkor agreement of 1874, the Federated Malay States. In this process the last of the Jawi sultans were largely brought under the umbrellas of two European empires. But while Dutch and English power served to reduce these Muslim kingdoms to minor vassal states, Islamic ideals of just rule still emphasized the commonality of the experience of the Muslims who inhabited them.

More than the incursions of the Portuguese and the Spanish in the sixteenth century, the consolidation of colonial hegemony in the nineteenth century involved a confrontation between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ and an awareness that Muslims, as they related with the wider world, were in political decline. This reinforced an already existing sense of spiritual decline targeted by the revivalist ‘*ulamā’* of the previous centuries. Nonetheless ‘*ulamā’* may not necessarily have been unanimous on the ideal nature of Islamic society and its political organization. It is, moreover, incorrect to maintain that the Islamic revival stemmed solely from the encounter with colonialism. As some scholars have argued, movements have periodically emerged from within traditionalist Islam proclaiming the need for renewal (*tajdīd*) through the reform (*islāḥ*) of religious practice (see Levtzion 1987, Voll 1992, and Azra 1992). Whereas, after 1900, Jawi reformism would be dominated by ‘*ulamā’* connected with Egypt, the roots of reformism are both international and traditional. Brown (1996: 22–30), for example, has demonstrated the traditional heritage of reformism by describing the activities of Shāh Wālī Allāh (1702–62) in India and Muhammad al-Shawkānī of Yemen (1760–1834). The latter is a particularly interesting figure. He was a Zaydī Shi‘a who sought to reconcile Sunnī and Shi‘a, and who affirmed the principle of independent rational investigation of the sources of Islam by the process of *ijtihād* (see Messick 1993: 42–45). Nonetheless this does not imply a linear progression from the ideas of al-Shawkānī to those of Rashīd Riḍā, despite his use of al-Shawkānī’s works and an enthusiasm for the Imams of Yemen as paragons of Muslim virtue (cf. Riḍā 1923; Messick 1993: 56; Dallal 2000).
The most famous pre-colonial example of the impulse to reform Islamic practice in the *bilād al-jāwa* may be seen in the activities of Nūr al-Dīn al-Rānirī, mentioned above. However al-Rānirī did not remain unchallenged. The ascension to the throne of a new (and female) ruler, Sultana Taj al-Alam Safiat al-Dīn Shah (1641–75), combined with the advent of a rival Minangkabau ‘ālim, spelt the end of his dominance in 1641 and the return of the old beliefs and practices (Ito 1978: 489–91). Still, despite his forced exile, the great compendium of fiqh that he wrote for the Jawa, the *Ṣirāt al-mustaqīm*, became established as a core text within the Jawi canon. Meanwhile Sultana Taj al-Alam patronized the more accommodatory reformist ‘Abd al-Raūf al-Sīnkīlī, who wrote his *Mi‘rāt al-tullāb* with her encouragement, and which also joined the Jawi corpus.

Just as Aceh was made the focus of reformist antagonism in the 1630s, before the temporary reassertion of ‘tradition’, reformism encountered both success and failures throughout the Muslim world. Rudolph Peters (1987: 93–115) has described a failed revolt of Turkish soldiers in Cairo in 1711 that was focussed around the activities of a single ‘ālim decrying the ‘heretical innovations’ (*bida‘*, sg. *bid‘a*) of local Egyptian mystics. According to some reformers, such innovations are practices adopted by Muslims whose validity is either not cited by the Sunna or whose justification rests on weak or false traditions. These could include the ecstatic rituals of some of the Şūfi orders or the popular visitations (*ziyārāt*) of tombs of holy men (*awliyā‘*) whose tombs are consequently seen as sources of spiritual energy (*baraka*). These Şūfi seekers of false *baraka*, argued the Cairene preacher, were to be beaten and the funerary domes to be torn down. However when public order was threatened he was forced to flee.

The aims voiced by this Cairene failure find an echo in the Arabian peninsula in the late eighteenth century, when the ruler of Najd formed an alliance with Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703–87). Inspired in part by the ideas of Ibn Taymīya (1263–1328), Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhāb sought to purge Arabia of all its ‘heretical innovations’. Yet he went further than Ibn Taymīya with his total rejection of mysticism (see Peskes 1999). Unlike the soldiers in Cairo, this movement, known to outsiders as the Wahhābīya, later enjoyed military success and captured Mecca (1803) and Medina (1805). Thereafter the Wahhābīs were free to raze the domes of Medina’s famous cemetery, the Baqī‘ al-Gharqad, and to enforce a rigorous adherence to their vision of normative Islam. In 1807 the Wahhābīya even felt strong enough to order the expulsion of all Turkish forces from the Hijaz (al-Amr 1978: 48). Finally, at the request of the Ottoman sultan, the Wahhābīya was brutally suppressed by the forces of the Egyptian viceroy Muhammad ‘Alī (r. 1805–48) in 1818.

It is often remarked that the Wahhābī interregnum in Mecca inspired parallel activities in the lands below the winds. For example, between 1821 and 1825, the Bugis ruler of Wajo’ (South Sulawesi) tried to institute
Islamic reforms in his own kingdom. And for the Java War (1825–30), Prince Diponegoro’s (1785–1855) spiritual adviser Hadji Madja has also been connected with such Islamic revivalism, although Steenbrink (1984: 29) has pointed out that Diponegoro had already come under the influence of another Sumatran scholar, Kjai Tahtajani. And when Raja Ali ascended to the position of underking of Riau-Lingga in the 1840s, he too commenced sweeping reforms that superficially resembled the edicts of the Wahhābīya. Yet at the same time he acted in a manner totally at odds with the strict tenets of the Ḥanbalī madhḥab, even wearing a gold crown at Friday prayers. Furthermore he maintained his position as the head of the local Şūfī order (see Raja Ali Haji 1982: 283–84).

The most celebrated example of Wahhābī-style revivalism in the Jawi ecumene is found in the Padri movement (1807–32) (see Dobbin 1974; 1983). The genesis of this movement lies with three pilgrims (Miskin of Pandai Sikat, Abd al-Rahman of Piabang, and Muhammad Arif of Sumanik) who returned to West Sumatra around 1807. But they were not alone, nor were they bringing reformist ideas into a vacuum. Sumatra had already seen two decades of disputation between members of rival Şūfī orders, primarily the Naqshbandīya and Shaṭṭārīya which was later led by Tuanku Nan Tuo (d. 1830). Dobbin (1983: 126) suggests that these orders may have been impressed by the writings of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī (1564–1624). This is quite possible, though it is more likely that the later reformer Shāh Wālī Allāh, who had translated one of Sirhindī’s works into Arabic, would have served as the transmitter of his ideas to a wider context (see Inayatullah 1971). Like Sirhindī, these groups emphasized the need for Minangkabau Muslims to ‘return to the sharī‘a’. This impulse to reform may have begun with an upsurge in the numbers of returned pilgrims and teachers able to afford the costs of travel to the Hijaz. Although data is currently lacking, such an upsurge could itself have been grounded in the development in Sumatra of an indigenous mercantile class. Kathirithamby-Wells (1993) claims that such development was constrained before 1800, although Wyatt (1998) has put forward that this was a feature of the second half of a long eighteenth century in Southeast Asia.

Steenbrink (1984: 32–45) suggests that by the 1820s and 1830s the Padri movement was built around a core of pilgrims and ‘ulamā’ led by Shaykh Jalal al-Din Ahmad from Koto Tuo. Initially Shaykh Jalal al-Din’s group tried to gain the support of the most prominent local ‘ālīm Tuanku Nan Tuo. Nonetheless they were unsuccessful and local adat groups rejected their calls and even persecuted some Padri, as the latest reformist ‘ulamā’ were known. These Padri responded in turn by launching a campaign of violence. Open warfare soon raged between the two sides throughout the many different village-polities (nagaris) that made up the Alam Minangkabau. Throughout the 1820s, the Dutch, although partisans of the adat faction, remained passive whilst their colonial army was kept busy fighting the war.
in Java. But with their military intervention on the side of the aristocracy and adat in 1831, Islam began to be asserted among the Minangkabau as the conflict changed from being a civil war to one of Minangkabau national resistance. In many ways this conflict, and those of the Java War and later Aceh, form the backdrop to the later national struggle of Indonesia from the turn of the 1900s when Islam – whether traditionalist or reformist – would be reasserted as the rallying point for alterity against colonial rule.

**One Javanese reformist: Ahmad Ripangi of Kalisasak**

Having sketched the background of aspects of reformism within the * bil¯ad al-j¯awa* – being grounded in increasing connectivity with the centres of Mecca and Medina and the desire to implant a more normative Islam in the ecumene – I now wish briefly to highlight the activities of one Javanese reformist. Ahmad Ripangi of Kalisasak (c.1786–1875?) has been discussed by Karel Steenbrink (1984: 109–13), and his career and aspirations are perhaps emblematic of the potential conflict between reformism and colonialism in the archipelago.

In June 1855, the Resident of Pekalongan requested that a certain Hadji Ahmad Rifa‘i (Ripangi) be sent to trial for causing religious disturbances in Kalisasak. This request and another in November 1858 were rejected by the respective Governors General of the day for lack of evidence. However when the Wedono of Kalisasak and his superior, the Bupati of Batang, again complained in April 1859 about Ahmad Ripangi’s disruption of the local Muslim community and lack of respect for the local police, a trial was launched.

From this trial, held in May 1859, a picture of Ahmad Ripangi emerges. He was born in Kendal, in the Residency of Semarang, where his father was the local religious official (*penghulu*). It was apparently after an eight-year stay in Mecca that he arrived in Kalisasak in 1839 where his wife had relatives. Thereupon he established his own *pesantren* where he stressed a proper knowledge of *uṣūl al-dīn*, *fiqh*, and *tasāwuf*. To teach these subjects he employed his own books, being simple rhymed compositions in Javanese written in an Arabic script (*p˘egon*), which were translations of the works of scholars from Mecca and Aceh. Ripangi soon gained popularity and became well known for his disruption of prayers at the local mosque and for his outspoken critiques of local practices and the local ‘priests’, as the Dutch called them. Indeed he held that the local methodology taught by them rendered people unable to recite the Qurʾān correctly and that local teachers were concerned only with matters of this world.

Ripangi’s popularity no doubt made him enemies among the local ‘ulamā’; however it was the evident popularity of his anti-Dutch message that concerned the authorities. In 1881, the Assistant-Resident of Yogyakarta – who also believed that Ripangi had been a member of the then troublesome
Naqshbandiya – estimated that at the height of his popularity he had had some two thousand followers (see Mr. 1881, no. 1041). Evidently the opinions of Ripangi had carried weight enough to upset the colonial status quo. When questioned at his trial, Ripangi affirmed that he had indeed instructed local Muslims to remarry given that the authority of the religious officials derived from an infidel régime. Moreover Ripangi did not deny ever having affirmed the principle of jihād against non-Muslim rule stating that such was ‘not a new teaching but a centuries-old teaching of the Qur‘ān’. In like fashion Ripangi consistently claimed that he was not adding anything new to Islam but was rather endeavouring to establish its true practice. Such statements as these affirm Ripangi as a scripturalist and reformist whose ultimate desire was the assertion of correct practice of Islam and, ultimately, the institution of Islamic authority. For this reason then he was exiled to Ambon in May 1859.

In their activities, reformists – whether radicals or accommodationists – were a force for the establishment of wider Jawi identity predicated either against a common invader or against the ‘unorthodox’ practices of their homelands. With Dutch power entrenched, jihād became impractical and its propagation only invited direct intervention from Batavia. This may in part explain the political silence in the later Muhimmāt al-nafa‘īs mentioned above. Hence reformers concentrated on education drawing on the existing networks of scholars within the ecumene that connected to West Asia. Shaykh Abdurrahman of Batu Hampar in West Sumatra (d.1899), for example, established a teaching complex (known as Kampung Dagang) which catered for two thousand students from diverse places. This complex also mimicked West Asia’s mosques with its dome and minaret and surrounding student lodgings – surau – assembled by ethnic origin. It was later graced by buildings in the style of the Middle East as erected by his son and successor (Sanusi and Edwar 1981: 4–5).

Reformism was not, however, the sole anti-colonial mechanism. Islam also embodied a response to government by non-Muslims in the form of the mystical networks – a structure that was often shared with reformist Islam, although the orders themselves differed. For although mysticism can take the form of a withdrawal from worldly matters, the structure of a Şūfī order (tariqa) can be the dynamic facilitator for resistance. Voll (1987: 85) contends that, from the eighteenth century, a tariqa ‘provided an organization without limiting control on a person’s activity’. Until the twentieth century, the mystical orders enjoyed swelling memberships. The Jawa were no exception to this rule, with the pilgrimage experience often including enrolment in an order, although it seems that the more sharī‘a-oriented Naqshbandiya order was taking the lion’s share of Jawi enrolments in the Hijaz, which would raise many Dutch eyebrows (see Laffan 2002). Many of the resistance leaders in Aceh or Banten were indeed Şūfis, and fighters killed or captured in Aceh were often found with mystical talisman (jimat, Ar. ‘ażima) or Şūfī prayer-books on their bodies (see Sartono 1966: 108–09; Tol and Witkam 1995;
Indeed to be a Muslim in Southeast Asia was also once synonymous with being a Şūfī, as Şūfīsm affirms the deeply personal relationship between teacher and student at the Mosque or madrasa. Yet by the late nineteenth century another revivalist movement had arisen which, like the Wahhābiya, set itself against many of the orders, whether ṣaḥī- or not. This movement, centred in Egypt, becomes of greater relevance for the Jawi ecumene in the twentieth century, and will be described in Chapter 6.

**Heightened Jawi ecumenism above the winds: the Ḥaǧj**

Having thus far concentrated on the textual and scholarly aspects of Jawi ecumenism, I wish finally briefly to consider the effect of the Ḥaǧj in providing a heightened sense of both Islamic and Jawi fellowship for the wider community. At the completion of the ceremonies of Islam and travel, pilgrims return to their societies with a fresh view on the world. This is not to say that a person’s spiritual character is necessarily changed by the Ḥaǧj. Achmad Djajadiningrat (1936) once remarked that the wayward youth of Banten sent to Mecca usually returned unchanged. Nevertheless the act of travel itself is of crucial importance in constructing one’s homeward vision. Throughout this book, and following El Moudden (1990: 69), I will argue that the Ḥaǧj was an ‘ambivalent’ experience for the Jawa; in the sense that it fostered seemingly contradictory ideas of both local and Islamic identities – indeed two different levels of what Victor Turner called *communitas*.

Turner was concerned with the act of pilgrimage (see, for example, Turner 1969, 1973). And whilst he did not concern himself with the Ḥaǧj directly, his ideas may be readily applied to it. In his discussion of pilgrimages in both Mexico and Zambia, Turner observed how absolute religious equality and fraternity was articulated in the focal ceremonies of the centre, where pilgrims gain a heightened sense of their communal existence. This sacred sense he called *communitas*, which he suggested dissolved their former differences. Turner also argued that there were three different forms of *communitas*; from the immediate ‘existential’ sense felt at a ceremony, to the normative sense evoked by ‘a perduing social system’, and the ‘ideological’ form that a religious system propagates. To this end there can be further variants of *communitas* expressed in terms of the local, national, or supranational variants of religious practice.

The Ḥaǧj, as the fifth and most arduous pillar of Islam, is a good example of how those several forms of *communitas* might be experienced. As the crowds swirl around the Ka’ba, or stand assembled at the plains of ‘Arafat and Muzdalifah, they wear the same pilgrim-garb and jostle together, in theory, without attention to social status. They are thus united by Turner’s existential *communitas*. Equally they are, to use the ideas of both Turner and van Gennep – whose formulation of ‘rite of passage’ Turner seems to have

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Witkam 2001).
employed – in a state of ‘liminality’ or transition as they move from the status of confessional Muslim to that of Hajjī or Ḥajja. And once they take on an elevated place in the perduring system of Islam they will encourage, by their example, that system’s continuance in the future. But although all participants in the Ḥajj pass through the same crucial rite of passage, both during and at the conclusion of these ceremonies, status and difference can be manifested. Few pilgrims fail to note the ethnic makeup of the assembled masses – as did one Sumatran writing to his brother in the 1870s (see Mr. 1874, no. 524) – or indeed their own treatment by the locals. Certainly there was an experience of profound difference felt by the young Ibn Baṭṭūta when he first performed the pilgrimage in 1326 (see Gibb 1956: 188f.; Netton 1986: 35f.).

The most accessible and personal window on the Ḥajj is the travelogue (riḥla), left to us by adventurers like Ibn Baṭṭūta. However there is no such established genre in Jawi literatures. Indeed, the first factualized Malay-language travel accounts are those of Munshi Abdullah bin Abd al-Qadir (1797–1854), and Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Misri (d.1847) in the nineteenth century. Of these two scribes, only Munshi Abdullah left an (incomplete) account of his 1854 journey to the Hijaz in the Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah (The Story of Abdullah’s Voyage). The account ceases in Jeddah shortly before his death. We thus know little about the personal or spiritual responses of Southeast Asians to the Ḥajj until that written in 1925 by a Javanese regent, Wiranatakoesoema.

Given this gap, it is perhaps useful to consider Netton’s (1986: 37–38) schema of pilgrim intentions. Netton outlines the essential purpose of riḥla as being the fourfold quest for ‘the shrine and/or its circumambient religious geography; for knowledge; for recognition and/or power; and for satisfaction of a basic wanderlust’. And although no Jawi riḥla have come to light prior to the 1900s which might be considered in isolation from European influence – both of the afore-mentioned Abdullahs worked for Europeans – similar motivations may be attributed to the Jawa, but with a distinct style of their own. The Batak journalist Dja Endar Moeda (alias Hadji Mohamad Saleh, b. 1861) provides us with a hint to this. Writing in 1903 and probably with reference to the Ḥajj of 1892–93, Dja Endar Moeda described a slightly different range of personal intentions. He wrote that (Indies) pilgrims visited the Holy Land for four reasons, namely: to maintain the tombs of their ancestors who had died there; to visit the tomb of the Prophet; to complete their religious duties; and to see a famous foreign land of the day (Bintang Hindia, vol. 1 no. 19, 19 September 1903).

Foreign observers have often seized upon this last point. Some have even downplayed the level of religious devotion among the Jawa, interpreting the Ḥajj as a mechanism for tourism above all else (Schmidt 1992: 158). In 1922, the Syrian–American Ameen Rihani (Amyn Rihānī, 1876–1940) felt free to pronounce that in the Javanese ‘the guide or his agent has a tourist rather than a pilgrim’ (Peters 1994a: 352). Certainly wanderlust and curiosity were the
hallmarks of many Jawi pilgrims. This impulse to see the sights also played an
important role in shaping the pilgrim’s long-term response to the experience.
Upon their return pilgrims brought letters from the Jawi community and gifts
such as dates, honey, or even clarified butter (Djajadiningrat 1936: 9). Family
and friends, having perhaps received these souvenirs, or vials of water from
the well of Zamzam, would want to know about the weather, people, sights,
and smells of the Holy Land.

Despite the lack of a specific riḥla literature, the Hājj is still alluded to in
other Jawi sources. In the seventeenth century, ‘Abd al-Raʾūf al-Sinkilī
recorded his scholastic itinerary in Arabia in his ʿUmDAT al-muḥṭĀJīn lā sulāk
maslAK al-muFridīn (The Support for Those Individuals in Need of the Way)
(Riddell 1990: 223–38). Then there are the Malay hikayat which have been
surveyed by Matheson and Milner (1984). The earliest discussed by them is
drawn from the Hikayat Hang Tuah. In line with Milner’s (1982) thesis on
king-centred polities (kerajaaan) and their centrality in the Malay imagination,
Hang Tuah’s quest was primarily for the quasi-mythical state of Rum rather
than Mecca. Indeed many Jawi societies maintained their own pilgrimage sites
as some Jawi rulers sought to assert the centrality of their own domains
inverting the classical Islamic paradigm. Such an inversion would have been
aided by their extreme distance from Mecca, and in the early sixteenth century
Tomé Pires reported that Sultan Mahmud of Melaka had tried to make that
city a rival to Mecca (Cortesão 1944: 253).

This tradition of focussing on local manifestations of Islam continues in
Indonesia today. Makassarese tradition ascribes Mount Bawakarang an
equivalence with Mecca (Gibson 1994: 69) and in Java the graves of the ‘nine’
saints credited with that island’s Islamization remain important centres of
mass pilgrimage (de Jonge 1998). Such centres are often tied to earlier royal
complexes and for many Javanese forty visits to the cemetery of Imogiri,
associated with Sultan Agung, are equal to one visit to Mecca (Woodward
1989: 175, 195). Yet there is not always a royal link, and for others seven
visits to the famous mosque of Demak – the site of Java’s first Muslim
kingdom – are accorded the same worth as the Hājj. It is also important to
remember that such manifestations of local or royal precedence over religious
observance are not specifically Jawi. The Iranian town of Mashhad, which
grew around the tomb of the assassinated Imām ‘Alī bin Mūsā al-Ridā
(d. 818) is known popularly as the ‘Mecca of the poor’, to which one visit is
of the same merit as a thousand to the Ka’ba (cooperson 2000: 74–75).
Hyderabad too has its ‘Mecca mosque’ complete with its own black stone said
to have floated to India from Mecca (Bayly 1996: 92). And in 1887, the ruler
of the Sudan even forbade the pilgrimage and nominated the tomb of his
father, the ‘Mahdi’ (Muhammad Ahmad bin ‘Abd Allāh, 1834–1885), as a
more suitable object of visitation (Ochsenwald 1984: 60, 73 n. 4).

Moreover, the existence of such local sites has never prevented Muslims,
whether Jawi, Indian, or African, from making the Hājj. Local pilgrimages
throughout the Muslim world remain but are precursors to the main event in the Hijaz. It is this greatest celebration of Islamic fraternity that gave (and still gives) its participants a sense of the totality of the Muslim world, and who could (and can) return to their homes to communicate that vision and reshape their presence within it. Still whilst the Ḥajj as process can serve to subsume the individual’s local identity within a greater Islamic *communitas*, both Jawi ecumenism or local particularisms may be reactivated by meeting one’s fellow in the same setting, whether on a foreign ship sailing to the Hijaz, in a Meccan café, or within the Ḥaram itself. Such an experience of meeting one’s neighbour among co-believing strangers also changes one’s perspective of the home world. In this light then, the pilgrimage is a process that emphasizes both Islamic *communitas* and Jawi ecumenism; particularly when the Jawa interacted with their own Jawi/ulam¯a in the Hijaz – either studying under them, or being enrolled in a Śūfī order by them. I shall return again to this particular aspect of Jawi ecumenism in greater detail in Chapter 3 below. For now though I would suggest that, for a Melakan of the nineteenth century, the appellations of Malay, Jawi, and Muslim were all concentric aspects of a single multiplicity of Muslim *communitas*. And all of them could be set in opposition to a foreign Other; though none were more foreign than the small number of Europeans who continued to dictate affairs in their homelands.
2

ARAB PRIESTS AND PLIANT PILGRIMS

Never forget: every Mohammedan is your enemy!
(Humme 1877: 84)

Dutch responses to the pilgrimage

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Dutch authorities believed that only one hundred or so Jawa ventured to Mecca each year engendering a relatively casual attitude to the Ḥajj at the time (Spat 1912: 338–40). Indeed regulations regarding the purchase of pilgrim passports were relaxed in 1852 under Governor General A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Steenbrink 1984: 101). Europeans in Southeast Asia continued to see their real enemy in the ‘Arab priests’ of the archipelago. In a famous dispatch in 1811, Raffles had once described them as ‘mere drones . . . manumitted slaves . . . who worm themselves into the favour of the Malay chiefs . . . They hold like robbers the offices they obtain as sycophants and cover all in a veil of religious hypocrisy’ (Morley 1949: 162).

Attitudes were usually no different under Dutch rule sixty-six years later when, in an article to the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsche Indië in June 1877, the former Resident of Timor, H.C. Humme, described how the ‘civilizing’ work done by Christian missions had rendered parts of the archipelago amenable to Dutch direction. He also wrote that when an Arab trader had left his three sons under the care of the Christian ruler of Savu, he had advised the latter to give them strict instructions that any attempt at proselytization would not be tolerated (Humme 1877: 89). By contrast with the Arab interlopers, local Muslims were usually cast as but nominal adherents to a foreign faith. In 1890 one missionary claimed that Islam, for the Javanese, was ‘a heavy and ill-fitting outer garment’ and that at home he would revert to his ‘national’ clothing, and absorb himself his ‘Polynesian and Hindu Pantheon, [with its] Gods, spirits and ghosts’ (Schuurmans 1890: 65).

Confused by the ‘Arab’ threat, it was only in the shadow of the events of 1857–58 in India that questions were raised seriously about the impact of the
Certainly officials would have been alarmed to hear that the years of 1858 and 1859 also saw a substantial rise in pilgrimage participation, with the official figures jumping from 100 to 3,000 pilgrims per annum (Spat 1912: 340). Furthermore it was suspected that such pilgrims could easily come into contact with the many Indian ‘rebels’ who had sought refuge in Mecca. Such anxieties were not entirely without foundation. We know that, later in the 1870s and 1880s, many Jawa studied at the Șawlatîya madrasa which was founded in 1874 by one such ʾemigré, Muḥammad Khalīl Raḥmat Allāh Kayrnāwī of Delhi (1818–90) (Ibrahim 1996: 158). Also known as Raḥmat Allāh bin Khalīl al-ʾUthmānī, this Indian ʾālim enjoyed the favour of Sultan Abdülhamid for a work (Izhār al-haqq, The Manifestation of the Truth) attacking the inconsistencies of Christian theology (Snouck Hurgronje 1906: II, 345 n. 1; ‘Abd al-Jabbār 1982: 108–12).

In March of 1859, the Indisch Genootschap of The Hague – with its membership of prominent merchants, academics, and officials whose careers and wealth depended on the continuance of Dutch rule in the Indies – held a meeting. In an open forum members addressed the following questions: ‘What are hadjis?’; ‘What is their influence on the Javanese?’; ‘Is it necessary or useful to adopt countermeasures?’ and ‘If so, in what way and by whom shall they be carried out?’ (Anon. 1859).

On the bureaucratic front, stringent government regulations of that same year specified that intending pilgrims were to seek permission to depart from their respective regent (bupati). Moreover these bupatis were to stamp the pilgrims’ passports after their return having conducted a short verbal ‘examination’. In this exam the regent was expected to determine if the pilgrim had actually been to Mecca. Here there was potential for high farce. Most regents had never been themselves, some simple souls might return with nothing to say of the experience, whilst enterprising fakes could give a convincing account of the Holy Land (see Spat 1912: 342; Djajadiningrat 1936: 178–79). Still, it was only with the bupati’s permission that a pilgrim would be permitted to don any form of quasi-Arab dress that alluded to his or her heightened status.

From 1860 pilgrimage passes were to feature additional information about the pilgrim’s movements, including, for the first time, the name of their ship, the birthplace and most recent abode of the pilgrim (Spat 1912: 340–42). Such information added one more layer of information to colonial knowledge about the pilgrimage. Nonetheless there still remained a dearth of informed expertise on the place of Mecca upon which the colonial state could make policy. Little was known about events after the pilgrims sailed from the Indies and there were calls for the establishment of Dutch agencies along the route and most especially at Jeddah (where a consulate would finally be opened in 1872).

In 1860 Salomo Keyzer (1823–68), a lecturer in Javanese and Islamic law at
the Royal Academy of Delft, sought to bridge the gap in Dutch knowledge of
the Hajj process. He chose to do so by devoting the bulk of his Onze tijd in
Indië (Our Time in India, The Hague, eight vols.) to the Hajj, describing Mecca
as the ‘cradle’ of an international plot for Muslims to rise against and
massacre their colonial masters (Jaquet 1980: 289). Certainly Mecca was
looming larger in the colonial imagination with the increasing rates of
pilgrimage participation, particularly in the years after the opening of the
Suez Canal in 1869. Not only did this event bring the Arabian Peninsula more
fully into the global-economy (Ochsenwald 1982: 61), it assured the future
prosperity of both Singapore and the Netherlands Indies (Bogaars 1973;
Vlekke 1959: 309); it also heralded a new era in the communication of change
throughout the lands below the winds. And despite ongoing Dutch hindrance
in the form of passports and Haji exams, Jawi pilgrim numbers continued to
rise, eventually outnumbering even those from India in 1892 (van Delden
1899). This may well be due to the Ottoman authorities applying far stricter
sanitary and political sanctions to South Asian pilgrims (al-Amr 1978: 174).
Nonetheless, after 1894, the Jawa would usually represent the largest
single grouping of pilgrims present at ‘Arafat each year (Vredenbregt 1962:
149).

Results of such increased participation were not slow in coming, and links
were soon drawn between the increasing number of pilgrims and the anti-
colonial activities coordinated by local chapters of the Şüfî orders (see
Mr. 1881, no. 978). The troubled region of Banten in particular seemed
affected by both hajis and insurgencies from the early 1870s (see Sartono
1966). However Banten, despite its rebellious tendencies, was firmly under
Dutch control. On the other hand Aceh was then in the process of being
drawn into the Dutch sphere in the most protracted jihâd of the nineteenth
century.

The Aceh War (1873–c.1910) and the renewed Islamic threat

Whoever in the archipelago is not for us is against us. And whoever is
against us we shall bring under our control. . . . The total sovereignty
over all the islands of this archipelago is a question of survival for
us. On it stands or falls the colonial power in whose name we as
Netherlanders are grateful. This might is our right.

The Indies journalist C. Busken Huet writing in 1883,
as quoted by van ’t Veer (1969: 85)

With the Anglo–Dutch treaty of 1871, and with both North Sea powers
fearing the intervention in Sumatra of a third force – such as France, the USA
or Italy – the Netherlands began the process of the ‘rounding off’ (afronding)
of its oceanic empire.¹ Until that point Holland had been content to hold the
principal economic zones of the archipelago. It could even be said that prior to the Aceh War colonial rule was a by-product of economic exploitation. The supply of such products as coffee and tea from Java or rubber and pepper from West Sumatra had now been secured by the brutal campaigns of the first half of the nineteenth century. What would follow in the closing decades of the century would be the annexation of smaller sultanates weakened by the superior tonnage and resources of European shipping or overwhelmed by commercial concessions. In this regard the patchwork of sultanates of East Sumatra would be overlayed by huge plantations which brought foreign labour – Chinese and Javanese – that would displace the local Malays. As one study has observed, ‘by 1900 their sultans were stuffed (with emoluments) and mounted on display in what was now a thoroughly Dutch administered East Coast Residency of Sumatra’ (Steinberg 1987: 195). This pattern was repeated throughout the archipelago as hereditary Sultans were sidelined and replaced by Dutch power. The Netherlands East Indies were taking final shape, with military conquests being reinforced by networks of Dutch capital and bureaucracy (see Steinberg 1987: 203–06). This was all justified by the argument that The Netherlands had the moral right as a superior civilization to exploit the less civilized parts of the world to its economic advantage.
Prior to the afronding, Aceh, which had a long history as an independent power, had survived through its domination of the pepper trade and its aggressive policies towards the smaller Sumatran states. However, by the 1870s, that trade had collapsed, and Acehnese power was on the wane. Piracy was rife in the Straits of Malacca, while the impoverished court enjoyed little control over its former imperium outside the capital. Dutch and British merchant-imperialists were eager to present Aceh as a rogue state ready for annexation. This was expected to be an easy matter.

Yet it was not to be so easy. When the first expeditionary force arrived in March of 1873 it was routed with the death of its commander General Köhler. This humiliation captured the imagination of large segments of the Jawi ecumene – at least momentarily. For example, one Javanese rebel, Hadji Mohamad Ali of Taskimalaya claimed to be in possession of the same magical weapons used by the Acehnese (Mr. 1873, no. 694). And a letter from a Sumatran in Mecca, Muhammad Salih, mentioned that a number of Jawi shaykhs, from both the British and Dutch spheres, had met at the house of a Batavian shaykh to discuss the conflict and affirm their opposition to the Dutch (Mr. 1874, no. 524).

The British were also alive to widespread sympathy for the Acehnese in the Peninsula. The Dutch Consul, then an English entrepeneur by the name of W.H. Read (1819–1909), reported that he was unable to stem the tide of inflammatory letters coming from Mecca. Such letters – known in Java as wasiat al-nabi or surat kiriman – predicted the final days of the world and the impending expulsion of non-believers from the lands of Islam. They were often alleged to originate from the Sharīf of Mecca, or were purported to originate from a plot hatched at Singapore by visiting members of the Sharīf’s party (see Snouck Hurgronje 1906: II, 181–82; Mr. 1881, no. 720). Sartono (1966: 167–68) records that many such letters, some written in Mecca, others locally, were found between 1880 and 1885 in Aceh, Lampung, Banten, Batavia, and the Priangan (see also Mr. 1881, no. 1139). Indeed many Jawa are said to have predicted the ultimate defeat of Holland and others even announced the dispatch of an Ottoman fleet – sparked initially by the Ottoman paper Baçiret (Reid 1969: 128, 149; Schmidt 1992: 58 n. 39). All of these unlikely possibilities strengthened the hope for an East empowered by Islam and an Islam seen in turn by Dutch observers as a pervasive and coordinated threat.

Keyzer’s theme of Mecca as the heart of an international conspiracy thus resounded throughout the 1870s and 1880s in official dossiers. In such files too the Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II (r.1876–1909), was often implicated by wild association or assumptions. This was due to his campaign for recognition as the Caliph of all Muslim peoples and his patronage of the Şūfī orders – and the Naqshbandiya in particular (see Fattah 1998: 68). Thus from 1879 the writers of Foreign Office dossiers, already excited by an attack on the British corvette Ready in Jeddah harbour in 1878, were re-animated by the echoes of
a Muslim plot in 1881. Writing from Jeddah, the British consul, James Zohrab, wrote that a letter had come from Java from ‘a person of influence among the Javanese’ claiming that

A widely extended secret society exists embracing Musulmans of all nationalities with the object of restoring the khalifate to the Arabs of the Hedjaz. . . . In Java . . . the Sultan of Turkey is disliked and is considered to have forfeited by his bad government and indifference to true Muslim interests, all claim to the support of his co-religionists. His speedy fall is considered certain, and his Empire, it is believed, will pass to Russia, neither of which events will create in Java either surprise or regret. . . . [Moreover] letters [are said to have been sent] from Abdul Mutalib [Sharīf of Mecca, 1880–82] addressed to Mussulman Chiefs in Java strongly inculcating fanatical ideas and principles and hatred of the Christians, declaring enmity towards them to be necessary and praiseworthy.²

If it indeed ever existed, the original letter was most likely written by a returned pilgrim with some knowledge of the day-to-day life of the Ottoman territories. Consensus among the ‘ulamā’ also held to the theoretical superiority of a Qurayshī (and thus not Ottoman) Caliphate, although Arab protestations were seldom voiced directly to the Porte in exchange for a form of indirect rule (Ochsenwald 1984: 6). Although they could hardly express such views openly, many Jawa residing in Mecca also resented the Ottoman government, its corrupt officials and poorly disciplined troops.³ In connection with this, the local government’s failure to deal with the regular attacks of the Bedouin on the pilgrim caravans continued to be seen as a sign of its inherent weakness.⁴ Even the Shāfi‘ī Muftī of Mecca, ʿĀḥmad bin Zaynī Dahlān, is said to have voiced criticism of it tempered by the fact that he himself was the recipient of a state gratuity (Kaptein 1997: 5).

The letter from Java cited above might be compared with news in a second letter which drew the attention of W.H. Read’s cousin in Singapore. It is clearly the work of a Jawi author ignorant of both Arabic and the Hijaz.

. . . as to the Mohamedan plot, my spies inform me that the Mohammedans have been warned to be ready in about two years time, when a second Mohamed will come. A man has already come forward. His age is 38. His name is Iman Imhabill. He was born in Mecca. Nobody knows his present sejourn. In two years there will be a war with the Kaffirs. After some forty years the Prophet Jesus will come upon the earth and then the Iman [sic] will die and Jesus will rule the world. . . . The Sultan of Turkey has already sent letters to all places where Mahomedanism prevails to make ready
for war against the Kaffirs when the time comes, in about two years.\textsuperscript{5}

Certainly the Hijaz, as the reputed source of many of these letters, was a dangerous place to live until the relative stability of Sa‘ūdī rule after 1924. This was even the case for diplomats, as when Bedouin attacked one party outside the walls of Jeddah in 1895. Such events led to Jeddah harbour being crowded with European warships. However gunboat diplomacy seldom led to any substantive results (Ochsenwald 1984: 200).\textsuperscript{6} Mecca thus remained the unassailable centre of pan-Islamic agitation disseminated by the ‘fanatical hadjis, priests and Arabs’ now flowing to the East in increasing numbers. Hence when reports of unrest in Mecca were received, Dutch officials were usually urged to be on their guard in the Indies (see, for example, Mr. 1879, no. 668).

At the heart of this Dutch fear lay also an awareness of a growing anti-colonial resurgence throughout the Muslim world. In 1883, the second Dutch Consul in Jeddah, J.A. Kruijt, connected this resurgence with the ongoing Acehnese conflict, of which he had experience, and which was now led by the ‘ulamā’ and omnipresent hajis. In particular he nominated the Wahhābī movement and the Sanūsīya order as being connected to this conflict. In previous dispatches he had freely associated both Mecca and Constantinople with anti-colonial uprisings in Algiers.\textsuperscript{7} The seeds of such fears were in turn well sown in an increasingly fragmented Dutch society below the winds.

An increasingly polarized colonial society: 1870–1900

Back in their Indies, the Dutch were the smallest minority in an extremely diverse colony. The nineteenth century witnessed a steady influx of Hadrami and Chinese migrants which in turn had followed the earlier migrations of Chinese into the region from the latter half of the eighteenth century (Steinberg 1987: 223; Trocki 1997). For the latter this was especially noticeable after the opening of the Suez Canal enabling more and more lower status Hadramis to seek fame and fortune in the bilād al-jāwa. Already in 1870 there were some 13,000 Arabs in the Indies (de Jonge 1997: 95). The Qāḍī of Say‘un, Muḥsin bin Alawī al-Saqqāf (d. 1873), was so concerned by this mass exodus that he composed a poem urging his compatriots to remain beside their ancestral wells rather than venture to the irreligion and vice of jāwa (Ho 1997: 134, 139–43).

Contrasted with their ancestral wells, the verdant gardens of Southeast Asia were rich indeed. The Hadramis also enjoyed a special place of honour among the Jawa by virtue of their assumed kinship with the family of the Prophet. This was emphasized by the use of such customary honorifics as habīb and sayyid. Further, due to their networks across the Indian Ocean,
many Hadramis made their fortunes in the management of the Hajj (see Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997). This foreign and Muslim economic elite also remained emotionally attached to the Hadramaut as the source of their identity. In many instances they sent their locally born sons, known as muwalladiin (Ar.) or peranakan (Mal.) back from the lands of the Jawa to the harsh truth (and assumed piety) of Hadramaut (Ho 1997: 134–37, 142). The very first modern college in Tarim was even founded (in 1886) by a pious endowment (waqf) established by such Singapore-based merchants. Van der Meulen (1947: 150) later remarked of the ancestral home of the al-‘Atṭās family that its ten mosques and deeply sunk wells were ‘monuments to the piety of the far-scattered sons’.

For this same reason the poorest inhabitant of Hureidha can prostrate himself on an Italian marble floor in the central mosque and his children can get a school education which, by giving far more than local conditions require, creates the longing as well as the capacity for life and work in the rich, new countries that are so far away.

Nevertheless, familiarity can breed contempt. And whereas Hadramis had long been living among the Jawa, intensified migration and their commercial activities were increasingly questioned by some Jawa, much as Meccans were revising their estimation of the Jawa as tractable visitors who always honoured their debts (cf. Snouck Hurgronje 1931). Moreover, with the migration of Hadramis of less illustrious birth there came an increasing tendency among the Jawa to question their claims to moral sanctity. Over time Arabs became less the ‘lord sayyids’ of Malay literature (see Raja Ali Haji 1982: 134) and more often envied merchants and moneylenders.

The Dutch certainly encouraged such prejudices, and continued to see them as a pernicious (and now pan-Islamic) influence. As a result, the first adviser to the Colonial government for Oriental Languages and Moehammedan Law, L.W.C. van den Berg (1845–1927), was commissioned to write a report on the Arabs in the Indies. This was published in 1886 as Le Hadhramout et les colonies Arabes dans l’archipel Indien (Hadramaut and the Arab Colonies of the Indian Archipelago). In his report, van den Berg noted the general vigour of their communities and the significant respect enjoyed by Hadramis among local peoples. At the same time growing numbers of migrants led to a physical demarcation in some towns as Arabs often maintained their own mosques and foundations distinct from indigenous society. This was no doubt compounded by the fact that, from the 1860s, they had been obliged by the Dutch to reside in racially distinct quarters (wijken) (de Jonge 1997: 97–103).

Sumit Mandal (1994) argues that this not only achieved the colonial aim of separation but also engendered a heightened sense of community among
them. Still, these quarters took in substantial non-Arab populations and most ‘Arabs’ were in fact the Malay-speaking children of local mothers. Nonetheless ethnic distinction was maintained, especially by the ‘Alawiyūn, the Hadrami elite that claimed descent from the Prophet through his son-in-law ‘Alī. Marriage was the key to maintaining this position. According to Islamic convention, only a partner of equal or higher lineage may marry a woman of noble blood (a sayyida or sharīfa). The suitability of any given partner was referred to as kafā’a (compatibility). Engseng Ho (1997) has argued that the issue of kafā’a became even more important for the ‘Alawiyūn in Southeast Asia when it became clear that they needed to avoid their long term absorption by both indigenous society and their less illustrious fellow Hadramis. For this reason, genealogies were written in the Hadramaut in the 1880s for consumption by the muwalladin living in the bilād al-jāwa (see Ho 1997: 141–42).

The ethnic mélange created by the influx of Chinese and Arabs ultimately emphasized the position of indigenous Muslims as the absolute underclass. This was officially entrenched by a tripartite colonial division of society into Europeans and their Christian allies, the Foreign Orientals (vreemde oosterlingen) and Natives. Indeed, racial purity underpinned the colonial order and the 1870s also saw the consolidation of the Dutch presence. With the Indies booming as colonial products could be shipped to Europe in increasing volume, more Europeans – including many women – made the journey out to an Indies now seen as a land of opportunity rather than a dumping ground for misfits and mercenaries (see Stoler 1995; Vlekke 1959: 310–14; Steinberg 1987: 293–94). Henceforth Indies Dutch sought to separate themselves further by emphasizing their language and culture, leading to a fundamental distancing of themselves as a ruling class (Stoler 1995). In 1904 Governor General van Heutsz would instruct Dutch officials to cease imitating local custom and abandon ceremonial umbrellas, in turn urging the priyayi to do the same (Steinberg 1987: 205; cf. Djajadiningrat 1936: 224–26). But, if the bureaucracy had begun to shed its ceremony, the sumptuary codes of the Indies – enforced until 1905 – ensured that all members of Indies society maintained their ‘national’ differences whether as ‘Arab’, ‘Chinese’, or ‘Batak’ (see van Dijk 1997).

The move towards the increasing insulation of colonial society and the ongoing morasse in Aceh reinforced the fear of Islam as the enemy of colonialism (Laffan 2002). Colonial fear moreover encouraged the Dutch press to dwell on the ramifications of any Muslim uprising. Between September and November of 1885 two leading Dutch papers – the Java Bode and De Locomotief – reported that the ‘ulamā’ of Cianjur and Sukabumi (West Java) had formed a secret society, alleging that they planned a revolt along the lines of the Great Mutiny of 1857 (Steenbrink 1993: 80–81). L. Brunner of the Java Bode – with the encouragement of the then Honorary Adviser for Islamic Affairs K.F. Holle – was especially active. In his pieces
he dwelt on the imagined intentions of returned pilgrims inspired by the successes of the Mahdī and eager to raise the banner of *jihād*. Another of his articles announced a plot to murder all the Europeans of Bandung at an upcoming horse race (Sartono 1966: 161–62). Mecca, the one place closed to Christian Europeans, remained the source of all trouble, and the focus of colonial fear.
Leaving the lands below the winds

The extreme distance of the archipelago from the Hijaz always made the Ḥajj an obligation more readily met by the wealthy. From the 1870s, with a prospering Indies connected to a globalizing market, more Jawi and peranakan traders were able to finance the Ḥajj (Steinberg 1987: 221, 301). In Mecca in 1885 Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 215) would note that the many Jawi pilgrims were seldom destitute. This reflected the increasing economic prosperity of mercantile elites in the Indies, particularly in Java and Sumatra, where the Dutch economic infrastructure had most deeply penetrated the existing trade networks. It also reflected the stringent conditions placed on that journey by the Dutch from the late 1850s.

Despite the high cost of travel to, and of life in, the Hijaz, in the 1930s Achmad Djajadiningrat (1936: 177) wondered at the Bantenese capacity for saving enough money to make the Ḥajj, even on the low wages of a day-labourer. However there were always many Jawa who were unable to meet such costs by thrift alone. These aspirant ḥajīs often contracted themselves to some of the Hadrami entrepreneurs of the Straits Settlements whose pilgrim touts adopted the practice of providing them surety at high interest. The aspiring pilgrim then discharged his or her debt through work contracts at the holdings and factories in the region; the plantation of Muhammad bin al-Saqqaf (Alsagooff) on Kukup island was infamous for its conditions and the debt-bondage it imposed on workers from Java (Mandal 1994: 47, 136).

As I have noted in Chapter 2, before being allowed to leave their regencies, Indies pilgrims were required to be in possession of a special passport. This document was to be stamped at the port of exit and then at all Dutch consulates on the way to Jeddah, such as Colombo or Aden. According to their official documents, most Jawi pilgrims were not leaving the bilād al-jāwa or the lands below the winds, but rather a colonial entity: Netherlands India. And before the ceremonies of the Ḥajj could be joined, the rituals of that state had to be undergone. Thus, with their passes stamped by their Regent
and then the harbourmaster, the pilgrims would be at the intersection of two networks, one connected to Mecca and the Muslim world, the other to Batavia and the Colony. I would thus argue that possession of this document would underline a variant of Jawi ecumenism and serve to instil in the pilgrim the idea that he or she was leaving their home; a home far larger than his or her village polity of birth (cf. Roff 1984: 238–45).

From the moment they pledged their intention to sail, the Jawi pilgrims were categorized by their ethnicity or linguistic group by both the colonial state and their pilgrimage hosts. Before they even left Southeast Asia, pilgrims were often allocated to the Meccan guides who were licensed by the Amīr of Mecca – more often known as the Sharīf – to convey them throughout the Holy Land of the Hijaz. These guides, known as the mutawwifūn (fem. mutawwifīt) employed overseas agents (wukalā’, Mal. wakil) who knew the languages of their intended customers. There were thus guides for the Minangkabau, Sundanese, Javanese, and Malays who were familiar with their charges’ customs and intentions in the Hijaz. These guides were often the local children of Jawi–Arab marriages – the very obverse of Southeast Asia’s muwalladūn. By 1898 there were 186 such guides registered as working among the pilgrims from the Netherlands Indies giving a ratio of roughly one guide for every 18 pilgrims (see van Delden 1899). Pilgrims from less populous or wealthy regions proved a less attractive transaction, and usually found themselves submerged within other (usually Malay) groupings either at the major staging points of Singapore and Batavia, or as they stepped onto the docks at Jeddah.

In the bilād al-jāwa, the wakil was also known as the kepala-djoemaāh (kepala juma’a, group-leader). According to Dja Endar Moeda, writing in 1903, the kepala-djoemaāh was

\[
\ldots a~ev\text{il}~\text{p}erson~–~\text{more}~\text{evil}~\text{than}~\text{a}~\text{leech}.~\text{It}~\text{is}~\text{not}~\text{merely}~\text{his}~\text{intention}~\text{to}~\text{suck}~\text{the}~\text{blood}~\text{of}~\text{his}~\text{victim}~\text{but},~\text{if}~\text{he}~\text{is}~\text{smart},~\text{to}~\text{suck}~\text{their}~\text{bones}~\text{and}~\text{skull}~\text{dry}~\text{too}.~\text{The}~\text{kepala-djoemaāh}~\text{is}~\text{far}~\text{from}~\text{the}~\text{family}~(\text{kandang})~\text{of}~\text{the}~\text{Prophet};~\text{even}~\text{further}~\text{than}~\text{a}~\text{robber}~\text{or}~\text{burglar}.~\text{His}~\text{speech}~\text{is}~\text{as}~\text{sweet}~\text{as}~\text{sugar}~\text{and}~\text{he}~\text{is}~\text{always}~\text{ready}~\text{to}~\text{serve},~\text{saying}~'[\text{Do it}]~\text{for}~\text{God}~\text{and}~\text{the}~\text{blessing}~\text{of}~\text{Mecca~and~Medina.~Don’t}~\text{worry,~the}~\text{shipping}~\text{agent}~\text{is}~\text{my}~\text{friend.~We~have~known~each}~\text{other~for~ages.~I[even]~have~a~few~shares~in~the~company.~Come!~Let’s~book~our~tickets~together.}’
\]

\textit{(Bintang Hindia, vol. 1 no. 20, 3 October 1903)}

The Jawi pilgrim would spend a great deal of time in the company of the kepala-djoemaāh. In the days of sail, the pilgrimage had constituted a form of ‘grand tour’ where the pilgrim would call at a multitude of small ports to take in the sights of each locale. Thus, given the prevailing monsoon, a pilgrim would be away for months (or even years) at a time.
Yet, with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the rise soon after in regular shipping passing through the Red Sea, the trip on board the increasing number of Dutch and English steamers bound for Suez was no longer subject to the monsoons which defined the lands below the winds. Within the Red Sea alone the direct Jeddah to Suez route had once created trip times of over thirty days. Under steam three days became the standard (see Ochsenwald 1982: 61). By the 1890s, small sailing vessels had disappeared from the pilgrimage routes due to pressure first from Hadrami operators in the 1870s and then the major European packet-lines. The final death-knell for the independent traveller came in 1898 when Dutch regulations decreed that pilgrims would only be allowed to travel to the Hijaz by steam – and thus on lines connected to colonial interests (Spat 1912: 347). From then on, Indies pilgrims also called in at fewer (and larger) ports. Colonial regulations of 1904 further stipulated that pilgrims could only board vessels bound for Jeddah at the three major ports of Batavia, Padang (West Sumatra) and Sabang (Aceh) (Spat 1912: 347). More than ever such vessels would have carried a cargo representative of the Jawi ecumene as they crowded on the decks receiving news and instructions from their European-run crews in Malay (Spat 1912: 348).

In his own work, Turner (1973) has described the profound fellowship felt by pilgrims on their journey to the focal point of the ceremonies proper. One might ascribe such feelings to the Jawa on board these fast new steamers. Here a sense of Jawi ecumenism may have expanded as larger, multi-ethnic, bodies of pilgrims bound for the same destination slept on the deck together. The port of origin would once have defined the ethnic mix of the Jawi pilgrims. Naturally the steamers departing from Batavia and Singapore would have carried a more diverse human cargo than smaller vessels from lesser ports. Once on board, a Bugis or Bimanese could easily become another ‘Malay’ or ‘Jawi’ amongst his or her fellow pilgrims.

Not only would the Jawa increasingly board fast-moving European ships – having perhaps travelled to the port of origin by train – their experience as Netherlands subjects was an expedition into an increasingly mapped and interconnected world (Thongchai 1994). Again it would be reasonable to observe how, in the nineteenth century, European technology inadvertently served to bind Muslims more closely together. In 1888, the Resident of Surakarta could not help but notice how the railways had made visits between pesantrens on Java more common. At the time he remarked that ‘no young man with any civilization or knowledge of the world would fail to comment on the time he was able to visit a pêsantrèn so quickly’ (Mr. 1888, no. 728). Now too one’s location on the globe and between Islam’s metropoles was able to be more accurately determined. And if a famous pesantren lay on a trainline, then Mecca was no longer just a place at the end of several weeks’ voyage, it was one possible destination on charts featuring Cairo, Paris and London (cf. Anderson 1983: 170–71). Over the following decades the impact
of maps and the insistence on the precise determination of the direction of prayer saw the evolution of *qibla*-charts with pieces of string passing through Mecca.¹

So it was that by the turn of the century more pilgrims and scholars were circulating more rapidly between Mecca and the Indies. As a consequence, the nature of the Jawi community in the Hijaz changed to accommodate two sorts of visitor. There arose a more salient difference between long- and short-timers, between pilgrims and the Muq¯ım¯un – who themselves were divided between long-term residents and the peripatetic scholars who moved back and forth across the Indian Ocean. But although the swelling size of the community would have allowed for a heightened sense of Jawi identity, it could also enhance a sense of regional difference within this outpost of the ecumene. Javanese and Minangkabau pilgrims could just as easily find more and more of their own fellow travellers in that city.

In all cases Mecca remained the hub of the Jawi religious universe, yet at the same time the claims of home would have pressed upon Jawa confronting daily life in that city as the pilgrims were led by their assigned guides. I have already quoted a generalization on the *kepala-djoemaha*h found in the account of Dja Endar Moeda. These observations were serialized in *Bintang Hindia* (vol. 1 nos 19–22) from September 1903, and the author expressed the hope that they would not attract the ire of his fellow Muslims. He described his role as translator for a shipful of ‘Javanese pilgrims’ bound for Jeddah, and warned intending pilgrims not to buy any food or water from the Arabs unless they first haggle for the price. Although impressed by the sight of Mecca and its throngs, Endar Moeda warned of a city crowded with tricksters and pick-pockets surrounded by (hostile) Bedouin. It was not without reason that many Jawa perceived the Hijaz as a land fraught with danger.

**The Hijazi experience**

Having arrived in the Hijaz, the pilgrims were usually met by their appointed guides. The colonial authorities, through their eyes at the consulates in Singapore and Jeddah, were always suspicious of the pilgrim-guides, and their guild, whose ability to extract portable wealth from their charges was legendary. Some of the services they offered were often of dubious utility or even religious validity. Nonetheless, in their own inimitable fashion, they smoothed the pilgrim’s journey, paying tolls, hiring transport in a houdah (*shuqdhuf*), and securing food and accommodation along the way. Without the guide no one could hire the material necessary to make the journey, and an already dangerous journey could easily become fatal. Often the guides acted in collusion with the Bedouin, as when a caravan between Medina and Mecca was held to ransom for several days in February 1892.² Nonetheless, a guide, even a crooked one, was indispensable for any pilgrim unless, like some Takayrna, he or she was prepared to walk the unsafe road to Mecca (van der
Hence the vast majority chose to stay in tightly managed ethnic groups under the leadership of their appointed translator and guide the *mutawwif*.

In 1885, the Persian pilgrim Mirza Mohammad Husayn Farahani recorded that there were six camel brokers attending to Egyptians, Persians, North Africans, Indians, Ottoman subjects, and ‘Javanese’ (Peters 1994a: 291). In the pilgrimage of 1902, another Persian pilgrim who encountered a ‘Malay’ caravan was unable effectively to communicate with them (Khan 1905: 197). Moreover this anglophile’s contempt for the Malays was clear when he described their natures as being ‘in keeping with the jungles of their native country – crude, chaotic, rank as the undergrowth, and as responsive to their timeless instincts as are the tiger, the bison, and the crocodile’ (Khan 1905: 195). Muslim brothers such as these remained foreign Others.

Everywhere the pilgrims seemed open to exploitation from the moment their baggage lay (often smashed) on the dock at Jeddah. In 1882 (and again from 1888) Sharīf ‘Awn al-Rafīq (Amīr of Mecca, 1882–1905) earned a commission, in addition to his levy from the pilgrim-guides, with the forced sale to the Jawa of locally printed Qur’âns (Ochsenwald 1984: 192; Peters 1994a: 276). Yet it was not only Arabs who were involved in the exploitation of pilgrims. In his official capacity as Consul in the Straits Settlements, W.H. Read charged pilgrims the exorbitant (and after 1875 unnecessary) fee of two and half guilders to stamp their passports (Reid 1997b: 44–45). The first Dutch Consul in Jeddah, Hanegraaf, was also the subject of complaints by pilgrims for his heavy-handed insistence on keeping in trust monies for their return passage, and then forcing them to buy tickets to one particular shipping agency, for which he received a handsome commission (Mr. 1872, no. 594; 1873, no. 201).

Further, in 1883, the second Consul, J.A. Kruijt, his offsider P.N. van der Chijs (d.1889), ‘Umar al-Saqqāf (Alsagoff), J.S. Oswald, and Hassan Johar were all party to a very effective pilgrimage monopoly. In this venture they promised to pay Sharīf ‘Awn al-Rafīq one guilder for every pilgrim transported by their agency to the Straits Settlements. In return the Sharīf applied pressure to bring the pilgrim-guides into the scheme which consequently forced practically all Jawi pilgrims to use the pool. According to Ochsenwald (1984: 102), ticket prices doubled as a result and the substantial profits were divided with 25 per cent to the Sharīf, 40 per cent to the guides and brokers, and the remaining 35 per cent to the individual members of the pool.

In principle the Sharīf of Mecca was held responsible for the safe conduct of the pilgrims by both the Ottoman authorities and the colonial powers. But when the Sharīf could not (or would not) pay an adequate annual indemnity to the surrounding Bedouin, the latter would resort to impeding the pilgrimage on which the Hijazi economy depended. For example, in 1895, no conveyance to Mecca could be secured due to an effective siege by the
Bedouin, and the dragoman of the Dutch consulate, Raden Aboe Bakar Djajadiningrat (see below), made a recommendation to his superiors that the Dutch government should refrain from sending pilgrims in that season. This view was also adopted by the Dutch Consul of the day, however, the then adviser for Native and Arab Affairs, Snouck Hurgronje, counselled against any measures which might lead the Jawa to believe that the colonial government sought to hinder the practice of their religion. After all, the corruption and difficulties faced in Mecca were an insoluble and indeed anticipated part of the Hajj for the Jawa.

It is also apparent from many accounts of the Hajj that the Jawa, although plum commercial opportunities, were little respected by Bedouin and townsman alike. In 1876 Doughty (1936: 2, 512) observed a Jawi caravan and interrupted his self-indulgent narrative to quote an Arab present with him: ‘Though I were to spend my lifetime in the Béled ej-Jáwwa, I could not – ! wellah (by God) I could not wive with any of their hareem’. Ten years later Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 233) likened the whole experience to that of a series of shearings for the Jawi ‘sheep’. And although it would be misleading to claim that the Jawa encountered only such negative sentiments, in the Hijaz they were simultaneously Muslim brothers and foreign others whose tongue, dress and customs differed from those of Arabs, Takayrna, and Turks. The spiritual unity (Turner’s communitas) experienced during the Hajj was thus felt in conjunction with profound cultural difference. Neither was this unique to those outside the Arabic language ecumene. Many travellers from other parts of the Muslim world found a similar situation among their fellows and came to feel a sense of longing for home.

Accounts such as those of the Maghrībi al-‘Ayyāshī (1628–79) have led El Mouddin (1990) to state that the experience of travel in the Muslim world (riḥla) is ‘ambivalent’. ‘Through it the traveller becomes more closely linked to the idea of the Muslim community as a whole, but at the same time learns what is specific to his own people and culture’ (El Mouddin 1990: 69). Another traveller from the Muslim West in the 1180s, Ibn Jubayr, was so incensed by the general rapacity of the ‘neighbours of God’, and the disharmony of the Muslim community as a whole, that he felt compelled to declare that there was ‘no Islam except in the lands of the Maghreb’ (Netton 1993: 64). Similar sentiments are found in the travelogues of the Iraqis ‘Abd Allāh al-Suwaydī (1692–1761) and Abu Thanā’ al-Alāṣī (1802–54) and an anonymous Hadrami born in the mid-nineteenth century (Fattah 1998; Ho 1997: 138). All saw the ‘true’ practice of their faith at home rather than in Mecca. Such experiences of ambiguity, I would argue, form part of the foundation of ideas of national consciousness among the Jawa.

Although the Jawa pilgrims were far from home, they need not have remained among strangers. Their parties and guides merged easily with the kernel of the Jawi ecumene abroad, the Muqīmūn. The physical presence of the Muqīmūn is difficult to quantify. By 1915 they are thought to have
numbered about 5,600, excluding children under twelve, accounting for a very noticeable 4 per cent of the local population (Kaptein 1997: 8). By comparison al-Baṭanūnī, who accompanied the Khedive of Egypt on the pilgrimage of 1909, estimated that the Jawa accounted for about 10 per cent of the Meccan populace (al-Amr 1978: 15). But whereas Vredenbregt (1962) and McDonnell (1986) have made laudable efforts to present statistics these should be taken more as an indication than as hard fact. A large portion of the data collected was through colonial sources and hence the formal sector. I shall now pause briefly to examine this collection of data.

Counting the pilgrims

The only way of accurately gauging how many Jawi pilgrims were present in any given year would have been to survey them as they stood on the plain of ‘Arafat, or (from 1894) when they passed through the fumigation lazarets installed at Mina and Mecca (see Roff 1992). At this point distinctions between Malays, Javanese, and Makassarese would have proved difficult for untrained observers, as indeed it was for most Meccans who only saw ‘Jāwa’ being largely unaware of particularities of dress, dialect, and custom. Vickers (1997: 188–89) deals with this same problem of identification with reference to the exiled Javanese of Ceylon who, subsequent to British appropriation of that island, became its ‘Malay colony’. A colonial official with little direct experience of the Netherlands Indies or the Malay Peninsula would face the same problem. And whereas the Dutch did maintain a policy of appointing Indies-experienced officials to Jeddah, how should one describe a group of pilgrims arriving from Singapore (perhaps without passports) consisting of family members from both sides of the Straits of Malacca? How, too, could Malay or Siamese subjects be differentiated from their Jawi cousins?

Colonial distinctions were also negated in the Hijaz as it lay outside direct colonial control, although the signs of a European presence were evident – particularly in relation to Jeddah consulates and the disinfecting stations installed to prevent the spread of cholera to the West. Here responsibility for the medical needs of Jawi pilgrims was answered by Abdul Razzack (‘Abd al-Razzāq), an Indian employed as both medico (from 1878) and British Vice-Consul (from 1881). It would appear that Abdul Razzack discerned few differences between the Jawa he had occasion to treat, estimating Jawi pilgrim numbers in 1884 at 7,716 but not dividing them by colonial nationality (see Roff 1982: 148). To distinguish Jawi pilgrims by colonial nationality (or indeed regional ethnicity) was clearly hard enough, and to combine the figures for both colonial possessions would lead to other errors, with some pilgrims being accounted for twice. It was relatively easy for a Jawi, refused a pilgrimage passport by the Dutch colonial authorities, to ship to Singapore and thence to the Hijaz – on occasion via Suez, as a number attempted to do in 1879 (Spat 1912: 345).
The examination system for pilgrims was finally dropped in 1902, due to Dutch satisfaction that the pass system, with its numerous conditions and stamps, was recording the vast majority of travellers to the Holy Lands (Spat 1912: 350). However there still remained room to avoid official notice. Passenger lists of many steamers were still imprecise in the 1910s, with pilgrims listed by the single names they possessed and filling any given ship with copious Ahmads and Muhammads.7 Similarly some pilgrims could make their way first to Suez and then sail on to the lesser port of Yanbu' rather than Jeddah and hence avoid the consulate altogether. For example, in 1909 the Dutch Agency in Cairo noted the presence of a Sumatran pilgrim (Abd al-Galil of Jambi) staying without a passport. And again Snouck Hurgronje observed in 1915 that it was still not unheard of for a student to arrive at al-Azhar completely unknown to the authorities.8

As I have noted in Chapter 2, both Great Britain and the Netherlands maintained consulates in Jeddah to answer the colonial need of managing an imagined Islamic threat among their subjects. By ostensibly protecting the interests of pilgrims, the colonial powers gained a window onto their activities abroad, and were able to control their travel by the use of passports and exams. In effect they were managing Muslims by restricting their political aspirations while nominally respecting their religious practices. Dutch regulations also required enrolment at the Jeddah consulate (and later its branch office in Mecca) by all pilgrims intending to stay in the Hijaz for longer periods of study.9 Yet, prior to the 1920s, the figures for those Muqimidn registered with the vice-consulate in Mecca are insignificant in comparison to assumed numbers (see Vredenbregt 1962: 154). This is most likely because the Dutch consulate remained a symbol of European authority (and interference) and, according to Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 7), was visited only with great reluctance.

Nonetheless some well-to-do figures did make their presence known. Following circular 1534 of 8 August 1881, officials in the Indies were required to inform the Jeddah consulate, and its parent embassy in Pera, if any 'pilgrims of note' (aanzienlijke pelgrims) planned to continue on to Constantinopole. Such figures were most often allied to the colonial order, and regulations in force since the 1870s ensured that most administrative offices, other than those of penghulu or minor functionary to the official mosque, were effectively closed to pilgrims and recognized 'ulamâ' (Schrieke 1955: 135; Abdullah 1972: 208). The Dutch, with their extensive network of officials and consulates, could certainly watch the pilgrims; but they never truly engaged with them, or even understood them.

Opening the prism of Snouck Hurgronje

In order to consider the weight of events in Mecca upon the Netherlands Indies, I shall now turn my attention to the intellectual hub of the ecumene as
embodied by the Muqimun of Mecca. Yet to do so, one must first come to terms with the powerful legacy of Snouck Hurgronje, whose seminal study of Mecca has acted as a prism for colonial, and indeed post-colonial, knowledge of the Jawi ecumene in the Hijaz. As will become clear in Chapter 4, Dutch colonial knowledge of that community and of Islam in the Indies was largely predicated on Snouck Hurgronje’s experiences of 1884–85. To understand the whole process of the monitoring of Islam in the Indies will therefore necessitate a reading of the life and connections of this scholar, and more especially his construction of the official Dutch view of the Jawi ecumene.

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje’s (1857–1936) début in Islamic studies was a doctoral dissertation on the historical origins of the Hajj (*Het Mekkaansch Feest*, Leiden, 1880). Thereafter all steps formed a scholarly pilgrimage of his own which even granted him access to the Ka’ba on 13 May 1885 (van Koningsveld 1985a: 8). Later, having compiled his two-volume work on that city, Snouck Hurgronje spent sixteen years in the Indies (1889–1906). For most of his working life he acted in an official capacity as Adviser for Native and Arab Affairs. This role was embodied by the office of the same name, the Kantoor voor Inlandsche en Arabische Zaken (KIAZ). Here Snouck Hurgronje laid the foundations for the work of his anointed successors.

In the 1880s the Dutch needed to understand the precise nature of the influence of the Hajj on their Asian subjects, as the information gathered by the consulates in Singapore and Jeddah had often proved unreliable (Schmidt 1992: 74; Reid 1997b). Thus when Consul Kruijt, on leave in Holland in 1884, met Snouck Hurgronje, who was then teaching at Leiden’s Indische Inrichting, and recommended to the Minister of Colonies, J.P. Sprenger van Eyck, that the young scholar be engaged to study the pilgrimage as it related to Ottoman pan-Islamism and the mystical orders.

This did not find a positive response at first. Sprenger van Eyck found it ‘highly doubtful’ that Snouck Hurgronje could successfully ‘study the political and religious situation of the pilgrims’ primarily because ‘he, and whosoever is commissioned to travel with him, must be acquainted with sufficient Malay to gain trustworthy access to native custom and ultimately personal access to [the pilgrims]’. However, following Kruijt’s insistence that his ‘years of intercourse with natives of all ranks and parts of the archipelago’ had rendered him a viable teacher, Snouck Hurgronje was appointed. The Colonial Institute was then subsidized by the government in the amount of fl1500 to defray Snouck Hurgronje’s expenses (van Koningsveld 1988: 61).

**The Jeddah consulate and a Javanese filter**

Snouck Hurgronje arrived at Jeddah on 24 August 1884 and lodged at the Consulate with Kruijt (Drewes 1957: 9) (see fig. 4). Like Snouck Hurgronje, Kruijt rejected the idea of a global Muslim plot, yet he was not sympathetic to Muslims, stating that ‘the general spirit of the Arabs was opposed to all
that a Christian and European is’. Such views were bolstered by the anti-Christian pronouncements of Sharif ‘Abd al-Muttalib bin Ghālib [r.1851–55, 1880–82], directed to the Muslims of Java, in February 1881 (Schmidt 1992: 72–73); and local memories of the anti-Christian massacres of 1858 and the consequent English bombardment of the town.

In Jeddah Snouck Hurgronje also formed a friendship with P.N. van der Chijs, the local manager for the Nederlandsche Stoomvaart Maatschappij Oceaan (a subsidiary of the Alfred Holt group) and occasional representative for Sweden and Norway. Among the small European community van der Chijs had the strongest influence on Snouck. Van der Chijs was a good manager capable of acts of great generosity. In 1877 he had manumitted two Jawi slaves and given them passage back to Singapore. As I have noted above, through the Jeddah pilgrimage monopoly, he also had an ongoing business connection with the Jawa. Van der Chijs spoke Arabic and, after Snouck Hurgronje’s return to Leiden, kept his colleague informed of local

Figure 4 Staff of the Jeddah Consulate with a visiting party en route to the Indies, taken Jeddah 1884. Rear: (from left to right) Hussayn al-Qawwas, C. Snouck Hurgronje; middle: (?), J.L.A. Brandes, J.A. Kruijt, P.N. van der Chijs, (?); front: Johar, a servant of Kruijt, Mohammad, a servant of van der Chijs. (Or. 18097 [NINO large plate, 2.2])
developments.\textsuperscript{14} It is also likely that van der Chijs spoke to Snouck Hurgronje about two prominent Indies Arabs. These were the Acehnese exile Ḥābīb ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zāhir al-Saqqāf (1833–96), then residing in Mecca;\textsuperscript{15} and a correspondent with strong connections to that city, Sayyid ʿUṭhmān bin ʿAbd Allāh bin ʿAqīl bin Yahyā al-ʿAlawī of Batavia (see Chapter 4). The latter was well known throughout the Indies as Said Oesman.

From his base, Snouck Hurgronje met parties of pilgrims as they passed through the consulate where they took their portraits. This work was later continued by the Meccan physician ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, with the prints being sent on to Leiden by van der Chijs in 1887–88. Today it is difficult to know how the Jawi pilgrims were assembled to be recorded for posterity. Perhaps as their guides led them to the consulate for registration they were invited to pose with their stamped passports in hand – perhaps even on the pretext that such was a part of the registration process. The images that were recorded within the compound of the consulate reflect Snouck Hurgronje’s aim of capturing the pilgrims from ‘our archipelago’ in ‘characteristic groups’\textsuperscript{16}. It is through these images published in the album that accompanied Mekka, that we as outsiders see the Jawi pilgrims for the first time. Of the thirty-nine plates issued, fourteen are group photos of Jawa grouped, as they would have been on arrival, by their region of origin. It is today difficult to differentiate many of these groups without the captions that accompany them. There are of course notable individuals, like a female pilgrim from Banten enveloped in a white shroud, or Prince Noer of Bacan accompanied by an uncle and Imam Ahmad who had told Snouck Hurgronje about the books read ‘below the winds’ (see fig. 1, Chapter 1). However the only clue to Prince Noer’s royal heritage is the higher quality of his shirt and, more tellingly, the fact that he and his uncle wore shoes. Otherwise most pilgrims are dressed in the ubiquitous sarung, Arab-style cloaks and various forms of turban.

At first it may seem strange that Snouck Hurgronje did not take the photographs in Mecca. But whereas photographers faced few problems in the open port of Jeddah, even the Egyptian Engineer Ṣādiq Bey had experienced trouble in his attempt to photograph Mecca in 1880, and Snouck Hurgronje’s local friends had highlighted such in letters to him.\textsuperscript{17} It may also have been the case that Snouck Hurgronje, in his desire to be an effective participant observer of Islam, realized that the use of a camera – and especially the bulky apparatus required in the 1880s – would not only fail accurately to capture the experience of Mecca, but would expose him to the crowd and render his operations useless. Similarly, in Mecca, Snouck Hurgronje ceased making entries in his diary, which would also have compromised him as a seeker of the wrong sort of knowledge. The only notes he could have made would have been in the form of the marginal annotations of most seekers of (approved Islamic) knowledge in the circles of the Meccan ʿulamā’ he would soon meet.

Snouck Hurgronje’s conversations with these pilgrims are likely to have stimulated further his desire to travel to Mecca in person to get to the heart of
Figure 5 Aboe Bakar Djajadiningrat (Or. 12.288 K2/AR 4774)
the Jawi community there. He must surely have considered a personal journey to Mecca long before accepting his commission from the Ministry of Colonies. Such longings are demonstrated in his first letter from Jeddah to his mentor Theodor Nöldeke (1836–1930):

> I must daily lament from this viewpoint, that the corner of the world where Islām lives and works, safe from European snoopers, the haram with its denizens is closed to me. Through a modarris [teacher] of the masdjid al-haram I hope that I will soon be able to meet . . . various inhabitants from our archipelago who have lived, studied and taught in Mecca for between 1 and 20 years and who will assemble at the Consulate and who are worth their weight in gold to me.18

As Snouck Hurgronje’s superiors believed, a study of the pilgrims could be achieved in Jeddah since the exacting rituals of the Ḥajj itself were well covered in the manuals used by the pilgrims. Yet what Snouck Hurgronje would achieve in Mecca was the animation of that information through personal experience. In order to do this Snouck Hurgronje needed key contacts whose activities intersected with his own. Among the people he met in Jeddah, two acquaintances would prove crucial. The first, the dragoman contracted to teach him Malay, Raden Aboe Bakar Djajadiningrat (c.1854–c.1914) (see fig. 5), became more than a technical assistant. The second, Aboe Bakar’s own teacher Sayyid ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī (1850–1924) (see fig. 6), was to act as one of Snouck Hurgronje’s protectors in Mecca.

Shortly after his arrival Snouck Hurgronje had met the genial Aboe Bakar recording in his diary that he was ‘the most amenable individual’ with whom he had come in contact.

> He has already looked after me from Mecca by providing an important number of books dealing with the Naqshbandiīja activities, furthermore he told me all that he knew about the organization of education in the Masdjid al-Haram. Without unusual intellect or peculiar cunning apparent, he appears to have profited tolerably well from a very good upbringing and has obtained by himself, with unusual partiality and industry, practical ‘useful knowledge’. I have no doubt that he will prove to be of the greatest utility when he returns here for a few days after the completion of the hadj.19

As I have argued elsewhere (Laffan 1999a), Snouck Hurgronje’s relationship with Aboe Bakar Djajadiningrat was crucial to his experience of the Jawi ecumene in the Hijaz. Indeed Aboe Bakar’s Bantenese vision of the Jawa being led by the Javanese became entangled with Snouck Hurgronje’s vision
Figure 6  A very young ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī? (NINO 1.43)
through his use of research reports that he had commissioned Aboe Bakar to write. More crucially, Aboe Bakar's personal connections provided a discursive constraint on Snouck Hurgronje's colonial vision as a participant observer. Snouck Hurgronje would be accompanied by Aboe Bakar's Javanese friends and he would be introduced to key Javanese ‘ulamā’.

Hence Snouck Hurgronje’s experience of the Jawa in Mecca was first and foremost an engagement with the Javanese of that city who emphasized their leadership of the ecumene. None of the biographies of the Jawi ‘ulamā’ (Tarājim ‘ulamā’ al-jāwa), which Aboe Bakar later sent to Snouck, were of Sumatran scholars, and thus in turn Snouck’s Mekka makes scant reference to them, or adjudges them as being of low quality. Of course there were Sumatrans active in Mecca around the time, as is shown by the letter of Muhammad Salih in Mecca to his brother in West Sumatra in 1874 (see Mr. 1874, no. 524). Herein he referred to three ‘shaykhs’ then in residence in Mecca: Ahmad Khalidi, Muhammad Nur bin Isma’īl Saligen, and Muhammad Salih bin Faqih Uthman. There is the chance that these shaykhs were actually pilgrim-guides, although the tone of the letter seems to accord them much higher status. In any case, by the time Snouck Hurgronje was in Mecca the Minangkabau and their teachers may well have been eclipsed by the flood of pilgrims from Banten.

After being engaged in Jeddah, Aboe Bakar settled into the consulate and his career. This saw him translating for various consuls and regularly travelling to Mecca to monitor the pilgrims and the Muqīmūn. Some members of that community were, like himself, the students of ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī. This Meccan scholar was the son of the eminent Muḥammad Śālīḥ Zawāwī who acted as the occasional Qāḍī of Jeddah. He was also a leading shaykh of the Naqshbandīya order in Mecca – most often initiating new members from Pontianak (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 288). The younger Zawāwī – most likely the teacher (modarris) referred to by Snouck Hurgronje in his letter to Nöldeke of October 1884 – was first educated at the Sāwlatīya madrasa founded by Rahmat Allāh Kayrnāwī (‘Abd al-Jabbār 1982: 140). He was also a non-conformist and opponent of the cronyism of Sharīf ‘Awn al-Rafīq. Indeed his own appointment as a teacher within the Haram had been secured only after intense opposition from the religious establishment (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 184).

With the friendship and protection of men like Zawāwī, the way to Mecca would soon be open for Snouck, even though the people of Mecca had become alive to the potential for European ‘snoppers’. Indeed, one Alsatian scholar Charles Huber had even met his death in the area in July 1884 (Drewes 1957: 9). Still, an undaunted Snouck Hurgronje was determined to press on, and to adopt, like those before him, the garb of a Muslim. But, unlike those before him, this adoption went beyond the purely sartorial. For Snouck Hurgronje, conversion was the key to achieving his ethnographic aims of observing his political and empirical subjects at a personal level (see Kommers 1998).
Therefore on 1 January 1885 he moved to Aboe Bakar’s home where he began to be personally instructed in the faith by his friend (van Koningsveld 1988: 86–87). Moreover, references in his diary to the visit of a barber and salves soon after indicate that he was even circumcized there.

Formal conversion to Islam is a simple process achieved through the recitation of the profession of faith before two witnesses. It seems that on 16 January 1885, Snouck Hurgronje was visited by two Turkish officials to witness his conversion. By the 18th he had secured the personal invitation to Mecca of the Ottoman Vali, Osmán Pashâ, whom he photographed at the Consulate on 21 January (see van Koningsveld 1988: 87). The way was open, and from this time Snouck Hurgronje took the same name as the Meccan doctor whose portrait appears in his photo-album, ‘Abd al-Ghaффâr, ‘servant of The All-forgiving’. Still, as the anonymous author of a Javanese handbook on Muslim ethics had written in the late sixteenth century, ‘A believer is also a Muslim, but a Muslim is not always a believer. Belief is inward, Islam is outward’ (Drewes 1978: 30–31). For the Muslim one’s inner faith (îmân) – being a personal matter solely between God and the individual – need not be questioned so long as it was not expressed in a manner which might lead other Muslims astray. When Snouck Hurgronje later revealed to Nöldeke that he had been within the Kâ‘ba, he added that he could only have done so ‘by recourse to the izhâr al-îslâm [the outward manifestation of Islam]’. I would thus maintain that Snouck Hurgronje was a Muslim – a fact accepted by his fellow Muslims – though most likely not a true believer.

The ‘ulamâ’ of Mecca in the latter half of the nineteenth century

Having encountered and photographed his subjects in Jeddah, Snouck Hurgronje – alias ‘Abd al-Ghaффâr – travelled to Mecca on 21 February 1885 to gain an introduction to their teachers. This was, as Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 4) later recalled, ‘a tiresome journey of one night and one day . . . in a most uncomfortable shuqduf . . . the great event in my life, the beginning of a medieval dream’.

Upon his arrival Snouck Hurgronje performed the tawâf before moving to the lodgings arranged through Aboe Bakar’s mediation. The next morning he returned to the Haram accompanied by his Javanese friends whereupon he encountered the eminent Aḥmad bin Zaynî Dahîlân.

Sayyid Dahîlân, a mummy-like figure, a skeleton covered with a skin of brownish yellow parchment, the head bent forward as if it would touch the ground if he were not supported on one side by a staff and on the other by the shoulder of one of the two Javanese servants without whose assistance the Muftî was not able to move in his own room. My friends told me, as they saw the great man advancing, that
I had to follow the custom of kissing the right hand of the venerated one while passing by. With the abrupt voice of an asthmatic the Rector addressed questions to the newly arrived student of sacred science, and with evident benevolence was contented with the scanty information that he came from ‘the Western parts’, that he had studied a good deal, but that he wished to increase his learning by attending the lectures of the famous professors of the Haram . . . The Sheikh al-ulamâ fully approved of the intentions attributed to me by my obliging companions and invited me to attend his own lectures on the famous commentary of Baidâwî.

(Snouck Hurgronje 1941: 4–5)

Ahmad Daḥlān, as Muftī of the Shafi‘ī madhhab, was then the most important figure for the Jawa in Mecca. One Jawi scholar, Muhammad Salih of Semarang (Saleh Darat), wrote a commentary on a grammar by Daḥlān, which was published in Mecca in 1886 (see Drewes 1971: 69). And Daḥlān’s biography, written by his pupil Abū Bakr Shatṭā, was published at the expense of Muhammad Salih’s son Aqib, and contained an elegiac poem written by a Sumatran called Abd Allah bin Muhammad Azhari (Kaptein 1997: 4–5). Daḥlān’s importance for the Jawa was also reflected in the Muhimmāt al-nafā‘īs, wherein the majority of fatāwā were given by him (Kaptein 1997).

And as Snouck Hurgronje had access to Daḥlān, then he had access to the majority of his Jawi students guaranteeing the success of his mission. Hence he was on hand to witness the stream of Jawi pilgrims coming to Daḥlān’s home behind their guides to throw off their old names and receive new Islamic identities on paper slips mass-printed for the purpose (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 237–38).

Snouck Hurgronje also often met with Nawāwī al-Bantinī – another of Aboe Bakar’s teachers – whose home stood on a hill over-looking the Haram. Nawāwī’s prodigious output also marked him as a revivalist scholar given that, unlike his Jawi predecessors who produced the works cited by Ahmad Bacan, he published solely in Arabic. He therefore intended students to read and understand Islam entirely in the original language of revelation. His importance for Snouck Hurgronje cannot be underestimated. A list of thirty-four works sent by Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje soon after his departure consists of eleven titles by Ahmad Daḥlān, two by Sayyid Abū Bakr Shatṭā, with the remaining eighteen coming from the pen of Nawāwī.

Similarly in Mecca Snouck Hurgronje claimed to have interacted with the other Jawi ‘ulamā whose biographies (tarājim) were later sent to him by Aboe Bakar in 1887. These included, as I have remarked above, a large number from Aboe Bakar’s home region of Banten; being Nawāwī, Marzūq, Ismā‘īl, ‘Abd al-Karīm, Arshad bin ‘Alwān and Arshad bin As‘ād. A proud Aboe Bakar described Banten as being ‘unlike any other land’ outside Mecca regarding the number of its people who sought ‘a detailed knowledge of [Arabic] grammar.’
Further Banten was consistently the source of the largest single body of pilgrims. In 1898 Banten contributed 1,289 pilgrims, followed by the neighboring Priangan (837) and Palembang (715) (van Delden 1899: 563). This was even more remarkable considering that there were twenty-five recognized Bantenese teachers working in Mecca, including two women (van Delden 1898: 653).

In his report, Aboe Bakar also described two Sundanese, Ḥasan Muṣṭafā (1852–1930) and Muḥammad of Garut; the Batavians Junayd, Mujtabā and ‘Aydarūs; and the Sumbawans, Zayn al-Dīn and ‘Umar. All had in turn been students to the great Jawī ‘ulamā’ of the 1850s; ‘Abd al-Ghānī Bīmā, Ismā‘īl al-Minankabāwī, and Aḥmad Ḵaṭīb Sambās. Most of these men were engaged in the education of Jawī students, whilst the most talented, such as Nawāwī had non-Jawi students too. It was a matter of course that new students gravitated to the teachers from their own regions before attaining an ijāza from them and moving on to a great Shaykh. In turn these student networks facilitated the economic linkages between the ecumene and the Muqīmūn. Such personal relationships often ensured that a master like ‘Abd al-Ḵarīm of Banten enjoyed a substantial welcome in their homelands (Sartono 1966: 163–65).

Some teachers were also actively engaged in commerce. Marzūq (Hadji Mardjoeki), a relative of Nawāwī from Tanara, was particularly famous for his regular journeys across the Indian Ocean maintaining his commercial interests (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 273; Sartono 1966: 185–88). However, when ‘Abd al-Ḵarīm succeeded Aḥmad Ḵaṭīb of Sambas as the head of the Qādirīya wa Naqshbadīya order in 1876, he could dispense with the need for regular travel back to the bilād al-jāwa, leaving his home of Banten to enjoy a life of wealth and position in Mecca.

In Mecca too, all such established leaders of the different lands of the Jawī ecumene and the Muslim world could speak with the added authority of a state yet to fall to the Western powers. And, whilst their writings and teachings in the Qurānic sciences may not have had an aura of anti-colonialism, it was in the inner sanctum of their teaching circles that Islam as the preferred ideal for independent government could be asserted without fear of police informers. Even Nawāwī, whose writings, like those of al-Maqassārī before him, were politically quiescent, who was the son of a Dutch-appointed penghulu, and whose own brother Ahmad then served as Penghulu of Tanara, would express his opposition to Dutch rule as a matter of principle (Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 270). Indeed Nawāwī may also have shown a proclivity to relate the turbulent events of his home world to his teaching. Johns (1997) has suggested that such a reading may be applied to his commentary the Marāḥ Labīd (Labīd’s Resting Place, Cairo, c.1885). It was for this reason then that Snouck Hurgronje’s mission was so imperative for Dutch colonial rule, and to see what personalities and atmospheres lay behind the teaching of the outwardly neutral kitab kuning described by Imam Ahmad of Bacan.
Pan-Islamism and Jawi ecumenism in Mecca

In his conversations with the ‘ulamā’ – Arab or Jawi – Snouck Hurgronje would have employed Arabic. It is also reasonable to assume that if he was accepted in Mecca as a sincere convert to Islam, then his scholarly ‘subjects’ would have emphasized their commonality with their European ‘brother in Islam’. Here in Mecca they stood united as European and Asian. No longer colonizer and colonized, to their minds Snouck Hurgronje’s sympathies must surely have lain with his coreligionists. For this reason Snouck Hurgronje’s Western ear was able ‘to drink in their words’ and the many conversations attacking the various European colonizers in general which were for him ‘less delightful than instructive’. Such ‘instructive’ conversations among the Jawa most often revolved around the Aceh War, while others dwelt on the decline of their own societies and asserted the need for the revival of Islam upon which resistance to Dutch power could be predicated (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 245–46). Indeed, prior to his last departure from Banten, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karīm declared that he would never return to his homeland while it was under infidel rule. And thereafter many of the branches of the Qādirīya wa Naqshbandīya in Banten moved from ‘Abd al-Karīm’s vague predictions of the restoration of the Bantenese Sultanate to active planning for rebellion (Sartono 1966: 163–66). It is, however, an overstatement to see the direct authority of the distant shaykh – transmitted through the scholarly networks – behind what would be, ultimately, a very local failure under local leaders.

Snouck Hurgronje not only profited from conversations held with such ‘ulamā’ as ‘Abd al-Karīm and Nawāwī at their homes, but in turn was an object of local curiosity. An indication of the esteem Snouck Hurgronje enjoyed may be seen in a number of questions addressed to him by Ahmad bin Zaynī Dahlān. Dahlān’s questions revolved around the major issues felt to be within Snouck Hurgronje’s expertise; namely the West, Christianity, and colonialism.

A question about Germania and Almania. Are they one race and kind like the Spanish? Or are they two races? Does Almania have an independent state and a sovereign king? The author of the Aqwam al-masālik does not mention Almania. Could you please shed light on this. Then could you, in a report, write a list of such states mentioned in the Aqwam al-masālik – without too much detail about their resources, armies, lands and their quarrels. I should like moreover a statement about the origin of the uncivilized among them [i.e. their colonies]. When did Europe conquer them and when did these states begin? When was the Christian religion introduced and what form of worship did they have in each state before the arrival of the Christian religion? When was each state independent and [when did it] attain its
own sovereignty? When was there independence like in India before the English? When did Holland emerge from Spain’s power and when did it take possession of the Jawi land? And when did France take possession of the lands of Algeria? When did Spain take Andalusia? Which states helped them in this? [Could you also write] a report on Galicia [Jalālaqa] and Venice [Bunduqīya] which are likewise not mentioned by these names. Your task is to develop all that in detail.25

The work cited by Dahlan was most likely Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī’s (d. 1889) Aqwam al-masālik fī ma‘rifat ahwāl al-mamālik (The Most Direct Path Leading to a Knowledge of Kingdoms, Tunis, 1867). This political study, including information on the Western states and their technological achievements, was directed to the advancement and revitalization of the Ottoman Empire (Hourani 1983: 87–94). Al-Tūnisī’s book clearly interested Dahlān as another small note sent to Snouck Hurgronje is a request to borrow his copy of the Aqwam al-masālik and another modern history, the Qatf al-zuhīr of the Syrian Iskandar bin Ya’qūb Abkariyūs (d.1885). Dahlān would have used these works for a planned revision of his own universal history, al-Futūḥat al-īslāmīya (The Victories of Islam, Mecca 1884) – which Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 165) later adjudged to be in harmony with the ‘uncritical’ spirit of his time. Given the tone of Dahlān’s requests it would seem that a master–student relationship existed between them and that their discussions gave Dahlān a chance to satisfy his curiosity about the nature of the West.

It is clear from his questions that Dahlān was concerned by the impact of European rule on Muslim peoples and equated it with Christianization. In his questions we also see reference to the contradictory actions of the Dutch who, having freed themselves from Spain, had set about imposing their hegemony over ‘the Jawi land’ (al-bilād al-jawī) – which Dahlān imagined as a unitary entity.26 Certainly the injustice of Holland’s colonization of the bilād al-jawā, after its own sufferings at the hands of Spain, was not lost on the Jawa themselves. References to the Hispano–Dutch connection were found in contemporary epics such as the Javanese Hikayat Baron Sakender (Ricklefs 1974: 374–413). One Bantenese rebel, Agoes Sabrim, was rumoured to have fled Java to seek aid from Spain after making the pilgrimage in 1869 (Sartono 1966: 131). Dahlān’s interest in Jawi questions was no doubt a result of his intercourse with his Jawi students, much as Ahmad al-Qushāshī and Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī had felt the need to compose works for the Jawa following interaction in Medina in the seventeenth century. Moreover, like most of the people in Mecca, Ahmad Dahlān was concerned with the independence (istiqlāl) and sovereignty (mulk) of Muslims. For although Dahlān’s Jawi fatāwā published in the Muhimmāt al-nafā’is did not contain reference to anti-colonial struggle, his attitude to the principle of jihād was laid out in
another *fatwā* on the popular campaigns of the Mahdī of the Sudan. Herein the Muftī affirmed that Muslims were all enjoined to fight unbelievers and polytheists to liberate Muslim territory.27

Perhaps a Sumatran teacher, Ahmad Lampung, expressed the most explicit statement of Jawi ecumenism ‘drunk’ by Snouck Hurgronje’s ear.28

The Sheikh often reflected how things would have gone if one had not eagerly welcomed the Dutch; if one had drowned the petty squabbles which divided the Jâwah at home by the noble war-cry of Islam: had one gathered under the colours of the Sultan of Banten, Palembang, or even Achêh and expelled the Belanda then many millions of Jâwah would form together a great Moslim empire, which other members of the race would continually have joined. . . . [and then in a letter to an errant relative in the Indies bureaucracy] . . . he described the tragic position into which the Jâwah lands were fallen owing to laxity in religious things, and insisted that stronger faith would have meant greater zeal and union, in which case no doubt an irresistible Moslim Jâwah empire would have developed instead of the *kafir* government.

It is therefore clear that the environment of Mecca facilitated the widespread expression of Jawi ecumenism founded increasingly in opposition to colonial rule. As I have noted in Chapter 2 above, the Aceh war activated both the hopes of the Jawa and fears of the Dutch. Jawi sympathy in turn overlapped with pan-Islamic sentiments as Jawa followed with interest the victories of the Mahdī or the failures of Sultan Abdülhamid. Indeed, through the personal agency of the Hadrami expatriate Ḥabīb ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Zāhir, the Aceh War had already attracted the attention of the Ottoman press (Reid 1969: 121–25). And, as I have mentioned, Snouck Hurgronje observed in Mecca how such topics fostered a sense of unity among the Jawa. Nonetheless, it would be wrong here to equate that very ecumenical sense with an embryonic Indies-wide nationalism. The Acehnese remained effectively alone in their battles, which Snouck Hurgronje himself would observe at first hand from 1891.

**Jawi–Arab relations in Mecca**

If the Jawi scholarly networks and anti-colonial sentiment were forces linking the Jawa in Mecca, then so too was the daily life of that city, where the burgeoning Jawi community formed a prominent minority. And like noticeable minorities in many places, there were communal tensions, especially in relation to the issue of religious authority. In his biographical report to Snouck Hurgronje (*Tarājim ‘ulamā’ al-jāwa*) Aboe Bakar related that Shaykh Nawāwī’s brother, ‘Abd Allāh, seldom attended the lectures of the Arab
teachers. Like many Jawi students, ‘Abd Allāh seemed satisfied with teaching and learning outside the walls of the Ḥaram – a situation which reflected the ongoing debate over the superiority of the Arabs as guardians of Islamic knowledge in both the Hijaz and the lands below the winds. It was well known in both regions that Arab teachers often had scant regard for most of the Jawi ‘ulamā’ of Mecca who in turn resented their patronizing attitude. Jawi indifference towards their Arab hosts was sometimes interpreted as a sign of some inherent shyness or modesty. Nonetheless, this allegedly ‘retiring nature’ could be over-ridden and Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 288) recalled an instance when a Malay from Pontianak had come to the defence of a Javanese being mistreated by an Arab in the Ḥaram.

The potential for Arab–Jawi opposition also appears in Aboe Bakar’s biography of ‘Abd al-Shakūr Sūrabāya, who spent his youth in the service of the Meccan Muḥammad Shaṭṭā.

It was thus at home, where [‘Abd al-Shakūr] was responsible for procuring food from the market, to the point where, should it please the great shaykh to purify himself for prayer at any time of the day then Shaykh ‘Abd al-Shakūr would be called to fetch a bucket of water. We have heard that sometimes he even slept on the threshold of the bathroom or the cisterns, to be awoken by the opening of the door in anticipation of his shaykh’s stirring from his sleep! It went so far that once the great shaykh tripped over the stomach of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Shakūr – who at once arose ready to do his bidding. Things went on in this degrading manner for him yet he was aware of – and even enjoyed – these means to the point where he became linked to the fortune of the shaykh.

Despite Snouck Hurgronje noting that the successive marriages of ‘Abd al-Shakūr to the daughters of Sayyid Muḥammad Shaṭṭā were regarded locally as mésalliances, ‘Abd al-Shakūr’s selfless devotion was portrayed by Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 283–85) in his own book with greater sympathy.

The very next night old Shattā stumbled over his pupil’s figure, invisible to him in the dark, upon which the latter hastily kissed his feet and fetched him the water of purification. When the divine apologised for the kick which he unintentionally gave the youth, the student begged him most fervently to wake him thus every night when necessary. The Sheikh, deeply touched, embraced his unselfish disciple.

Aboe Bakar, while implying a paternal relationship between ‘Abd al-Shakūr and his master (which reflects the idealized devotion of a Sūfī for his shaykh) did not relate their embracing. Indeed Aboe Bakar described the
situation as disgraceful (mahāna), though ultimately beneficial to ‘Abd al-Shakūr as a willing participant. The embrace described by Snouck Hurgronje may indeed have taken place but Aboe Bakar’s own description serves to illustrate the contempt of some Jawa for the selfless devotion of ‘Abd al-Shakūr, and perhaps even some of the Ṣūfī orders. If this is indeed the case then he may have anticipated the published criticisms of Ahmad Khāṭīb al-Minankabāwī in the 1890s described in Chapter 5 below.

Despite such occasional undercurrents, Aboe Bakar in his Tarājim – and thereafter Snouck Hurgronje in Mekka – referred to the mixing between Arabs and Jawa in Mecca. Some teachers, like ‘Umar and Zayn al-Dīn of Sumbawa or ‘Abd al-Shakūr Ṣūrābāya, were noted for their fluency in Arabic following long years of association with the people of Mecca. Their extended residences usually resulted in marriages to Arab or Egyptian women. Indeed it was the daughter of such a match who was the cause of rivalry between the two Sumbawan teachers.

The children of such marriages often grew up to take positions as mediators between the two communities, either as pilgrim-guides or in trade and education. Such was the case with the sons of Shaykh Junayd of Batavia, who had married an Egyptian woman. Both men commenced careers in Mecca as teachers catering for students from Batavia, Sumbawa, and Bali. Likewise in the Southeast Asian context it was such children who would first mediate between the Arab and Jawi strands of Islamic discourse (Roff 1967: 32–90).

It is noteworthy that many of these locally born children, if they remained in Mecca, identified as Meccans or even Egyptians if their mothers were from Cairo. Thus the West Asian part of one’s heritage was emphasized in the Hijaz, especially by those who grew up with Arabic as their mother tongue. One such muqīm, the head of the Jawi pilgrim-guides between 1883 and 1888, was known as al-‘Irāqī. Moreover, many such Jawa were keen to hide their foreign origin in the face of the acrimony they received on the streets of Mecca. In a report to the Consul in 1913, Aboe Bakar referred to this tendency.

If their much abused people of origin are mentioned, the peranakan born in Mecca of an Egyptian parent will say angrily that they are Cairene [Masri] and use the Maghribi epithet ‘only good for tripe, dribble and gravy’ to [describe the people of] British India. Indeed for the Indies they say ‘Broken cup’ and for Java: ‘Snake-eater!’ Thus they disguise their origin.31

Marriages between Arabs and Jawa in Mecca strengthened the links between Southeast and West Asia and served to embed the multi-ethnic community of Mecca in an overall world of believers. Conversely the friendships formed between Jawi students in Mecca also led to a tightening of Jawi ecumenical
bonds back in the archipelago reinforced by marriages between their children. The child of a marriage between a Javanese and a Malay would have felt a more Jawi affinity. Such personal networks should also be considered when exploring the nature of identity change in the *bilāḍ al-jāwā* and form an extension of what Snouck Hurgronje (1906: I, 54) later observed in Aceh where the once deprecatred intermarriage of members of different clans saw the gradual dissolution of these groups and the creation of a stronger Acehnese identity. Still despite all such expressions of Jawi ecumenism, whether in pan-Islamic solidarity, Arab-Jawi opposition, or intermarriage among the Jawa, important inter-cultural barriers remained, and it is these that I now wish to consider.

**Ambiguity within the ecumene**

Whilst it is important to stress that the growing Jawi community in Mecca played its role in the realization of a Jawi identity below the winds, Jawi unity, on the one level, could sit beside a sense of diversity on another. In Mecca most Jawa would circulate in their own ethnic groups, being led by their own guides and frequenting particular houses assigned to them as perpetual endowments. For example, when Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjārī stayed in Mecca in the eighteenth century he resided in a *waqf* house established there by his patron Sultan Tahlil Allah of Banjar (1700–45). This house remains a centre of the Banjarese in Mecca today (Azra 1992: 503). Further, as Ochsenwald (1984: 24, 44–45, 124) points out, Mecca was loosely divided with certain quarters containing concentrations of particular groups. The clearest racial compartmentalization in the Hijaz was to be found in the large camp of Africans (Takayrna) outside Jeddah.

Such differences were, I believe, also emphasized by the various Şūfī orders popular in their homelands. Prior to the eighteenth century it was not uncommon for a scholar to be a member of any number of different orders and to be familiar with their rites. Yet by the late nineteenth century the orders had very specific, and often exclusive, memberships (cf. Voll 1987; Levtzion 1997). In this light membership of an order might also have been a strategy for ethnic distinction. Although inter-*ṭarīqa* boundaries remained porous (Sartono 1966: 152), in the *bilāḍ al-jāwā* the territory of the different orders was jealously guarded, leading to a double division whereby the different memberships of a single order maintained strong senses of regional autonomy. This desire for autonomy sometimes evolved into regionally specific orders such as that founded by Ahmad Ḵaṭīb Sambās, the Qādirīya wa Naqshbandīya, itself a fusion of the rituals of both the Naqshbandīya and the Qādirīya. As Aboe Bakar affirmed in 1913, in general the Naqshbandīya drew adherents from the Priangan, Batavia, and Sumatra; the Qādirīya from Banten and Borneo; Bugis went to the Sanūsīya; Madurese the Rāshidīya; while the ‘Alawīya attracted some Sumatrans (van Delden 1898: 53).
As I have suggested previously (see Laffan 1999a), when attuned to Aboe Bakar’s terminology, the fragmented nature of the Jawi community is even implicit within the reports he sent to Snouck Hurgronje. This may be seen in his description of Ismā’īl al-Bantinī and the activities of the Qādirīya wa Naqshbandīya order which he headed there, with their own special feasts (‘azīma) hosted in rotation by the shaykhs of Mecca and ‘attended by all the Javanese both of note and status’ (Ṭurājim ‘ulamā’ al-jāwa; Cod. Or. 7111).

At such gatherings, the unity of Islam was again asserted with renditions of famous Šūfī poems for the assembled community. Yet such feasts were not always inclusive. As I have noted above, most Jawi pilgrims, like their teachers before them, would attach themselves to a particular order and especially a particular shaykh or his khalīfa to become obedient to his direction. These feasts Aboe Bakar described seem representative of the Javanese tradition of the slametan. Though we have no direct evidence for them in Aboe Bakar’s reports, other, analogous, feasts would have served as gatherings where Acehnese, Minangkabau, or Malays would gather together to enjoy the rituals, fellowship, and foods savoured in their own lands.

It is also clear from the Aboe Bakar reports that Jawi students likewise had a regional focus in their academic activities. In the 1880s some teachers – like Mujtabā of Batavia – catered specifically to Sundanese, Malay, or Batavian students. Indeed van Bruinessen (1990: 238) has observed that there continues today to be a difference between the curricula of texts used in the pesantren of Java as opposed to those of Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, and other parts of the archipelago affirming the divisions laid out by Aboe Bakar. Nonetheless, after one or two years under a Jawi shaykh, students would move on to the circle of one of the great masters of both the ecumene and the Muslim world; such as Nawāwī, Daḥlān, or Ḥasab Allāh (see below). It is here then that Jawi students, whose Arabic was now fluent enough for such lectures, would have experienced a full sense of Islamic community as experienced by participating in the ‘sacrament’ of reading the texts of Islam in which Snouck Hurgronje had taken part.

A shortened stay: politics and murder in the Hijaz

Snouck Hurgronje was able to remain safe in Mecca for five months. However, he did not have unrestricted access to all members of the scholarly community, as he himself later admitted (Snouck Hurgronje 1941). Indeed his close association with Ahmad Daḥlān constrained his field of research as, soon after their first meeting, he was informed by his Javanese companions that there could be no question of meeting the latter’s principal rival Muhammad Ḥasab Allāh (1828–1917). Moreover, behind their dispute lay another between the Turkish Vālī and the Sharīf, as Daḥlān’s patron was ‘Awn al-Rafīq while Ḥasab Allāh sided with Osmān Pāshā. For us this dispute raises
the issue of the alignment of Snouck Hurgronje’s Javanese friends and guides. The virulence of the dispute seems a reason for thinking that Snouck Hurgronje had few opportunities to associate with those Jawa who studied under Hasan Allâh.

During the last period of Ottoman control of the Hijaz (1840–1916) the relationship between the Sharîf of Mecca and the Turkish Sultan was a symbiosis (Ochsenwald 1984). In exchange for indirect government and significant subsidies – in the form of grain from Egypt and the annual purse from Constantinople – the amîrs of Mecca acknowledged the Ottoman sultan as ‘Caliph’. For this reason they respected his viceroy, the Vâlî, whilst carrying out most of the day-to-day administration of the territory as it related to the Hajj; particularly by cultivating good relations with the Bedouin. In general this was a relationship which worked. However when, as a reaction to the hostile activities of Sharîf ‘Abd al-Muţṭalib, an unusually competent military commander, Osmân Nûrî (1840–98) was made Vâlî in 1881, during his first period of governance (1881–86) he set about imposing more direct rule from Constantinople and instituted a programme of major public works. This was coupled with attacks on the existing networks of power dominated by ‘Abd al-Muţṭalib’s successor ‘Awn al-Rafîq. In 1885 this opposition was mirrored in the disputes of Aḥmad Dahlân and Muḥammad Hasan Allâh.

There were many Jawa who sought Hasan Allâh’s instruction and who had an impact on his thinking. Hasan Allâh was evidently asked by some Acehnese to write a fatwâ on the Dutch system of containment (concentratie stelsel) in their homeland. Indeed there were disputes among the Acehnese. Between 1884 and 1896 the leading Acehnese ‘ulamā – Teungku di Tiro (d.1891), Habib Samalanga and Teuku Uma (1854–99) – were divided as to how to treat Muslims living within Dutch territory. Teungku di Tiro at first ignored the harassment of these by his forces while Habib Samalanga regarded them as apostates who were to undertake periods of isolation (khalwa) for penance should they make their way to Muslim territory (Snouck Hurgronje 1906: I, 182, II, 116).

The Meccan fatwâ that sought to resolve this dispute, and which did not appear in the Muhimmât, reflected an uncompromising attitude to non-Muslim rule maintaining that jihâd was to be conducted wherever possible and if in the public interest (maslaha) (van Koningsveld 1990). Had Snouck Hurgronje enjoyed access to the house of this Meccan shaykh he may well have heard more specific information relating to his mission to uncover potential seeds of pan-Islamism and anti-colonialism.

Ultimately Snouck Hurgronje’s ventures among the residents of Mecca were cut short. He was forced to leave the Hijaz without participating in the Hajj or proceeding to Medina, not because he had been unmasked as a crypto-Muslim, but because he was falsely implicated in the murder of Huber a year earlier (see Pesce 1986: 10–15). Despite Snouck Hurgronje later persuading
the Vâlî of his innocence, his all-too brief ‘medieval dream’ was at an end. On 17 September he embarked from Jeddah, unable to join the Ḥajj but nonetheless enlightened through the intense experience of life in Mecca and an association with the hub of the Jawi ecumene.

**Mecca’s Southeast Asian ‘colony’**

In the months after his return to Leiden, Snouck Hurgronje summarized the importance of the Jawi community in relation to the pilgrims and his nation’s farthest colony. It was, for him, the ‘heart’ of the religious life of the archipelago, the proper knowledge of which would guarantee Holland’s colonial mission.

All other considerations as to the consequences arising from the Hajj sink in comparison with the blooming Jâwah colony in Mekka; here lies the heart of the religious life of the East-Indian Archipelago, and numerous arteries pump from thence fresh blood in ever accelerating tempo to the entire body of the Moslim populace of Indonesia. Here the threads of all mystic societies of the Jâwah run together, from thence they draw the literature used in their religious schools, here, through the mediation of friends and relatives settled down, they take part in pan-Islamic life and effort. Just as no dam can be set against the pilgrim stream, so now nobody can do anything to prevent every flow backwards and forwards from bringing to Arabia seeds which there develop, return to the East-Indies as cultivated plants, and multiply themselves again. It is thus important to the Government to know what goes on in Mekka, what elements are exported from there every year, and how by skilful handling these can be won over to support the Government or at least made harmless. Then it will be possible, without breach of the peace, to steer the spiritual life, avoiding measures based on misunderstanding, at times hateful and at other times too lax; in some cases entirely ‘taking the wind out of the sails’ from the influences streaming from the intellectual heart of Islam, and in others at least modifying them. But above all things no judgements based on classifications: Not the Hajjis, the adepts of mystical orders, the divines educated in Mecca are dangerous, fanatical etc.; all three together however represent the intellectual connection of the East-Indies with the metropolis of Islam, and thus have the right to a more than superficial observation on the part of the European administration, so that one should not estrange the moderate elements by prejudice or narrow-mindedness, should know the irreconcilable elements, should be aware of every new movement, and possess means to estimate its importance.

(Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 291)
Snouck Hurgronje was correct to emphasize Mecca’s place in relation to the Jawa. Yet his, and ultimately Dutch colonial, understanding of Mecca needs to be re-examined in light of his training and his own relationship with elite Arab society and the Jawa of the Hijaz.

Snouck Hurgronje approached the study of peoples from ‘our archipelago’ as an Arabist employing Javanese informants. In order to train colonial officials, Dutch orientalism emphasized the acquisition of Arabic as the logical starting point for any study of Islam and hence Muslim peoples. Yet, as an Arabist, there is the potential for one’s vision of an Islam defined by the Medieval jurists to be Arabized, with that which does not conform to the classic textual image being rendered inferior or thought at least misguided (cf. Meuleman 1997: 104–06). Whilst Snouck Hurgronje was generally a fair observer of Muslims, whose Islam he believed should be assessed from daily practice, he still felt in 1887 that the Jawa of Mecca themselves were highly conscious of their unorthodoxy and he did not neglect to observe the ‘national’ implications of such consciousness. Moreover he cast their longings for a revived global Islam as one involving physical power rather than communal belief. What the Jawa longed for was Islamic civilization resurgent as an ‘Empire’.

[The Jawa] compare only the shadow side of their native conditions with the light side of Mekka life, and sacrifice without inner strife every patriotic feeling, every inclination to native customs, to the uplifting consciousness of solidarity with the great Moslim Empire . . . When after longer settlement . . . their verdict of this is . . . less favourable . . . their contempt for their own country is in no whit lessened. While formerly they cast up awed glances to the scantily observed Mekka world, now, in proud consciousness of their progress they look down on the ‘impure’ society to which they once belonged.

(Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 233)

Snouck Hurgronje’s terminology implies a view of the Jawa as members of a unitary community defined by the overlapping fields of Dutch colonial power and Islam. As I have noted above, Snouck Hurgronje often referred to the Jawa as the people of ‘our archipelago’. In so doing he merely echoed popular Dutch nomenclature and the sentiments expressed by Veth (1870: 175), who had written about the forms of Holy War in ‘our state of Insulinde’. The term Insulinde itself was even used by Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 292) at the end of Mekka to describe ‘the huge island empire’ and he paid a back-handed compliment to its originator, Multatuli (Eduard Douwes Dekker, 1820–87).

Snouck Hurgronje’s own construction of the bilād al-jāwa was perhaps also influenced by Renan, whose theory of nations being created by ‘the desire to
be together’ he cited in both Mekka and in his professorial lecture on ‘the Netherlands and Islam’ (see Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 3; 1915: 101). In Mecca the Jawa were subsumed by a greater Muslim society administered by the still independent Ottoman Empire. However, despite their desire to be together as Muslims, that ‘new society’ to which they belonged continued to make implicit divisions between ‘people’ and ‘tribe’ often clearly marked by specific roles within the Meccan economy (Ochsenwald 1984: 20). Such, I have argued, helped create the idea of a Jawi community.

Yet what was this society to which the Jawa belonged? Were the Jawa, as a broader group, conscious in 1885 of the same singular homeland being imagined by outsiders such as Veth and Snouck – or even Ahmad Dahlan? Perhaps through the communitas engendered by Jawi ecumenism in Mecca, some Jawa were increasingly sensitized to their shared characteristics, which had long allowed their leading ulama to work for the Islamization of the bilad al-jawa (Azra 1992). Still, as I have noted above, important inter-cultural barriers remained – especially given the swelling size of the community which would have given smaller groups more scope to activate their own communities, focussed on their own orders and gathered around their particular guides.

Snouck Hurgronje was aware of such conflicting tensions and affinities. Hence the Acehnese were scorned as being in no way the great (and distinct) civilization they claimed to be (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 289). And, although he assembled the Jawa as a unitary community, he nonetheless discounted expressions of Jawi nationhood as infeasible or merely the opinions of a radical minority like the Lampung Shaykh. However there is a key element of the Lampung Shaykh’s sentiment which might prefigure national revival, being the sense of past greatness lost through laxity of faith.

Indeed if Snouck Hurgronje felt that he could gain a clear picture of Jawi political views in Mecca, he admitted that determining the true nature of their religious views was less simple (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 247). These he related to the Jawi inferiority complex he saw in Mecca. Naturally the practices of their countrymen that the ulama felt to be defective were to be derided, and of course the jahiliya of the archipelago was to be painted over with the broad strokes of Islamic salvation. Yet this should not mean that they felt themselves as a people to be base and without any ‘patriotic feeling’. For Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 256), contradicting his earlier remarks as to the extinction of Jawi patriotic inclinations, wrote that ‘combined intercourse and years of common endeavour [in Mecca] have created a much more vivid consciousness of the unity of their islamised race’. If anything Snouck Hurgronje inadvertently spoke of the very ‘ambiguity’ that the Jawa experienced in Mecca as he developed his colonial narrative of infiltration and explication in order to generate ‘practical knowledge’ of the Jawa (cf. Kommers 1996).
The Jawi ecumene was indeed a complex entity both united and riven by conflicting tensions and affinities. It is therefore wrong to regard this as any explicit form of Jawi nationhood. Nonetheless their fellow Muslims in the Hijaz saw the Jawa as a unitary community. Within that community there were tensions, political and religious, as in any group, yet over the years a realization of the strengths of that unity would be developed further and would in turn colour the development of an independence movement around the Java Sea. But before I move on to examine conceptions of the ecumene transmitted through the religious networks connecting West and Southeast Asia, I wish to consider the colonial networks, with their implicit framing of the Jawa, established during Snouck Hurgronje’s tenure in the Indies.
[Colonialists] are not as oblivious to the facts of Muslim history as are our naive and good-hearted intelligentsia, nor are they as dumb as our brilliant rulers. They base their colonialism on comprehensive and detailed studies of the resources and foundations [of] the people they colonize. Their major goal, however, is to annihilate the seeds of resistance . . . Orientalism emerged on this basis as well. It emerged in order to assist imperialism from a scientific point of view and in order to lay down its roots in the mental landscape. But we, alas, worship the orientalists stupidly, and we naively think that they are monks of learning and knowledge and that they [have] distanced themselves from their crusading origins.


In this chapter I wish to explore how the Dutch began, under the umbrella of the Ethical Policy, to plant deeper civilizational roots in the Jawi mental landscape. Yet this project, with its implicit creation of a definably Indies society, had particularly national implications among those Jawa who collaborated with Dutch rule, and especially those who read the Malay newspapers that were beginning to proliferate in the archipelago.

**Advisers and collaborators**

The creation of the colony of the Netherlands Indies was an ongoing process throughout the nineteenth century. By the 1890s the shape of that entity was becoming clearer with the archipelago bound to more direct rule from Batavia; one currency, the guilder; and a single anxiety about Islam as a force with the potential to undo the entire edifice. Alongside the clear advantage that Dutch power enjoyed in terms of military technology and speed of communications – whether by road, rail, telegraph or steamship – the
inter-communal divisions between the Jawa and the collaboration of their elites remained crucial to the continuance of that power with its much vaunted ‘peace and order’ (rust en orde). Moreover as the Dutch maintained an extremely small physical presence in their colonies, the need to make use of local knowledge was always pressing. Thus the Dutch attempted to ‘know’ the lands of the Jawa by the extensive use of indigenous aristocracies and informants.

In Java in particular the Dutch had long appropriated existing priyayi networks to which they attached a body of European ‘advisers’. (This structure is well-illustrated in fig. 7.) A Dutch Resident would thus ‘advise’ his ‘younger brother’ the Regent (Bupati), who was also assisted by his own Chief Minister (Patih). From the 1880s this advice took the form of command. Meanwhile the priyayi were deprived of their hereditary rights to levy labour and maintain large bodies of retainers and were henceforth reduced to being

Figure 7 The administrators of Cianjur (Bintang Hindia vol. 2 no. 19, p. 203)
the lower cogs of a bureaucracy that spanned the whole colony (Steinberg 1987: 195).

Although now effectively in authority, the Dutch still relied heavily on the advice of the Bupati whose knowledge of local custom was assumed to exceed by far that of his political masters. Below the Resident and Bupati were a number of districts overseen directly by a few Assistant-Residents who coordinated the local Heads (Wedono) and their Dutch counterparts, the Controleurs and Aspirant-Controleurs. The Wedonos in turn supervised a number of indigenous sub-officials (Mantri) and clerks (Magang), to maintain networks of police, informers, spies, and runners. In short they were the day-to-day interface between rule by decree and local knowledge. However their effectiveness in controlling crime often rested on symbiotic agreements between village heads (kepala desa) and local strong-men (jagolpreman) (Sartono 1966: 134–39). Schulte Nordholt and van Till (1999: 65–66) furthermore point out that there was often ‘no clear distinction’ between police spies and these jago until the Indies police force was modernized (and Europeanized) from 1905. And what knowledge did filter back up to the Dutch and their local protégés was usually targeted to serve very personal aims in the form of promotions, emoluments, or vendettas. As Sartono Kartodirdjo (1966: 90) observed, the duality of this system – Dutch and native – ‘brought about an ambivalent system of administration’.

At the top of the native hierarchy, the Bupati was, as we have seen, responsible for stamping all passes of intending pilgrims to Mecca and again on their return. In the 1870s the Bupati of Cilacap ensured that practically no-one in his district was able to secure such a pass (Steenbrink 1993: 80). Below the Bupati, the many Wedono and Magang maintained a watchful eye for acts of subversion – particularly in the guise of Islam as represented by the ubiquitous hadjis and priesters who were excluded from their company. In 1873, Holle had made a recommendation to the Governor General urging that no hadji be appointed in the government service. Without Holle ever knowing it, the Governor General of the day had accordingly determined to apply the principle without making it an official government order (Steenbrink 1993: 79 n. 8). This is not to say that Indies officials could not make the Hajj, but to do so brought frowns from the Dutch ‘elder brothers’ concerned by any manifestation of ‘religious fervour’ (godsdienstijver) (see Sartono 1966: 89–90). Hence many native officials attempting to connect with their own ‘Arab’ faith were at pains to distance themselves from the overt influence of the ‘ulamā’. Some made the Hajj in their retirement, and even remained occasionally embarrassed apologists for Dutch rule in Mecca (see Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 246). In so doing they removed themselves further, and thus also the colonial authorities, from the local knowledge their masters required.

Further, as the custodians of Islamic knowledge and ritual practice, the ‘ulamā’ remained financially independent, as the economic basis of their
institutions, founded in the support of the local populace, drew no revenue from the Government. Thus the ‘ulamā’ remained effectively outside the colonial system of knowledge. At the lowest end of the official spectrum it even seems that some clerks more often kept local ‘ulamā’ informed of colonial plans rather than reporting their teachers’ activities to their superiors (Sartono 1966: 96).

Although the Dutch had tried to incorporate Islam through the official post of the Penghulu, whose salary was funded by the Office for Native and Arab Affairs, and the formation, in 1882, of the so-called ‘Priests’ courts’ (Priesterraden), there remained a gap in colonial knowledge of the power of the ‘ulamā’ – and more especially the Şāfī orders. The shortcomings of this system were exposed by the Banten Jihad of 1888, which both Dutch officials and their local allies failed to anticipate. In an outpouring of various grievances, the parochial chapters of the Qādirīya wa Naqshbandīya order were able to act as a channel for the massacre of the officials of Ciligon – both Dutch and native (see Sartono 1966; Djajadiningrat 1936: 38–50, 215–17, 232–35; van Bruinessen 1992: 92). They had also been able to coordinate the collection of weapons, amulets from Mecca, and white clothing for the Jihad; activities that seemed to belie the official policy of maintaining ‘a watchful eye’ on Muslims. Indeed one observer was stunned that all this activity had gone unnoticed by system with its countless ‘village-leaders, passers-by, record-keepers, vaccinators, clerks, assistant-wedonos, wedonos etc.’ (‘S’ 1890: 52–53). Following a harsh government crackdown, the fear of the hadjis and priesters galvanized the Dutch public of Java and once again calls were made for restriction of the Ḥajj (Sartono 1966: 269–94). It was thus in this renewed state of colonial fear that Snouck Hurgronje was again called upon to study Islam in a local context and devise a solution to the ‘Islam question’.

Snouck Hurgronje arrived in the Indies, ten months after the Banten Jihad, on 11 May 1889, having spent two weeks in the Straits Settlements where he offered to travel to Aceh and resume his dual-existence as ‘Abd al-Ghaffār. After staying in Batavia with his friend, the Advisor for Indies Languages, J.L.A. Brandes (1857–1905), Snouck Hurgronje travelled throughout West and Central Java in order to familiarize himself with his new field of operations. This was with the ultimate aim of producing a monograph study of Islam on Java (van Ronkel 1942; Drewes 1957: 12). In this way Orientalist scholarship was engaged in the Indies, as it had been in the Hijaz, to gain a window on local knowledge of Islam as experienced by the Jawa.

**K.F. Holle (1829–1896)**

Snouck Hurgronje was not the first Dutchman called upon to provide an in-depth knowledge of local Islam in the service of colonial power. In this he was preceded by the largely self-taught Karel Frederik Holle and the
acknowledged expert on ‘Native Languages and Mohammedan Law’ L.W.C. van den Berg. However, during his tenure in the Indies (1869–87) van den Berg concentrated his attentions primarily on the immigrant Hadrami population. Van den Berg and Snouck Hurgronje also had a poisonous relationship, which was manifested in their respective articles and which nearly took them to the courts. It is of little surprise to see then that Snouck gravitated to Holle, whose advice to the Colonial Government van den Berg had often belittled (Laffan 2002).

Yet this was not simply a case of a shared enemy. A reading of Tom van den Berge’s recent biography of Holle shows that he and Snouck Hurgronje had similar ideas on how the Islamic question should be handled in the Indies, and indeed on how the natives of the archipelago were to be annexed ‘spiritually’ by The Netherlands (see van den Berge 1998). Indeed Holle might well have served as a model for Snouck Hurgronje who also formed extensive connections – including two (consecutive) marriages – with the Sundanese elite of the Priangan. Certainly Snouck Hurgronje, who commenced correspondence with Holle in 1885, was full of praise for his ‘missionary zeal’ (van Koningsveld 1985a: 48–49).

Holle had arrived in Java as a boy in 1844 where his father established a tea plantation near Buitenzorg (in the Priangan) and acted as the administrator of Bolang. At the age of seventeen Holle joined the Government service and in his activities as a public official is said to have developed a sympathy for his ‘brown brothers’ (*Bintang Hindia*, vol. 2, no. 5, 1904). Holle later inherited his father’s holdings in the Priangan, married locally (like many Dutchmen of that time), and devoted much of his time to the study of Sundanese, even campaigning for the development and use of a Sundanese alphabet, based on Javanese. This latter project was his attempt to unseat the place of the widely used Arabic script which he feared enabled Sundanese to be drawn to a foreign, and dangerous, religious radicalism emanating from the Middle East.

Despite his paranoia, like Snouck Hurgronje, Holle was a Muslim in that he manifested the outward signs of this faith for a native audience. His adopted name was Said Mohamad Ben Holle, and a photo taken in 1870 shows him wearing a fez (Nieuwenhuys 1982b: 51–55). This conversion was a result of his long and close relationship with his brother-in-law, Raden Hadji Moehamad Moesa (1822–86). The latter served as the Penghulu and Bupati of Garut, and later as the Chief Penghulu of Limbangan. According to a belated eulogy in *Bintang Hindia* (vol. 2, no. 5, 1904):

This highly placed native [Moesa] had spent his youth in Mecca and was a very able priest and man of extraordinary influence. Both Holle and the Chief Penghulu learned a great deal from each other. Through Holle’s influence the priest began to understand that the duty of justice to the poor had to be fulfilled and he propagated this modern understanding in turn among the elites; whilst Holle
gained a heightened conception [of Islam] through the medium of Mohammadan doctrine.

In 1871 Holle was appointed as an Honorary Adviser on Native Affairs to the Colonial Government where he continued to be an advocate for the Sundanese. Behind the scenes he continued to draw the elites of the Priangan away from a foreign Islam that he saw as hostile to both indigenous culture and Dutch rule (Steenbrink 1993: 78–85; van den Berge 1998). In 1873, he and Moesa travelled to Singapore to gauge the reaction there to pan-Islam and the recently commenced war in Aceh. There he formed the opinion that it was the returned pilgrims who were importing a new current of religious bigotry in Java.

Holle’s hostility to political Islam was manifested in his official recommendations. As I have noted above, it was Holle’s advice to the Governor General as a result of his trip to Singapore that ensured that higher public office was out of reach to any Jawi seeking to connect with the Islam of the Hijaz. And when news of the alleged Meccan plot of 1881 became known to him, he bypassed official channels by communicating directly with Kruijt in Jeddah and Read in Singapore (see Mrs. 1881, nos. 259, 518, and 519). Then in June of that year he provided a detailed assessment of the dangers of the Islamic press abroad and the Hajj (Mr. 1881, no. 978). His advice to the Colonial Government became increasingly strident, and L.W.C. van den Berg – in a long report – countered his ‘well-intentioned colleague’ stating that ‘in every Arab he sees an enemy, in every hadjie a scoundrel, and in every Arabic or Arabic-script book a seditious tract’ (Mr. 1881, no. 978; cf. Steenbrink 1984: 54). To a degree this was true, but what Holle truly feared was fanaticism of any kind. Indeed he was quite familiar with a large number of hajis, including his own brother-in-law Moesa. Ironically though another of his early protégés who had already made the Hajj as a boy, and who even became a distinguished ‘ālim, would be elevated in the colonial service by Holle’s successor Snouck Hurgronje. This was Hasan Moestapa of Garut (Ḥasan Muṣṭafā Qārūṭ, 1852–1940).

Hasan Moestapa

As I have noted above, it was not possible for colonial scholarship to function without drawing on the local knowledge of key informants. In the Hijaz that role was played by Raden Aboe Bakar Djajadiningrat. In the case of Snouck Hurgronje that earlier Hijazi relationship facilitated in part a connection with Hasan Moestapa, whose local knowledge of the Priangan and the bilād al-jāwa would add to Dutch colonial knowledge of both his Sundanese homeland and Aceh, where he was later stationed (see fig. 8).

Snouck Hurgronje had first met Hasan Moestapa in Mecca and Aboe Bakar describes him in his Tarājim. Around 1886, Hasan Moestapa returned
to West Java when his father stopped financing his stay in the Holy Land (van Ronkel 1942: 315). He then arrived in Garut to take up a salaried position of "penghulu" at a "pesantren" close by the principal mosque of the town. It is more than likely that this appointment had been recommended by Holle.
According to Ajip Rosidi (Solomon 1986: 13), Hasan Moestapa had caught Holle's eye in the 1870s and he had attempted to persuade the latter's father to send him to the local school. It is also likely that he had hoped the young Sundanese would not travel to Mecca as he had claimed in his official dispatches that Bantenese society was rapidly changing and taking on West Asian dress and custom. Hasan Moestapa nonetheless made the pilgrimage a second time, but his elite heritage still kept him bound closely to Dutch power — much as Holle had hoped.

Following Snouck Hurgronje’s arrival in Garut on 18 July 1889, Hasan Moestapa accompanied him on his tour of West Java (van Ronkel 1942: 315–16). On this journey he also provided Snouck Hurgronje with a list of the ‘ulamā’ of West Java, apparently noting their ‘specialties, teachers, heirs apparent, places of origin, [and] relatives’ (van Ronkel 1942: 316). Essentially this was the Sundanese adjunct to Aboe Bakar’s Tarājim, showing where the roots struck in Mecca penetrated in the Priangan; an image reinforced through the other accounts given to Snouck Hurgronje by the native officials and ‘ulamā’ he interviewed on his journey. Moreover, Hasan Moestapa helped provide Snouck Hurgronje with an understanding of Java itself. This is apparent in the letters Snouck Hurgronje wrote to the Dutch-Indies press (‘Letters from a pensioned Wedono’) and in his work on Aceh.

Hasan Moestapa was later appointed to the unenviable post of Chief Penghulu of Kota Raja in 1893, assumedly because of his previous contact with the Acehnese ‘ulamā’ in Mecca. In this capacity, which only lasted until 1895, Hasan Moestapa enjoyed a measure of trust from prominent Acehnese, including Teuku Uma, a lukewarm ally of the Dutch until his ‘defection’ the following year (Snouck Hurgronje 1906: I, xiii). Thereafter Hasan Moestapa took up the same post in Bandung following the resignation of his colleague Raden Hadji Moehamad Nasir. There he served until 1918 becoming a well known, if somewhat eccentric, ‘ālim and writer in his native Sundanese (Kern 1946: viii; Kartini 1985: 21).

Informants and local knowledge: orientalists as interpreters

The examples of Aboe Bakar, Hasan Moestapa, and Raden Moehamad Moesa show clearly the dual life that some elite ‘ulamā’ led – being connected both to the colonial and to the spiritual metropoles. Yet one should also be cautious in assuming that such informants unquestioningly surrendered all information at their disposal to their patrons or, more especially, to those officials who enforced governance at the ground level. As Bayly (1996: 6), speaking of India, explains:

[I]nformants were inevitably drawn from the very communities which the Western powers sought to dominate. Even if they served their alien masters loyally they moved in realms of life and thought which
they wished to keep hidden from the rulers. The basic fear of the colonial official or settler was, consequently, his lack of indigenous knowledge and ignorance of the ‘wiles of the natives’.

Yet Snouck Hurgronje, like Holle, was an exception who claimed to know his subjects ‘inside-out’ and far better than the local officials and their so-called ‘native friends’ (Kommers 1996: 111). Not only did he devote his time to the exhaustive study of the Indies, its peoples and religious traditions, he lived a double life within their ‘realms of life and thought’ as his alter-ego ‘Abd al-Ghaffār. Apart from van Koningsveld’s investigations, little attention has been given to Snouck Hurgronje’s marital relationships, but his highly born partners most certainly provided influential connections within the Priangan. In this regard Snouck Hurgronje and Holle’s situation also mirrors the influence of elite women on some of the most successful British Orientalists in India (Bayly 1996: 91–94) once again illustrating the vital role played by local knowledge in informing colonial scholarship. Nonetheless, for the Dutch, local knowledge of Islam did not reside solely with the Jawa. Another source of information on the practice of Islam in the *bilād al-jāwa* was the many Hadramis who had long lived among them.

**Said Oesman and the Hadramis**

Snouck Hurgronje claimed in his correspondence with Nöldeke that there was seldom a day that had passed since his arrival on which he did not speak Arabic with the local Hadramis (van Koningsveld 1985a: 61). Snouck Hurgronje’s fluency was confirmed by Achmad Djajadiningrat (1936: 78), who once observed him in conversation with the eminent Said Oesman (see fig. 9).

Good relations with the Arabs of the Indies were important and Said Oesman was a powerful ally. Born in the Arab quarter of Batavia in 1822, Said Oesman went to Mecca to pursue his studies with ‘Abd al-Ghānī Bīmā and a young Aḥmad bin Zaynī Daḥlān. After touring North Africa, Turkey, and the Hadramaut, Said Oesman returned to Batavia in 1862 where he established his own printing business (Azra 1997: 250–51; Steenbrink 1993: 84). From there, Said Oesman was in regular contact with van der Chijs in Jeddah and this, coupled with his association with Daḥlān, makes it likely that Snouck Hurgronje was made aware of his existence while in the Hijaz.

In 1885–86, Said Oesman’s writings were employed by the government in the aftermath of allegations made against the Naqṣbandīya in the *Java Bode* (The *Java Messenger*). These allegations were first made to the *Java Bode*’s editor, L. Brunner, by the former Chief Penghulu of Kota Raja, Achmed bin Mohammad al-Segaff (see Chapter 2). The resulting article ‘Prangsabil’ (Mal. Holy War), created a ferment within the European community, leading to
the *Java Bode* being shut down by the government. Behind the scenes such allegations were supported vociferously by K.F. Holle, who had affirmed the tenor of al-Segaff’s allegations to Brunner based on information provided by Mohamad Moesa. Subsequent investigations undertaken by Resident Peltzer found no evidence of any link between the Naqshbandiya and an impending *jihād*. And after first questioning the dissemination of Said Oesman’s anti-Naqshbandī epistle, *al-Nāṣīḥa al-anīqa li al-mutalabbisin bi al-ṭarīqa* (*Elegant Advice for Adherents of the Ṭariqa*, Batavia, 1883), which had been backed by
Holle, the Raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, following advice from van den Berg, determined that rather than stirring up antagonism among the members of the tarekat, it promoted a line agreeable to the Government.²

So it was that Said Oesman was the subject of Snouck Hurgronje’s unreserved praise in an article in the Rotterdamsche Courant (14–16 October 1886). Under the title of ‘An Arab ally for the Indies government’, Snouck Hurgronje stated that ‘such unlooked-for allies as these are for us a gem worth setting in gold . . . [for] an Arab like Othmân ibn Jahja is more valuable than a lot of wine-drinking and “free-thinking” bupatis’ (VS: IV, i, 69–83). Van der Chijs sent a copy of this article to Said Oesman who evidently enjoyed the praise. Certainly Said Oesman recognized Snouck Hurgronje as a potential patron, and in a letter to him indicated his willingness to serve the Netherlands government.

In the last few days the political journals which Mr. van der Chijs and others told us about have arrived. In light of this might I, in consideration of the [public] good and sincere devotion, request a position with the Dutch leaders of state for my good name and position and for the benefit of the entire people. You are my means to this end . . . As for your request for [copies of] my works . . . I present them here to you . . . hopefully you will not pay too much attention to any errors or mistakes in them.³

It was thus within forty days of Snouck Hurgronje’s arrival in Batavia that he recommended Said Oesman for a governmental post.⁴ And after further service he was accordingly appointed as an Honorary Adviser on Arab Affairs in 1891. Throughout his attachment, Said Oesman remained an advocate of the Dutch rust en orde which provided him with the scope to prosecute his campaigns against what he saw as local innovation and heresy. Yet in order to speak with authority among the Jawa he still needed to invoke the authority of Jawi ‘ulamā’ whether by citing Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjārī or seeking the approval (taṣḥīḥ) of Nawāwī Banten in Mecca (Azra 1997: 258, 261–63; Mr. 1886, no. 262). At the same time Said Oesman was, as is clear, an effective propaganda tool, and the Dutch would willingly subsidize the production and distribution of his tracts where they aligned with colonial policy (Mandal 1994: 127). For example, in his later Minhaj al-istiqāma fī al-dīn bi-al-salāma (Guide for the Safe Practice of Religion, Batavia, 1889–90), he again backed Moehamad Moesa and Holle and condemned as ‘victims of foolishness’ the members of the Qādirīya wa Naqshbandīya who had been behind the Banten Jihad of 1888. Indeed he published over a hundred didactic tracts seeking to institute West Asian norms and ‘correct’ models of mysticism, coming as he did out of a Hadrami tradition of reformism (see Freitag forthcoming, Chapter 5). In particular he was critical of the same anti-colonial orders identified by Snouck Hurgronje, equating the ‘people of the tārīqa’ with those
of *bid'a* (Azra 1997: 258–63), a view which his referee Nawāwī shared only to a limited degree (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 271–72).

For his years of loyal service, in 1897 Said Oesman was made the unofficial Muftī of Batavia – a pseudo-official role created by Snouck Hurgronje. In 1898, he was officially encouraged to compose a Friday prayer invoking God’s blessing on Queen Wilhelmina on the occasion of her inauguration. Here, in somewhat formulaic language, he praised the fruits of just colonial rule that allowed the continued practice of Islam (see Kaptein 1998). Such public displays of affection for the colonial state and its sovereign were further rewarded by the Dutch when, in 1899, and like Aboe Bakar three years earlier, he would be awarded the Order of the Netherlands Lion, much to the disgust of his Arab peers (Mandal 1997: 194; Kaptein 1998). Yet, despite his long association with the Dutch, Said Oesman later attacked the introduction of Western-style teaching methodology in modernist Jawi schools, and indeed the teaching of Western values in Dutch schools increasingly patronized by local elites in the late 1890s (Steinberg 1987: 195, 208). One of the first such students was the nephew of Raden Aboe Bakar, Achmad Djajadiningrat (1877–1943), whose career will be discussed below.

**Colonizing Islam: ‘pacification’**

Snouck Hurgronje’s tasks in the Indies were inextricably linked with his previous experience in the Hijaz. In Banten there is evidence that some of the Bantenese met by him in Mecca – including ‘Abd al-Karīm and Marzūq – were associated with the rebellion of 1888. There was even the widespread belief held by the rebels that their struggle would be capped off by the return from Mecca of the ‘ulamā’ ‘Abd al-Karīm, Marzūq, and Nawāwī. However, in terms of the overall relationship between Dutch rule and Islamic resistance, the Banten Jihad had been a brief disaster and Snouck Hurgronje was at pains to absolve most of his Meccan acquaintances of any charges (Sartono 1966: 307–08). By contrast in 1889 the Acehnese conflict was entering its fifteenth year.

Despite the illusory nature of that claim at the time, Aceh had been proclaimed a part of Netherlands India by right of conquest on 31 January 1874. Popular resistance continued regardless, as successive Dutch forces returned to make further gains and batter the Acehnese while initially maintaining a tight blockade at sea. Few then realized that the conflict would drag on for another thirty years. The vacillating progress of the war itself often reflected political shifts in the Netherlands between the hawks and doves of the Dutch Lower House. By 1886 all that remained after earlier Dutch withdrawals was the ‘line of concentration’, beyond which the position of the ‘ulamā’ as popular leaders was strengthened. General van Swieten therefore urged that decisive action finally be taken: the Dutch should either withdraw or pursue total war (Reid 1969: 248). In essence this was also the line that
would be taken by Snouck Hurgronje following his study of the former sultanate. Snouck Hurgronje, who had formally entered colonial service as Adviser for Oriental Languages and Mohammedan Law in March 1891, was therefore recalled from his tour of Java by C. Pijnacker Hordijk (Governor General 1888–93), and required to travel to Aceh in July. There he accompanied the Dutch forces and interviewed those Acehnese who were within the line, or others brought before him from beyond it. Once again Snouck Hurgronje’s methodology would rely heavily on interviews with native informants. In his memoirs, General K. van der Maaten recalled one instance when Snouck Hurgronje gained the confidence of an initially hostile Acehnese by asking the name of his teacher in Mecca. He then was able to prove, by way of a letter recently received from that teacher, that he was on the best of terms with him. As a result the Acehnese in question apparently became a most cooperative and reliable helper (van Koningsveld 1988: 70–71). Such interviews all added to information derived from his meetings with Ḥabīb ‘Abd al-Rahmān in Jeddah – who had offered to return from exile as a mediator in 1884 (Schmidt 1992: 78).

Snouck Hurgronje remained in Aceh until February of the following year and returned to Batavia to prepare his manuscript. During this period he liaised closely with the future Governor General and ‘Pacifier of Aceh’, General J.B. van Heutsz (1851–1924), with whom he would cooperate closely in the campaigns of 1898–1900 (Witte 1976: 54ff.). The volumes of Snouck Hurgronje’s reports which detailed the Acehnese people’s history, daily life and folk-culture were all published in his comprehensive ethnography De Atjèhers (1893–94), although two further reports regarding political and military strategy were not released (Wertheim 1972), Snouck Hurgronje’s policies for the eventual suppression of the Acehnese are nonetheless clear. The most vigorous proponent of pacification proved to be van Heutsz whom Snouck Hurgronje said had a ‘will of iron’ and ‘heart of gold’ (van Koningsveld 1985a: 64). Van Heutsz took charge of the Acehnese campaign in 1898 after its revival in 1896 under C.H. van der Wijk (Governor General 1893–99) and then moved to defeat the Acehnese by copying their own methods of guerilla warfare. Small, lightly armed, detachments would thus constantly harry the Acehnese and specially the ‘ulamā’, whom Snouck Hurgronje had identified as being at the heart of the resistance.

In De Atjèhers, as in Mekka, Snouck Hurgronje dealt extensively with the ‘ulamā’ – known locally by the title of teungku – and identified them as the leaders of the resistance empowered by the doctrine of jihād. There could be no hope of winning over the hostile ‘ulamā’ who should therefore be ruthlessly hunted down (Wertheim 1972). It is more than the symbolic link between orientalism and colonialism that saw Snouck accompany van Heutsz on his actions in Pedir in 1898. Then, from March 1899, those Acehnese who surrendered were obliged to sign a ‘short declaration’ (korte verklaring) drafted by Snouck Hurgronje. This was a document pledging obedience to
the Dutch throne and its officers, making the signatory, like his fellows throughout Sumatra, an accomplice and state pensioner.

Snouck Hurgronje continued to advocate decisive action against an enemy to be confronted with its own guerilla tactics, and argued that for Islam ever to accommodate itself with the modern world the teaching of jihād would have to be abandoned and the ‘ulamā’ ‘modernized’.

Circumstances have imposed on the Dutch nation the task of impressing this modern doctrine on the Achehnese. It is no light or enviable task, for the doctrine of jihad has been for centuries more deeply rooted here than in any other part of the archipelago. But it must be fulfilled, and on the manner of this fulfilment will depend in no small degree the attitude of all other Mohammedans in Netherlands-India towards the Dutch government.

(Snouck Hurgronje 1906: II, 351)

Once the Acehnese – and indeed all the Jawa – were overcome they were expected to adjust to the benefits of European governance; especially the rust en orde which the Dutch constantly enforced. It was the continuing role then of the Office for Native Affairs to intervene in the life of Islam in the Indies when its political manifestations threatened that peace. However conquest and harassment by the colonial army was only one strategy employed by the Dutch – whether advised by hawks like Snouck Hurgronje or van Heutsz. At the turn of the century, a new government in Holland lent its ear to a rising movement that would seek to patronize the Jawa in a new way and bind them to Dutch rule by inculcating in them an aspiration for Dutch civilization (beschaving) rather than traditional court culture or hostile and ‘Arab’ Islam.

Colonizing Islam: ‘association’ and ‘emancipation’

Our [colonial] inheritance . . . has been held to us until now by force. But if this unity is to withstand the storms of the times, we must now follow the material annexation by a spiritual one.

(Snouck Hurgronje 1915: 85)

‘Pacification’ by violent force was but one strategy applied by the Dutch to maintain control of their colony. With the burgeoning size of the bureaucracy in the late 1890s, the gap that had emerged between Dutch patron and elite client from the 1870s was to be re-bridged. Now Dutch power required a trained body of Jawa to carry out its governance. And whether as teachers, medics, or junior officials, Dutch language and training would be a key to their future and a path to progress (kemajoean) (see fig. 10).

An early example of such a new servant of Dutch power was Achmad Djajadiningrat who recalled his Sunday meetings as a student at Snouck
Hurgonje’s home in Weltevreden (1936: 65, 77–78). Here Snouck Hurgronje entertained a who’s who of multivalent colonial society. On one occasion Achmad sat with the future Governor General van Heutsz; the scholar Brandes; Raden Aria Bratawidjaja, the Patih of Cirebon; K.F. Holle; Hasan Moestapa; and the redoubtable Said Oesman. These last four were all then serving as Honorary Advisers to the government in the areas of Islam and linguistics. This mix of the soldier, two scholars, a native aristocrat, a retired official and plantation owner, and two ‘ulamā’ – one Jawi the other Arab – is a remarkable encapsulation of the intersection of scholarship, colonial policy, and the collaborative populace of the Indies.

As is clear from the preceding discussion, Snouck Hurgronje’s initial contact with the Djajadiningrat family was a direct result of his friendship with Aboe Bakar. After his arrival in the Indies, Achmad and his brothers, Hoesein (1886–1960) and Hasan, were taken under Snouck Hurgronje’s wing. As the first full-blood native admitted to the Willem III school in Batavia, Achmad would advance in the government service as the influential Bupati of Serang (1901–24) and Batavia (1924–29). And, under his leadership, Banten was transformed from a province known for its anti-colonial fervour to one of the least troubled by the Islamic ‘problem’.

The Willem III school was, moreover, a centre for the inculcation of Snouck Hurgronje’s ideology as it maintained a second department for the training of colonial officials (Drewes 1961). Achmad Djajadiningrat (1936: 62) later paid

![The Ethici mode, R.M. Tjokroadikoesoemo and his teacher (Bintang Hindia, vol. 2, no. 8, p. 85)](image-url)
tribute to Snouck Hurgronje stating that ‘the whole family’ owed him ‘a great
debt’. Snouck Hurgronje had influenced his ‘way of thinking and aspirations’;
throughout his working life he had always ‘valued and followed his directions
and advice’. Yet this was all despite his earliest inclination to follow in Aboe
Bakar’s footsteps to Mecca and to even become a great ‘ālim – an ambition his
uncle in Jeddah also entertained. As a youth his dreams had been shattered
by the realization that his status within the colonial society (and the elite
groups it patronized) jeopardized such ambitions. Once the teacher at the
pesantren of Karundang declared that he would ‘never learn anything with a
stomach filled with rice bought with unclean money’ (Djajadiningrat 1936:
21). Resistance to all taints emanating from the Christian Dutch continued to
alienate the majority of the Jawa – regardless of whether they were connected
to the Middle East.

As seen in the example of Achmad Djajadiningrat, it was Snouck
Hurgronje’s hope that, by channelling such talented youth of the collaborative
elites, Holland could continue to direct the affairs of the Jawa in a partnership
that mirrored his own relationship with Aboe Bakar. This policy, known as
that of Association (Associatie), and manifested in Snouck Hurgronje’s
parlour gatherings, became an aspect of the broader philanthropic ideals
of the Ethical Policy, voiced by Conrad Th. van Deventer (1857–1915), a
lawyer with seventeen years’ experience in the Indies (1880–97). In his 1899
article entitled ‘A debt of honour’, van Deventer argued that Holland’s long-
standing extraction of wealth from the Indies entitled its peoples to a greater
provision of services. This is not to say that van Deventer was the first to
express such views – a former minister from Batavia, W.R. Baron van Hoëvel,
had been an eloquent critic of colonial policy in the Dutch parliament in the
1850s and 1860s (Fasseur 1992: 108–10).

Meanwhile, the notion of an ‘ethical’ stance stems from a 1901 pamphlet,
‘De ethische koers in de koloniale politiek’ (‘The ethical direction in colonial
policy’), by the editor of De Locomotief (The Locomotive) Pieter Brooshooft
(1845–1921). The aspirations of the Ethici were officially sanctioned in the
same year, with Queen Wilhelmina’s speech announcing an enquiry into
public welfare in Java, and later effectuated during the incumbencies of
A.W.F. Idenburg as Minister for Colonies (1902–05, 1908–09, 1918–19) and
Governor General (1909–16).

The most contentious notion now connected with Snouck Hurgronje’s
legacy, and by default with the Ethical policy, is ‘emancipation’. According to
some observers this was a programme absolutely to disassociate Muslims
from their faith (see Wertheim 1972; Noer 1973: 93; Steenbrink 1993: 88–89;
and Algadri 1994). Thus from Weltevreden, and then Leiden, Snouck
Hurgronje and his students propounded his policies of association through
Western education in order to ‘emancipate’ the Jawa from what they saw as a
medieval and inflexible version of Islam enforced by the traditional ‘ulamā’.Certainly, in a series of lectures given in Leiden in 1911, Snouck Hurgronje
(1915: 79) expressed these views in very definite terms. There he decreed that it was necessary to ‘emancipate Muslims from some of the Medieval rubbish’ that they had ‘carried in their wake for far too long’ and that Muslim societies need to adapt to ‘modern culture’, a process then taking place in Turkey, Egypt, and Syria.

This emancipation did not entail any repression of the Hajj, as its banning would only provide fuel to Holland’s pan-Islamist enemies. Rather, the political connection of the ecumene with its ‘spiritual heart’ was to be closely monitored by a suitably qualified official in Mecca, and then redirected by Islamic policy in the Indies. In this regard Snouck Hurgronje disagreed with the antiquated and ineffectual policies regarding the examination of pilgrims. Change should rather be affected in a far more subtle and pervasive manner. And despite his usage of the negative term of ‘emancipation’, Snouck Hurgronje (1915: 85) believed that it, and the parent platform of ‘association’, in no way jeopardized the faith of the people of the Indies. This was due to his division of Islam into the domains of the political and the religious. Thus he maintained that natives wanted an exclusively ‘national’ and political’ but ‘not religious’ form of association, a vision already outlined in De Atjèhers (Snouck Hurgronje 1906: II, 278).

It is thus unfair to claim that Snouck Hurgronje sought to emancipate the Jawa from the faith in toto if we accept his practical division of the domains of Islamic practice. Nonetheless, his subtle policy was easily translated into an unofficial policy of intolerance by the officials and missionaries who personified colonial power in the Indies much as their English cousins did in India (Oddie 1991; Bayly 1996). Again Snouck Hurgronje’s views on the inviolability of (politically neutral) religious conviction are clarified in his correspondence with Nöldeke. When discussing Achmad Djajadiningrat in 1893, Snouck Hurgronje explained that

such young men – whose number grows greater by the day – remain true Muslims, yet their mental attitude (geestrichting) is naturally directed far from the great mass of simple peasantry and the membership of the religious life with their narrow-minded civilization.

(van Koningsveld 1985a: 34–36)

In this period, too, the colonial regime began to take closer notice of mosques, religious schools, and their ‘narrow-minded’ teachers. In 1889 the Government began to be more interested in the appropriation of mosque funds (Mr. 1889, no. 287). In 1891 Snouck Hurgronje had urged that he be given time to return to his interrupted study-tour of Java; the purpose of which had been to provide an overview of the various pesantren and their kiais (see Mr. 1891, no. 330). Through the close monitoring of Islam and its international connections, it was believed that any future trouble could be nipped
in the bud, although – as Holle had also advocated – the best preventative measure of all was to treat the peoples of the Indies with justice.

By 1908 Snouck Hurgronje believed that his policies would bear fruit in Java, where he assumed that the ‘passive Javanese’ were amenable to a joint Dutch–Indies nationalism, but not jihād. In the interests of the fostering (opvoeding) of the peoples he and his fellow academics called Indonesiërs, it was necessary to enlarge the body of elite Javanese. For, ‘based on an intimate knowledge of the Javanese and their aspirations . . . in Indonesia a compromise [is possible] between Islam and humanism’. Although a self-declared ‘Easterner by adoption’, Snouck Hurgronje remained a humanist by dedication with a focus on the peoples of what he – reflecting European scholarly discourse, but not existing Jawi parlance – termed either Insulinde or Indonesia.9

Throughout his career then Snouck Hurgronje and his associates were concerned with the indigenous generation of a new Islam, stripped of the doctrine of jihād and made compatible with modernity and humanism. This was expected to lead to a future of cooperation between Colony and Motherland. Both Achmad and his brother Hoesin Djajadiningrat, who became the first Indonesian to complete a doctorate under Snouck Hurgronje in Leiden, symbolize an ideal of emancipation by orientation towards European civilization rather than the palace or the traditional metropoles of learning in West Asia.

Such an emancipation is clearly revealed in Achmad Djajadiningrat’s reports from Banten where, from 1910, the original agitators from the Ciligon uprising began to return from exile in Kupang (West Timor), whilst others – at the encouragement of Aboe Bakar in Jeddah – returned from Mecca.10 Snouck Hurgonje’s successor, G.A.J. Hazeu, who visited Serang, also noted that these men, who were followed constantly, had not agitated against the government in any way. Such men, Achmad Djajadiningrat declared, were no longer a threat to public order. Yet he urged continued vigilance as there always remained the chance for new agitators to emerge in the form of ‘the fanatical North Bantamer’, or from among the ‘ulamā’, ‘who are not so easily centralized and civilized’. The key to the continuance of colonial rule therefore lay in the Government’s ‘just and equitable treatment so that they [the people] remain peaceful citizens (rustige burgers)’.11

Nonetheless Achmad and Hoesin were notable exceptions in the larger scheme of things, given that few Indonesians ever enjoyed access to Western education, much less to the Willem III gymnasium. It was an entirely elite concern. It is also unlikely that Snouck Hurgonje foresaw an equal relationship between motherland and colony. He seems to have held some sympathy for Muslims and their spiritual aspirations, but this sympathy was not extended to the temporal realm and expressions of international Islam earned his sharpest condemnation. Among what he saw to be the ‘confusions’ afflicting the Jawa on their road to Western civilization was the issue of the
Caliphate which he declared to be ‘a symbol for the intelligent, and a fetish for the ignorant masses’ (Bousquet and Schacht 1957: 39). From the 1890s this fetish took an increasing amount of his, and his successors’, time.

Snouck Hurgronje reigned in Weltevreden until 1906. Yet to judge by the often-frustrated tone of his official recommendations his advice was not always heeded. In 1903, after several visits to Aceh and increasing disagreements over the management of that province, Snouck Hurgronje finally fell out with the ambitious van Heutsz who was subsequently installed as Governor General. By then Snouck Hurgronje, over-stretched by official duties, was eagerly awaiting the chance to return to Holland for a year’s leave. On 26 June 1905 his friend Brandes died. In the following March he sailed for Europe and in September of that year was offered the chair held by his ailing teacher De Goeje. With this appointment he was also to continue his role as Official Adviser to the Government on Indies and Arabic Affairs. This, he said, had been agreed leaving the ‘back door open’ to return to the Indies in the future, and kept the colonial network he established ‘under his control’ – particularly as his former post with the Office for Native Affairs would in future be occupied by his own hand-picked students. It was agreed that among the tasks of Snouck Hurgronje’s successor, Hazeu, would be the continued recruitment of gifted young natives to the colonial service (and their further education under Snouck Hurgronje in Leiden).

Snouck Hurgronje was to be consulted regarding the placement of consular staff in Jeddah, Cairo, and Singapore.

_Bintang Hindia_ as Malay propagator of the Ethici vision of an Indies national community

Snouck Hurgronje’s élite parlour gatherings and the advice he gave to the government were matters that directly affected only a small number of people, although the wider, and indirect, impact should not be underestimated (cf. Roff 2001). Meanwhile, Dutch cultural orientations would be projected into the Indies mental landscape by the relatively new medium of the press. One influential Malay-language disseminator of such ideas was the _Bintang Hindia_ (see fig. 11).

Apart from the Dutch language _De Locomotief_, under Pieter Brooshoof, _Bintang Hindia_ (Indies Star, 1902–07) was a key journal communicating the ideas of the Ethici and their allied élites in the Indies. _Bintang Hindia_ was published in Amsterdam under the joint editorship of an army officer based in the Indies, Lt H.C.C. Clockener Brousson (b. 1871), and a Sumatran then studying in Holland, Abdul Rivai (1871–1937).

After serving in The Netherlands between 1888 and 1892, Clockener Brousson had been promoted and posted to Aceh in 1896. In 1899 he founded a newspaper for soldiers published in Batavia (Soerat Chabar Soldadoe [The Soldier’s Paper]). Meanwhile, Abdul Rivai, the first native medic to attempt
study in the Netherlands, was clearly allied to the Ethici vision. In 1900, while studying in Amsterdam for admission to the University of Utrecht, Rivai commenced his own journal (Pewarta Wolanda [The Dutch Reporter] 1900–01) to ‘foster the native population’s affection for its masters’. He later campaigned, through Dutch journals, for a heightened awareness of the needs of Javanese society and the propagation of Western education in Java (Poeze 1989: 90). In 1901 he even claimed that were the Dutch to attend to their colonial population with justice, they in turn would ‘turn their face in prayer no longer to the ka’bah but to The Hague, where they know the Queen of the Netherlands . . . to be enthroned’ (Poeze 1989: 91).

According to Ahmat b. Adam (1995: 94), Rivai had met Clockener Brousson in Medan well before the two decided to publish together a tri-monthly Bandera Wolanda (The Dutch Flag), whereas Poeze (1989: 91) states that they first met in Holland in 1901. Clockener Brousson was, like Snouck Hurgronje and Holle, a convert to Islam (Ahmat b. Adam 1995: 96). But to maintain colonial respectability he claimed to the Minister of Colonies that
he had only done so ‘in order to maintain better relations with Muslims’ (Poeze 1989: 92).

After the financial collapse of Bandera Wolanda, Clockener Brousson and Rivai found success with the unashamedly pro-Dutch and didactic Bintang Hindia. Through the support of three leading organizations with connections in the Indies (the Vereeniging Oost en West, Vereeniging Moederland en Koloniën, and the Algemeen Nederlandsch Verbond) Bintang Hindia achieved significant governmental support from the Minister of Colonies in 1904. So it was that Idenburg cautiously welcomed the journal and referred the matter to Governor General van Heutsz (Poeze 1989: 92–93).

This predominantly Malay-language broadsheet was richly provisioned with photographs and debates seen as critical for the illumination of the élites of Java and Sumatra. It aimed to prove its loyalty to the crown and Dutch flag and, with its large photographs of both Idenberg and van Heutsz, it massaged the right egos. Within the pages of Bintang Hindia it is also clear where the vision of the Modern lay, with pictures of snow-clad streets and icy canals. The Netherlands had finally opened to the East while the East was to be made aware of its intellectual dependence on the West. Subscriptions soared as the emergent lower priyayi-class – now slowly gaining access to Dutch education and training – appeared to embrace Bintang Hindia. Yet there remained in Rivai’s writings an underlying sense of dissatisfaction with the snail-like pace of change. ‘Why’, he asked, ‘are so many people of the colonies (koloniën) rising against their motherlands (moederlanden)?’ For Rivai access to Dutch education would provide the key to strengthening the ‘rope of friendship’ between the two peoples (Bintang Hindia, vol. 1, no. 2, 15 January 1903). This last metaphor for the paternalistic relationship between colonizer and colonized was deliberately calculated to appeal to a Muslim audience, much like Rivai’s analogy of Amsterdam as the new Mecca. The connection between God and His community is often referred to as being ‘the rope of God’ (ḥabl Allāh, cf. Qur’an 3: 103; Siegel 1969).

One language, one people, one homeland: Bintang Hindia’s vision of a new Indies nation

Like Snouck Hurgronje and the then Minister for Education, J.H. Abendanon (1852–1925), Clockener Brousson and Rivai initially championed Dutch as the language of education. In 1903 (vol. 1, no. 4) Bintang Hindia declared that ‘natives want to learn Dutch in order to help the Dutch guard and care for the Indies (tanah Hindia)’. The writer (probably Rivai) argued that when soldiers are given weapons they are taught how to use them. So, too, knowledge of Dutch would be used in a responsible way for the good of all. Those who received Dutch education would thus be aware of the benevolence of the Dutch government. As Snouck Hurgronje declared, ‘Indonesians are imploring us to give them instruction; by granting their wish we shall
secure their loyalty for an unlimited time' (Vlekke 1959: 330). Furthermore, regular sections on correct Dutch grammar – and indeed lessons on ‘proper’ Malay – were intended to give ‘civilized natives’ (*ontwikkeld inlanders*) the chance to practise and improve their language (see *Bintang Hindia*, vol. 3, no. 6, 1905).

However, through the influence of Idenberg and van Heutsz, it was decided that Malay, long the language of government between colonizer and colonized, was the most fitting choice for the mass of Indies subjects (Ricklefs 1993: 156–57; Maier 1993). The issue now became what sort of Malay would be adopted and *Bintang Hindia* commended the allegedly pure Malay of Riau-Lingga as taught in government schools. Although the journal continued to feature a column in Dutch, Clockener Brousson revised his earlier enthusiasms and stated that it was far preferable for natives to speak good Malay than bad Dutch (*Bintang Hindia*, vol. 3, no. 15, 1905). According to Rivai and Clockener Brousson, the role of organs like *Bintang Hindia* was to expand the Malay vocabulary and equip the peoples of the Indies with a language consonant with modernity. Contrary to the opinions expressed by some Dutch correspondents, the peoples of the Indies were interested in subjects apart from poems and stories, and only a proper understanding of politics could improve their people (*bangsa*) and homeland (*tanah air*) (*Bintang Hindia*, vol. 3, no. 9, 1905). Both terms deserve close attention.

The very evolution of the word *bangsa* from ‘grouping’ to ‘nation’ is interesting in itself. *Bangsa* is derived from the Sanskrit term *vam.sa*, which expresses a sense of ‘tribe’, ‘nation’, ‘lineage’, or ‘people’, and is a classifier for exclusive groups, most usually of people (Gonda 1973: 149, 385). Hence a *bangsa* is communal construct formed by context. The traditional Malay epics often referred to the *bangsas* of the known world: to Indians (*bangsa Keling*), Arabs (*bangsa Arab*), and Portuguese (*bangsa Feringgi*), who had all interacted with people of the lands below the winds. And within these lands, too, there were the Malays (*bangsa Melayu*) of various negeris – like Melaka, Siak, and Palembang – as well as the other distinct indigenous communities identified by their languages and customs, such as the Javanese (*bangsa Jawa*) or Bugis (*bangsa Bugis*).

By contrast I would return to a point I made in Chapter 1. Namely that the wider self-identification of a ‘Jawi’ *bangsa* usually required the context of their interaction outside the *bilād al-jāwa* or in the company of non-Jawa within these lands. It was primarily among fellow believers abroad that these Southeast Asians – whether Acehnese, Javanese, or Malay – imagined themselves as Jawa or, in their own language of ecumene, *bangsa Jawi*. And given that the Netherlands Indies was still a nebulous construct at the turn of the nineteenth century, it was harder still to find an external context in which *bangsa Hindia* could achieve wider currency; especially given that few Jawa were making their presence felt in Europe as they had been in West Asia for centuries. As we shall see below, this formulation did ultimately gain
acceptance among the Muslims of the Netherlands Indies. Ariffin (1993) has shown for the period after the Japanese occupation the idea of a peninsular and mono-cultural Malay bangsa was opposed by the raja-oriented groups, while the idea of a multi-ethnic bangsa based on the artificial administrative construct of East Sumatra would fail when it set itself against the broader Indonesian nationalism.

To return then to 1905: If such meta-bangsa categories as bangsa Jawi or bangsa Hindia had, for the moment, little value within the Indies – and perhaps even less among those who identified themselves with the negeris of their particular rajas – then the colonial context could bring the religious construct to the fore. When a native was asked to define his or her nationality, then a Malay or Javanese would more than likely have declared their primary bangsa to be Islam. A Chinese writing in the 1780s had once complained how his former countrymen had taken up Javanese customs and took to calling themselves ‘islam’ (Reid 2001: 310). An echo of this identification may be seen in an article written by a Javanese in the Djawi Hisworo in 1919. Here a certain Danoelelono described his recent visit to Batavia and observed how the locals identified Islam as their identity. Anyone wearing a black felt cap (peci) was considered equally an orang islam, and such categories as orang Jawa or orang Sunda were only meaningful as contextual subcategories (see Djawi Hisworo, 20 January 1919, No. 8/IPO 1919, 4). Such an equation of ‘Muslim equals native’ was – as we have seen – equally meaningful to the Dutch. But unlike the bangsa defined in terms of ethnicity or perhaps possession of a raja, this religious bangsa made no intrinsic territorial claims: claims that were being made by Bintang Hindia for the bangsa Hindia and formulated around the territorial entity of tanah Hindia. Nonetheless, while the various communities existed within both the tanah Hindia and the lands below the winds, they remained connected to a multiplicity of lands and were not yet any singular place. To call this profusion of polities a homeland (tanah air) was a radical step.

Like bangsa, tanah air (homeland, lit. ‘land and water’) was a recognized concept in the Malay vocabulary of 1905. It is used by Bintang Hindia without special comment or explanation. Tanah air conjures up ideas of an archipelagic homeland, or one of which the sea is an implicit part. This would make sense for most of the Malay-literate trading polities of the bilād al-jāwa where ‘Malays’ identified with the territory maintained by their ruler. Yet tanah air was not that familiar to Malay speakers outside Western discourse. William Marsden made no mention of tanah air in his lexicon of 1812 and it is not until Shellabear’s Malay–English Vocabulary (1902) that it appears as ‘one’s native land’. In the following year it appeared in Wilkinson’s (1903: 154) dictionary as ‘territories; districts; the whole extent of land and water forming a geographical unit’ based on its usage in the Anglophile Munshi Abdullah’s Hikayat Abdullah (The Account of Abdullah, 1849). Certainly the usage of tanah air by Bintang Hindia, and later in Singapore by Utusan
Melayu and al-Imam (see Chapter 7), would have served to reinforce Abdullah’s conceptualization.\textsuperscript{15}

But how then could Malay speakers make the jump from their own tanahs to the colonial entity of Hindia? Both Ahmat b. Adam and Poeze have contended that Bintang Hindia supplied the first step in this transition. Nonetheless, I would suggest that it is rather the increasingly ecumenical discourses of Islam and the Hajj, as they interacted with the Dutch rule that had negated the positions of their own rajas as custodians of religion in the late nineteenth century, that present the impetus for such an identification. The writings of Bintang Hindia could thus resonate with this pre-existing sense.

Ahmat b. Adam (1995: 106) has also identified Bintang Hindia as the first real propagator of an Indonesian national image. He notes, for example, that it had a majority ‘Indonesian’ staff. Certainly it had an impact. Poeze (1989: 105) remarks that both the magazine and its editor Rivai were an inspiration to Wahidin Soedirohesoedodo (1852–1917), the founder of the Javanese organization Boedi Oetomo (Noble Endeavour, 1908). But while Bintang Hindia had a national audience, its readership was still confined to an ‘emancipated’ intelligentsia in government service. Islam for them was very much a background symbol of indigenous unity. And this is not to say that Bintang Hindia’s message of an Indies bangsa was eagerly digested by all such élites. For example, one reader, Datoek Soetan Maharadja of Padang (1860–1921) was far more concerned with ideas of the maintenance of the Minangkabau and Malay worlds and little interested in ideas of wider Indies nor yet Eastern fellowship (Abdullah 1972: 216; Ahmat b. Adam 1995: 136).

Ahmat b. Adam (1995: 111) and Poeze (1989) rightly regard Rivai as the principal activist behind Bintang Hindia. As Ahmat b. Adam points out, after the editors went their separate ways in 1907, the paper lost its political overtones and started a slow decline. Problems first appeared between the editors in 1905. At that time it became clear that Rivai in Holland and Clockener Brousson in the Indies had very different ideas about the political orientation of Bintang Hindia. Rivai was even campaigning for indigenous readers to form their own associations, mooting the formation of an Indies organization to be called the Vereeniging Kaoem Moeda (The Association of the Young Generation). Interestingly, Rivai’s idea anticipated the titles of many localized organizations of the 1910s and 1920s which maintained the term ‘young’ in their titles, but these usually took the Dutch jong, such as the Jong Sumatranen Bond (1917), Jong Jawa (1918), Jong Minahasa (1918), and even the Jong Islamieten Bond (1925).

After Rivai’s call for the Vereeniging Kaoem Moeda, an unimpressed Clockener Brousson then actively took to criticizing his Amsterdam partner and the journal was weakened by their dissent and financial troubles (Poeze 1989: 94–97). It was at this low point that Clockener Brousson secured, by the end of 1905, the personal backing of Governor General van Heutsz – perhaps
due to Clockener Brousson being a veteran of van Heutsz’ Acehnese campaign. Van Heutsz saw the inherent potential in this national broadsheet to direct editorial content in support of his administration (Poeze 1989: 97–98). In so doing Bintang Hindia was effectively neutered and its temporarily reconciled editors no longer debated politics on behalf of natives. Nonetheless, the idea of bangsa Hindia itself was not considered contentious and was taken up in the Indies by the emerging élite inspired by the ideals of Association and the Ethici. This may most clearly be seen in E.F.E. Douwes Dekker’s collaboration with Rivai in 1907 to form the Indische Partij (The Indies Party).

While Bintang Hindia defined the bangsa and tanah air as a body held together by Dutch rule and the Malay language, it is in a sense ironic that the most detailed enunciation of this platform came when, on 1 January 1907, Clockener Brousson outlined a very national programme. Addressed to ‘All the people[s] of the [Dutch East] Indies’ (segala bangsa Hindia), Clockener Brousson expounded the (European) virtues of national unity in Malay heavily laced with Dutch terminology. Here in the Indies lived many different peoples under the unitary protection of the Dutch flag and queen. According to outsiders, these peoples – Malays, Javanese, and Bataks – seemed scarcely aware of each other or lived in mutual enmity. Why not therefore recognize the unity of the speakers of Malay and cultivate a new culture (beschaving) under the benevolent direction of the Dutch throne? Clockener Brousson thus stressed, in a mélange of Malay and Dutch, the need to cultivate a sense of love (hiba) for ‘our bangsa’ with the inculcation of national sentiment (nationaliteitsgevoel) and patriotism (vaderlandsliefde) in the bangsa Hindia (Bintang Hindia, vol. 4, no. 18, 1 January 1907). Certainly this was by no means a new idea in Dutch circles. For example the prominent Indies journalist and writer P.A. Daum had run a newspaper in the 1880s with the title Het Indische Vaderland (The Indies Fatherland). Still, that had been a Dutch language paper targeted at an expatriate Dutch audience. And at the time Dutch officials marked it as a rag while L.W.C. van den Berg wondered just what those natives who read the Dutch press would make of ‘such matters as the vaderlandsliefde, pride, and candour; by which the European is distinguished’ (Mr. 1881, no. 978). What made Clockener Brousson’s patriotic appeal different in 1907, by comparison, was that it was addressed to a cross-section of indigenous peoples; and then in the only language to which they could all enjoy some access.

As Locher-Scholten (1981: 207) has pointed out, the Ethici – like Clockener Brousson and Idenberg – were far more concerned with the Indies of itself than its indigenous inhabitants. Their calls for the elevation of all the natives of Indië remained embedded in the idea of a Dutch Indies. And despite Clockener Brousson’s declaration to the Indies people, and the community of language used by Rivai, the importance for Bintang Hindia with respect to its indigenous readers should more truly be seen in its emphasis on the Modern
and ideas of progress. This was certainly the principal feature of the broad-sheet recalled by Soetan Mohamed Zain (1948: 65) when writing in the 1930s. Indies aficionados of the Modern, like Zain, began to take the name *kaum muda*, a term which we have seen was championed by Rivai, and which was further developed by one of *Bintang Hindia*’s correspondents, Dja Endar Moeda.

*Bintang Hindia* (vol. 1, no. 25, 12 December 1903) had already devoted a Dutch feature article to this Sumatran activist, extolling the virtues of the industrious editor of *Pertja Barat* (*West Pertja*, 1890–1911) and the Batak paper *Tapian nan Oeli* (1900–03). Dja Endar Moeda’s own monthly journal *Insulinde* (Padang, 1901–05) also emphasized the importance of learning European languages, of studying ‘science’, of wearing trousers, and taking photographs, and in all ways distinguishing oneself from the *kaum tua*, the ‘old generation’. According to *Bintang Hindia*, here was a self-educated man able ‘to act as a bridge over the chasm which, alas, always forms between “ruler” and “ruled”’. Dja Endar Moeda was painted a far better servant of his people than the unlettered critics who believed that the only goal for a native was a painted parasol! Here was ‘an Indiër, an Indo-Nederlander . . . from whom we can expect much’.

As Ahmat b. Adam (1995: 102–03) shows, the most widely influential idea developed by Abdul Rivai in the pages of *Bintang Hindia* was that of empowerment through education. There no longer need only be men of prowess (*bangsawan*) by birth alone. Now a new intelligentsia was rapidly emerging made up of intellectual aristocrats (*bangsawan pikiran*) such as Dja Endar Moeda. Elsewhere this idea was also being developed in parallel by another style of *Kaum Muda*. This explicitly Islamic *Kaum Muda*, connected to the intellectual hub of Cairo above all, I shall discuss in Chapter 6 below. But first I wish to turn to a reorientation among the Jawa of Mecca that occurred almost as soon as Snouck Hurgronje stepped on the gangplank of his steamer bound for the Netherlands.
A changing Mecca

Reporting on his visit to Arabia in 1917, D.A. Rinkes felt that Snouck Hurgronje's description of Mecca remained so comprehensive that it would be an ‘absurdity’ to repeat it.¹ However this view of a static Hijaz is misleading. In the months and years after Snouck Hurgronje’s departure, changes occurred within the Hijaz that would have a bearing on the Jawi community in Mecca and, consequently, on Dutch knowledge of that community. These sets of changes were, first, the death of Ahmad bin Zayn¯ı Dahlan in 1886 and the assertion by ‘Awn al-Raf¯ıq of absolute control of Mecca; and second, and even more significantly, the death of Naw¯aw¯ı al-Bantínī in 1897, and the rise of Ahmad Khaṭīb as leader of the Jawi ‘ulamā’.

Snouck Hurgronje’s connections within the Hijaz, and thus colonial knowledge, were first weakened by the death of Ahmad bin Zayn¯ı Dahlan. In order to secure absolute control of Mecca, Sharī‘ ‘Awn al-Raf¯ıq ceased to cooperate with the Ottoman Governor, Vâlî Osm¯an P¯âsh¯â. He then made a political hijra to Medina, where he was followed by Ahmad Dahlan. This journey proved too much for the frail shaykh, who died there in 1886. His deputy, the Meccan-born Hadrami Muḥammad Saʿīd B¯a Buṣayl (d.1912), a man not widely admired by the Jawa, was subsequently appointed as Muftī.

Faced with an uncooperative Sharī‘, Osm¯an P¯âsh¯â was provided with a way out in the form of a promotion to the wealthier Vilayat of Aleppo. In the following decade, ‘Awn al-Raf¯ıq asserted himself as the real authority in Mecca and saw that successive Ottoman governors remained relatively pliant. One incidental casualty of the departure of Osm¯an P¯âsh¯â was Ḥabīb ‘Abd al-Raḥm¯ān al-Z¯ahir who had managed to gain an official appointment as shaykh al-sad¯at in Mecca for his support of the latter. He was removed after serving only one month (Reid 1972: 59, n. 52). More importantly for the Dutch though, Snouck Hurgronje’s Hijazi network, operated by Aboe Bakar and van der Chijs, suffered as a consequence. The first European casualty
was van der Chijs himself. In late 1888 Sharīf ‘Awn attempted to expand the shipping monopoly to take in all Indian pilgrims. The British consulate objected strongly and the new Vālī intervened by abolishing the post of head of the pilgrim guides then held by van der Chijs’ friend al-‘Irāqī. His sacking effectively destroyed van der Chijs’ commercial influence among ‘our little Javanese’. Despite van der Chijs’ protests to the Vālī, and his pleas for the appointment of a new consul by the Dutch embassy in Pera, the fate of the Ocean Steamship Company in Jeddah seemed sealed. Furthermore, in 1889, ‘Awn decreed that only Ottoman citizens could become guides, effectively reducing any influence that the foreign consulates might have in response to his activities (al-Amr 1978: 183). In that year too a despondent van der Chijs committed suicide.

‘Awn al-Rafīq then asserted himself over all aspects of Hijazi society. In 1892 he quarrelled with his own nephews, ‘Alī and Husayn, leading to the latter being removed to Constantinople (al-Amr 1978: 129). A number of Meccan notables – including ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī and Ḥābib ‘Abd al-Rāhmān al-Zāhīr – even took the unprecedented step of bypassing the Vālī and writing a direct petition to Sultan Abdülhamid. A commission of inquiry – including the future vālī Ahmad Rāṭib Pāshā – was sent to the Hijaz. However ‘Awn succeeded in bribing this body, which issued a glowing report on his administration, leaving him free to torture and expel the plaintiffs (al-Amr 1978: 56).

Thus, in 1893, Snouck Hurgronje’s old ally ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī found himself in exile travelling to Egypt and India (Snouck Hurgronje 1941: 15). But he was by no means friendless. In 1895 Zawāwī toured the Straits Settlements and Riau before moving to Kutai (East Borneo) as the guest of a member of the Al-Saggof (al-Saqqāf) clan. Snouck Hurgronje’s recommendation to the Consul had ensured he would be well treated in the Indies. In 1896 Zawāwī assumed the post of Muftī of Pontianak where, as a guest of both the sultan and the colonial state, he was allowed complete freedom of movement not being required to register as a Foreign Oriental. His further activities in the bilād al-jāwa will be taken up in Chapter 7.

‘Awn al-Rafīq’s despotism bore hard on the pilgrims to Mecca. The financial vulnerability of the average Jawi pilgrim – and to a degree his or her guide – was underscored in 1893, when an attempt was made to revive the pilgrimage monopoly. In that year the proprietor of a Batavian shipping company, I.G.M. Herklots, converted to Islam and fled to Mecca in order to escape an earlier scandal in Jeddah. There he managed to gain the favour of ‘Awn al-Rafīq and became the major agent responsible for transporting pilgrims back to the bilād al-jāwa who were ‘offered’ homeward tickets for passage on one of the vessels chartered by his agent in Batavia. The commission Herklots paid to ‘Awn al-Rafīq ensured that it was difficult to leave Mecca without one of Herklots’ tickets.
The Jawa were furious at what constituted yet another illegal act perpetrated either under or with the connivance of the Ottoman authorities. Thus Aboe Bakar submitted a report apprising his superiors of the situation, yet they found themselves unable to act quickly as a climate of fear ensured that few were prepared to give evidence. Aboe Bakar therefore suggested that the returned pilgrims be interviewed in the Indies when they were safely beyond the reach of Sharīf ‘Awn.7

The woes of the Jawi pilgrims were again magnified in 1896. In that year a former employee of Herklots, Şâlîh Fâqîh Samkâri,8 appeared in the Hijaz; as did another European, van Eyck, who rejoined his old partners, ‘Umar al-Saqqāf (a member of the first monopoly of 1883) and ‘Umar Naﬁf of Jeddah (1822–1908). According to Aboe Bakar, the British Consul was heard to remark to his Dutch counterpart that ‘the pilgrims will have no respite until al-Saqqāf and van Eyck are gone from Jeddah’. Aboe Bakar reported that both consuls were ‘tired of [the Vâlî] Ahmad Râtib Pâshâ . . . because he and his accomplice the Sharīf have a known share in the company through the aegis of those three crooks’.9 Little appears to have been done, and Aboe Bakar later complained bitterly to Snouck Hurgronje over the perceived inaction of the government of the Netherlands Indies.10

Sharīf ‘Awn reigned supreme over the Jawa in Mecca. In 1897, Aboe Bakar even insinuated – in Malay for added security – that ‘the Groot Sjerief’ had had a hand in the deaths of two colleagues.11 Equally, if ‘Awn al-Raﬁq could force out his opposition or conspire to have them murdered, he was in no hurry to deliver up the fugitives from Dutch law. Thus two activists from the Banten Jihad, Hadji Sapioedin and Hadji Abdoelhalim, were never in danger of prosecution in Mecca (see Sartono 1966:261–62). Their presence was only discovered by Aboe Bakar, who identified Sapioedin in Mecca in 1891, for which he received an official citation (Laffan 1999a:523).12 Again in 1898, Aboe Bakar noted that the Dutch political agent in Banten had cabled advising the impending arrival, from Celebes via Singapore, of two other suspects – Hadji Moehioedin and Hadji Ahmad. Having been interviewed by Aboe Bakar the pair absconded. Aboe Bakar then cabled the local government and the Vâlî, but knew full well that local police would feel no compulsion to expend a ‘full effort’ in their apprehension.13 Snouck Hurgronje further observed that the apprehension of men like Sapioedin was practically impossible given that in Mecca they were accorded the title of muhājirūn (i.e. ‘emigrants’ from non-Muslim territory) and were supported through pious donations.14

As time went on questions were also being asked about the nature of the role of the consulates and about Snouck Hurgronje’s journey to Mecca. One Consul, Jacques Edouard De Sturler (b.1855, Consul, 1895–97), would plague Aboe Bakar with questions about Snouck Hurgronje’s ‘inner course’ and the ‘manifestation’ of his Islam leading Snouck Hurgronje to accuse Aboe Bakar
of betraying their ‘great secret’ of twelve years. A deeply troubled Aboe Bakar defended himself, but his insecurities are emblematic of how Dutch access to local knowledge in the Hijaz, and thus colonial knowledge of Islam, was compromised. Moreover the indiscretions of De Šturler were by no means isolated. The Jeddah post was long staffed by a series of isolated (and sometimes corrupt) Consuls. These men were furthermore subject to both ‘Awn al-Raftîq and the locally engaged staff – Jawi and Arab – on whom they relied absolutely.

**From Nawāwî al-Bantinî to Aḥmad Khaṭîb al-Minankabâwî as leader of the Jawi community in Mecca**

Snouck Hurgronje’s closest link with the Jawi community was severed by the death, in 1897, of Nawāwî al-Bantinî. This scholar had continued to forward to Snouck Hurgronje copies of his works, and his compliments, via Aboe Bakar. With Nawāwî’s passing the way was open for another more radical scholar to emerge. And it is this man who personifies perhaps the greatest change to affect the Jawi community in Mecca in the last decade of the nineteenth century.

Although there is technically no ecclesia in Islam, the ‘ulamā’ can occupy roles that command high esteem, especially when they are allied to an existing power structure. This was especially true of the Ottoman empire where muftîs had become salaried officials within a hierarchical structure that came, in theory, under the purview of the Şeyhülislam in Constantinople (Hourani 1983: 28). Aḥmad Daḥlān may be seen as an example of such an incorporated ‘ālim. Sometime between 1887 and 1892, Aḥmad bin ‘Aṭṭāf al-Minankabâwî (Aḥmad Khaṭîb, 1860–1915) assumed the less sumptuous robes and salary of imām in the Haram. In so doing he joined the religious hierarchy of the Ottoman Hijaz and assured his future prominence within the wider Jawi ecumene.

For historians of Indonesian nationalism and reformism, Aḥmad Khaṭîb is the most famous ‘ālim to have been born in the Alam Minangkabau. According to the Meccan biographer ‘Aḥmad al-Jabbâr (1982: 38), Aḥmad Khaṭîb was the grandson of a Hijazi emigré, ‘Aḥmad Allâh, who had settled in Kota Gedang where he held the post of imām and earned the title ‘state preacher’ (khatîb negeri). Yet Aḥmad bin ‘Aṭṭāf’s earliest beginnings might equally have led him into partnership with Dutch colonialism in the manner of Hasan Moestapa. Aḥmad’s father, Abd al-Latîf, then the district head of Ampat Angkat, had planned to send him to the regional Dutch school for the native elite in Bukittinggi. Although his father’s state position was a Dutch creation, Aḥmad’s association with the Dutch – however indirect – was not to last long. After graduation from the local primary school he embarked for the Hijaz in 1881, together with his grandfather and his younger cousin, Muhammad Tahir bin Jalal al-Din (1869–1956) (see Chapter 7 below).
And, given that Aḥmad bin ‘Ābd al-Laṭīf never returned to the archipelago, he might be seen as having enacted the principle of hijra, propounded by ‘Ābd al-Karīm al-Bantinī in the 1880s, where Muslims should emigrate from lands ruled by unbelievers.

Once in Mecca, the young Aḥmad settled in a house owned by his grandfather and he attended the lectures of Aḥmad Daḥlān, Abū Bakr Shaṭṭā, and Yahyā Kablī (Sanusi and Edwar 1981: 17). Of these three, Abū Bakr Shaṭṭā had the strongest influence on Aḥmad, and he later specialized in the teaching of Shaṭṭā’s Iʿānat al-ṭālibīn (The Seekers’ Aid). As Shaṭṭā was also the devoted pupil of Daḥlān, a connection between the young Minangkabau, Shaṭṭā and Daḥlān most likely existed when Snouck Hurgronje visited Mecca. Despite this confluence, it seems that no meeting ever took place between the Dutchman and his future adversary as was later alleged by Khaṭīb’s relative Agoes Salim (Noer 1973: 31–33; Abdullah 1984: 202–25). In any case he would have been too young to be of interest to Snouck Hurgronje.

It would also seem that Aḥmad had but limited contact with the prominent Javanese teachers of Mecca. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that while Ahmad Khaṭīb was initiated as a Naqshbandī (Sanusi and Edwar 1981: 27), he was disposed to being a harsh critic of the Jawi shaykhs of that order. In later life he was especially critical of the Jawi leaders of the Qādirīya wa Naqshbandīya with whom both Snouck Hurgronje and Aboe Bakar had associated. However the issue of mysticism alone does not explain his avoidance of such great scholars as Nawāwī, who himself adopted a neutral attitude to the mystical fraternities. Perhaps an ethnic cleavage made wider by local politics is more in evidence. Indeed, given the divisions between Ahmad Daḥlān and Muḥammad Ḥasab Allāh in the 1880s, it is reasonable to suggest that many Minangkabau, and maybe other Sumatrans and Malays, circulated in different groupings from the Javanese. Certainly the now swelling Jawi community in Mecca would have fostered the continuing devolution of Jawi fraternity along the ethnic lines of their homelands. In 1874 Muḥammad Sāliḥ had already written a letter to his brother in West Sumatra about the shaykhs of their ‘own people’, none of whom are named in the later reports of Aboe Bakar (see Mr. 1874, no. 524).

In Mecca, Aḥmad Khaṭīb was also fortunate enough to have gained the patronage of Shaykh Muḥammad Sāliḥ al-Kurdī, the owner of a book-shop at Bab al-Salam, who bought a house for Ahmad and whose two daughters Ahmad married (‘Ābd al-Jabbār 1982: 39). According to Snouck Hurgronje's informants, Sāliḥ al-Kurdī was the most prominent money-lender in Mecca whose clients included ‘Awn al-Rafīq. One story relates that when Sharīf ‘Awn expressed his surprise to al-Kurdī that he had married his daughter to a Jawi who had only learned Arabic after arriving in Mecca, the latter commended him as a dedicated and pious student and even as a potential imām within the Ḥaram. This the Sharīf accordingly ordered, and Aḥmad
Khaṭīb subsequently established his circle near Bab al-Ziyada (‘Abd al-Jabbār 1982: 39). The story may well be apocryphal but, in any case, Aḥmad’s energy, and intelligence, may well have earned him a licence to teach within the Meccan Haram only because he had local heritage and strong connections with the élite of that city.

It would also appear, from many works, that Aḥmad even rose to the position once held by Aḥmad Dahlān (cf. Azra 1999a: 154). Yet while Ahmad rose to the Ottoman salaried position of imām (prayer leader) and khaṭīb (preacher) within the Haram – as his grandfather had been in Kota Gedang – and by which he became known to the Jawa as Aḥmad Khaṭīb, he never held the rank of muftī. Nonetheless, this elevation was a significant event for the Jawa. Now a Jawi ʻalīm could address the ecumene with the added sanction of holy office bolstered by the authority of the Ottoman state. Moreover, for the many Jawa who had not yet seen the Haram and who did not have any concept of its intrigues and hierarchies, his title, which he ‘never neglected to place . . . upon any writings and letters which he . . . sent to the archipelago’, must have sounded all the more significant. For this reason, questions relating to the controversial construction of a second congregational mosque in Palembang, in 1893, were sent to Aḥmad Khaṭīb rather than the Muftī Shaykh Bā Buṣayl. Khaṭīb also engaged in a war of pamphlets with Said Oesman who defended the existing, state-sponsored, mosque as the sole centre for the Muslim community of Palembang. From this war of pamphlets, and through his attacks on Dutch-sponsored Islam in works published in Cairo, Mecca, and Padang, Aḥmad Khaṭīb presented himself as a scholar ready to challenge any Muslims who cooperated with the Dutch authorities. I shall return to this point again below.

Aḥmad Khaṭīb’s lectures are said to have attracted scores of Jawi students from all parts of the archipelago. One may even see in Ahmad Khaṭīb the active personification of a renewed Jawi ecumenism overcoming the normal ‘ambiguity’ of life in Mecca or perhaps the less charged atmosphere of the fiqh classes of some of the other Jawi teachers. And if Aḥmad Khaṭīb was a willing protagonist for anti-Dutch aspirations, he is also remembered as being opposed to Arab pretensions of leadership in Mecca. This is the image presented in one conventional source for the activities and life of Aḥmad Khaṭīb, Hamka’s Ajahku (My Father, 1958). Within this work Hamka (1908–81) has woven a narrative of national identity through conversations between his father, Hadji Rasoel (Abd al-Karim Amr Allah, 1879–1949), and Aḥmad Khaṭīb. Hamka presents these discussions through the device of his father’s diary. And in this ‘diary’ the Jawi experience of Mecca is one set in terms of opposition to the Arab shaykh. According to Hamka (1958: 50–52), when Hadji Rasoel returned to Mecca in 1901, Aḥmad Khaṭīb urged him to commence teaching in the Haram. However, there he was challenged by Muftī Bā Buṣayl, who condemned his use of Shaṭṭā’s Iʿānat al-tālibīn and prohibited him from teaching.
'I was shocked', he said in his notebook, ‘as a matter of fact lots of people less knowledgeable than myself taught in the Haram. Yet they were all Arabs or Jawa who had become paying students of Arab shaykhs.’ . . . [Rasoel] returned to complain about this to his teacher Shaykh Aḥmad Khaṭīb and explained everything to him. On hearing this his teacher laughed raucously and said: ‘My dear boy! You don’t know the secret then. This is an old score. You are forbidden to teach because you are my student. Had you passed time studying with him then you would have easily gained permission to teach. This is the struggle in Mecca my boy! We are Jawi they are Arabs. They feel that they are more important and more deserving. They look down on us believing that we know nothing. Moreover they think that they can teach us Arabic. And one more thing Rasoel! I was a student of his enemy Sīdī Shaykh al-Bakrī. It was he who composed the commentary for the Fath al-muʿātin. That’s the reason for your being forbidden to read it’. Shaykh Aḥmad Khaṭīb also added: ‘When I first began teaching in the Ḥaram, I too bore all sorts of calumny. They were so dazzled by our progress that they were urged by others to stone us when I was teaching so that my lamp was smashed!’

It should be remembered once more that the vast majority of Jawi teachers were active in teaching from private homes. Few enjoyed the station attained by Aḥmad Khaṭīb, or indeed a teaching circle (ḥalaqa) within the Ḥaram. Even the great Nawāwī Banten taught from his home.19 Based on the later experiences of Hadji Rasoel, the paucity of Jawi ulemā in Islam’s holiest mosque was more due to cultural and personal tensions they faced from among the established Egyptian, Hadrami, and Daghestani ulemā. If this was indeed the case then Aḥmad Khaṭīb broke new ground by fostering his own Jawi students in the Ḥaram.

The ‘anti-colonialism’ of Aḥmad Khaṭīb

Always interested in the developments in Mecca, Snouck Hurgronje had followed the career of Ahmad Khaṭīb since 1894 when he described one of his works, al-Manhaj al-mashrū‘ (The Ordained Method, Cairo, 1893), in a dispatch to the Director of Education.20 There is no mention of Aḥmad Khaṭīb in Aboe Bakar’s letters until June 1895, when he advised Snouck Hurgronje that he has sent him a recent work by the latter. This was only one of several of the Minangkabau’s works dispatched from Jeddah in that year. The works sent included: al-Jawāhir al-naqīya fī al-aʿmāl al-jaybīya (The Pure Essences of the Trigonometric Arts, Cairo 1892); Rawdat al-ḥussāb fī ʿilm al-hisāb (The Mathematicians’ Garden of the Science of Calculation, Cairo 1893); al-Minhaj al-mashrū‘; tarjamat kitāb al-dāʾī al-masmū‘ (The Planned
Method: A Translation of The Heeded Caller, Cairo 1893; al-Riyād al-wardīya (The Blooming Gardens, Cairo, 1894); Dhū al-sirāj pada menyatakan carita isrā’ dan mi’rāj (The Lamp that Illuminates the Story of the Night Journey, Mecca, 1894).21 To be added to this list is his polemical dispute with Said Oesman, the Ṣulḥ al-jamā‘atayn bi-jawāz ta‘addud al-jum‘atayn (The Treaty between the Two Congregations on the Permissability of Exceeding Two Friday Mosques, Mecca 1894). Āhmad Khaṭīb was certainly prolific, and by the end of his career he is said to have published forty-six works (‘Abd al-Jabbār 1982: 41–45). It also appears the majority were composed in Arabic, though none seem to have enjoyed the longevity of Nawāwī’s contributions to Islamic knowledge and they are all but forgotten in Southeast Asia today (see van Bruinessen 1990).

Most of Āhmad Khaṭīb’s early works were either concerned with trigonometry or attacks on Minangkabau adat. Such attacks had been made long before at the time of the Padri movement. When the Dutch intervened on behalf of the aristocracy they had become the de facto partisans of adat against the Sharī‘a in the Alam Minangkabau where once, as in most Jawi contexts, adat and Sharī‘a had coexisted. To stand against the dominance of adat was thus also an anti-colonial act. And if West Sumatra’s matrilineal traditions were already an anathema to Āhmad Khaṭīb, during his Meccan career, the village of his birth, Kota Gedang, had become the staunchest pro-Dutch (and thus pro-adat) region of Sumatra (Hadler 2000: 245ff.). Therefore adat and colonialism implicitly represented a united opposition to the Islam that he wished to propagate. Yet he remained confident in the triumph of the Sharī‘a. According to al-Mīnhāj al-mašrū‘, the battle between adat and Sharī‘a was clearly unequal and it could be seen that the time would come when indigenous adat – and therefore the supporting network for Dutch control – was no longer dominant.

Thus a concerned Snouck Hurgronje sent a request to Aboe Bakar to gather what he could in order to measure the full range of Ahmad Khaṭīb’s pronouncements. And in September 1895 an alarmed Consul De Sturler read of Ahmad Khaṭīb’s anti-colonial sentiments, most likely based on reports of his Dhū al-sirāj pada menyatakan carita isrā’ dan mi’rāj. This evidently surprised Aboe Bakar.

As you already know, Monsieur De Sturler told me that he had received a report stating that Āhmad Khaṭīb Padang had written a work on Holy War. So I said that perhaps this did not exist and that maybe it was made up. Could Khaṭīb have been slandered in the report? Then [De Sturler] instructed me to get all of the afore-mentioned Āhmad’s works – including those sent to you . . . Up until now we have come across four books. Two in Malay and two in Arabic – the latter being light works on astronomical calculation and trigonometry.22
Despite Aboe Bakar’s surprise, Snouck Hurgronje illustrated Aḥmad Ḵaṭṭīb’s mentality (geest), quoting at length from Dhū al-sirāj in a letter to the First Government Secretary:

Know then that when I heard of the situation of our Malay so-called Muslim brothers who, having had intercourse with the white infidels, now know little of their own religion other than formulas. Meanwhile the whites awake in them uncertainties in the Mohammedan religion – so that they even doubt the Night Journey of our Prophet! Such uncertainties [in turn] gain influence among the untutored as they docilely learn of the Night Journey from their disbelieving teachers unfamiliar with the substance of their own religion. Whereupon they, in their scholastic blindness, are drawn by these whites in each and every way, ignorant of their own stupidity, it grieves me, to the pitiable status of becoming mere animals and hence apostates. [They are thus] outside the fold of the Islamic religion such that it is not fitting that they should receive ritual burial after their deaths. In this world they are but the slaves of the whites and in the world to come shall reside for eternity in Hell!23

The tone of this passage should not be regarded as a view rare among Jawi ‘ulamā’. There had been a long tradition in Islam of criticism of any Muslim who accepted service with an oppressor, Muslim or non-Muslim (Cooperson 2000: 57). Furthermore Aḥmad Ḵaṭṭīb was not the first ‘anti-colonial’ Jawi to base his activities in Mecca, as can be seen from the examples of the earlier Yūṣuf al-Maqassārī and ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Bantinī. By contrast though, in the 1880s and 1890s Nawāwī al-Bantinī continued to maintain good relations with the Consulate through Aboe Bakar. This is not to deny his undoubted anti-Dutch sympathies (Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 270), which must have been heightened in 1889 when, in the aftermath of the Banten Jihad, his brother Ahmad was exiled to Padang Sidempuan where he died (Sartono 1966: 344–47). With some overstatement, Abd. Rachman (1996: 94–95) and Chaidar (1977: 87) claim that he gave a spirited defence of his homeland in lectures in Cairo. Abd. Rachman (1996: 108) even claims that Nawāwī headed a patriotic organization in Mecca called ‘Javanese Territory’. These accounts should be treated in light of the narrative that both writers have developed of Nawāwī as a retrospective hero of the Javanese pesantren tradition and even Indonesian independence. Perhaps the closest Nawāwī came to disseminating any anti-Western feeling was in a work wherein he apparently decried any Muslim who set the rich above the needy, who got close to the Dutch rulers, and who ignored any wrongs (inkār) perpetrated against fellow Muslims when they had the power to confront or oppose them.24 Nawāwī obviously set the principle of Jihād aside in the interest of public good, and whilst Abd. Rachman claims that the Dutch were worried about his influence, there is no
evidence of this in comparison to the vehement denunciations of Aḥmad Ḳhaṭīb and his alleged call to prang sabil. Furthermore, in his writings, Ahmad Ḳhaṭīb actively denounced the conduct of the Dutch in the entire bilād al-jāwa, whilst Nawāwī largely avoided political writing.

Still, did Ahmad Ḳhaṭīb really condemn associates of unbelievers to eternal damnation pro forma or did he encourage his students to activate themselves and their religion in order to agitate for the independence of their homelands? We may never know. In any case it was clear from his writings that Aḥmad Ḳhaṭīb needed close attention and Aboe Bakar took personal responsibility for the gathering of material ‘so that no mistakes will be made as in the past’. Indeed Aboe Bakar’s effectiveness as a colonial agent of local Hijazi knowledge may already have been decreasing at this time – especially considering that he was extremely over-worked (Laffan 1999a:539). No doubt any Jawa with hostile intentions towards the colonial government (such as Ahmad Ḳhaṭīb) would have suppressed them in the presence of its loyal servant. Aboe Bakar could no doubt still move freely among his fellow Jawa, although he may no longer have enjoyed their fullest confidence.

The reformism of Aḥmad Ḳhaṭīb?

By 1904 Snouck Hurgronje would describe how ‘the most gifted and learned member of the Jawah-colony’, would inform ‘all his pilgrimage-bound countrymen . . . of the absolute incompatibility of the Moḥammedan religion with present-day rights of inheritance’. Through his anti-ādat campaigns Aḥmad Ḳhaṭīb also demonstrated an inclination towards what would now be termed reformism (Azra 1992; ‘Abd al-Jabbār 1982: 38). Moreover, like many reformists, Aḥmad Ḳhaṭīb was a critic of the less orthodox methodology of some of the Ṣūfī orders, such as the Sammānīya, and later the Naqshbandiyya. In particular he was concerned with the absolutist practices of some masters, claiming that they sought to usurp the position of the Divine (Abdullah 1972: 204; van Bruinessen 1992: 110–11). Yet despite an apparent sympathy with the ideas of his contemporary Muḥammad ‘Abduh (see below), little is directly known of Aḥmad Ḳhaṭīb’s thoughts on the latter, save that he is said to have allowed his students to read ‘Abduh’s works so as to be able better to refute them. Johns (1988: 268–71) has suggested that it may actually have been Nawāwī who laid the groundwork for the future acceptance of ‘Abduh’s thought among the Jawa.

In any case, Nawāwī and Aḥmad Ḳhaṭīb certainly appear to have been at odds. In one work Nawāwī even criticized the Minangkabau for being only concerned with paying off his debts (Azra 1997: 261–63). Yet on the whole it is worth remembering that in Mecca in the 1890s, Jawi reformists and traditionalists were not yet engaged in the vitriolic debates about tradition that would characterize the Islamic movement in the Indies in the 1910s and 1920s. There were as yet no followers of Muḥammad ‘Abduh or Rashīd Riḍā
returning from Cairo wearing the ‘modern’ fashions of that city and trying to claim the leadership of the Jawi ecumene. It seems rather that future members of both factions were united in the quest to regain their independence of action and reinstate Islam as the guiding philosophy in their own communities; whether quietly like Nawāwī, or aggressively like Ahmād Khāṭīb.

Suffice it to say that the younger Jawi ʿālim lectured to many future leaders from throughout the archipelago and, based on Schrieke’s 1927 study of West Sumatra, the anti-ʿadat campaign he began in 1892 proved successful (see Schrieke 1955: 119–35). Some of his pupils went on to take on roles as state officials in the sultanates of Sumatra, like Muhammad Nur in Langkat, and Hasan Maksum in Deli. Others included the Javanese founder of Moehammadijah, Achmad Dachlan, and his successor, K.H. Ibrahim. Then there were the Minangkabau reformers: Hadji Rasoel, Muhammad Djamil Djambek (1862–1947), Muhammad Thaib Umar (1874–1920), and Abdullah Ahmad (1878–1933); and their traditionalist rivals Muhammad Sa’d Mungka (1857–1921), Khāṭīb ‘Ali (1861–1936), Sulaiman al-Rasuli (1871–1970) and Djamil Djahe (1875–1941).

Ahmād Khāṭīb is an example of a Jawi who had chosen to devote his life to his religion in Mecca. A return to the Indies would have been a retrograde step for him, yet it was the step that many of his pupils would take. As a symbol and a rallying point for Jawa struggling to (re)assert the Sharīʿa in their home world, Ahmād Khāṭīb’s status assumed a wider meaning. Evidently here was some vision of a united Jawi future. Yet some Jawa in the Indies were starting to divide on doctrinal lines responding to an attack launched by ʿulamāʾ exposed to a new Cairene discourse led by Muḥammad ʿAbduh. I therefore wish now to turn to the direct impact of that discourse in situ.
I now wish to highlight the way in which Cairo came to exert a new presence in the Muslim world, and how some Jawā were drawn to that centre. In this way I wish to challenge the assumption that Mecca and Cairo offered a similar experience to the Jawā set in natural opposition to the educational modes of the West (cf. Benda 1983: 59). Indeed it is this very refocussing of strands of the reformist movement that has remained untreated by current scholarship. In order properly to explain that shift, and the ramifications of this change, I have backgrounded the role in Mecca of the Sumatran Ahmad Khaṭīb. I shall now examine Cairo as a centre for new ideas about the Islamic community as it related to an increasingly colonized world divided apparently between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’. This phase of my discussion will be dealt with in the section ‘Islamic revivalism’ and necessarily incorporates a discussion of how the activists Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ‘Abduh viewed their changing world in the context of Egypt in the 1880s and 1890s. Finally, I bring the Jawā into this context and explore how they understood that same world, and how they began to formulate their place within it. Indeed the revivalist movement, which at times intersected with Ottoman pan-Islamism, only engaged some Jawā. And although many Jawā students lived and worked in Cairo under the gaze of ‘Abduh’s devotee Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1936), they were often equally inspired by one of ‘Abduh’s opponents, Muḥtafā Kāmil Pāshā, and his propagation of the very un-Islamic example of Meiji Japan.

**Revivalism, pan-Islam, and a modern Cairo**

New manifestations of Islamic revivalism emerged in the late nineteenth century. These were a response, in part, to the decline of the Ottoman Empire
which was forced to relinquish control over the last of its tributaries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. So with dwindling international prestige and the encroachments of Russia (which would defeat the Empire in the war of 1877–78), Sultans Abdülaziz and then Abdülhamid II had embraced the title of Caliph and allowed the impression to be given internationally that the Sublime Porte could claim an interest in the affairs of Muslims worldwide. With such recognition, the Porte could potentially benefit from donations under the banner of religious works. One such project, the Hijaz Railway, constructed between 1901 and 1908, was designated a waqf and enjoyed the financial support of Muslims throughout the world which it is said accounted for a third of its capital outlays (Antonius 1938: 74).

It would also appear that Ottoman government propaganda was successful among some European states. At the advent of the Aceh War, the Dutch Ambassador to Pera confirmed that the Sultan was the Caliph of all believers (van ’t Veer 1969: 40). In the 1910s Italy and France erroneously acknowledged the spiritual primacy of the Sultan in their new North African possessions (E.M. 1912: 1137–39). And, despite Snouck Hurgronje’s exasperated objections to Ottoman claims, state pan-Islamism was to a large degree a Western obsession before the rise of indigenous nationalist movements. Still, it was but one aspect though of a Muslim reaction to colonialism, for a new revivalist movement spread simultaneously among the educated élites of Constantinople, Cairo, and Tunis (Hourani 1983: 67–102). In Cairo, between 1871 and 1879, Islamic revivalism and pan-Islamism were embodied by Jamāl al-Dīn ‘al-Afghānī’ (1838/9–97).

Al-Afghānī, who was actually born in Iran, remains an enigmatic character whose life-long search for a patron led him to ignore the dictum that ‘the worst of scholars is he who frequents princes’, although it could be said that he was more of an activist than an ‘ālim. Throughout his travels – commencing in India at the time of the Mutiny of 1857 – he campaigned for a revitalized caliphate. The Shah of Persia, the Mahdī of Sudan, the Emir of Afghanistan, and finally Sultan Abdülhamid were all championed by him at various times during his peregrinations (Keddie 1983). And despite not writing widely, al-Afghānī was able to inculcate his ideas in a body of activists and idealists whom he urged to write and publish (Keddie 1994: 17). In retrospect al-Afghānī has been most commonly understood in terms of the idealized portrait painted by his followers who were keen to obscure his rationalist Shi’i heritage. Indeed, his early views of modernist education, expressed in Constantinople in 1870, verged on irreligion and led to his exile from Turkey. According to Keddie (1994: 23), ‘Islam was seen by him and many who came after him largely as a source of solidarity, in particular solidarity against the encroachments of western governments’. Keddie (1994: 13–18) also observes that his pan-Islamism was only asserted after the annexation of Tunisia by France (1881) and Egypt by Britain (1882). Nonetheless, the novelty of al-Afghānī’s thought, according to Hourani (1983: 114), was that he
emphasized the idea of Islam as a civilization rather than Islam as a religion.

Al-Afghānī’s most famous disciple was Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). Born into a peasant family in the Egyptian Delta, ‘Abduh pursued an eclectic education – including Mālikī and Ḥanbalī jurisprudence at Tanta and al-Azhar and brief experimentation with the Shādhilīyya Şufī order under an uncle (Haddad 1994: 31). However ‘Abduh found his first real inspiration under al-Afghānī, whom he first met in 1869, and who introduced him to the works of Ibn Sīna (Avicenna, 980–1037) and Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406) and directed him on a path to the study of rational philosophy. In 1878, ‘Abduh held a teaching post with the recently established state college, the Dār al-Ulūm (The Home of the Sciences). Prior to his exile in 1882, he served as editor of the official gazette al-Waqā‘ī al-misrīya (Egyptian Events) which ‘played an important part in forming public opinion’ during the crisis years of 1880–82 before the British occupation (Hourani 1983: 133).

However Egypt was not only the staging ground for al-Afghānī’s revivalism and ‘Abduh’s reformism, which I shall term Cairene reformism: a discourse refined and extended by Rashīd Rida under the banner of the Salafīya movement. From the 1840s, Cairo’s intellectual life came to be dominated by elite Egyptian students who had been sent to France for further education. They included Rifā‘a Badawī Rāfi‘ al-Tahtāwī (1801–73) who acted as a guide for the students in Paris between 1826 and 1831. Back in Egypt al-Tahtāwī preceded ‘Abduh as the editor of al-Waqā‘ī al-misrīya, a task he performed in addition to his role as inspector of schools, examiner, and head of the state translation bureau (Hourani 1983: 71). Another major figure, ‘Alī Mubārak Pāshā (1823–93) (in France, 1867–68), was to distinguish himself as Minister for Schools and Public Works under the French-educated Khedive Ismā‘īl (r. 1863–79) and his successor Tawfīq (r. 1879–92). It was Mubārak’s initiative that had seen the founding of the Dār al-‘Ulūm in 1872 (see Jomier 1965: 131–32; Eccel 1984: 162–67).

Such men as al-Tahtāwī and Mubārak were the instigators of a radical reorientation of the Egyptian elite through the foundation of modern schools, journals, and infrastructure. These were designed to instil in Egyptians a new mentality of devotion to the nation and love for the homeland (hubb al-watan) (Mitchell 1988: 137). From that time, too, railways were laid, reservoirs dug, and new Western-style cities constructed. However, the ambitious project of opening the Suez Canal in particular imposed massive financial burdens on the state leading to a government in chaos and beholden to the financial houses of Europe.

In 1881 a group of Egyptian officers, antagonistic to the Turco-Circassian elite and the Anglo–French commission of the public debt, styled themselves al-hizb al-watani (‘the patriotic faction’) and seized control in a coup under the command of Ahmad ‘Urābī Pāshā (1839–1911). It seemed unlikely that the banks of Europe, which had so weakened Egypt by extreme usury during
the reign of Ismā‘īl, would recoup their loans. Further, international access to the Suez Canal seemed threatened. All this was the excuse for the British invasion of 1882 in order to regain control of the communication routes to India and to ensure the repayment of the Egyptian debts to the banking houses of London and Paris. And, although the British defeated Ahmad ‘Urabī’s forces at Tel el-Kebir with relative ease, they seriously underestimated the depth of popular support for him voiced by the Egyptian people, believing instead that Egyptians would be happier under any government that would reduce their taxes. Moreover, some British officials deliberately misrepresented that nationalist sentiment as some form of anti-Western pan-Islamism, despite ‘Urabī never enjoying any tangible help from Sultan Abdülhamid (Daniel 1966: 385–89, 394).

Once the British forces were established, the pro-British Khedive Tawfīq was reinstated and, in 1883, one of the commissioners sent to manage Egypt’s debt in the 1870s, Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer, 1841–1917), was appointed the civilian administrator of the British protectorate. However, as ‘adviser’ to the Khedive he became effectively Egypt’s civilian ruler from 1883 to 1907. Under this protectorate, the Khedival government continued its educational reforms which had resulted in the creation of two distinct schooling systems. There was, on the one hand, the traditional network of Islamic schools (kuttāb, pl. katātīb) connected ultimately to al-Azhar and, on the other, the secular schools attended by the sons of land-owners and the emerging middle-class. This latter group constituted the new intelligentsia – young literate professionals who were influenced by both Ottoman and Republican French ideologies and who adopted the modern styles of dress that marked them apart, such as the suit and fez (tARBūSH). This situation had a parallel in the Dutch East Indies, where members of the native élite, such as the Djajadiningrads, were given Western schooling and clothing while their fellow Jawa relied on the existing network of traditional Qurānic schools. It was this tension that reformists, with their emphasis on the maintenance of religious identity, would attempt to resolve in both Egypt and the Indies, as many such youths appeared to be embracing the West whole-heartedly.

**Al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā**

This is your umma, one umma. And I am your Lord, so worship Me.

(Qur’ān 21: 92)

‘Abduh joined al-Afghānī in exile in Paris in 1883. There they worked on the influential journal al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā (The Strongest Bond) which appeared between March and October of 1884. Its pages aimed to inform Muslims of the events taking place in a wider world of Muslim countries, picturing ‘the West’ (al-gharb) united in its enmity for Islam, in turn located in ‘the East’ (al-sharq). According to its colophon:
al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā is distributed free, and in its sections are [discussed] the most important [matters] that influence Easterners (al-sharqiyīn) in general and Muslims in particular... its founders are men with urgent concern for the East inspired by actions of benefit for their homelands (awtānīhim) and their religious community (millātīhim).2

(al-Bustānī 1957: 256)

Many of their articles thus dealt with the Sudan, India, and Egypt. Here the emphasis was placed upon the need to inculcate in Muslims the urgency for a unity they projected back to the early Islamic community. Readers were urged to ‘follow the plan of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and to return to the first origins of the straight Islamic religion’ (al-Bustānī 1957: 12). In so doing, Islam was asserted as a victorious civilization, ignoring the long history of division within the Islamic community (millāt), now set in opposition to a Western, Christian entity. In the 1880s ‘Abduh had been involved in a series of debates with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Gabriel Hanotieux, who had argued for a vigorous Aryan civilization's superiority over an inferior Semitic Islamic civilization. ‘Abduh countered with reference to the intolerance of the Aryans and argued further that they were indeed the imitators of a once ascendant Islamic civilization (see al-Bustānī 1957: 25; Haddad 1994: 37–38). Moreover, the many inter-ethnic and sectarian divisions within that civilization were glossed over by al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh, who alleged that:

[Muslims] do not pay heed to connections with peoples (shū’ūb) or racial clans (‘aṣabāt al-ajnās) but they look to the congregation of religion (jamā‘at al-dīn). For this reason the Arab does not flee from the government of the Turk, and the Persian accepts the rule of an Arab, and the Indian obeys the leadership of the Afghan with no aversion among any one of them.

(al-Bustānī 1957: 11)

Such an idealized depiction was, however, contradicted by ‘Abduh in his statements to the Pall Mall Gazette in August 1884. There, in an interview with Wilfred Scawen Blunt (1840–1922), he described how the Egyptians had once complained of Turkish oppression, and how they once again desired their national independence. And it was only the English invasion that had allowed Egyptians to ‘see in them our brothers in religion, if not in race’. Thus he pressed for the appointment, by the Turkish Sultan, of a native Egyptian as ‘chief of our Egyptian nation’ for by no means did they desire their own ‘king’ (Daniel 1966: 450–52).

Along with his own inconsistency in matters of Islamic solidarity, there were many fractures clearly visible in the body of Islam in the 1880s.
According to ‘Abduh and al-Afghānī, colonialism not only involved the disintegration of the single Muslim body, but it engendered a heightened sense of difference among the Muslims of different client states. This sense of difference led to the formation of ideologies of ‘nationality’, based on ‘ethnicity’ (both: al-jinsīya), and ‘materialism’ (al-dahrīya). Al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh condemned these concepts in the first issue of their journal.3 Moreover, they critiqued the many ‘materialists’ who had absorbed too many Western values calling themselves ‘the leaders of freedom’ (zu‘amā’ al-hurrīya). Al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh professed their objections to all the modern, materialist, ideas encapsulated in the buzz-words of ‘freedom’, “nationality” (waṭanīya), and “nationality/ethnicity” (jinsīya) asserting instead that ‘it is not strange to Muslims that their communal bond is stronger than any bonds of nationality and language as long as the Qurān is recited among them’ (see al-Bustānī 1957: 5, 18). It was thus in the first article of al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā, ‘Ethnicity and the Islamic religion’ (al-jinsīya wa al-diyāna al-islāmīya), that ‘Abduh attempted to deal with jinsīya by likening it to Ibn Khaldūn’s concept of ‘asabīya (tribal solidarity) (al-Bustānī 1957: 9–12; cf. Kerr 1966: 137–39). Here ‘Abduh described how every individual of each community (umma) felt a sense of solidarity (ta’assub) with his ethnic group (jins). He claimed that such non-religious solidarity only caused people to kill each other without reason, acting out the false belief that it was a natural inclination. According to ‘Abduh this was in truth ‘an empty affectation’ (khālī al-dhihn) leading only to such artificial categories as ‘Indian’, ‘English’, and ‘Tucoman’ and the endless desire for conquest. The only solution, therefore, was to renounce the formulation of various jinsīyas and make their ‘asabīya a new Islamic solidarity creating a single umma desiring only the protection and preservation of the Sharī’a. Certainly the need for the reassertion of the Sharī’a was in ‘Abduh’s mind. In all the Ottoman Empire, the so-called capitulations had allowed the equation of jinsīyas and religion as the means by which Armenian, Syrian, and Greek residents could gain the protection of a European power.

However the language of al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā is ambiguous. And, despite the rhetoric of a united Muslim umma set against both the hostile West and internal division, the very same term is used on many occasions to describe the specific entity of Egypt (see, for example, al-Bustānī 1957: 12–15). Certainly the idea of umma can, like the Malay bangsa, define a multiplicity of meanings spanning ‘generation’ to ‘nation’. In the Qurān the term umma is more specifically used for the community of believers (ummat al-mu’minīn) and refers to those ‘ethical, linguistic or religious bodies of people who are the objects of the divine plan of salvation’ (Paret 1961: 603–04). But when al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh spoke of ‘the ills of nations’, or ‘those ummas afflicted by decline’ they were equally, by their refutations, dividing the Muslim umma into a patchwork of colonized (or near-colonized) bodies; each as ostensibly indivisible, and all opposed to the West.
Perhaps the most useful summary on the contemporaneous secular and religious usage of this term is that provided by Tibi (1997: 223–24) in his discussion of Arab nationalism and modern political Islamism.

The Arabic translation of the word ‘nation’ is *umma*. . . . [A]dherants of political Islam and Arab nationalists both use this term. Its use to denote ‘nation’ evolved as a result of European influence; the traditional Islamic notion of *umma* has a completely different meaning and also a different historical background. Prior to Islam, the Arabs were organized in each case as a *qawm* within an overwhelmingly tribal setting. The unification of Arab tribes within the framework of the overall Islamic *umma* was . . . the great achievement of early Islam. This *umma* was supposed to be universal, i.e. neither ethnic nor national. In Islamic theology, the only criterion for drawing distinctions between Arabs and non-Arabs ought to be piety. . . . [Nevertheless] there never existed a harmonious Islamic *umma*. . . . J. van Ess . . . has suggested that ‘the great exaggeration of the significance of the *umma*-concept is a product of modern times; in early Islam it scarcely played such a role’. The inter-ethnic (Arabs, Turks, Iranians) and inter-sectarian (Sunni–Shi‘a) conflicts have dominated Islamic history. Nevertheless, in contemporary political Islamist ideology, Islam is perceived as a political identity as well as the framework of an Islamic political community for all Muslims. Furthermore, Islam is interpreted as an international political system: an alternative one to that dominated by the West.

**Cairene reformism**

Apart from their primary goal of projecting an imagined ethno-religious unity in Islamic civilization, al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh aimed to alert Muslims to the need for a return to the Qur‘ān and Sunna. Yet this was to be coupled with aspects of the new ‘rational’ education in the skills to advance Muslims who, due to their alleged ignorance of ‘true’ Islam as a ‘progressive’ and ‘rational’ religion, had been in decline for some centuries as a civilization. This view was concisely – if bewilderingly – expounded in his *Risālat al-tawhīd* (*The Epistle of Unity*). As ‘Abduh once announced, here translated by Kerr (1966: 108):

I spoke out on behalf of two great causes. The first of these was the liberation of thought from the chains of imitation and the understanding of religious faith as the members of the early Community understood it before dissension arose, and the return of religious learning to its original sources, and consideration of religion in the
scales of human intelligence that God created to repel the excesses of faith and diminish its errors and stumblings, so that human social order prescribed by God in His wisdom may be attained. In this way religion may be counted the true friend of science, a stimulus for inquiry into the secrets of the universe, and an appeal to respect established truths and rely upon them for cultivating our spirits and reforming our actions. . . . The second cause I adopted was the reform of the Arabic language.

Muslims were thus to be made aware that they were obliged to activate themselves through all knowledge; including ‘Western’ knowledge. However, this was not to be blindly emulated like so many Egyptians who had gone to France and returned as ‘materialists’. Nevertheless, unlike al-Afghanî, ‘Abdulh came to engage with the West rather than just challenge it. And at the personal level it was through the mediation of Lord Cromer that the Khedive allowed ‘Abdulh to return to Egypt in 1888. From Cairo he set about defining the intellectual programme of a new rationalist reformism that would, in the long run, leave a more enduring mark on debates about the role of Islam in the modern world than his anti-colonial excursions in Paris.

What distinguishes al-Afghanî and ‘Abdulh’s religious discourse is the role of the individual. Empowered by free will, the individual is to enact the Sunna through a rational and personal investigation of the sources of Islam (ijtihād, the exponent of such being a mujtahid) and the application of all aspects of modernity not hostile to Islam. I am not suggesting here that ijtihād was solely reformulated Egyptian reformers. Brown (1996) has shown convincingly how Ḥanbalī ‘ulamā’ never abandoned ijtihād while leading Yemeni and Indian scholars debated its application from the eighteenth century. And, although this programme would outwardly appear to be the result of an exposure to Western rationalism, the aspect of free will versus divine predestination has long concerned the ‘ulamā’. Such theological debates among the early Muslim community had led to the formation of the school of the Mu’tazila, known for their emphasis on the absoluteness of human free will. Indeed it has been remarked that ‘Abdulh’s own theology displayed Mu’tazilī tendencies (Kerr 1966: 111–12), although these were partially edited out by his conservative follower Rashīd Riḍā (Hourani 1983: 142).4

According to these Cairene reformists, following centuries of codification by the ‘ulamā’, the Islamic world had entered a period of decline (inhīṭāt, iḍnīhlūl) or ossification and inertia (jumūd). This they linked to the structure of taqlīd, being the faithful emulation of the decisions of the founding imāms to whose dictates most Sunni Muslims adhere. Moreover, for traditionalist scholars taqlīd embodied the personal relationship between teacher and student. Thus students emphasized their linkage with their teachers, who authorized them to teach, and back through chains of authorities (isnād) to the very imāms themselves (cf. Bowen 1993).
This methodology forms the structure against which the Cairene reformists often defined themselves, urging the revival of the practice of *ijtihād*. Yet, in their zeal to invoke the principle of *ijtihād*, reformists cast *taqlīd* as ‘blind imitation’ despite such an interpretation ignoring the constant adjustments made by ‘ulamā’ in order to deal with the problems of contemporary life (Eickelman and Piscatori 1990:10). For the Cairene reformists this was not enough, and Muslims needed to return to an imagined past perfection in order to secure again their place as the foremost civilization on the Earth (cf. Riḍā 1923).

As we have seen, activists of all shades were in motion in Cairo and, as in the Indies, colonial power sought to channel that activity, where possible, to lines of thought compatible with their vision of Western modernity. Indeed the discourse of individuality and modernity that Cairene reformism espoused – as opposed to the alleged fatalism of traditionalism – has led some observers to compare reformism to Protestantism and to trace its roots in the impact of Western colonialism (see Wertheim 1959:214; Peacock 1978). Keddie (1994: 25–26) states that al-Afghānī compared himself with Martin Luther, and was admired by the Islamophiles Wilfred Blunt and E.G. Browne. He furthermore attracted Renan’s praise in the 1880s when he argued that Islam was a young religion whose adherents were yet to take on the lessons of modern science outside a small circle of the elite (Keddie 1994: 20). Meanwhile Hourani notes that ‘Abduh dipped regularly into nineteenth-century Western thought, reading Guizot, Spencer, Rousseau, and Tolstoy (Hourani 1983: 135).

Such comparisons between reformism and Protestantism may also have led colonial officials initially to treat such ‘modernists’, as they termed them, with favour. Cromer (1908: 599) even paid ‘Abduh a backhanded compliment by doubting his very conviction as a ‘sincere’ Muslim. Such doubts have been extrapolated at length – and with some venom – by Kedourie (1966). In this respect the intellectual independence of ‘Abduh was compromised after his return to Cairo in 1888 when Cromer used him against the hostile Khedive ‘Abbās Hīmī (r.1892–1914). Nonetheless this relationship allowed ‘Abduh a great deal of freedom, especially when he was elevated to the administrative council of al-Azhar in 1895 and the post of grand-Muftī of Egypt in 1899.

Over the following decades reformist ideology and practice made wide inroads in British-occupied Muslim societies. This was facilitated particularly by the press. Yet Egypt was by no means a purely reformist centre. Despite enforced changes in curriculum and written examinations (Eccel 1984: 172–83), al-Azhar remained a conservative centre hostile to ‘Abduh. Likewise his attempts to reform the religious courts met with stiff opposition. Despite his patrons in high places, ‘Abduh had but limited success in his own lifetime. And, whilst his religious movement was growing in Egypt, Ottoman pan-Islamism was finding a place in the *bilād al-jāwa*.
Pan-Islam below the winds as an ‘Arab’ movement

We may recall that by the end of the nineteenth century the agglomeration of peoples and cultures under Dutch power was assuming a single structure as Indië/Hindia. Then, with the dawn of the twentieth century, the elite Jawa within its borders were encouraged by the Ethici to consider that their nationhood was that of bangsa Hindia. For such emancipated Jawa, Islam was only a background to a unity reinforced by the almost universal use of Malay and Dutch rule. For the Dutch, and such allies as they had, ‘radical’ (i.e. political) Islam as focussed on the ‘Caliphate question’ was cast as the greatest danger to this unity.

The ideal of the Caliphate as a key to distinct Muslim identity often lies at the heart of claims to Muslim nationhood, especially when the unity of the Muslim world is projected back to an idealized caliphate, much as the reformists did. However the Muslim world was only briefly united and many counter-caliphates soon emerged to claim the mantle of Muhammad’s authority, such as those of Mu‘awiya bin Abī Ș fyän (r.661–80) in Syria, the Umayyads in Spain (756–1031) or the Fātimids of North Africa and Egypt (909–1160). Indeed the Muslim world had long outlived the Caliphate by the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258. Nonetheless, given Abdülhamid’s claims, pressed from the 1870s, it remained a key concern of the imperial powers (Schmidt 1992). This fear was keener regarding India, where many Muslims redirected their loyalty to the Ottoman sultan after the deposition of the last Mughal ruler in 1858 (Bayly 1996: 345, n. 26). There were thus millions of Indians who accepted the primacy of Abdülhamid and such claims sowed seeds which would flower in the pan-Islamist movements of the 1920s (Niemeijer 1972).

The Jawa, by contrast, had never seen a dynasty that could claim any Jawi Caliphate, or at least one that had had its claims acknowledged beyond the borders of the once powerful Sultanates of Aceh, Banten or Mataram. And, given that the Dutch had absorbed these lands at different times, and by sometimes retaining the original ruler, they did not create the massive vacuum created by the British in 1858. Still, Abdülhamid was respected by many Jawa. They would be made increasingly aware of his claims to the primacy of the Caliphate by the activities of some Hadramis who lived among them. This was in a way incidental as the Hadramis sought to address their complaints to the Porte to overcome the official discrimination they faced as Foreign Orientals.

The first official complaint made by Hadramis living under Dutch rule to Abdülhamid as Caliph of all Muslims came in 1873. Ten years later, the newly established Ottoman Consulate in Batavia encouraged such contacts and identification (de Jonge 1997: 102–03). In 1898 a correspondent to ‘Abduh and Ridā’s journal al-Manār (The Beacon) described requests by Indies Arabs for recognition as Ottoman citizens through Turkish claims over the Yemen
(Bluhm 1983: 36). However such calls to fellow Muslims and ‘our sultan’ had little to do with the Jawa being usually addressed towards ‘Fellow believers in the Jawa islands in general and Arabs in particular’. And when, in 1900, Muhammad bin Aqîl (Muḥammad bin ‘Aqîl bin Yahyâ, 1863–1931) distributed a pamphlet in Singapore under the rubric of a ‘demand for a council of Muslims living under Dutch rule in Java’ he meant Arab Muslims. Similarly the rough handling, in 1904, of several Arab students returning from Constantinople’s Galatasaray Lyceum had far greater news value in Cairo than in Batavia. On their arrival in Batavia, the boys were forced to remove their Ottoman uniforms and don Dutch-prescribed Arab dress. One boy in particular refused his own father’s request that he obey the governmental regulation, preferring to keep his Ottoman tarbûsh and suit. Another article about the students (al-Liwâ‘, 11 May 1904) was entitled ‘The new Andalusia’ implying that the persecutions of the Dutch were analogous to the Spanish conquest of Islamic civilization’s brightest light. Doubtless the papers that reported these outrages, al-Liwâ‘ (The Banner, Cairo), and its contemporary al-Mu‘ayyad (The Reliable, Cairo) found Jawi readers but it was among Foreign Orientals that the practical effects of caliphal suzerainty were most earnestly desired. Another example of such Arab-centricity is the article penned by a Batavian correspondent under the title ‘European fanaticism against Muslims’ (al-Liwâ‘, 16 August 1904). In the main the injustices catalogued by the author were the specific grievances of Arabs living in the Indies. Certainly, as nationality was by no means a given around 1900, these correspondents referred to themselves in religious, rather than ethnic, terms. Nevertheless Jawi Muslims remained of peripheral news-value. So, when they did appear in the Cairene press, their struggles were misrepresented as a jihâd directed towards an affiliation with the distant Ottoman ‘Commander of the Faithful’. This was the case with a localized insurrection in 1904 at Sidoardjo (East Java) led, as in Banten in 1888, by a cell of the Qâdirîya wa Naqshbandîya – although there was no connection between them (see al-Liwâ‘, 16 August and 4 September 1904).

Assertions of pan-Islam, voiced primarily in Cairo, would seem to be tangential to the Jawa. Mandal (1997) even asserts that in many spheres of activism in the bilâd al-jawa, Hadramis saw themselves as the ‘natural leaders of native Muslims’. And as the Dutch conception of Islam was couched in terms of an external threat embodied by the ‘Arab Sjech’ and the ‘fanatical Hadji’, such assertion of loyalty to Istanbul encapsulated all Dutch fears. From 1898 their officials in Cairo and Pera gained the additional responsibility of vetting the local presses (Schmidt 1992: 109–11). Consequently the circulation of the more strident journals, such as the Thamarât al-funûn (The Fruits of the Arts, Beirut), al-Ma‘lûmât (Information, Constantinople) and al-Liwâ‘, was prohibited in the Indies. Meanwhile pressure was brought to bear upon the Hadrami community by Said Oesman, who badgered his compatriots about writing hostile articles to such papers (Bluhm 1983: 37),
apparently unaware that his own son-in-law, Muhammad bin Aqil, wielded one of these poison-pens. Rashīd Riḍā is later said to have named Said Oesman the ‘Antichrist of Java’ (Būrūbūdūr, 2 July 1924), probably due to his famous relationship with the infamous Snouck Hurgronje alias ‘Abd al-Ghaffār as reported in al-Manār in 1910 (Abaza 1998: 106–07).

So much for the Hadrami push for recognition. On the other hand confusion seemed to reign among the Jawa, despite Constantinople’s efforts at raising their pan-Islamic awareness. Snouck Hurgronje (1906: II, 17 n. 6) noted that the colophon of a reprint of ‘Abd al-Raʿūf’s exegesis (Tarjumān al-mustafīd – The Learner’s Translator), published in Constantinople in 1885, described Abdūlhamid as ‘the king of all Mohammedans’ (de vorst van alle Mohammedanen). This was indeed the case, although the Arabic appellation did not, as I expected, describe the Sultan as ‘the commander of the faithful’ (amīr al-muʾminīn). Instead we find that he is ‘the leader of Muslims’ (imām al-muslimīn), which was rendered more specifically in the following Malay paragraph as ‘the raja of all Muslims’ (rajanya sekalian orang islam) (Abd al-Raʿūf 1885:1).

During his study tour of Java in 1886, L.W.C. van den Berg also saw various compilations of Friday sermons printed in Bombay which described Abdūlhamid (and sometimes his late predecessors) as the ruler of all Muslims, ‘the righteous king . . . who vigorously makes war on the unbelievers’ (see Mr. 1885/86, no. 148). Such attempts brought but nominal recognition though from the Jawa. In his own report to the government van den Berg even felt confident that there was little public danger as so few people understood enough Arabic to grasp the meaning of the invocations in these compilations.

It was only in the Hijaz that the Jawa directly encountered the machinery of Ottoman government, where it was neither well maintained nor efficient. Still, the increasing number of Jawa in the Hijaz could wed pan-Islamic rhetoric to their own aspirations for the Indies. In 1890, the head of the Acehnese guides in Mecca, Mohammad Saleh, managed to collect several hundred dollars to pay for readings, by ten ‘ulamāʾ, from al-Bukhārī’s Sahīh at his home. This attracted the attention of the wider Jawi community much in the way that they had gathered to discuss the war at the house of a Batavian shaykh in 1874 (see Mr. 1874, no. 524). The Dutch Consul, Hendrik Spakler (b.1861), could see in this later gathering only an attempt to disseminate pan-Islamism, and asserted that such a rendition could not have occurred without the prior approval of the Ottoman authorities. Perhaps instead they chose to turn a blind eye.

In 1900, correspondence in al-Manār still stressed that the Jawa needed to be ‘familiarized with the Turks and the Sublime Caliph’ as they were ‘very ignorant about their religion and their world’. Prior to the establishment of the telegraph and the mass-printing of vernacular pamphlets and posters featuring photographs of the Sultan-Caliph, few Jawa would have thought much of ‘Rum’ affecting their daily lives. This is not to say that they were entirely ignorant of the Ottoman Empire. In the late nineteenth century some
well-to-do businessmen already had photographs of the Sultan on their wall (see Gullick 1987: 185). The Sultan was not universally acclaimed however, which spurred the efforts of the Malayo-Hadrami editors of *al-Imam* (*The Leader*) to devote attention to Abdülhamid and his projects (see, for example, *al-Imam*, vol. 1, no. 7, 16 January 1907). Such articles must have had some impact, but not everyone had access to newspapers. In 1912, the Dutch official van Lennep – stationed at Cairo – cited the tale of the Javanese who, upon hearing of the construction of the Hijaz Railway, asked: ‘since when has Turkey obtained authorisation from Queen Wilhelmina?’ (Schmidt 1992: 129 n. 468).

Aside from language choice and literacy, there were other practical limitations to the exercise of a tangible pan-Islamism or its equation with Islamic empires of former times. But when, in the nineteenth century, attempts by Aceh’s leaders failed to revive an Ottoman relationship in their war of independence, it underlined the powerlessness of the Hamidian regime (Reid 1969, 1972). In general the substance of Hamidian pan-Islamism should not be put much higher than to say that Jawa sympathized with the Turks and their misfortunes as much as the Turks sympathized with them. For example, Mohammad Hatta (1902–80) once recalled his own and his classmates’ sympathy for Turkey during the Balkan Wars (1912–13). However this was later tempered by his uncle’s explanation of Abdülhamid’s despotism. ‘As a result of this explanation I changed my view about Turkey. I retained my sympathy for the people, but I no longer revered the Sultan’ (Penders 1981: 24).

Schmidt (1992: 142) even remarks that the ultimate failure of Hamidian pan-Islam is disappointing but expected given the overwhelming distance of miles and language. Despite such impediments, suspicions of pan-Islam continued to produce panic among the Dutch. While the pilgrimage report of 1897 had happily announced the absence of any ‘noteworthy pilgrims’ to be followed by a mere handful in 1898 (see Anon 1898: 648; van Delden 1899: 562), by 1906 the system of monitoring such visitors appears to have lapsed. This may be gauged by the uproar caused by the visit to Constantinople made in that year by the brother of the Sultan of Kutai, Hassanoedin Pangeran Sosronegoro. Dutch officialdom assumed that some pan-Islamic intrigue lay behind the trip and Sosronegoro’s poor Dutch exacerbated the already confused circumstances. One official even resorted to contriving an encounter with a portrait of the Dutch Queen to see where his loyalties truly lay. His visit to the centre of what was then viewed as a world conspiracy was later seen for the innocent gesture it was. However it resulted in the reinstatement of more vigilant surveillance of such travellers and caused the long forgotten circular number 1534 of 1890 to be recirculated with an annoyed request by Governor General van Heutsz that it be remembered in future.10

Despite the collapse of the Hamidian regime in 1908, Snouck Hurgronje still outlined the danger he saw in pan-Islam in a series of lectures presented
in the United States in 1914. Not only did pan-Islam remain a threat, it constituted ‘a needless confusion’ for the ‘thirty-five millions of Mohammedans whom history has placed under the guardianship of my own country’ (Snouck Hurgronje 1916: 177). But, in the end, Snouck Hurgronje’s persistent and dogmatic assertions regarding the pan-Islamic threat must be regarded as misdirected (van Dijk 2002). Snouck Hurgronje’s direct experiences of Mecca and its environs had occurred during a period when pan-Islamism was in fact a political phantasm. This phantasm had been magnified by both the British and Dutch foreign offices grappling with anti-colonialist movements that voiced their aspirations for independence in terms of an Islamic framework which reflected an imagined Western project of pan-colonialism. In the end there was no universal recognition of an Ottoman Caliph; and the diplomats of Protestant Holland and Great Britain drew too many historical analogies between the Papacy and a Caliphate that might unite all Muslims in a single political umma. Indeed only a handful of students, most of them Hadrami peranakan, ever arrived in Constantinople from the bilād al-jāwa (Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 37). By comparison, though, some Jawa were investigating Cairo which, although nominally an Ottoman territory, had been independent since the reign of Muḥammad ‘Alī.

Cairo as an Islamic metropole and modern experience for Indies Muslims

In her study of the genesis of expatriate Hadrami nationalism in Indonesia, Mobini-Kesheh (1999: 30–31) has shown how some Hadrami reformers writing to the Cairene press as advocates of Hamidian pan-Islamism began the parallel process of idealizing their particular homeland of Hadramaut. In this way Cairo itself can be seen as an intellectual metropole for Indies Hadramis, who began to send their sons to study in that city. I would argue further that Cairo also emerged as the specific metropole for first Malay and later most Southeast Asian reformists. I also present Cairo as a focal point for the application of new ideas of unity (ittiḥād) focussed on local reformulations of French patriotism.

Based on internal evidence in Aboe Bakar’s reports of the close familial and scholarly connections between Jawi and Egyptian ‘ulamāʾ’ in Mecca, and given the strong historical ties between the Hijaz and Egypt, it is reasonable to assume that Cairo featured in the itineraries of some Jawi scholars.11 One family of scholars in Palembang, for example, maintained the sobriquet ‘Azhari’ (see Peeters 1996). Chaidar (1978) even claims that Nāwāwī spent part of his youth studying in Egypt and Syria, although there is as yet no direct evidence to support his claim.

Wider publicity regarding a nineteenth-century Jawi presence in Cairo came in 1868, when the Indologist P.J. Veth published a note in the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsche-Indië concerning ‘Javanese’ students in Egypt. This was
based on information found in two other works, Alfred von Kremer’s *Aegypten* (Leipzig, 1863, two vols) and Salomo Keyzer’s *Onze tijd in Indië*. Veth’s consequent employment of the term ‘Javanese’ is an understandable rendition of the term *jāwa*. Unfortunately the note is very brief and sheds little light on the Azharī Jawa. Veth was dismissive at best of there being many students from Java or the Malay lands in Cairo, despite recording that a Jawi hall (*riwāq al-jāwa*) had been established for students from Southern Arabia, India, and the Indies, though the former no longer tended to frequent it. This triangle of regions indicates that it was perhaps established at the bequest of a Hadrami, given the familial trade networks of the Hadramis that criss-crossed the Indian Ocean (cf. Clarence-Smith and Freitag 1997). Nevertheless, the very name *riwāq al-jāwa* clearly referred to Southeast Asians. Veth also repeated that, according to the late Dr Homan, there were only two or three Azhar-trained natives in Batavia, although Homan’s own Malay scribe was said to have recalled a popular Malay expression that: ‘A teacher who studies religion goes to Cairo (Mesir)’. When asked if all teachers went to Cairo to study religion (*mengaji*) he was answered: ‘Not all, only those who want to become smart!’ Perhaps the attraction of Cairo’s diverse libraries would have been gaining given that Mecca’s institutions were relatively devoid of scholarly books after the first Wahhābī interregnum (Peters 1994b: 259–60).

The existence of this *riwāq* reinforces the antiquity of the relationship between the *bilād al-jāwa* and the scholarly triangle of Mecca, Medina, and Cairo. Lacking an object of pilgrimage, Cairo was solely a destination for study and hence the Jawi community there was smaller (and perhaps younger) than that of the Hijaz. There are nonetheless indicators that Cairo continued to play a role for the Jawa. Again, according to Chaidar (1978: 85–87), Nawāwī was invited to attend a conference at al-Azhar (in the 1870s?). He may well have stayed at the *riwāq*. And although the account of his attendance as related by Chaidar is probably spurious, Nawāwī certainly maintained connections with Cairo. The vast bulk of his work was published there, commencing as early as 1859 with the first Bulaq edition his *Fath al-mujīb*, a commentary on the *Manāqīb al-hadīth* of al-Shirbīnī (d.1569) (see Brockelmann 1993; cf. Chaidar 1978: 96).

In the 1880s further reference to the *riwāq al-jāwa* is to be found in ‘Alī Mubārak’s *Khīṭāt al-tawfīqīya* written between 1871 and 1888. Once again there is little detail but as its residents were at that time allotted scant rations there must have been a very small number of students. Nonetheless, prior to the attempted reforms of Muhammad ‘Abduh in 1897, the *riwāq al-jāwa* enjoyed a degree of autonomy in teaching, with its own library and a shaykh elected by the Jawi students (cf. Dika 1990: 89–92, 95–96). When Mubārak wrote his encyclopedia, the incumbent Shaykh of the *riwāq* was a certain Ismā‘īl Muhammad al-Jāwī (Mubārak 1889: IV, 22). This may well have been Shaykh Ismā‘īl al-Minankabawī who, according to Aboe Bakar, had been famous in Mecca ‘for his prosody, fluency, and knowledge of all the religious
sciences’ (Tarājim ‘ulamā‘ al-jāwa, Cod. Or. 7111). He was probably the same shaykh actively recruiting in Singapore for the Naqshbandiya order in the 1850s, who had earned the printed admonitions of no less a critic than Said Oesman (Azra 1995: 9–13) and who had perhaps even been expelled from Mecca. Indeed, in September 1885, one informant told the Resident of the Preangan that the books of al-Minankabawi had been burnt publicly in that city (Mr. 1885, no. 642A), although this may well have been a transposition of the famous rivalry between the two leading Naqshbandī teachers of Mecca, Sulaymān Affandī and Khalīl Pāshā, which had come to a head in 1883 with the burning of a pamphlet of the former on the orders of the Vālī (see Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 176–79).

Perhaps Cairo, with its increasing print activity and greater freedom of expression, was a temporary refuge for Ismā‘īl al-Minankabawī. That some Jawa could look toward Cairo is also indicated by the fact that most of the first commercial printings of Jawi texts were made there, as is indicated by the catalogue of Jawi and Farsi books held at the Khedival library (al-Dāghistānī 1889). This small collection not only included a couple of the Meccan imprints overseen by al-Ṭāfānī, but also held an earlier Cairene edition of al-Fālimbānī’s Hidayat al-sālikīn (Cairo, 1880) and the very first Arabic–Malay–Javanese glossary compiled by the Javanese scholar, Abū Bakr bin ‘Abd al-Qaddūs al-Ṭībānī (al-Turjumān, Cairo, 1884). I would suggest that Aḥmad Khaṭīb may well have recommended al-Azhar to his students later in the 1890s, knowing of the riwāq al-jāwa, its standing connection with the Minangkabau, and its active presses. Like Nawāwī, he had sent his first works to Cairo for publication, and his own sons, ‘Abd al-Karīm (d.1947) and ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd (d.1962), later settled in that city. There too, Aḥmad Khaṭīb knew that his students would come in contact with another Minangkabau scholar, Shaykh Ismā‘īl al-Muṭṭalib. It is highly improbable that the Ismā‘īl Muḥammad al-Jawī noted by ‘Alī Mubārk, and described above, was Shaykh Ismā‘īl ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib. This second Shaykh Ismā‘īl at al-Azhar was born in Padang c.1869 and arrived in Cairo c.1894, after several years spent in Mecca where, as a Minangkabau, he would most likely have studied with Aḥmad Khaṭīb. Given this second Ismā‘īl’s origins, and perhaps those of his predecessor, it is also likely that in Cairo he knew Ahmad Khaṭīb’s cousin, Muhammad Tahir bin Jalal al-Din (1869–1956; see fig. 12). Shaykh Tahir had spent fifteen years in Mecca (c.1880–c.95), where he had worked as a muṭawwīf, before he moved to al-Azhar for four years to complete his studies in astronomy (‘ilm al-falak). It was at this time that he also came into contact with ‘Abduh and formed a working relationship with Rida.

From such small beginnings in the late 1890s, other Malay (and peranakan) students came to meet the founders of al-Manār. Moreover, of the fourteen Indies’ subjects noted to be studying in Cairo in 1904, four were relatives of the Sultan of Riau-Lingga enrolled at a private preparatory school. They had
Figure 12 Shaykh Tahir Jalal al-Din, ‘a Minangkabau now a religious teacher in Cairo’ (Bintang Hindia, vol. 3, no. 23, p. 265)
been escorted there by Shaykh Tahir and the Hadrami muwallad and adopted member of the Riau court, Sayyid Shaykh bin Ahmad al-Hadi (1867–1934). Another five Batavian boys – mostly Indies-born Hadramis – were at the Nāṣirīya school under the protection of Ḥāfizat Bey while five other Dutch subjects were at al-Azhar (Schmidt 1992: 80; Mandal 1994: 148–49).

In the late 1890s, then, al-Azhar was not Cairo’s only claim for the attention for Hadrami or Jawi students. The intellectual climate in Egypt was far more open than in the Hijaz. It provided an active daily press and a network of schools not tied to traditional education. In 1896, Aboe Bakar would refer to this obliquely when he advised Snouck Hurgronje that there was little new in the Hijaz in the way of books, but rather there were ‘books of marvels’ to be found at ‘another place’. Aboe Bakar accordingly noted that he had drawn up a list, with the prices marked in francs.12 It would seem that the ‘other place’ to which he referred might well have been Cairo. In the coming years the presses of that city would dominate in terms of publishing books for the Jawi end-market. As I shall show, this was not solely because of the reputation of al-Azhar. Ironically it was because the Jawa themselves were beginning to make their mark on the reformist movement under the leadership of Rashīd Riḍā.

**Cairo and the national idea**

Cosmopolitan Cairo was far more than the staging ground for ‘Abduh’s reformism. From the late 1890s, too, Muṭṭafā Kāmil (1874–1908), the leader of the Egyptian National Party (more correctly the Patriotic Party, al-Hizb al-Waṭanī), sought to inculcate ‘patriotic affection’ (waṭanīya) in the Egyptian people while preserving their nominal links with Constantinople. Like al-Taḥṭāwī and ‘Alī Mubarāk before him, Kāmil had assimilated the ideals of the patrie during his years of study in French and in France. By 1904, however, Meiji Japan eclipsed his old idol and proved to be for him the example of the modern state most fully imbued with waṭanīya (Laffan 1996, 1999b). However, for waṭanīya to exist there had to be a new way of looking at the ‘national’ community and its territory: the waṭan.

Such developments came early in the case of the Ottoman Empire (cf. Lewis 1988: 32–41), and in Egypt in particular. Hourani (1983: 80) describes al-Taḥṭāwī’s understanding of Egypt as a distinct community (umma); ‘part of the Islamic umma, but . . . also . . . a separate umma, in ancient and modern times, and as such . . . a distinct object of historical thought.’ Again in an 1881 essay to explain some of the ‘words current on the tongues of men’, a lecturer at both al-Azhar and the Dār al-‘Ulūm, Ḥusayn al-Maḥsūfī, described both the waṭan and the umma. For him, the latter could be wider than communities bound by religion, language, or place, although ‘the umma created by language best deserved the name, because unity of language best
fulfill[led] the purpose of society (Hourani 1983: 194). Such views of *umma*, as I have mentioned above, were scorned by al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh in *al-‘Urwā al-wuthqā*.

Even more explicitly though, al-Tahtāwī was interested in the French concept of patriotism, which he phrased as ‘love for the homeland’ (*hubb al-watān*). Like the later ‘Abduh, he assimilated it with Ibn Khaldūn’s *‘asabīya* (Hourani 1983: 78). Moreover, Hourani (1983: 79) quotes al-Tahtāwī from his *Munāḥij al-albāb al-misrīya fi mabāḥij al-adāb al-‘arabīya* (*The Paths of Egyptian Hearts in the Joys of the Contemporary Arts*, in circulation in the 1870s) where he wrote that:

> there is a national brotherhood between [the people of one country] over and above the brotherhood in religion. There is a moral obligation on those who share the same *watān* to work together to improve it and perfect its organization in all that concerns its honour and greatness and wealth.

Although Zaki (1965: 46) has remarked that ‘Abduh’s French experiences also played a role in his definition of the *watān* he was, as I have shown above, by no means focussed on patriotism. Furthermore the modern construct of nationality, *jinsīya*, was highly contentious for ‘Abduh as it was founded in the idea of race (*jins*) rather than religion. As I have shown, ‘Abduh rejected all such ‘Western’ or ‘materialist’ assertions. And in his capacity as Muftī he had felt strongly enough to issue a *fatwā* reworking in part his 1883 article. According to ‘Abduh (1981: IV, 1527–30):

> The *watān* of the Muslim in the Muslim lands is the place in which he intends to stay and to make his living, and in which he makes his home with his family if he has one. His place of birth and upbringing are irrelevant for this homeland, as are the former traditional practices of his people and what they know of laws and social intercourse . . . [there] he is a subject of the undisputed ruler who lives within its borders . . .

> As for nationality (*jinsīya*), it is unknown to Muslims. . . . The nationality which the European nations possess resembles what the Arabs knew of as *‘asabīya* – being the attachment by blood relation to a single tribe or a number of tribes or an alliance whereby those related aid each other. . . . Islam came and put an end to that removing all trace of it [by] making all people equal. Nothing remained of relation by blood nor of its traces concerning rights or edicts. Nationality has no influence on Muslims without exception . . . In sum then, there are no differences between the human species such as Arab, Indian, Turk, Syrian, Egyptian, Tunisian, and Moroccan apart from aspects of legislation or social intercourse . . .
As for the preferential laws known as ‘the capitulations’, absolutely nothing of such laws exists between Muslim governments.

As Hourani wrote (1983: 144), ‘[Abduh] had intended to build a wall against secularism, but had in fact provided an easy bridge by which it could capture one position after another.’ In the quotation above, one can easily step from ‘Abduh’s recognition of separate Muslim sovereigns, to separate lands, each with their own jinsîyas. And while ‘Abduh was clearly opposed to jinsîya as a concept, he too worked constantly within the framework of a national revival. Even Riḍâ later described ‘Abduh as a ‘patriot’ inculcating ideas of ḥubb al-watān (Adams 1968: 220). An Indonesian writing to al-Manâr in 1933, could even describe ‘Abduh as ‘the father of watānîya’ – a claim not disputed by Rashîd Riḍâ (Haim 1962: 75).

Still, if the essentially ethnic category jinsîya was divorced from Islam, watānîya, by contrast, was presented by Muṣṭafâ Kâmil as being almost a part of religion. Indeed Kâmil, who was well known as a ruthless political opportunist and an exemplar of ‘materialism’, claimed that Islam and watānîya were like ‘two inseparable twins’ (al-Râfî 1950: 146–7). And, unlike ‘Abduh, Kâmil was successful among the new élite, as was witnessed by the throngs of young students and professionals who surrounded his funeral cortège in 1908 (Hourani 1983: 202). This was carried a step further with the fusing of people and territory to fully conceptualize the nation-state – the umma – as in the ‘Party of the nation’ (Ḥizb al-Umma) founded, ironically, in 1907 by one of ‘Abduh’s students, Ahmad Luṭfî al-Sayyid (1872–1963) (Kazziha 1977).

In the 1910s, Egyptians were increasingly focussing their hopes on the watān – rather than the person of the Khedive or the distant Ottoman Sultan – and they were anticipating a national revival and independence. In short they had made a transition from pan-Islamism to a territorial nationalism. Given the Cairo discourse that I have described above, those few Jawa living there then may well have thought about where their own ‘patriotic’ sentiments lay, and if there was such a thing as Jawi watānîya, Jawi jinsîya, or even a Jawi umma. This seemed to be of interest to at least one Jawi of the riwāq, Abd al-Wahid Abd Allah of Tapanuli, Sumatra.13 In 1912, he wrote an article to al-Manâr describing the state of Islam in his ‘Jawi corner’ of the world (al-qutr al-jâwî) under the title ‘The community of the Jawîyîn’ (ummat al-jawîyîn). Herein he concentrated on the laxity of Islamic practice among the Jawa – and especially the Javanese – and seemed to elevate the Muslims of Malâyû, a loose geographical category that seems to have included Sumatra (Abaza 1998: 101–02). But where was the Jawi watān? Even if it did exist this entity had, as is clear, no precise name. Furthermore, how could Jawa – whether in Cairo, Mecca, or Southeast Asia – begin to conceive of an ‘Eastern’ umma? I will now suggest that the ascendant Japan proclaimed by Cairene discourse provided this link.
Japan as an Asian and Islamic model

From 1900, many Muslims identified with the Japanese because of their struggle with Russia, a power actively hostile to the Ottoman Empire and thus Islam. As a part of this ground-swell Kâmil’s book al-Shams al-mushriqa (The Rising Sun) presented Japan as a model for Egyptians, Muslims, and Easterners in that order (Laffan 1999b). It is thus no coincidence that the year of the Russo–Japanese war also saw an upsurge in reportage of the Jawa in the Egyptian press as the people of Cairo turned their gaze to the East.

Yet if an ascendant Japan stimulated an awareness of the ‘East’, Kâmil’s pro-Ottoman paper al-Liwâ’ concentrated on the Jawa as the passive victims of Dutch missionary activities. He claimed that the missionaries deprived the people of their religion, while government policies kept them ignorant both of Japan and their ‘natural loyalty’ to the Sublime Porte (al-Liwâ’, 16 August 1904). I have already remarked how, in the pages of the Cairene press, the Jawi was seldom attributed any agency, except in terms of loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan (al-Liwâ’) or as a passive recipient of Cairene reformism (al-Manâr). Various letters from ‘Jâwa’ to al-Liwâ’ spoke of Dutch apprehensions while Japan’s victory was painted as a victory for ‘us Easterners’ (21 May 1904) or related it to a pan-Asian revival under the Ottoman Caliphate (16 October 1904). According to the Batavian correspondent a new mood was visible in the Indies causing the Dutch, it was falsely alleged (see fig. 13), to clamp down on reportage of Japanese victories.

While the anonymous correspondent of al-Liwâ’ had a more fraternal view of the Jawa, referring to attacks on Natives as attacks on Islam and Muslims, Kâmil continued to focus on Japan’s role as an Eastern saviour.

Fate has ordained that it is in Japan’s interest to be on the best terms with the Muslim world. And it does not look with a conquering eye to the day when it can lay its hand upon Java – that rich island which excels the other islands of the Asian Archipelago in terms of its wealth and its population of 25 million Muslims – to put an end to the evil and oppression of Dutch rule. Indeed the domination of their overlords has got to the point where the Javanese will welcome any other government that will release them from the oppression of the Hollanders. (al-Liwâ’, 6 November 1904)

Yet Japan had not only gained the attention of Cairo’s secular nationalists. In 1906, Rashîd Riḍâ advocated that the Japanese should be invited to convert to Islam (Adams 1968: 196). This was most likely due to Tokyo’s announcement that Japan would host a summit of religions in March 1907, which another of ‘Abduh’s followers, ‘Alî Aḥmâd al-‘Arjâwî, claims to have set off
Figure 13  The Japanese emperor Mutsuhito (*Bintang Hindia*, vol. 2, no. 5, p. 47)
to attend (see Laffan 2001). This hope for a Muslim Japan also echoed widespread hopes long felt in Southeast Asia (see Chapter 7 below). Such a linking of the fates of Japan and the Muslim Indies would also be developed through the activities of Ṭanṭāwī Jawhārī (1862–1940), a member of the Manār circle, and a graduate of the Dār al-‘Ulūm. In 1906 he too composed a work dedicated to the Japanese emperor for the congress of religions (Adams 1968: 246). Like ʿAbduh, Jawhārī was disliked among the conservatives of al-Azhar (de Jong 1982: 263). And it is also not surprising that he developed close connections with the Jawa of Cairo with his texts later being used by reformist Kaum Muda in the Indies. For example his al-Islām wa al-‘ulūm al-‘ašīrīya (Islam and the Modern Sciences) was used at the Dinijjah school in Sumatra.

Similarly hopes for the conversion of the Japanese were voiced as far away as in Constantinople, where pictures of the Russo–Japanese war were popular. In 1909, a prominent Kurdish Dervish, Saʿīd Bitlisi, commenced a tract ‘in defence of Islam and the Prophet’ with a call to the Mikado (Schmidt 1999: 96–97). Nonetheless the Japanese were not Muslims and it had become clear, following the widely anticipated Tokyo Congress of religions, that they never would be. Their (momentary) failure to accept the call to Islam was laid out by al-Jarjāwī in his Rihlā al-yābānīya (The Japanese Journey, Cairo, 1908) wherein, like Kāmil, he described the waṭāniya of the Japanese. Still, he left the door open for a future renaissance, where Islam and Japan remained partners in ‘Eastern’ progress. It is also notable that, in this same book he could find the time to make a few uncharitable observations about the Malays he had seen in Singapore, where he claimed that they maintained ‘the manners of belief, but only in matters of worship. In other respects there is nothing to distinguish them from other peoples. They have no aim nor motivation impelling them to adopt the means of obtaining [their arisal]’ (al-Jarjāwī 1908: 95). It seems then the al-Jarjāwī had failed to notice that these same people had recently begun to connect with his own homeland, indeed with his own home city.

An emerging Jawi national community in Cairo

As in Jeddah and Singapore, the Dutch authorities monitored events in Cairo. And while it was possible to remain shrouded in anonymity among other pilgrims in the Hijaz, long-term students in Cairo were noticed. From 1908, the Dutch Agency recorded the names of Indies subjects residing in Cairo. Proportionally they came from the key regions of Lampung, Padang, Sambas (from 1910), and Banten (from 1912). Among the students were also three of the Hadramis graduated from Constantinople’s Galatasaray. It seems that the networks in operation from the Malay world and Batavia stretched to Cairo while, until the arrival of the Bantenese in 1912, the Javanese usually stopped short in Mecca where all their leading teachers lived.¹⁴ This, I believe, under-
scores the more advanced, and more explicitly political nature of reformism that would emerge in Sumatra.

Thus after 1900 a new Jawi community developed in Cairo invigorated by arrivals who already had personal contacts there. As we shall see in the next chapter, this flow was to a large degree set in motion by the nascent reformist presses of Singapore and Padang. In 1912 conditions in the riwāq had become so crowded (there being at least 24 students residing there) that Ismā‘īl ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib – through the Dutch Diplomatic Agent, van Lennep – made a request to the Egyptian Ministry for Pious Endowments for more room to be made available.15 Strangely the Dutch – being aware of this cramping – were perplexed by the Italian government’s decision to build a hostel for its Eritrean and Tripolitanian subjects. Van Lennep enquired whether his government should not do the same for its Muslims. In response the Ministry of Colonies determined to remain distant following advice from Snouck Hurgronje who thought it strange that the authorities should even consider encouraging ‘the waste of [sending] gifted students to the cycle of Medieval learning as represented by the mosques of Cairo and Mecca’. Snouck Hurgronje further argued that should the Dutch government choose to provide ‘dozens’ of its subjects in Cairo with housing then it should first provide for the ‘thousands’ in Mecca. In any case the students seemed entirely capable of fending for themselves.16

This last point was largely true. Students gathered together and formed self-help groups or aided new arrivals in procuring accommodation in much the same way as Indonesian students operate in Cairo today (Abaza 1994). Yet not all students had someone to meet their steamer in Suez. Some were nonetheless prepared to make the journey direct to Cairo with the increasing fame of ‘Abduh’s memory magnified by the luminous presence of Riḍā. On 15 April 1911, the Sumatran journal al-Munir (The Radiant) (vol. 1, no. 2) ran the following story.

The Association of Loyalty (Persekutuan Persetiaan) of Singapore has received a letter advising the safe arrival in Suez of some students of that place who travelled to Egypt in search of knowledge. It also said that when they arrived at that place not knowing any friends there they decided to ring a scholar of note – Sayyid Rashīd Riḍā, the writer of the journal al-Manār of Egypt. This great man accordingly instructed his brother to go and pick them up in Suez. Thus they were comfortably established for the moment in Egypt at that gentleman’s home. They were soon able to rent accommodation as they wished to study at al-Azhar. Some Egyptian ‘ulamā’ soon had questions for them asking what learning they had studied and also about the condition of the Muslims of this place as they had heard that the study of Islam here was very poor. They also asked if there were many Islamic schools and newspapers; and if many people had
started to rise up calling for welfare; and if there were many newspapers making such calls. They also asked what was the study of religion like and which books were studied. There were many other questions, however due to their limited Arabic it was hard to give attention to the intent of these questions.

Many details of this account resonate with the experiences of three students from Sambas in 1910, as reported to Pijper (1977: 134–38) by Muhammad Basyuni Imran (1893–1981) in 1947. Muhammad Basyuni had made the pilgrimage in 1901–02 and studied in Mecca under ʿUmar Sumbawā, ʿUthmān Sarāwak, and ʿAḥmad Khaṭīb until 1906. Having been a subscriber to *al-Manār* (with some of his questions published by Riḍā) it was only natural that when he, his brother, Ahmad Fawzi, and their friend Ahmad Saʿud, arrived in Suez in December 1910, they should cable Riḍā. Thereafter in Cairo they were met at the station by Ṣāliḥ Riḍā, who took them to his brother’s home where they stayed until rental accommodation could be found at another apartment owned by Rashīd Riḍā.

There Rashīd Riḍā quizzed them on the state of learning among the ‘ulamāʾ of Jawa. However unlike the students described by *al-Munir*, Muhammad Basyuni was congratulated by Rashīd Riḍā for his command of Arabic. After six months at al-Azhar they were invited to enrol at his newly opened Dār al-Daʿwa wa al-Irshād (The House of Islamic Propagation and Guidance, founded 3 March 1912). According to *al-Munir* (vol. 1, no. 5, 29 May 1911) Riḍā had felt so impelled by the poor state of Islamic reform in the *bilād al-jāwa* that he established that institution on Roda island. Moreover the editors interpreted the foundation of this institution as a demonstration of Riḍā’s ‘love for the Muslims of China and our side here’. According to one student within the *riwāq al-jāwa*, Abd al-Wahid Abd Allah, in 1912 there were thirty Jawa enrolled at al-Azhar and that another three had enrolled with Riḍā’s school (see Abaza 1998: 102).

Many Indies Muslims – and especially those of Sumatra – saw study in Cairo as an investment in their future, an investment advocated by the active reformist press (see Chapter 7 below). On 24 September 1911, *al-Munir* (vol. 1, no. 13) had reported the sailing from Padang of Haji Marah Abd al-Malik bin Tuan Haji Sutan Uthman for Suez. On this journey he was accompanying two boys who would study in Egypt; his own son Abd al-Majid, and that of the trader Tuan Haji Abd al-Ghani, Muhammad Ramli. As al-Munir mused:

This is the beginning for us people of this place [Minangkabau] to try sending our children in the search for knowledge at that place [Cairo]. Indeed we all hope that they will increasingly serve as a model for the future children of our bangsa. And [we hope] that they will be a torch lighting the way for them and safely return bringing with them the
various seeds of knowledge which will lead the people of our bangsa on the straight path of religion.

The arrival of these two boys was not, it seems, noted by the Dutch Agency, although there is no reason to doubt that they did arrive in Cairo.

I would suggest that the very small size of the Cairene community – as compared to that in Mecca – would have lent itself to a far more intimate appreciation of Jawi ecumenism. Indeed the students of the first decade of the 1900s generally came to Cairo having had an experience of ecumene during three or four years spent studying in Mecca. Often their fathers had performed the Ḥājj in the 1870s and 1880s and had already returned to the Indies with a heightened sense of the unity of their Jawi people. Now that ecumenism could be lived afresh in the riwāq al-jāwa. As this Cairene nucleus continued to expand, its members made efforts to create a united Jawi association. That association, the Jamiah Setia Pelajar (The Loyal Association of Students), was founded in 1912 under Shaykh Ismā‘īl’s patronage with a core membership of twelve students. The creation of an association of Jawi students abroad also mirrors that of the Ethici-sponsored students in Leiden from 1908 (Ingleson 1975). Without access to the records of the Jamiah Setia Pelajar – if any were kept – one can only speculate as to where that loyalty was directed. I would suggest, however, that the rising political temperature of Cairo would have strongly affected these students. Indeed the riwāq al-jāwa lay just off Maydān al-Azhar. From this square, Azharite students had launched violent protests against renewed state intervention in traditional education between 1908 and 1911 (Dika 1990: 109–15). And from there also the national revolution of 1919 would be launched in support of the exiled Sa‘d Zaghlūl Pāshā (1857–1927), although one observer has remarked that this was the last occasion when the ‘ulamā’ of al-Azhar played a role in popular rebellion (Dika 1990: 151).

Like any modern organization, the Jamiah Setia Pelajar also had its own journal – the first Malay paper in the Middle East – entitled, significantly, al-Ittihad (Ar. al-İttiḥād [Unity]). Perhaps its foundation was also a response to criticism voiced in al-Manār that the Jawa of Cairo did not even bother reading newspapers (Abaza 1998: 98). It is also interesting to observe that the heightened frequency of Jawi letters to al-Manār from both the ard. Malāyū and Jāwa during 1911 and 1912 drops away sharply at this time. Perhaps al-İttiḥād was the cause of that drop in correspondence, as Malay readers would gain their own journal in Cairo aligned with the ideology of Rashīd Riḍā. Of course al-Manār remained important for Southeast Asians, many of whom – like Abd al-Wahid of Tapanuli, Abdullah Ahmad of Padang and Muhammad Basyuni of Sambas – identified with the widest community of the Jawa, and who emphasized the importance of a knowledge of Arabic as a part of the reform of Islam among them.
Al-Ittihad was first publicized by al-Munir on 9 January 1913 (vol. 2, no. 21) with the announcement that its first issue had been on 31 October 1912 with planned circulation in Mecca, Malaya, and the Indies. In light of its wide circulation ‘all of us Jawi people studying in Cairo agreed to call it al-Ittihad’ (al-Munir, vol. 2, no. 21, 9 January 1913). Its editors were Ahmad Fawzi of Sambas and Muhammad Fadl Allah bin Muhammad Suhaymi of Singapore. Both hoped that their paper would be of benefit to all the people of ‘our side of Java and Sumatra as well as our Malay people in general’. Other writers included Fawzi’s brother, Muhammad Basyuni, and Abd al-Wahid Abd Allah of Tapanuli (see above).

In the first issue Fadl Allah and Ahmad Fawzi pointed out that Europeans were wrong to have little regard either for Cairo as a centre for learning or for the Malays as a Muslim people. They avowed that Cairo had all sorts of schools and the graduates of its medical school needed only to go to Paris for their diplomas. They even quoted the Egyptian saying that ‘He who has not gone to Cairo has not yet seen the world!’ For them Cairo as an intellectual metropole was complete (sempurna) and a place where they could learn about their Islamic history and the glories of Arab civilization. And in its reportage of overseas events – drawn from European and Arab papers of the day – al-Ittihad naturally presented an Islamic slant.

Little more is known of al-Ittihad but that it was perhaps printed on the press of Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī (founded 1860), visited by Hendrick Kraemer (1888–1965) in 1922. Al-Ḥalabī’s son had made a trip to Java and Sumatra, knew Malay, and had customers in Batavia. That a businessman could find the Jawa of Cairo and their extended networks a lucrative enough proposition reinforces the permanence of their position around the walls of al-Azhar and its adjacent bazaars. Roff (1970) has noted that, following the rubber boom of the 1920s, student numbers in Cairo expanded markedly. Rubber was primarily cultivated in the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra and would appear to account for the more Malay than Javanese character of the community in Cairo. However, it is clear that the relative minority of the Javanese in Cairo was already remarkable well before this particular boom. When students from British Malaya and Southern Siam are added to the Dutch statistics the Javanese students would have been further outnumbered. Nonetheless, the severe economic pressures brought about by the Great War saw a decline in student numbers and spelt the end of al-Ittihad and its parent society. Many students were unable to remain in Cairo and sought financial aid from the Dutch Agency to return to the Indies. The Khedive was also prevailed upon to allocate bread to them and an allowance of twenty piastres a month (Schmidt 1992: 82).

Their fellows in the Hijaz were similarly stranded. The pilgrimage effectively ceased in 1915 due to the dangers to ocean shipping, although some pilgrims continued to attempt passage via India. The Dutch government was also obliged to shut its consulate in the Hijaz due to the Ottoman abrogation.
of the capitulations (see Mr. 1915, no. 105X). Now it turned its attention to Islamic activism on Java and to circumventing any Ottoman or German propaganda among its native populations. Of even more pressing concern in Batavia was the anxiety that if Holland was drawn into the war against Britain, the undefended Indies would be easy prey for the Japanese fleet. The putative Japanese threat subsided by the end of 1917, yet this war, like the earlier Russo–Japanese conflict, was to have a vital impact on Indies Muslims. The Dutch government had put any talk of self-determination for its subjects on permanent hold, refusing to arm the population in times of war lest they rise against the Dutch, and exposing the hypocrisy of the long-dead Ethical Policy. Furthermore, the myth of Europe as the centre of civilization was laid bare, much as Europe itself had disintegrated as its peoples fought and died for their nations – not their religion. As one Javanese wrote in January 1919: ‘The events of 1918 have been so momentous that it will not be so easy for us to forget that year’ (*Pergerakan Kita*, 6 January 1919, No. 1/IPO 1919, 2).

Cairo, too, found 1919 a turning point, where the Egyptian nationalists, led by Sa’d Zaghlūl – who had sat with both al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh – would begin to wring major concessions from Britain after thirty-seven years of occupation. The remaining Jawi students living in Cairo must have been emboldened by a sense of the national struggle and now dreamt of the ultimate independence of their own lands. Yet the Jawa had not suddenly learned of revolutionary ideas in Cairo. The impulse to travel to Egypt and to become involved in a national movement had already been implanted back in Southeast Asia by the development of an Islamic voice under British and Dutch rule. In the next chapter I wish to go back and trace the development of this voice with reference to the parallel Cairene milieu which I have sketched above.
The Jawi press: connecting script, language and faith

These days there are people who believe that the illnesses of nations may be cured with the publication of journals.

(al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā, al-Bustānī 1957: 15)

We natives must fight and fight hard. Not with cannon, rifles, machetes or bayonets, but with the power of our ideas. There is no freedom without struggle.

(Kaom Moeda, 29 October 1918 No. 217/IPO 1918, 44)

Newspapers and the printing press opened up the world to the reader, and communicated a new view about how that world was configured. They also allowed people to activate the power of their ideas in the public sphere. As Khalid (1999) notes for Central Asia, reformism was made possible by print. In Cairo al-Afghānī had urged his followers to write and publish in journals, so long as they wrote as Muslims and not ‘materialists’. However, at the time al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh were collaborating, Southeast Asia was still largely insulated from their reformist ideas, despite van den Berg (1886: 174, n. 1) noting that the Arabs of Southeast Asia read al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā. I do not dispute that a few copies of al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā managed to filter through the Muslim world to the Indies. Perhaps the fame of the journal even preceded it below the winds when, in 1884, the Chief Penghulu of Cianjur warned the government about anti-colonial sentiments found in an Arabic journal printed in Paris (see Mr. 1885, no. 647c). Still, circulation numbers quoted by Ochsenwald (1984: 59) indicate that no copies were ever sent there directly. 152 copies were sent to Cairo, where there were very few Southeast Asians, and a mere five went to the Hijaz, where there was no independent journal of any sort until 1908 (Ochsenwald 1984: 80). It is also worthwhile noting that Snouck Hurgronje, who was on the lookout for evidence of pan-Islamism in Mecca in 1885, did not allude to the journal’s existence there or in Cairo, which he passed through on the way home in 1885.
Although ‘Abduh’s Parisian vehicle did not engage Southeast Asians at large, from the 1890s it is clear that Cairo became for them a centre of a new modernity and Muslim print-culture. For despite ‘Abduh having pronounced his distaste for the ‘materialist’ belief that salvation lay in newspapers and Western learning without reference to religion (see al-Bustānī 1957: 15), aspects of the secularist discourse in Cairo would prove attractive to many Southeast Asians. The power of the printing press – initially rejected by Muslims in part because print removed the personal interaction between teacher and student (Mitchell 1988: 92, 152; Robinson 1993) – began to be realized. By the late 1890s some newspapers began to augment, and even supplant, the authority of Mecca’s scholars as Jawi readers began to refer to al-Mu’ayyad for news of the Muslim world or to al-Manār for fatāwā (Bluhm 1983).

In Egypt, the relatively relaxed attitude of the British towards the press allowed both Rashīd Riḍā and Muṣṭafā Kāmil to prosecute their respective programmes; the first religious and the second nationalist. This is not to say that each set of ideologies was mutually exclusive there. Rashīd Riḍā was a committed Syrian nationalist, and Muṣṭafā Kāmil also called for religious unity under the Ottoman Caliphate. Nevertheless, their parties disagreed on the methodology for obtaining independence or religious reform and were antagonistic to each other. Riḍā, for example, accused Kāmil of reviving the fanatical ‘asabīya of the pre-Islamic period (see Federspiel 1977: 67). On the other hand, Muṣṭafā Kāmil’s successor, Muḥammad Farīd (1868–1919), regarded the relatively quiescent Rashīd Riḍā as a British spy (Gershoni 1993: 334). Riḍā could even appear pro-British in certain contexts, as in his keynote address to the Lucknow convention of ‘ulamāʾ in 1912, when he remarked that ‘[I]n India and Egypt [Muslims were] indeed fortunate to enjoy freedom of the press’ (al-Mufīd, 27 May 1912). This same speech also contained an attack on such colonizers as the French, Russians, and the Dutch (but not the British) and an exhortation to remember the Muslims of Java and Malaya.

As for the Muslims of Java and Malaya, their condition is the worst of all! Holland has already surrounded them with insurmountable barriers of ignorance. [Therefore] if you want to learn something about them then consult English works and translate and disseminate them in your papers. And thank the grace of God and work and struggle to make education and learning common among you.

Four years later, during the Hajj of 1916, Rashīd Riḍā would address the crowd at Mina on the evils of French colonialism while the newly independent King Ḥusayn (r.1908–25) was courting French support in Jeddah. Rashīd Riḍā even distributed a tract, printed before the war, detailing an improbable plot to remove the black stone and exhibit it in the Louvre (Peters 1994a: 326–27). Through his journal, and by distributing such tracts,
Rashīd Riḍā continued to make use of the press to advance the idea of an Islamic community united by the threat of spiritual and temporal decline.

Once again I would seek to compare this use of the press for an Islamic purpose with Anderson's secularist model of print capitalism. For, while Rashīd Riḍā’s tract may not have been comprehensible to the Jawi pilgrims at Mina, the use of Arabic script would have allowed them to feel addressed by it as Muslims (cf. Anderson 1991: 13). But whereas Anderson points out that languages do not, of themselves, generate nationalism, and that the (romanized) print medium replaced a ‘dead’ language of the divine, I would stress that the arabic script was an important signifier of alterity and nationhood not so readily erased by the modern newspaper. Indeed, in the early twentieth century, the Jawa had recourse to two ecumenical languages – Arabic and Malay – each able to be written in the one sacred script making Anderson’s (1993: 36) view, for that time at least, a gross overstatement. And neither was Arabic simply a symbolic unity without enunciation. Setting aside the feelings of difference that indeed existed, we need only recall the community still felt by Southeast Asians in the presence of other Muslims as they recited, not read, the Qur’ān, mystical hymns or other key Islamic texts.

Still, within the larger Islamic tradition, there remained the Malay-language Jawi ecumenism which would continue to feed a growing political awareness. And although the jawi variant of Malay did ultimately fade in Indonesia, the shift from sacred to vernacular involved more a bifurcation of communalisms than the assertion of one over another. Arabic continues to retain sacred force for all Muslims as both revealed and enunciated speech while Malay continues to unite members of the largest Muslim nation in the world.

Throughout the Indies colonizer and colonized alike continued to use Malay, the Jawi ecumenical language par excellence (Maier 1993). Siegel (1997: 33–37) has argued that Malay was a weak force for identity as it did not belong to any one people. Moreover he asserts that, as a lingua franca, it was intrinsically incapable of supplying its speakers with a true sense of self. However, Siegel’s argument is founded on an examination of the writings of the mestizo population who sought to resolve their status between native and Dutch worlds. Islam is but a weak, and undescribed, force in the background irreconcilable with true nation creation. Yet by ignoring the alliance between Islamic identity and Malay as a language of Islamic ecumenism, writers like Siegel have missed the essential shift from a native Islamic to a native Indonesian consciousness. Although the Dutch also used Malay, they increasingly emphasized their mother-tongue in an effort to distinguish themselves as race and class (Stoler 1995). And, while Dutch was a language within the physical competence of most Indies subjects, until the advent of the Policy of Association, the lack of educational opportunities barred them from it as a means of expression. Even when sons of the native élite, like the Djajadiningrats, received Dutch education they were not accepted by Dutch society (Djajadiningrat 1936: 241–42). The counterpoint to this tendency was
therefore to affirm Malay as a native possession. It both remained the ecumenical language and increasingly became that of a native Indies consciousness.

Of course if Malay was to be the language of nativeness, then there was no questioning which script the Dutch preferred them to use. In 1860, the Leiden academic J. Pijnappel (1822–1901) made the case for the replacement of the arabic script in the Indies. By imposing Western script, he argued, the Dutch could ensure the ultimate replacement of (hostile) Arab influences by their own Western culture (Mandal 1994: 112–14). The echoes of this policy are to be found in Holle’s championing of a Sundanese script (van den Berge 1998: 113ff.) or by an official circular of 1894 urging all penghulus to employ Latin script (see Mr. 22 May 1894, no. 468). In 1905, a junior official with the Office of Native Affairs, J.E. Jasper, argued that the Javanese should be supplied with books in roman script rather than (hostile) Arabic or (obsolete) Javanese characters (Jedamski 1992: 24). With rising literacy, the Commissie voor de Volkslectuur/Balai Poestaka emerged from the Office of Native Affairs, later to become an autonomous organ of colonial control under the ambitious D.A. Rinkes. This organization’s aim to further spread romanized Malay (rumi) among the inhabitants of the Indies following up on the vigorous activities of the rumi presses under the Eurasians and peranakan Chinese from 1856 (Ahmat b. Adam 1992: 38–78). Nonetheless, the blossoming of rumi overshadowed the simultaneous rise of a jawi press. It is this strand of the national movement, outwardly at odds with the Ethical discourse that I now wish to examine after looking at an early attempt at jawi publishing in Batavia.

**Wazir Indië: the first jawi paper of the Indies**

Whilst there had been Islamic presses in the archipelago, such as that of Kemas Haji Abd Allah at Palembang in 1848 (Peeters 1996), Jawi newspapers under Muslim management took a long time to develop. Still, the jawi press of the twentieth century had at least two nineteenth-century antecedents. The first, Jawi Peranakan (Jawi by Birth), appeared in the Straits Settlements in late 1876, where it was under the control of a group of Muslims of mixed Indo–Malay parentage (Roff 1967: 49–52). Soon after, in August 1878, another paper appeared in Batavia edited by a peranakan called Abd al-Khattab (Ahmat b. Adam 1995: 40–41). This paper, Wazir Indië, claimed to be the colony’s first truly Muslim paper. It was specifically targeted at serving Malay officers of the Indies government, which is reflected by the long list of scribes, magistrates, and chief magistrates among its subscribers (see Wazir Indië, vol. 1, nos. 6 and 7, 12 and 19 September 1878). It seems, too, that Abd al-Khattab modelled his paper on the Jawi Peranakan whose editors had a subscription to Wazir Indië, suggesting that Abd al-Khattab was engaged in a new print network that engaged a small ‘imagined community’ on both sides.
of the Straits of Malacca. To mark the end of Ramadân in 1878, Wazir Indië especially wished the Jawi peranakan community of Singapore a joyful feast (vol. 1, no. 8, 3 October 1878).

In the first issues of Wazir Indië, readers were urged by the paper’s owner to help his venture ‘so that we may not be embarrassed before the other bangsas which have newspapers’. Abd al-Khattab therefore asked: ‘Muslim friends (sahabat-sahabat bangsa Islam)! Where are our original letters?’ Moreover the following caveat, which emphasized the sacredness of the Arabic script, was regularly printed on the front page.

Gentlemen, you all know that this paper of ours may not be mistreated! It should not be left about or dropped in unclean places for within it are several noble sayings (kalimah) [from the Qur’ân]. Likewise, lest it be inadvertently burnt, it should be protected from any such eventuality. Moreover, with respect, we ask that our foreign friends do not treat it as they treat other scripts (kurun-kurun huruf lain).

(Wazir Indië, vol. 1, no. 7, 26 September 1878)

Not only were readers encouraged to support their own sacred letters, they were urged to speak better Malay as a key to their identity as Muslims (bangsa Islam). But, unlike the later Bintang Hindia, or the journals examined by Siegel (1997), Wazir Indië was unabashed in presenting Islam as an acceptable rallying point for identity. And, despite its usually pro-governmental editorial policy, Wazir Indië rose to defend the non-hadjis who had adopted pilgrim garb, in contravention of colonial sumptuary laws, on the grounds that such dress signified one’s faith.

Wazir Indië also sought to define the Jawi communities it described. In the second issue (vol. 1, no. 2, 22 August 1878) a Sundanese word-list was followed by an explanation of the bounds of Sundanese territory. In his editorial of 9 January 1879 (vol. 2, no. 2), Abd al-Khattab also stressed the linkage between language and identity. Here he sought – through the very Western device of a footnote – to explain just what the Malay bangsa was.

The Malay bangsa* is a bangsa famous throughout the world for its intention to improve by meeting the tests applied to other bangsas. The Malay bangsa wishes most fervently to progress and greatly admires matters of excellence and honour which might be employed [by it] to write and promulgate the cultural behaviour (budi-bahasa) redolent of those qualities. The Malay bangsa has its own epics, poems, and quatrains and is skilled in eloquent composition and has a script for its own language – as exemplified by this newspaper. The Malay bangsa has an honoured name and is respected throughout the world. The Malay bangsa has a rich, eloquent and robust language
capable of affirming that which accords with knowledge and its essence.

*[Members of] the Malay bangsa are located together in the islands of the Netherlands Indies; that is in Borneo and other islands, in Sumatra and its neighbours such as Bangka and the like. On the island of Java [they reside] only in the negeri of Batavia where most of the people can’t be said to be Javanese or Sundanese. So how can one tell who is a Malay? Whoever acknowledges [membership] of this bangsa is certainly Malay. By necessity they must be Muslim, but it is hard to differentiate them on this basis from such bangsas as Arabs, Khojas [Persians] and Sundanese for they are indeed Muslims too.

It is important to note that Abd al-Khattab clearly felt that Malay was a language already equipped with a vocabulary wide enough to deal with all issues. There is none of the embarrassment that Siegel describes, and which may be found in Bintang Hindia which, given its dependence on Dutch terminology, felt keenly the supposed inadequacies of Malay. Still, Wazir Indië had a brief efflorescence and folded at the end of 1879. Nevertheless, it had set a precedent. In future the Islamic credentials of Jawi journals – and their target bangsas – was affirmed by their choice of Arabic script and Malay language. For example, in 1913, al-Munir (vol. 3, no. 2, 23 March 1913), would announce the publication of a sister paper, al-Akhbar, to be printed in ‘Malay letters’ (huruf Melayu, i.e., jawi).

On the other hand, publishers of rumi organs, which were usually allied with the collaborative élites, were still largely disconnected from the jawi-literate networks of Islam. In 1904, Bintang Hindia (vol. 2, no. 7, 1904) observed with amusement a feud between the jawi periodical Alam Minangkerbau (sic) [The World of Minangkabau] and the Chinese peranakan-owned Tjahaja Sumatera (The Light of Sumatra). The Alam Minangkerbau decried the overwhelming use of rumi and urged the reimposition of the ‘long-used script of the Malay bangsa’. Tjahaja Sumatera countered by invoking the pernicious ‘Arab’ influence that underwrote the Alam Minangkerbau’s script of choice.

However the commercial exploitation of the jawi script was at a disadvantage from its very modest beginnings as typography, unlike the more time-consuming lithographic process, cannot render the written hand faithfully. This, Proudfoot (1997: 170–74) eloquently argues, may well have been a key factor in the late development of an Arabic-script press. As a consequence early Islamic journals suffered from fonts that were neither elegant nor easy to read. The reader had to push beyond this unappetizing fact and concentrate on the ideas being debated. And although Ahmat b. Adam (1995) demonstrates that jawi lacked popularity among publishers and the colonial public – reflecting the Chinese and Eurasian dominance of the
industry – a knowledge of jawi nonetheless remained a key aspect of Muslim alterity for many who sought to overturn that dominance.

Another aspect of the relatively late development of jawi printing is the apparent lack of any organized political parties that required their own organs. In his study of Malay nationalism, Roff (1967) has charted the connections between Malay groups that evolved to become political movements employing the press to first link together and then publicize their aims. Yet while study clubs and community organizations ultimately formed the nuclei for Malay political organizations, before 1910 most Jawa would scarcely have considered parties, like newspapers, as valid forums for the realization of their aspirations. Nevertheless, the belated rise of mass literacy would ensure that reformism planted deep roots in the nation-states of the future when schools and newspapers would prove an essential part of both nationalist and reformist discourse. As Schrieke (1955: 134) noted in the case of West Sumatra in 1927, ‘new ideas – newspaper ideas – found an entrance in spite of everything’. The first true Jawi progenitor of these newspaper ideas was al-Imam.

**Al-Imam (1906–08): the first channel of Cairene discourse in the bilād al-jāwa**

Let there arise from you an umma, inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right and forbidding evil.

(Qur’ān 3: 104)

As in West Asia and the Middle East, the success of modern mass-movements in Southeast Asia depended on the existence of an active indigenous press and a body of literate subscribers. Once this was achieved with the birth of al-Imam Cairene reformism could make its real debut below the winds. Wider attention was first drawn to al-Imam in Roff’s *The Origins of Malay nationalism* (1967). And, although re-examined by Abu Bakar Hamzah (1991) and Milner (1995), the presentation by al-Imam of a new idealized community as drawn from specifically Cairene discourse remains under-emphasized, at least in English sources. More recently, Abdul Aziz Mat Ton (2000) has devoted a study to the political aspects of al-Imam’s programme, reproducing many valuable sections of the journal. But while he makes many important observations, Abdul Aziz pays little attention to the precise Cairene milieu from which much of its ideology was derived, and has overdrawn the relationships between the Wahhābīya and the thought of al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh. Further he has overemphasized the aspect of anti-colonialism and underplayed the very ardent self-critique in al-Imam’s pages.

An imām is, as in the case of Ahmad Khaṭīb, a (prayer) leader or guide. The editors of this journal clearly believed that they were sent to guide the Muslim community below the winds and referred to their audience as ‘those
led’ (al-ma’mūm, see vol. 1, no. 1, 23 July 1906). However it was not just reformist leadership that was disseminated by this journal. In their attempts to raise the level of the Malay bangsa, the editors also promulgated an Arabized language of homeland (watan) and community (ummat). This was derived from their reading of the Cairene press and applied to the models proposed by competitor organs such as the Utusan Melayu (Malay Messenger, see Milner 1995: 89–113).

Singapore was an appropriate site for the introduction of modern Cairene discourse for a number of interconnected reasons. Most crucially we may recall that it was the major staging point for the Ḥajj. Moreover, the strong commercial links associated with the shipping of pilgrims interacted with the political and economic links of the British Empire. Cairo and Singapore respectively marked the Western and Eastern termini of Britain’s dominance of the Indian Ocean. British dominance not only facilitated communications, but a relatively relaxed attitude to the indigenous presses allowed new organs to flourish where they might have been stifled by conservative Malay rajas or Dutch officials.

Singapore was also a meeting point for the ecumenes of Islam, and many Indian and Hadrami entrepreneurs had long settled there with local Malay wives and families. As their familial and commercial networks similarly stretched across the Indian Ocean and intersected with colonial networks, they also served as one more key in the transmission of Cairene ideologies. It is worth recalling that the first students to venture to Cairo from Southeast Asia after 1882 were the peranakan sons of such men, and the élite Malay sons or scholars with whom they associated.

By the 1890s, the fast-declining court of Riau-Lingga, which lay in the same small archipelago as Singapore, was keen to expose its sons to the new opportunities of Cairo. Two key partners in the mediation of the new Cairene ideas and propagators of the advantages of a modern Cairene education were the peranakan bin Ahmad al-Hadi, the adoptive son of Raja Ali Kelana bin Raja Ahmad of Riau, and his Minangkabau friend Shaykh Tahir Jalal al-Din, the cousin of ʿAbd al-Khaṭīb. Both of these men owed their partnership in part to their mutual relations with the Riau élite. Both were members of the Rushdiah Club on Riau, founded in 1895 (Roff 1967: 62). This club had also established a printing press, the Maṭba’a al-Ḥimadīya, whose first offering was a work by Snouck Hurgronje’s old friend ʿAbd Allāh Zawāwī, who was even invited to Riau by Raja Ali Haji.1

In 1906, Shaykh Tahir and al-Hadi – who in 1901 had become the Singaporean agent for Raja Ali Kelana’s brickworks on Batam Island – tapped into this centre and its patrons, establishing the offices of al-Imam in Singapore. In content and form al-Imam mimicked Riḍā’s al-Manār with borrowings from both it and al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā. Indeed its editors were known locally as Kaum al-Manar (Roff 1967: 59). Both Shaykh Tahir and al-Hadi had attended lectures given by ʿAbduh during their visits to Cairo as
wardens to the princes of Riau-Lingga. However, the Manār-connection obscures the fact that al-Imam sourced some of its Arabic articles from other parts of the Cairene press. And although al-Hadi was not an ‘ālim like Tahir, he was a regular contributor responsible for translations from al-Liwā’, al-‘Ālam al-islāmī (The Islamic World), and al-Mu’ayyad.

Neither were they neophytes in the world of print media: al-Hadi was actually the Singaporean agent for Bintang Hindia. A photograph taken of him in 1906 for that paper exhibits the dapper figure of a member of the Kaum Muda with his suit and fez (see Bintang Hindia, vol. 4, no. 9). This image may be contrasted with an earlier photo of Shaykh Tahir dressed as an Azharite ‘ālim and then employed at a private school in Cairo (Bintang Hindia, vol. 3, no. 23, see fig 12). It is unclear why the latter’s photograph was included in the pages of Bintang Hindia, but he most likely had met Clockener Brousson or Abdul Rivai and had, like al-Hadi, impressed them as a man of sympathetic modern inclinations.

Another prominent associate was Muhammad bin Aqil bin Yahya, the widely travelled son-in-law of Said Oesman. Bin Aqil had contributed several anti-Dutch articles to al-Mu’ayyad in 1896 under the pseudonym of Sayf al-Dīn al-Yamanī (Yemeni Sword of Religion) which had led his father-in-law to harangue the Arab community of Batavia.2 According to bin Aqil’s obituary, Rashīd Riḍā even believed that he had been responsible for the circulation of al-Manār in the archipelago (Bluhm-Warn 1997: 297). On 21 November 1907, bin Aqil, in the presence of ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī – described as ‘the great opponent of bid’ā and champion of the Sunna’ (al-Imam, vol. 3, no. 6, 25 November 1908) – established Singapore’s al-Iqbal boarding school. This institution, under the patronage of Raja Ali Haji, was headed by the Egyptian-born ‘Uthmān Affandī Ra’fat, a close friend of ‘Alī Yūsuf (1863–1913), the editor of al-Mu’ayyad. In late 1907 Ra’fat returned to Cairo to recruit his staff.3

Other members of the al-Imam circle included Shaykh Muhammad Salim al-Kalali, its first director, who was born in Cirebon and who had – according to the Dutch Consul in Singapore – played a role in the early years of the Aceh War.4 Then there was Hajji Abbas bin Muhammad Taha (b.1885) and Encik Abdallah bin Abdul Rahman of Muar. Hajji Abbas, born in Singapore of Minangkabau parentage, spent much of his youth in Mecca and later translated educational works from Syria and Egypt. Encik Abdallah became involved in importing them directly. In 1906, all of these figures were most concerned with importing the ideas behind such books. In the opening issue al-Kalali stated that he and his fellow editors were not satisfied with the language of the traditional Malay state texts (undang-undang negeri) and defined the role of al-Imam as being to introduce ‘Arabic terms’ that would lead to ‘social good’ (kebajikan) (vol. 1, no. 1, 23 July 1906).

Certainly al-Imam’s links with the intellectual discourse of the Central Lands of Islam were apparent to Dutch observers who first interpreted it as a

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new manifestation of hostile Arab Islamism. In his own study Ahmat b. Adam (1995: 140) repeats the Dutch prejudice that it was an ‘anti-Christian’ paper. Naturally the symbolic armory of Caliphate was employed by al-Imam in the form of articles on the Hijaz Railway (kereta api Hijaz), the Sublime Porte (al-bāb al-‘ālī), and Abdülhamid as ‘the Commander of the Faithful’ (amīr al-mu’minīn). Thus Spakler, the Dutch Consul in Singapore, sent a report to Snouck Hurgronje describing the establishment of an organ for ‘pan-Islamic propaganda’ and dwelt on the suspicion that some of its editors, known for their previous hostile activities, now found safety under the British. He also wondered why it was that Said Oesman had visited the journal’s offices.\(^5\) Snouck Hurgronje’s replacement in Weltevreden, Hazeu, responded that such fears were groundless and that al-Imam represented an innocuous form of ‘modernism’ (Schmidt 1992: 64–65, n. 79).

Consul Spakler may later have felt a little justified when al-Imam ran longer features on ‘our lord the Sultan’. Still, it was a restrained pan-Islamism which usually chose to regret the imposition of foreign rule while browbeating the Malays, and especially their rulers (echoing the arguments of both traditional Sunnī political theory and al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā), for being responsible for their own downfall. And whilst al-Imam praised freedom of the press in British India (vol. 2, no. 8, 4 February 1908), its editors were at first careful not to offend the Dutch government by use of indirect language. In a description of the ascension of Muhammad Safi al-Din as Sultan of Sambas (al-Imam, vol. 2, no. 5, 7 November 1907), the correspondent even described its ‘marketplaces bedecked with the flag of the Dutch Queen’s justice’. Only in 1908, when the paper began to fail and with Shaykh Tahir in Cairo, did the writers begin to be directly critical. At this time they began attacking the Dutch system of forced cultivations and its anti-Arab policy, bemoaning ‘the fanaticism of the Westerners’ (ta’assub orang bangsa Barat) (al-Imam, vol. 2, no. 8, 4 February 1908 and vol. 3, no. 6, 25 November 1908).

**Watan and umat**

Dutch and British rule tolerated the activities of these reformers and allowed al-Imam’s dissemination through fifteen agencies in the Federated Malay States and twenty-two in the Netherlands Indies. But it was a cautious tolerance, and the Dutch especially were concerned by the Arab heritage of the men of al-Imam. Yet whereas Roff (1967: 64) felt that only Taha could really be regarded as a (peninsular) Malay, it could equally be said that only bin Aqil could be regarded as an Arab; al-Hadi, for example, had only one Arab grandparent. Like most Indies Arabs, these men usually had Malay mothers and indeed a Malay upbringing. Malay was their mother tongue.

Although identity for such men was ostensibly grounded in Islam, the issue of bangsa was obviously important to their readers. So when letters arrived
from Padang asking whether Shaykh Tahir ‘al-Azhari’ was a Minangkabau or an Egyptian it evoked a reprimand with the reminder that skin colour was irrelevant compared with one’s ‘inner nature’ (isi) and (Islamic) knowledge (ilmu). Al-Imam’s editors further claimed to have no interest in ‘boasting about their bangsa or lineage (keturunan)’. Tahir had merely adopted the sobriquet al-Azhari ‘because of his affection for the place which had opened the eyes of his heart’. Hence the readers of Padang were advised to ‘desist from attaching ethnicity to skin-colour and concentrate on content’ (al-Imam, vol. 1, no. 6, 18 December 1906).

But, despite such sanctimonious exclamations about Tahir’s lack of concern with ethnicity by virtue of his attainment of Islamic knowledge, bin Aqil made his own sense of bangsa plain when writing to pan-Islamic journals in Egypt and Lebanon. There he assumed the standpoint of an Arab, and expressed paternalistic views about the Jawa (Mandal 1994: 145). Indeed he and al-Kalali felt keenly their role as leaders of the Malays in a region they felt to be their own. This claim al-Kalali made clear in the inaugural issue.

Indeed we are not of the same lineage as the people of this place [bukan daripada orang sini pihak keturunan], nonetheless as those who are locally born we have become attached to their country [negeri] as our homeland [watan] for we have drunk its milk, grown up on its flesh and blood and enjoyed all its benefits. Should we not therefore feel indebted to its country and people?

(al-Imam, vol. 1, no. 1, 23 July 1906)

From the outset it was thus clear that these peranakan editors felt that the local milieu was their own field of action – their own watan (Mal. watan). The immediate and unglossed use by al-Kalali of the watan indicates that it was a word already known below the winds. Nevertheless, as in nineteenth-century Egypt, its meaning had to be refined to suit the local context. An example of this was when, on 17 November 1906, al-Imam (vol. 1, no. 5) devoted substantial space to a speech delivered to the Rushdiah Club by Tengku Uthman, the son of Sultan Abd al-Rahman of Lingga, in which he had made several references to ‘the homeland’.

This was an address relating to Dutch weakening of the status of the Riau élite which Uthman cast in the cause of the ‘beloved homeland’. This was glossed in the header as both the watan and tanah air. The watan and tanah air was, as Tengku Uthman affirmed, to be defended, with all its inhabitants working for the common good to undo the treachery and self-interest of their fellows concerned only with riches and station. Indeed the greatest danger came from any who let their own greed divert their riches from serving the watan. And, although fate was naturally in God’s hands alone, the people should not be afraid to speak out for their own watan and tanah air, nor be ashamed before foreigners (bangsa ajnabi).
For God did not grant us our *tanah air* other than for us to make it a piece of heaven on the face of the earth. And by using what He has granted us in the form of healthy bodies and mutual affection we can effectuate a life free from hunger and thirst and united by the bond (*'urwa*) of the Sharī‘a.

Throughout his entire speech, Tengku Uthman thus cast service to the *watan/tanah air* as a sacred responsibility for all its inhabitants, in his case those of Riau-Lingga, and challenged any who believed that service to the homeland was not a sacred duty. Hence Tengku Uthman asked rhetorically:

> What then is the community (*umat*) of this land (*negeri*) working for its return to independence . . . and uniting for both homeland (*tanah air*) and nation (*umat*)? . . . It is we of the Muslim community (*kita inti beragama dengan agama umat islamiah*), the Malay *umat* . . . with its people in the many different negeris (*anak bumi tiap negeri itu*). . . . Indeed, ‘God does not change what is in a people until they change what is in themselves.’

(cf. Qur‘ān 8: 53; 13: 11)

The above passage contains a number of crucial terms, and I shall discuss the place of the *umat* at greater length below. For the moment, though, I wish to concentrate on the joining of religion with place and people as, by the identification of religion with patriotic and communal aspirations, *al-Imam* and its partisans excluded Chinese or Indian inhabitants of the region from its programme. And regardless of the secular Franco–Egyptian heritage of the modern *watan*, the usage of the term throughout *al-Imam* – and with greater frequency than *tanah air*, which was often used as a gloss – also suggests the active selection of a term with more ‘Islamic’ than indigenous credentials. Yet, unlike *Bintang Hindia*’s clear claims to loyalty for the *tanah air* of the Netherlands Indies, *al-Imam* was unable to be specific about where exactly the *watan* of the Malays lay, leaving the term to resonate with local understandings of negeris or tanahs.

We might recall how, in 1878, the editor of *Wazir Indië* had felt the need to explain who the Malays and their lands were through the use of a footnote. In 1906, defining Malay territory still presented problems. This had proved an issue for Encik Abdallah when he rendered Kāmil’s *Shams al-mushriqa* into Malay, choosing to water down or remove references to *watāniyya* by trying to describe a sense of love for the inhabitants (*anak-anak*) of a given negeri (Laffan 1996). *Al-Imam* therefore stepped up the campaign to heighten awareness of the *watan* and, on 16 January 1907 (vol. 1, no. 7), published a half-page definition under the bilingual header ‘Love for the homeland’ (*Hubb al-watān, kasih akan tempat kediaman*).
Love for the watan – that is the place of residence (tempat kediaman) – comes in two forms. The first form of love for the watan is that of our childhood, which is expressed by obeying our parents and living out what our teachers instruct and affirm. This is because it is well known that such [practices] will situate us within the watan, our place of residence, from which we derive benefit.

The second form is realised when we are grown and mature. At this time love for the watan is expressed by our care for our place of residence. And with our body, soul, property, and knowledge we preserve it from anything that threatens it and we draw to it anything that might give benefit to its people. [At this stage then] we wish to give precedence to all things which will be of benefit to our place of residence in general above anything which might give benefit to ourselves in particular.

This declaration was continued in the following issue (vol. 1, no. 8, 14 February 1907) with the slightly modified title ‘love for the territory (negeri) and protection of the place of residence’. This repeated the importance of using education (pelajaran) for one’s fellow countrymen – the people of the watan. Knowledge (pengetahuan or ilmu) was also projected as the key to national advancement in a wider world.

It was for this reason then that the al-Iqbal madrasa, sponsored by al-Imam, emphasized useful knowledge rather than the old kitab jawi. Its programme, announced in Arabic in vol. 2, no. 4 (7 October 1907), stressed the acquisition of practical skills consisting of ‘the religious sciences and associated disciplines, Arabic and its associated disciplines, English, Malay, mathematics, geography, history, drawing, script – both Arabic and Latin – speech, and composition.’ Knowledge had to be beneficial (yang memberi faidah), a practical tool (alat pekerjaan), that had already elevated the other bangsas of the world. Here an Arabic phrase was quoted, ‘one cannot love the homeland if one does not go beyond the back-yard’. Al-Imam explained that this meant a patriot not only needed to be aware of the wider world, but that he or she should labour beyond the confines of the home to elevate the people of his or her watan.

Thus it is incumbent upon us to love our place of residence and our territory (negeri) and to serve it with all our might. And even if we leave it but once, or indeed if we never leave it, we should pursue all matters that might bring benefit to it. We should reject anything that might threaten it with our utmost efforts so that our life is made beautiful and bountiful and so that we are renowned among all humanity.

The theme of homeland was further addressed by Muhammad Murtaji in the same issue, as it was from 14 May 1907 (see vol. 1, nos 8 and 11). His series
bore the Arabic title ‘The meaning of nation, homeland, government and freedom’ (*Ma’nā al-umma wa al-watān wa al-hukūma wa al-ḥurriyya*). It was then glossed with the Malay imperative ‘Unite in brotherhood, the place of residence, the power of government, and freedom!’ (*Himpun persaudaraan dan tempat kediaman dan kuat kerajaan dan kebebasan*). Addressing himself to ‘the sons of the noble homeland’ (*abnā’ al-watān al-‘azīz/anak-anak bumi yang mulia*) Murtaji declaimed that ‘at this current time of refinements (*kehalusan*), there are current upon the tongues of the Islamic community, presently afflicted by despondency, words such as *watān, hukūma* (government), ‘*adl* (justice), *siyāsa* (politics), and *ḥurriyya* (freedom)’. In so doing Murtaji was echoing the efforts of Ḥusayn al-Marṣafī who had sought to explain many of the same terms to Egyptians in 1881 (Hourani 1983:194) – despite such concepts having been critiqued in *al-Urwā al-wuthqā* as having no relevance to the true Islamic community. It was clear that they were now indispensable for the Muslims of the 1900s.

Murtaji devoted the bulk of his discussion to the term *umma* (Mal. *umat*). An *umat*, he stated, could be one of three types. It was either ‘a grouping of people of one tongue; one fixed place of residence; or one religion’. According to Murtaji, the first grouping was naturally tied to a given government (*kerajaan*), as linguistic unity followed the language of state. However, the problem with this *umat* was that it did not allow openness of thought. Such needed to be obtained then by learning the languages of other *umat*s.

The second form of *umat* was ‘a group of people possessed of a piece of land’ (*jumlah dari manusia mengambil mereka itu akan sepotong bumi*). Such a group would then take the name of that place to differentiate them from other groups. Hence there were the *umat* Melaka, *umat* Bugis, or *umat* Jawa. And the people of those places had lived there for their whole lives, deriving benefit from their fertile soils. By so doing they wished the same fate and identification for their descendants. In this sense then Murtaji linked the understanding of *umat* with *watān*. In his second instalment (vol. 1, no. 11, 14 May 1907), Murtaji continued with this link by stating that the members of the *umat* were to work together to raise their mutual state by education. And in this enterprise there should be an implicit sense of equality among the members of the *umat*. Thus no one, ‘even an aged and learned Shaykh’, should abuse a fellow member, ‘even if he is only small and young . . . And if he has made a mistake, then he should be corrected politely and without insult.’

Murtaji thereupon called upon Malays to use their wealth and station ‘to aid the *umat* and *watān*’ rather than for their own selfishness. For ‘by neglecting to aid their fellow countrymen (*anak-anak buminya*) and compatriots (*orang-orang tanah-airnya*) their *umat* would fall into servitude under the foreigners (*bangsa asing*). For much as anyone may only be accepted within a village by service to that place, so too membership of the *umat* was to be confirmed by service to its people.’ Indeed it was this model of
nationhood, expressed by Muṣṭafā Kamīl in his book on the remarkable watāniyā of the Japanese umma (al-Shams al-mushriqa), which had proved so attractive to al-Imam. And much of Kamīl’s ideology was transposed within Murtaji’s presentation of an idealized community. It is therefore no surprise that al-Shams al-mushriqa is advertised at the end of Murtaji’s article, although it is worth noting again that the translation toned down his rhetoric of patriotism (watāniyā) as the prime motor of national advancement (Laffan 1996). Love of the homeland was still a facet of religious devotion rather than an end in itself. Despite this qualification, the secularist Kamīl remained for al-Imam the perfect example of someone who had spent his life to elevate his umat and watan. His untimely death in 1908 was greeted by a heartfelt obituary to the man who had struggled against the cynicism and defeatism of his compatriots to remove the British ‘lion’ from the neck of his benighted country (al-Imam, vol. 3, no. 4, September 1908).

So it was that, unlike Kamīl, al-Imam stressed a religious, rather than primarily cultural, identification with nationhood. In his series Murtaji went on to describe the third form of umat – that of brotherhood forged by allegiance to a single divine code and maintained by preventing any deviation from that code or sectarian division. Such a unity was the only means of undermining the greed and backwardness of supposedly Islamic rajas who had brought their umats low. It was this third, and superior, form of umat, that was implicit among its fraternity. Here then Murtaji quoted the Qur’ān on the unity of all who obeyed God’s dictates: believers are to ‘cling to the rope of God and not part from each other . . . and to enjoin good and forbid wrong’ (see Qur’ān 3: 103–04).

Having thus dealt with the umat, Murtaji moved back to the watan, describing it again in terms of a place requiring the devotion of its inhabitants. However, this time he expressed the connection as a set of relationships between the person and the place through the umat. Thus the watan was ‘a piece of land supporting a particular umat’.

Hence it is a place of residence. In this it is much like the soul being as the watan of all thoughts, and the body being as the watan of the soul, clothing as the watan of the body. Indeed in this manner so too the village-home, state (negeri), land (benua), country (bumi), and this world (alam dunia ini) are all places of residence and thus watans.

Such concentric possibilities of potential watan are illustrative of the broad language of al-Imam, which could identify the Malays, Muslims, or indeed Easterners in turn. From the beginning al-Imam had defined its role, like al-Urwa al-wuthqā, as being for the Easterners in general and Muslims in particular. In this sense it was possible for them to describe an umat of the East (kita umat timur ini) suffering at the hands of a Western umat (umat
Indeed the world consisted of many umats, each described by al-Imam (vol. 1 no. 1, 23 July 1906) as ‘a gathering of communities’ (perhimpunan kaum). The umats so described were defined by al-Imam in terms of lineage and language in a way that is analogous to the secular usage of bangsa in journals like Bintang Hindia and Utusan Melayu (Milner 1995).

These first steps towards defining a united Malay nation possessed of an archipelagic homeland were thus being taken in al-Imam concurrently with those taken by the élite circles of Java that were familiar with Western discourse. Nonetheless, the progress of al-Imam towards a clear notion of nationhood was still hampered by the lack of a clearly defined Islamic or Malay watan and its appeals to the tradition of a far wider community of believers. For it is also important to stress here that the very term umat, like bangsa, has always to be construed as a construct, even in its Qur’ānic loci. So when, in Cairo in 1907, Lutfī al-Sayyid founded his ‘Party of the Umma’ (Hizb al-Umma) that umma was understood to represent the ‘Party of the Egyptian Nation’. And although al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh had used the same term in al-Urwa al-wuthqā to define both the community of believers and particular bodies of Muslim peoples, it is doubtful that, for Muslims of the 1900s, there was any association of this term with the whole Muslim world without explicit reference to an Umma of Islam (ummat al-islām) or the Qur’ān. For al-Imam to address the Muslim community at large, its writers needed to specify the ‘Muslim umat’ no less than they needed to specify ‘our Malay umat’ or the ‘umat of Japan’. So it was that, in their self-descriptions, al-Imam’s editors spoke of the umat Timur, umat Melayu, umat Islam kita disini (our Islamic umat here) or even umat kita sebelah sini (our umat of this place).

It is evident that the Malay-language journals owned or operated by indigenous Muslims – such as Utusan Melayu, Bintang Hindia and al-Imam – were all trying to develop an idea of nationhood based on an ethno-linguistic community (bangsa/umat) located in a definable territory (negeri/tanah watan). The only difference was that al-Imam usually favoured the Arabic-derived umat over the Sanskrit-derived bangsa, and added an Islamic character to its argument. By so doing the watan could be a more Islamic form of tanah air – especially when paired with the popular tradition that ‘Love of the homeland is a part of faith’ (Hubb al-watān min al-īmān).

Lessons on the road to independence: our Islamic history

From 1906, the watan-ideal promulgated by al-Imam was intended to be embedded in al-Imam’s ‘imagined community’ of the Malay nation (umat/ bangsa Melayu). Yet al-Imam was not just concerned with identifying that community and reforming its religion. The ultimate goal was the independence (Ar. istiqlāl) of their various lands (tanah).
What do we see around us? To the Southwest the land of Sumatra (tanah Sumatra) is in the grip of the Dutch. To the Southeast lies the land of Java (tanah Jawa), also in the grip of the Dutch. To the East is Borneo (tanah Borneo), similarly dissected by that people (kaum). Across the Eastern sea lies Manado (tanah Manado) and the Sulu Isles also under that race (bangsa). Across the Western sea is the land of the Malay Peninsula (tanah Melayu peninsula), served up as a dish for England’s enjoyment. Does all this not make one’s heart heavy or indeed wound it? . . . Given all this why then have all of our brothers and kings not thought, concentrated on or prepared for the future (mustaqbal) nor given lessons to the people of their watan? As a matter of fact they suffer no lack of money and possessions!

(vol. 1, no. 3, 19 September 1906)

Again, in 1907, al-Imam highlighted the ultimate quest for independence of the watan and published the advice of the Emir of Afghanistan to his son Habib Allah Khan ‘as a service to our rajas and people’.

Above all you must hold onto your religion [and] work for your people’s happiness and security through wealth and trade. . . . [S]eek knowledge and use your intellect by encouraging your people to become educated. Be benevolent so that all will love you – yet do not treat foreigners in such a way for they will not respect you . . . [I]ndeed do not give other bangsas concessions (imtiyazat). Give one street and your kingdom is lost!

(vol. 2, no. 5, 7 November 1907)

In order to hold on to sovereignty, al-Imam prescribed the maintenance of religion. And the advocated means of holding onto that religion were what marked the connection between Cairene reformism, with its emphasis on true Islam as rational civilization, and the Kaum Muda of Southeast Asia. This connection is best illustrated by an examination of the aspects of Islamic modernity they presented.

According to al-Imam, the Malays not only needed to be made aware of their need to develop and return to the truths of Islam, but to regain control over their destiny as a distinct umat. In general, for al-Imam there were two sorts of umat, being those which had surrendered to foreign powers through laxity of faith, and those which maintained themselves on the world stage through maintaining their [Islamic] unity. Hence the greatest task for any living umat was the absorption of the ‘collective system’ (nizam perhimpunan) (al-Imam, vol. 1, no. 1, 23 July 1906). One good example of such a living umat was Johor under the late Sultan Abu Bakar (r.1862–95), his name being famous among his umat for his works for the benefit of his people (bangsa) and people (kaum). As for the other rajas,
[They] surrendered the government of their nation and people (umatnya dan kaumnya) to a foreign religion and ceded the pick of their country’s crop to a foreign people so that all the Muslims within it must line up one by one and shoulder the difficulties and burdens loaded upon other [colonized] peoples.

*(al-Imam, vol. 2, no. 8, 4 February 1908)*

As *al-Imam* hoped for the independence of a genuinely Muslim Malay umat, it attempted to harness a deeper Islamic historiography and identification with the entire Muslim world. Most issues of *al-Imam* were commenced with a long serialization of Islamic history beginning, naturally, with the life of the Prophet and moving on to the glories of the Islamic imperium. True Islam was thus asserted, as it had been by al-Afghānī, as a once-victorious civilization (*tamadun*, Ar. *tamaddun*). Accordingly, *al-Imam* (vol. 1, no. 2, 21 August 1906) advised that any umat that intends joining the ranks of living people (bangsa yang hidup) must embrace *tamadun*.

Here was a node at which the reformers felt that some energetic leadership was required. There was indeed a difference in perception between editors and readers as to what exactly ‘our’ Islamic history (tarikh, Ar. *ta’rīkh*) was. Indications that they were not imagining quite the same umat are shown by the editors’ frustrated appeal for questions on ‘real’ Islamic history as they had no desire to answer readers’ ‘questions in Malay about the Malay umat of old’ (see vol. 2, no. 8, 4 February 1908).

Evidently *al-Imam*’s readers still looked back to the Jawi kingdoms of Pasai, Melaka, and Aceh, brought to life in the classical *hikayat* which even the editors quoted. In such chronicles there is often an implicit equalization of local history with that of China and Rum. According to Minangkabau legends, for example, the West Sumatran kingdom was a counterpart to the Ottoman Empire (Ruhum) and China and the Minangkabau ruler was therefore equal to the rulers of those two states (Abdullah 1970: 4). Similarly the Malay *hikayat* often establish a connection between the rulers for whom they were composed, and such heroes of Islamic historiography as Alexander the Great or the enigmatic prophet al-Khaḍīr (Azra 1999: 93; cf. Abdullah 1970: 13).

For such reasons Said Oesman condemned the writers of the *hikayats* as ‘specialists in *bid’a*’ in his *Manhaj al-istiqāma* (cited in Milner 1995: 164, n. 50). And *al-Imam* (vol. 2, no. 8, 4 February 1908) similarly lectured to its readers that ‘[Islamic] history is not like an epic or poem [but an account] of the civilization – *tamadun* – of the umat Islam . . . the rightly guided caliphs, the Umayyads, the ‘Abbasids, Khorasanids, and Andalusia!’ In the list of the great Islamic civilizations *al-Imam* enumerated a heterogenous mix of states, Sunni and Shi‘i, Turkish, Persian, and Arab. Clearly the editors believed that a true understanding of Islam required the implanting of a Middle Eastern historiography among the Jawa which conflicted with traditional literature.
(Johns 1979: 43–67). There could be no mention of Melaka or Mataram other than as nations whose failure to be truly Islamic made them the easy prey of foreign aggressors.

This sense of historical unity forged in Islam was grounded outside the local context and foreign to contemporary ideas being developed on Java (see below). As far as the editors of al-Imam were concerned, there was no unity in Southeast Asia prior to the arrival of Islam. Reformists thus sought to make the Malay/Jawi world peripheral to the Central Lands of the Middle East by challenging and even belittling local traditions. And, by characterizing indigenous literature as an assemblage of ‘mere’ tales and poems, al-Imam, like contemporary Western scholarship, presented Islam as a veneer over still unenlightened or animist Malays.

In one long contribution, a correspondent wrote that ‘convinced faith’ was ‘only enunciated by [Malay] lips and not inscribed on their hearts’ (al-Imam, vol. 3, no. 4, 27 September 1906). Malays were therefore to be brought to a true knowledge of the light of Islamic civilization and its Arabic-speaking founders. This project is exemplified in al-Imam’s emphasis on a historical narrative that centred around the lands above the winds, now imagined as historically united and contiguous. Yet at the same time, al-Imam’s own narrative of the many ‘kingdoms of the countries of our side’ (al-Imam, vol. 1, no. 1, 23 July 1906) pointed implicitly to the fractured political nature of the global Islamic community. And at the al-Iqbal school students would see the mapped representations of the modern (and largely colonized) states of the greater Muslim umma united only in suffering.

The historiography presented by al-Imam had many of the ingredients of a nationalist historiography. There was the revival of a glorious (and Islamic) past in competition with that being excavated by Europeans in Java and Egypt. And there was an attempt at reclaiming Malay as their exclusive language and Islam as their religion. And while al-Imam could address itself to the Malays, it lacked an appeal to a clearly defined watan – whether Malay or Jawi. What existed instead was a variety of tanahs and rajas joined by religion and language but separated by colonial and royal hegemonies. The editors of al-Imam did not identify with the same ideas of a greater indigenous past. Rather, ideal Islam was a civilization to be reactivated by a revival of faith and the appropriation of modern systems of learning. To this end, and like the élites of Cairo whose books and articles they read, they were prepared to look beyond the Muslim world and the West. For these activists Japan provided the best example of an ascendant Eastern power in touch with an Eastern tradition of alterity to the West.

The impact of Meiji Japan below the winds

For al-Imam in 1906, the image of Meiji Japan served to embody modern concepts of watan and ummat, much as it had for Muṣṭafā Kāmil in Cairo. In
earlier discussion I have shown how the Aceh war had provided a powerful symbol for the Easterner empowered. Initial Acehnese successes and Dutch frustration formed a base of confidence ready to be built upon by other Eastern conflicts. This was shown by the belated interest in the Crimean War and enthusiasm for the Japanese victories at Port Arthur and in the Straits of Tsushima.

Such images of the ascendant East – embodied by Aceh, pan-Islam, and Japan – were first conflated when the Ottoman warship Ertroğrul harboured in Singapore from December 1889 to March 1890 on its way to Japan. This inspired rumours of an Ottoman rescue of the Acehnese and even a Turco–Japanese alliance (Reid 1969: 258). But the Acehnese were not the only Southeast Asian rulers to recognize Japan’s potential as a source of aid against the Dutch (Andaya 1977). Al-Imam’s own version of the Just King, Maharaja Abu Bakar, even made a state visit there in 1883 (see Sweeney 1980). And, intriguingly, one of the backers of al-Imam, Muhammad bin Aqil, and a patron, ʿAbd Allāh Zawāwī, accompanied each other on a journey there in 1898–99 for reasons that are as yet unclear (Lee Warner, as cited by Roff 2002). This journey, if it indeed occurred, might well have planted a seed in Riau that would lead to the failed missions of Raja Hitam to Tokyo in 1912, and again in 1914 where he died (Andaya 1977: 152–54).

So it was that from the 1880s Japan would provide the model for a resurgent East for Southeast Asians. This model would be advanced by a variety of activists, including Abdul Rivai, Wahidin Soedirohoesodo, and E.F.E. Douwes Dekker (1879–1950) (Nagazumi 1969 and 1972). Japan was also popular among the future nationalists who would study in Holland in the 1920s (Ingleson 1975: 13). Most of these men were connected to either the Ethici, or were the products of the Ethical policy. It is perhaps surprising then that non-Muslim Japan engaged the imagination of the reformists in both Cairo and Singapore.

The Russo–Japanese war was thus crucial in leading many Indies Muslims to consider alternative bases of commonality revolving around perceptions of race rather than religion alone. These two concepts were often blurred by nationalists and reformists in their reduction of the world into East and West, with their journals often addressed ‘to Easterners in general and Muslims in particular’. Hence, indigenous Muslims increasingly came to separate themselves from the European Other with the contrasting images of the Easterner empowered (Japan) or the Easterner oppressed (impoverished and backward native society).

Japan was not solely an élite concern. Due to revision of the treaties governing relations between Japan and Holland in 1896, from 1899 Japanese residents in the Indies were entitled to European status. This had a major psychological impact. Previously the Japanese had been viewed locally as inferiors to the Chinese. The Dutch had in part conceded this recogniton as there were only around 1,000 Japanese in the Indies, of whom some 80 per cent
were women engaged in such activities as hairdressing and prostitution (Fasseur 1994: 37). Nevertheless, a major point of law had been made that stirred the Chinese on to agitate for similar treatment, and made some educated natives ask questions about Japan. Bintang Hindia (e.g., vol. 2, no. 2, 1 February 1904) ran stories on the European fascination for Japan, with its high artistic culture shown as representing Japan’s advanced civilization. Yet such cultural emphases fell into the background as the course of the war was portrayed with avid enthusiasm. Now the illiterate – but literacy aware – people who sat around the readers of newspapers and journals gained a clear notion of Japan as the ascendant Asian nation. Such an image later percolated from the urban metropoli into many rural areas transforming, for example, in the Batak lands into rumours of ‘a great ship that would sail through the clouds with a Japanese army that would overthrow the Dutch’ (van der Meulen 1981: 45).

With Japan’s rise, many Muslims believed that the Japanese emperor might even convert to Islam and join Turkey. This was no doubt further heightened with the publication, in 1906, of Matahari Memancar (The Rising Sun) – Abdul Rahman of Muar’s translation of al-Shams al-mushriqa. This had been foreshadowed in al-Imam, with articles on Japan translated from Kāmil’s papers al-Liwā’ and its sister al-‘Alam al-Islāmī. In the case of the latter, a planned mission of Turkish ‘ulamā’ to be sent to Japan was noted in the inaugural issue (vol. 1, no. 1, 23 July 1906). Here al-Imam speculated loudly on the potential for Japan’s conversion to benefit Muslims. Having mastered Western technology it was argued, Japan should convert to one of the four revealed religions (Magiism, Judaism, Christianity, or Islam) in order to enter the modern world. This choice should be governed by whether the existing exponents of that faith would accept them as leaders and true allies and, more specifically, as equals of England. Only Muslims, it was argued, would accept the Japanese on such a basis and here the lack of (racial) fellowship between Ethiopian and Western Christians was highlighted. Thus, given the enormous potential for pan-Eastern fellowship, the Japanese should embrace Islam and join their brothers in China, Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and the Netherlands Indies. Moreover, given that all Muslims were brothers (see Qur’ān 3: 98) ‘it would not surprise the reader . . . if we say that a Muslim Japan would become the leader of all the people East of Bāb al-Mandab [the entrance to the Red Sea]’.

The British authorities noted these enthusiasms, but were frank (if not entirely complimentary) about their chances.

Much of this is sheer bombastic nonsense. It is almost impossible to conceive of a people in the forefront of civilization like the Japanese adopting a religion so hopelessly out of touch with the modern world as that amalgam of Judaism and Christianity which Mohamed planted in the mind of the seventh-century Arab . . . The outcome of
the Russo–Japanese War has certainly been a check to the eastern progress of Russia; but it may result equally, though the fact is not yet patent, as a check to European aggression in other parts of Asia.  

The Dutch authorities also felt that there was something more sinister and tangible about this enthusiasm. In 1908, Shaykh Tahir was alleged to be collecting money to fund a mission to Japan to request aid for the West Coast of Sumatra. The source of this money was said to be his brother, Mohammed Amin, the Chief Penghulu of Koto Tuo.

Well after the heady days of the Russo–Japanese war and the realization that Japan’s leaders would not embrace Islam, many still saw Japan as a model to be studied. On 31 July 1911, Encik Ibrahim – a Peninsular Malay – gave a talk to a well-attended meeting in Padang on his trip to Tokyo, relating his observations of Japanese manners and the apparent care shown by the Japanese rulers for their subjects. Mass public education had instilled pride in the Japanese and created an industrious and efficient people. The editors of al-Munir (see below) in turn reflected that everyone knew that ‘the land of the rising sun had opened the eyes of many’... ‘if only we could instil the same sense of unity and purpose in our bangsa! (al-Munir, vol. 1, no. 12, 8 August 1911).

In 1912, Jawi correspondence to al-Manâr attributed the decline of Southeast Asian Muslims in part to the impact of European missionaries (Bluhm 1983: 39). However, the key fault, it alleged, lay among the believers themselves in their faulty practices. In the same year, a Jawi student in Mecca, ‘Abd al-Hâfiz, would complain that articles on the Jawi lands in al-Manâr, such as that by Abd al-Wahid Abd Allah of Tapanoeli, were too focussed on the Malays. He suggested that they were ‘not sufficiently penetrating and analytical’, and that Muslims therefore required a model to combat their faults. For ‘Abd al-Hâfiz al-Jâwî Japan remained that model (see Bluhm 1983: 39; Abaza 1998: 102).

Visits to Japan continued. Among its callers were a number of Malay students in the 1910s and various emissaries, overt and covert, from their rulers – including those of Aceh, Bali, Deli, Serdang, and Siak (Andaya 1977: 139; Schmidt 1992: 64–65). In 1917, Agoes Salim’s paper Neratja (vol. 1, no. 7, 10 July 1917) claimed that Raden Soemarsono, the former Jaksa of Purworejo, planned to travel to Tokyo to found a hall of residence for one hundred Jawi students living there. It was said that R.M. Soetopo planned to do the same with a few dozen students. Neratja also quoted a report from De Locomotief that the Japanese government was supporting many students. If this was indeed the case then this number would have exceeded any student community in either Cairo or Leiden at that time. Agoes Salim’s own response was to ask sarcastically, ‘Why are we going to Japan? Hasn’t the Dutch government been here for three hundred years promising to provide natives higher education?’ Later an article by ‘S.G.’ in Kaoem Moeda
(28 October 1918), claimed that the Russo–Japanese war had shown natives that ‘peoples of all colours’ could become ‘first class people’ and that Boedi Oetomo, the Javanist organization founded in Yogyakarta in 1908, was the first example of this (IPO 1918, 44). Progress through emulation was now clearly attainable.

The Dutch were naturally concerned by Japan and while they had observed the fumblings of the Riau court they were equally anxious about Japan’s larger ambitions. Some Japanese intellectuals reasoned that if modern civilization lay in Europe, then to the West and South were colonies to be gathered. In 1910, correspondence between the Tatar Japanophile Ibrahim Abduresid (1857–1944) and Muhammad bin Muhammad Ali of Sambas was published in Constantinople. By late 1911, Muhammad bin Muhammad Ali is said to have assisted some Japanese in purchasing twenty-six thousand hectares of coastal land – perhaps in order to supply a landing site for a future imperial expeditionary force (Ucar 1995: 15–17).

Curiously Ucar also referred to a visit to Tokyo by a certain Sayyid ‘Uthmān ‘Alawi with the intent of spreading Islam in Japan. Said Oesman would then have been in his seventies and this may actually be a reference to the 1898–99 visit of his son-in-law and ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī. Indeed one must again wonder about the influence of this trip on both men and their associates given al-Imam’s focus on Japan and an interest in Japan among students from Sambas and Pontianak in the 1910s.

Bernard Lewis (1993: 30) underestimates the importance of the Russo–Japanese war for Muslims throughout the world in comparison to Atatürk’s (1881–1938) later victory against Britain in 1922.

But Russia, though European, was not Western, and Japan, though Asiatic, was remote and little known, particularly in the Islamic lands where Asianism as a concept had not yet taken root. When Atatürk drove out the Greeks and faced down the mighty British Empire, he gained the first major Muslim victory against a Christian power for centuries, and a wave of exhilaration passed through the entire Muslim world, from French and British West Africa to the Dutch East Indies.

In retrospect, this would appear to be true in the Middle East, although Lewis ignores the widespread hopes voiced for the conversion of the Japanese among Muslims of all classes. Moreover, Indies subjects were beginning to be told that they had more in common with the Japanese as Easterners. As Abdul Rivai announced in a feature article with reference to America’s refusal to follow the Dutch and elevate the Japanese to the rank of Europeans, ‘it is impossible for ink and paper to disguise flesh and blood’ (Bintang Hindia, vol. 4, no. 24, 1 April 1907). Later in Singapore al-Imam duly declared that the Malay physique was ‘identical with that of the Chinese and the Japanese
who had vanquished the six-foot tall giants’ (*al-Imam*, vol. 3, no. 3, 29 August 1908).

**Conventional origins of the ‘national’ movement on Java**

The story of an Indonesia-specific nationalism is conventionally laid out with the formation of diverse cultural organizations formed by Dutch-educated élites throughout the Indies and among expatriate students in Holland (i.e., Vlekke 1959: 360–61; Steinberg 1987: 302–04). Many of these bodies were established by an emerging generation of Dutch-educated youth, reminding us of Abdul Rivai’s 1905 call to found a Vereeniging Kaoem Moeda. Examples of a diffuse Indies movement may be seen in the Javanese Boedi Oetomo (founded 1908); the Minangkabausche Bond (1910); the Sundanese organization Pasunden (1914); and the Sarekat Sumatra, Sarekat Minangkabau, and Jong Minahasa (1918) (Abdullah 1972: 237; Ricklefs 1993: 168). The example of the Jamiah Setia Pelajar of Cairo shows, however, that this was not an impulse restricted to those people exposed to Western education. And, emphasizing this phenomenon, in 1912 *al-Munir* (vol. 2, no. 1, 19 March 1912) noted everywhere the impulse for peoples to form associations to raise their respective bangsas ‘for societies and leagues are the major elements of the civilized world.’

According to later, and somewhat patronizing, writers from the start these localized movements showed the marks of Dutch influence (Vlekke 1959: 360–61; Pijper 1977: 101). And, as Shiraishi (1990: xi) reminds us, such movements maintained a national, rather than a nationalist, character. Many were led by conservatives empowered by colonial education who still pledged their loyalty to the colonial state, much as Abdul Rivai had, and who, like him, had moderate aims for Indies autonomy. For example, the first organization retrospectively declared the progenitor of Indonesian nationalism, Boedi Oetomo, was founded at Yogyakarta by élite students of the Training School for Native Doctors (School tot Opleiding van Indische Artsen, STOVIA) in May 1908 (Nagazumi 1972). For these activists knowledge and station were the key to social (and communal) advancement as many had come up from the junior echelons of the *priyayi* structure. They were, to use the terminology of Abdul Rivai, ‘intellectual aristocrats’ seeking a future in the colonial entity of the Netherlands Indies.

The membership of Boedi Oetomo, reflecting their largely *priyayi* background, was also attracted to ideas of a greater past being then unearthed by philologists and archaeologists like Brandes and Kern (Supomo 1979: 180–81). And this idea of the past, encouraged by colonial scholarship, was emphatically that of Java’s pre-Islamic civilization and the key to its understanding lay in Leiden at the school of Indies studies (Indologie). Yet these claims of larger unity under the great Indianized state of Majapahit, while largely illusory (Maier 1992: 26), did not reflect an inclusive vision of the
Indies as such, although some members, such as Tjipto Mangoenkeesoemo (1886–1943), did see Boedi Oetomo as the vehicle for far broader social and political change (Ricklefs 1993: 165).

One early attempt at formulating a wider Indies identity had been made when E.F.E. Douwes Dekker joined Abdul Rivai to form the Indisch Partij in 1907. Douwes Dekker also tried to evoke a name for this wider Archipelagic homeland and opted for ‘Insulinde’, first coined by his relative Multatuli and used by Dja Endar Moed a for a Sumatran paper in 1901. However, despite Douwes Dekker’s call for ‘Indië for the Indiërs’ and ‘Asië for the Asiërs’, the largely Eurasian aspirations that his party represented aroused the suspicions of some ‘pure-bred natives’, who disputed the existence of any such thing as an Indies consciousness. As leader of Insulinde (also formed in 1907), Douwes Dekker asserted that Indies nationality was a multiple identity that guaranteed the equality of its constituent peoples. After an attack on Douwes Dekker’s platform by a certain Poerwodihardjo, who stated that the Indo–Europeans were no race, but really Dutchmen ‘infected’ by Javanese blood, Douwes Dekker was defended in the journal Darmo-Kando by a certain ‘Toengkoe Oemar’. Oemar asserted that Javanese and Sundanese remained distinct but equal claimants to a singular nationhood as these names ‘Indiër’ and ‘native’ were merely marks (tjap) not races (ras). ‘A Javanese stays a Javanese, and a Sumatran remains a Sumatran. Man is no chameleon, but all groups together form a people, a nation!’ (Darmo-Kando, 11 November 1918/IPO 1918, 46). Any claims of nationalism, Javanese or Indies, countered the Soeara Ra’yat (Voice of the People, 15 November 1918, no. 37), were ‘idiotic’, obsessed as they were with capitalism as the common enemy (see IPO 1918, 46). However, not all Indies Muslims would agree with this assertion either for, while many members of Sarekat Islam were concerned by the issue of capital, they would eventually be forced to make a choice between an affiliation with communism and Islam.

**Parallel Islamic activism on Java: Sarekat Islam and Moehammadijah**

While valid in many respects, the vision of a linear development of an Indonesian nationalism evolving from diverse regional nationalisms all tied to the Western metropole and class struggle is neither simple nor completely satisfying. In the course of the fusion of the various regional movements, Islam would be asserted by some activists as the underlying mechanism of commonality, much as today some Islamic activists claim that only Islam can prevent Indonesia from breaking apart. To understand this fusion I wish to return to the origins of both the Islamic and national movement as it emerged on Java. These two key organizations – one connected first to Muslim trade interests and the other to reformist education – do not fit so neatly within the regionalist and élite narrative. Indeed it was Sarekat Islam that formed
the true basis for the national movement. And, while the ideology of anti-capitalism was indeed important for its early, Western-educated, leadership, including such men as Raden Darsono and Tjokroaminoto (1883–1934), most of its early membership conceived of the movement in distinctly Javanese religious, and sometimes even messianic, terms (see Shiraishi 1990).

But while many of the people attracted to Sarekat Islam were attracted to the movement in terms of the promise of an Islamic revival on Java, and to Tjokroaminoto as a messianic figure in the mould of the Just King (Ratu Adil), some left-leaning Sarekat Islam leaders, such as Raden Darsono, tried to explain its national objectives in ethno-religious terms. Many people accepted this identification with few problems. Still, it was somewhat contentious in some circles. In the Oetoesan Hindia (18 November 1918, no. 218) a ‘Kijai Dipo’ wrote an article disputing Raden Darsono’s claims about the essential division of humanity into racial and religious categories (IPO 1918, 46). For, while Kijai Dipo could not deny the linguistic divisions that beset humanity, he asserted that religion was a force for unity which transcended all barriers. So it was that a religious scholar and sympathizer of Sarekat Islam was disputing the underlying equation, then present in the (admittedly Java-centric) movement of the day, that Islam was a force for the identification of natives per se. It is this force, theologically suspect but undeniably present, that I wish to consider in the remainder of this book.

Regardless of its initially Javanese character, it is important to remember that Sarekat Islam was the first mass movement to claim an Indies-wide membership. Although formed to compete with Chinese batik traders in the Princely States of Central Java, the very name Sarekat Islam declared its constituency in terms far broader than any specific ethno-cultural framework, soon expanding with branches in the Outer Islands. Among its leaders, both Tirtoadisurjo (1878–1918) and Tjokroaminoto were former civil servants trained by the Dutch. Tirtoadisurjo had initially been involved together with a number of Hadrami mercantilists in Batavia to form the Sarekat Dagang Islamijah (‘The Islamic Trading Association’, 1909; see Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 42–44). This body soon collapsed due to financial disagreements and, after a brief stint with Hadji Samanhoedi (1868–1956) to form the Sarekat Dagang Islam in Buitenzorg (‘The Islam Trade Association’, 1910), he went to Surakarta to take on the management of another, similarly named, body to help Javanese batik-manufacturers compete with the Chinese. This organization, originally founded by a group called the Rekso Roemekso, was called in 1911 the Sarekat Dagang Islam Soerakarta and then, with Tirtoadhisurjo’s arrival, simply the Sarekat Islam. Its constituency was thus outwardly for all Muslims, though as Mobini-Kesheh (1999: 45) has pointed out, Hadrami money was far more welcome than Hadrami leadership.

Regardless of these ‘Islamic’ badgings, that Tirtoadisurjo and Tjokroaminoto had a Western education has been seen as reason enough to fit the movement into the Western-oriented narrative. According to Shiraishi
Islam for Tjokroaminoto ‘was no more and no less the signifier of the yet nameless nation of natives’. Yet while neither Tjokroaminoto or Tirtoadisurjo was connected directly to West Asian activism (or even the wider Jawi ecumene), the membership of Sarekat Islam often was. Even the executive of the first (failed) Sarekat Dagang Islamijah contained a mixed assembly of individuals connected to different metropoles. It included a number of Hadrami merchants, such as Shaykh Ahmad bin Abd al-Rahman Ba Junayd; the Doktor Jawa, Mohammad Dagrim; and the Javanese merchant and, later, publisher of *Medan Prijadi* (*Field of the Priyayi*), Hadji Mohammad Arsad. Islam as commonality was what enabled this quantum leap of unity between Hadrami merchant, Jawi pilgrim, and *priyayi* journalist.

As Siegel (1997: 28) has suggested, Indies activists were then seeking recognition, not independence; there was as yet no outward antagonism towards the non-Muslim Dutch. Siegel is wrong, however, to discount Tjokroaminoto’s assertion as to the cause of the movement’s astounding success (Siegel 1997: 33). There is no reason to disbelieve the leader when he stated that Sarekat Islam became ‘an extraordinary movement’ because thousands of members were ‘bound by the rope of the religion of Islam’ (Shiraishi 1990: 60).

This Islamic commonality and cooperativeness of the movement was even underlined by the 91-year-old Said Oesman, who addressed Sarekat Islam’s first mass assembly at Surakarta on 23 March 1913:

> Once again we consider it our duty to say thanks to the just Dutch colonial government which justly and dutifully enables us to perform our religious duties freely without any interference. Even more, they graciously help us to perform our religious duties by providing salaries to the religious judges, by cancelling regular court sessions in the month of fasting and by supporting the building of mosques, as well as by other kind deeds which we have mentioned in our writings and in our prayers.

(Steenbrink 1993: 133 quoting the Hazeu papers, KITLV)

The activities of Sarekat Islam also intersected with the Javanese reformist movement Moehammadijah, established in Yogyakarta in 1912. Its founder, Achmad Dachlan (1868–1923), was connected to traditional Javanese ecumenical networks. He was born in the Kauman district of Yogyakarta as Muhammad Darwis, the son of Hadji Aboebakar, *khatib* of the great mosque. He first studied in the traditional atmosphere of Mecca from 1890, where he appears to have taken the name from the late Muftī of Mecca. Yet, like Shaykh Tahir, he became aware of the new Cairene reformism, and back in the Indies he subscribed to both *al-Manār* and *al-Munir* (Hamka 1958: 78).

In Yogyakarta, Dachlan pursued an interest in astronomy, which was in vogue with his contemporary reformists Tahir Jalal al-Din and Djamil
Djambek (Hamka 1958: 80; Yunus 1979: 89). These reformists were often preoccupied with determining the exact orientation of prayer (qibla), much as Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjārī had been during his stay in Batavia (Steenbrink 1984: 92). It was actually a dispute relating to the siting of the qibla of the Kauman mosque that led to Dachlan being sent to Mecca again around 1900. It was most likely on this sabbatical, perhaps under Aḥmad Khaṭīb, that Dachlan affirmed his commitment to the case for reform. Still, it would be a reformism based first and foremost on Javanese soil, as the movement’s many branches became active in providing education and social services to the Muslims of that island. Indeed, Moehammadijah remained a very Java-focussed organization until Dachlan’s death in 1923. However, following its linking with Hadji Rasoe’s Sumatera Thawalib movement (see below), its membership base rapidly expanded to reflect an increasingly national platform with a programme that most writers have been happy to attribute entirely to the thought and activity of Muḥammad ‘Abduh.

‘Abduh in Indië

‘Abduh’s name still commands respect among the reformists of Indonesia and there is a popular perception that the principles of Moehammadijah were sourced directly from him (Hamka 1961; Noer 1979). ‘Abduh was certainly an inspiration to many Indies reformists, a fact reinforced by al-Imami’s propagation of his edited version of the Nahj al-balāgha (The Way of Eloquence), originally composed by ‘Alī bin Abī Ṭālib, and by the inclusion of his Risālat al-tawḥīd and the Tafsīr al-manār in the programme for Moehammadijah schools in the 1920s (Bluhm-Warn 1997: 307).

However, such a perception is not without its critics. We may recall that, in the 1890s, ‘Abduh was generally reviled in conservative circles, and probably within Aḥmad Khaṭīb’s halaqa, with only Shaykh Tahir Jalal al-Din defying the trend. Moreover, in light of ‘Abduh’s suspected entente with Lord Cromer, Aḥmad Khaṭīb’s 1895 attack on Muslims following their white masters and teachers into Hell would have resonated strongly with many of his students. Furthermore, in their project of humanizing Muḥammad and presenting Islam as a religion consonant with modernity, the systematic denial by ‘Abduh and Ridā of any prophetic miracles other than the Qurʾān (Kerr 1966: 119; Brown 1996: 64–65) would have offended the sensibilities of men like Khaṭīb, who still affirmed the truth of such miracles as the Night Journey. To deny such miracles could only be regarded by many Muslims as evidence of unbelief. In 1918, one Javanese, Tjekroek Troeno, felt impelled to attack the modernists on these very grounds in the journal Djawi Hisworo. Here he accused those people who did not ascribe to God any corporeal form, and who disbelieved in the power of the prophets and angels, as being merely nominal Muslims (abangan).12

Arbiyah Lubis (1993) also points out that ‘Abduh’s influence on
Moehammadijah was not so much in theology, but rather in the spheres of educational organization and the general impulse for a return to the sources of Islam – the latter call having also been made by Ibn Taymîya. Lubis also shows that, in terms of theology, the leading thinkers of Moehammadijah – such as Mas Mansoer (1896–1946) – were far more amenable to conservative Ashârî doctrine which Rashîd Rîdî, and not Muhammad ‘Abduh, offered. After all, the works of ‘Abduh as presented to Jawi audiences were largely edited by Rîdî.

It should also be noted here that Moehammadijah was initially a very Javanese organization based on the leadership of a kiai with experience of traditional pesantren education and an indirect acquaintance with Cairene reformists through the pages of al-Manâr and al-Munîr (Hamka 1958: 78). His first contact with reformism would have been closer to the form of Ahmad Khaṭîb than Muḥammad ‘Abduh. Still there is little sign of Ahmad Khaṭîb’s anti-Christian rhetoric in the life of a kiai noted for the open spirit of engagement which characterized his interaction with the Dutch, including regular forums involving Christian missionaries (Pijper 1977: 107; cf. Islam Bergerak, 1 November 1918, No. 25/IPO 1918, 47).

Moreover, if Moehammadijah initially plotted a median, and at times quietist, course between tradition and reform, it could utilize al-Manâr or the Risâlat al-tawhîd as sources to be read alongside the other more traditional kitab kuning without necessarily abrogating their contents. Moehammadijah schools would thus continue to teach the famous Egyptian Tafsîr al-jalâlayn (Johns 1988: 266). Similarly, Federspiel (1970) has attempted to compare reformists and traditionalists on doctrinal points and found that there were far more similarities between them than differences. However, he did point out the increasing emphasis placed by Moehammadijah on the centrality of the individual and the heightened impulse among reformists to combat innovation (bid’a) and superstition (khurâfa). The main point of departure is taken by him as 1925, after which ‘the effort to expunge bidah and churafat was given more attention, apparently because of the interest of a new leadership and the expansion of the movement onto Sumatra’ (Federspiel 1970b: 65).

The linking of Sumatran and Javanese reformists indeed explains the general redirection of reformism in the Indies as the two sympathetic, but nonetheless competing, networks merged within the national movement. However, this tells half the story, as key external events, which I shall discuss in Chapters 8 and 9, first united and then polarized Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua in the 1920s. Moreover, from the example of al-Imam above, it is clear that reformist activism in the Indies did not really begin around the Kauman district of Yogyakarta or in Padang, but in Singapore, the port through which most Jawi pilgrims then passed. In light of the Malay rhetoric of al-Imam and the Javanese focus of Sarekat Islam and Moehammadijah, a connection between the Malay and Javanese discourses was crucial to the viability of any
future Jawi or Indies nationhood. However, before considering the wider Indies movement, I shall consider the foundations of reformism on Sumatra, the key island that would link the overlapping Malay and Indies movements in the *bilâd al-jâwa*.

**The religious Kaum Muda of Sumatra**

After a tour of Mecca and the Malay Peninsula around 1903, Muhammad Djamil Djambek (1862–1947) returned to West Sumatra. There he broke with the traditional system of education, whereby the students sat around the teacher in a circle with texts open on their laps, and introduced the *tablîgh* method whereby the teacher stood before a class, arranged in rows, and lectured with the use of a blackboard. Similarly, Hadji Rasoel returned to Sumatra in 1906 and over the following years developed the Sumatra Thawalib madrasa of Padangpanjang along modern lines with a system of graded classes with desks (Ricklefs 1993: 170). As in Malaya, such activities caused this movement to be labelled Kaum Muda. And perhaps it would not be going too far to say that it could best be translated as ‘young upstarts’. It may even have been a calculated reference to the Kaum Muda of *Bintang Hindia*, such as Abdul Rivai and al-Hadi, with their Westernized ways of dress and script. Nonetheless, this was a label embraced by them, applying the reverse term Kaum Tua to their traditionalist opponents.

Through the Kaum Muda schools the very methodology of Muslim education was externally Westernized and the divisions among Sumatran Muslims became more clearly demarcated. Some Kaum Tua even referred to reformist madrasas as ‘infidel schools’ (Bowen 1993: 50). Once Raja Ali Haji of Riau (c.1809–c.1870), writing in his *Kitab Pengetahuan Bahasa* (*Knowledge and Manners*, c.1869), had criticized Malays for donning the clothing of Europeans claiming that ‘at night one would not know they were Malay’ (Andaya and Matheson 1979: 113). Said Oesman, in his *Jamʿ al-nafatʾis*, had recited the admonitions of al-Ghazâlî when he claimed that it was ‘unbelief to dress like an infidel and to speak highly of these clothes’ (Drewes 1978: 37; Bluhm-Warn 1997: 302). In like fashion Kaum Tua attacked the Kaum Muda’s wearing of trousers, ties, and even Panama hats (Hamka 1958: 82). Certainly some Kaum Muda teachers were famous for their dress which did not differ greatly either from the new élites of Cairo and Constantinople. They would have been in step with the fashions of the major cities of Java where Ethici protégés and Hadramis were embracing a similar style of modernity, even if the cut of one’s jacket in Singapore would more often resemble those of Constantinople than London (Proudfoot 1993: 32). Mahmud Yunus’ *Sejarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia* (*The History of Islamic Education in Indonesia*, 1979) features two photos of Ahmad Khâṭîb’s student Muhammad Thaib Umar. On one page he stands together with Djamil Djambek in a sarung, on another he stands alone (c.1913) wearing a *tarbūsh* and tie (Yunus...
1979: 89, 144). No doubt all these Kaum Muda would have approved of the latest recordings of the Qurʾān for the gramophone, available from the late 1890s and advertised in the pages of *al-Imam* in 1906 (cf. Snouck Hurgronje, VS: II 419–47).

Some Kaum Tua maintained their ban on the use of Western technologies and fashions well into the twentieth century declaring the Kaum Muda and their schools to be guilty of apostasy. Kaum Muda countered by drawing distinction between trousers and crucifixes (Hamka 1958: 80). Muslims, they argued, need no longer be so obviously distinct from their foreign overlords in terms of dress. One’s radicalness was rather to be framed in what one wrote and read. It was no longer enough just to dress as a Muslim or even to don the turban of *a hadji*. One had to be a Muslim within and use the knowledge of both West Asia and the West to one’s own advantage by publicly appropriating their symbols and technology, including, where necessary, their script.

At the same time though the very ‘Arab’ ideology advocated by the reformers was not lost on local elites and traditionalists. The Kaum Muda were often branded as being ‘Wahhabi’—together with the usual epithets ‘zindiq’, ‘Muʿtazila’, and ‘Khawarij’—bearing in mind that the Wahhabiyya was again looming as a threat to the Kaum Tua in the Hijaz. At first Hadji Rasoel and his allies rejected the term. But after their readings of the works of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya (d.1350), they began to identify with them more openly in their attacks on local *bid’a*. This led to a major reaction by Kaum Tua. And, some time after the death of Ahmad Khāṭīb, on 14 March 1916, they wrote to their Kaum Tua patrons in Mecca. These in turn drafted a *fatwā* declaring the four most prominent Kaum Muda leaders (Abdullah Ahmad, Hadji Rasoel, Djamil Djambek, and Labai al-Jounousi) to be apostates and liable to imprisonment by the Sharīf should they journey to Mecca (Hamka 1958: 85).

**Al-Munir**

The second reformist Kaum Muda journal commenced publication in Padang on 1 April 1911, fifteen months after financial disputes and personal rivalry saw the end of *al-Imam*. Its very title, *al-Munir* (Ar. *al-Munīr*, *The Radiant*), echoed a partisanship for the ideals of ‘Abduh and Riḍā and its correspondents, such as Hadji Rasoel, were admirers of their former student Shaykh Tahir.

Unlike the more heterogenous lineage of the men behind *al-Imam*, who sought to lead a Malay *umat, al-Munir*’s direction was largely determined by the local aims of its Minangkabau editors. Their home region of West Sumatra was nonetheless like Singapore as it was bound to both Arabic- and Western-language metropoles by its traditional village schools and a training school for native officials. Kota Gedang—the very *watān* of Ahmad Khāṭīb—had become a major source for future employees of the colonial state (Hadler
More than anywhere in the Indies, reformism and the networks of the Ethici intersected in the Alam Minangkabau. Perhaps this in part explains the future tangled relationship between Minangkabau reformists and political activity in the Indies, and thereafter Indonesia.

Al-Munir’s manager was Abdullah Ahmad of Padang (1878–1933). It was owned by another Minangkabau trader, Haji Sutan Jamal al-Din Abu Bakar. Its correspondents included Hadji Rasoel; Muhammad Dahlan Sutan Lamba’, a teacher of Padang; Haji Muhammad Tayyib Umar of Batu Singkar; and, in Kota Gedang, Soetan Moehamad Salim. The prominent Datoek Soetan Maharadja was also an early collaborator with the project until it shifted from an emphasis on the pro-Western modernism he espoused to the puritanical reformism of Hadji Rasoel and the other ‘Mecca people’ (see Abdullah 1972: 216–29). Indeed his later attacks often verged on outright xenophobia as when he claimed that veiling was a practice adopted by Meccan women due to their extreme ugliness (Noer 1973: 217).

In turn the attitude of these ‘Mecca people’ to Minangkabau adat is best illustrated in the early career of Hadji Rasoel. Rasoel’s debut came, in 1907, with the death of his own father, Shaykh Amrullah, the local head of the Naqshbandiya order. Hadji Rasoel quickly alienated the Kaum Tua by refusing to allow the usual commemorations for his father’s death, which he argued were not in accordance with the Sunna. Thereafter, claims Hamka (1958: 58), his father engaged in an active campaign to turn local ulema from a reliance upon charms and spells through a proper understanding of monotheism much as he had been ‘converted’ by Ahmad Khatib in Mecca. Many had been engaged in learning the arcane arts so as to struggle against new Dutch taxation initiatives which had already caused some people to emigrate to the Malay lands. According to Hamka (1958: 62), his father saw that not only were such studies inherently profitless, but also any struggle against the Dutch was useless given that there was no effective unity among the members of the various nagaris.

Matters came to a head in 1911 when Rasoel entered the mosque of Kampung Kubu on the shores of lake Maninjau, dressed impressively in a jubba, dark glasses, and an ‘Aleppo turban’, and challenged for the right to read the khutba. The local adat leaders were furious and both parties were called to a meeting with Controleur Ch.H.J. Baron van Hoevell, a young Indologie graduate. Van Hoevell found that matters of custom devolved on adat heads, i.e., the local panghulu, whilst matters of religion were Rasoel’s domain. The Kaum Muda were thus recognized locally by colonial government.

In this regard Steenbrink (1993: 91) has observed that whilst Muslims were to be increasingly ‘emancipated’ through the policies of the Office of Native Affairs, this was offset by the fact that a stricter interpretation of Islamic law was to be enforced in practice. And as Dutch officials had often studied the classic West Asian texts in their training on Islam they naturally leant towards
the same scripturalist approach of the Kaum Muda coupled with the techniques of individual interpretation stressed by reformist Christianity. Normative piety was thus reinforced by state power when concerned with matters of ‘religious custom’ as when, in 1912, the Government appointed Abdullah Ahmad and two other Kaum Muda to sit together with some Kaum Tua on a religious council for Sumatra. Thus Dutch power, informed by Leiden orientalism, granted the Kaum Muda official recognition as acknowledged spokesmen on Islamic issues, much to the chagrin of their Kaum Tua enemies (Abdullah 1972: 227). In 1918 Hadji Rasoel was even called upon to help formulate marriage law in West Sumatra (see KITLV, H1083, nos 112, 113) while another of Ahmad Khatib’s protégés, Khatib Ali, was named by the resident as inspector for Kaum Muda schools (see Oetoesan Melajoe, 28 October 1918, No. 205/IPO 1918, 45). Such official recognition was paralleled in Java where, by 1918, the Malay-language government schools would teach religion by the use of a textbook written by Achmad Dachlan (Dīn Allāh, God’s Religion, see Hamka 1958: 91). Hamka (1958: 106) even claims that, in 1924, Abdullah Ahmad was appointed as an Adviser to the Office of Native Affairs on Java; although this last point remains to be proven.

Despite the de facto backing of officialdom, the ascendancy of Rasoel and his faction was not assured. Indeed he was shunned by a large segment of Sumatran and Peninsular Malay society. Still, he had already won a symbolic local victory in 1916 when the old Kubu mosque, with its traditional bullhorned roof, was replaced by a new structure with three minarets. Meanwhile, his lessons embodied a spirit of a new internationalist Islam, with students learning chants from Yemen, the Hijaz, and Egypt (Hamka 1958: 70). For Kaum Muda like Rasoel, teachers had a vital role to play in making Jawi students aware of their wider Muslim world and the imperative to enact reform within it – and even by accommodating one’s doctrine with the Dutch rulers. To this end al-Munir would bolster their efforts in their schools, often founded under the benevolent gaze of the Dutch authorities.

From the start al-Munir directed its calls to teachers as the best exponents of self-help, and expressed the ideals of the Modern to be achieved through religious reform and the proper inculcation of patriotism.

We plan to establish true Islam among the people of our people (bangsa) . . . and to show them the way to the field of advancement and the life of the world which will bring us perfection in the next life . . . [We aim to bring our people] to the field of love for the homeland and its people [ke lapangan yang kasih kepada tanah air dan anak bangsanya] . . . and the way of love for the community [dan atas jalan mengasihi bangsa].

In the same article, echoing al-Imam, al-Munir focussed on the imperative to be aware of the decline of one’s bangsa and homeland – now phrased, as in
Bintang Hindia, as the tanah air. It also reminded readers of the need to establish newspapers as had been done in Egypt, India, and Turkey where so much had been done to raise their peoples and homelands. Here al-Munir paid tribute to the many newspapers of the Malay bangsa, and reprinted an article from al-Imam on ‘The use of newspapers or journals’.

[However,] for us people of this place there has as yet been no single newspaper or journal which could lead our people in particular, or us Sumatrans in general, on the way of promoting understanding of the religion of Islam.

(al-Munir, vol. 1, no. 1, 1 April 1911)

As can be seen from Chapter 6, al-Munir stressed the benefits of study in Cairo to its readership. After featuring correspondence from ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī – ensconced since late 1908 as ‘professor’ (guru besar) in Mecca – it lauded the efforts of Rashīd Rīḍā in publishing the magazine it ardently followed, and who loved Egypt ‘as if it was his own tanah air’ (al-Munir, vol. 1, no. 5, 29 May 1911).

In the course of promoting the activities of the Jawa of Mecca and Cairo, al-Munir announced, on 9 January 1913 (vol. 2, no. 21), the foundation of al-İttihad in Cairo, a paper for which Abdullah Ahmad served as an agent, and which his journal later quoted (see al-İttihad, vol. 1, no. 7, 6 May 1913; al-Munir, vol. 3, no. 7, 6 June 1913). On that occasion al-Munir reported ‘with great pleasure’ the appointment of several Jawa to teaching posts in Mecca, as new Ottoman regulations (promulgated in 1910) admitted teachers to the Ḥaram by examination.

[Under the old régime] all those ‘ulamā’ of Mecca fit to teach were forbidden to do so in the Ḥaram and it was no easy task to get permission to do so other than through the favour of the Muftī of Islam in Mecca. Now, it seems that there are eight of the people of our Jawi side counted among those who teach in the Ḥaram. Five of them are Javanese – Shaykh Muhammad Mukhtar Batavia, Shaykh Shadhili Banten, Shaykh Ahmad, Shaykh Mahfuz,13 and another Shaykh whose name is not known – perhaps it is Tuan Muhammad Baqir bin Muhammad Nur,14 a scholar from Yogyakarta, Java. Then there is a Mandailing, Shaykh Abd al-Qadir;15 a Minangkabau, Shaykh Ahmad Khatib, and a Patani, Shaykh Muhammad Nur.16 In addition to this they all receive a gratuity from the ‘King’ (raja Makka) . . . which is unprecedented.

In a parallel report of 1909/10, Aboe Bakar provided the names of the key ‘ulamā’ who headed a community of some one hundred Jawi teachers. These were the Sundanese Raden Moehamad Moechtar, Ahmad Djaha and Ahmad

Whereas we would perhaps expect the predominantly Minangkabau editors of *al-Munir* to emphasize Aḥmad Khatīb’s prominence in their list of new appointees, it is important to note the equivalence granted to the *ulamāʾ* from all parts of the archipelago: ‘our Jawi side’ (*sebelah kita Jawi*). This is also distinguished from ideas of a Javanese ethnic group, the *bangsa jawa*. Thus the editors are trying to communicate a wider sense of community now more acutely ‘imagined’ by the readership as a part of the wider Muslim world and a wider Malay-speaking world.

As the editors of *al-Imam* had begun, the men of *al-Munir* were also keen to stress that their endeavours were not inimical to Dutch government. In 1912 they commented that:

> our *bangsa* lives in perfect peace in the shade of the three-coloured flag and within the protective environment of our Government. It is as if our people and homeland are protected from all the evil of savage enemies by the stone ramparts of the government of the Netherlands.

*(vol. 2, no. 1, 19 March 1912)*

This, then, was the sense of nationhood shared by these men from 1911. They were Minangkabau Muslims first and (Sumatran) Malays second – guarded by a benevolent Dutch government that spread its protection over the whole Indies. It would at first appear that these men who, like Rasoel, had studied in Mecca in the 1890s, did not present themselves primarily as Jawa once they returned to the Netherlands Indies or Federated Malay States where local particularisms were reasserted. Moreover these reformists did not invoke resistance against their colonizers, but rather, like Muḥammad ‘Abduh, worked with the passive acceptance of colonial rule for their own ends. Thus when their Kaum Tua enemies accused them of working against the government they struck a raw nerve and the editors felt compelled to respond to the charges of a certain ‘Mr. Jealous’ (*si Hasad*) and to restate their loyalty to the colonial state. Here they cited the opinion of ‘the Muftī of Egypt’ (most likely ‘Abduh), who had pointed out that to eject the English from Egypt, and thus endanger public order, was not in accordance with God’s command. Rather it was imperative upon Muslims to work for progress (*al-Munir*, vol. 3, no. 3, 8 April 1913).

Nonetheless, from the first issue of *al-Munir*, the process of creating nationhood can be observed. And, while the terminology of *bangsa* and *tanah air*
was shared with other papers like *Bintang Hindia*, the impact of the national movement then growing in Java usually imported European models of the *patrie* or *vaderland*. By comparison *al-Munir* made the heritage of its patriotism clear with reference to the *watan* from 14 May 1911 (vol. 1, no. 4). Here a *hadji* from Tanjung Singayung quoted a fragment of a *ḥadīth* (which he thought to be a Qur’ānic verse) that had appeared on the front page of the journal: ‘...honouring the faith and the religious community and loving the homeland and home-town’ (*...īkrām al-dīn wa al-milla wa ḥubbān li al-watān wa li al-maḥālā*). This he rendered (more fully) in Malay as ‘Because of the love of the homeland and place of residence it is incumbent for all enabled by material and intellectual opportunity or by rank to help the people of one’s *bangsa*’. The editors too identified their *tanah air* as a *watan*. Echoing *al-Imam*, *al-Munir* ran a long series of editorial features under the title ‘*ḥubb al-watān: kasih akan tanah air*’ from 23 October 1911 (vol. 1, no. 15) to 4 January 1912 (vol. 1, no. 20). As the writer explained, ‘most people know that the *watan* is the place or village of one’s ancestry’, people seemed only to care for their own village and did not consider the villages of others of their own *bangsa*. Thus the efforts of *al-Munir* to raise the *bangsa* were compromised by the selfishness of the people. People needed to think of the other members of their *bangsa* and become – as in Europe – more unified.

*Al-Munir* also stressed that other (developed) nations did not look to foreign countries, peoples or religions in times of trouble. Rather they were entirely self-reliant empowered by ‘nothing other than their affection for the *watan*.’

Because of this *al-Munir* campaigns in the hope that the people of this place will also rise up and help and aid one another so that they become as one village, one *negeri* and one Alam Minangkabau to be able to face any disaster or danger.

(vol. 1, no. 15, 23 October 1911)

In attempting to explain the concept of the *watan* as a shared territory, the writer did not confine himself to a discussion of the *watan* as such, but rather conceived of the idea of love for the homeland to be enacted through mutual regard for the inhabitants of one’s *bangsa*. Upon attaining unity then the Minangkabau people would be empowered and deserving of (future) self-government (*menjadi kepala pemerintah*).

Nonetheless, despite the ‘Islamic’ connotations of its homeland, *al-Munir* remained committed to emulation of Western education in partnership with the colonial authorities, and was full of praise for the colonial government when a new school was opened with ‘government blessing’ in late 1911 (vol. 1, no. 16, 6 November 1911). Here the writer incorporated aspects of Muhammad Murtaji’s article on the meaning of the *watan*. 

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[At this school may our youth] learn many things and not depreciate the bangsa. Don’t forget the homeland (tanah air) or betray the leaders of the government or neglect its intended basis for that is love for the homeland as is understood by advanced people. What they understand as the watan is not just some piece of land where one is born. Rather they understand it as a place of residence (kediaman) which has many shades of meaning. Thus the soul (arwah) may be said to be a watan because it is the seat (kediaman) of all kinds of opinions and ideas. And the body can be said to be a watan, because it is the vessel of the soul. And clothing can be said to be a watan, because it is the container of the body. In this fashion the household, or the village neighbourhood and other such [places may be considered watans].

While al-Munir continued to propagate its message of unity within the Minangkabau watan, this was accompanied by a shift to a wider identification of all the peoples living under the protection of the Dutch flag. If the members of the Jawi bangsa living abroad could see the merits of unity, then so too a unified Indies could start to be visualized with sharper focus.

Al-Islam and the decline of the jawi press

The Sarekat Islam first termed its annual general meeting a ‘national congress’ (nationaal congress) in 1916. In that year, too, Abdullah Ahmad of al-Munir started collaborating with Sarekat Islam’s leader Tjokroaminoto to found the al-Islamijjah Association. This body published a fortnightly jawi periodical in Surabaya entitled al-Islam. The publication included a final page in rumi script which explicitly reflected the new national focus for the Indies movement. It gave the periodical the significant subtitle: ‘organ for Indies Muslim nationalists’ (orgaan voor Indisch-Mohammedaanske nationalisten) or, in the Malay equivalent, ‘the voice of Indies Muslims who love their religion and their homeland’ (tempat soeara anak Hindia jang tjinta pada igama dan tanah-ajernja). Their nation was, when denoted in Dutch terms, clearly a fusion of religious and patriotic devotion. The role of religion – and monotheism in particular – was elsewhere elaborated as the principal motor of progress (kemajoean), and kemajoean guaranteed the (intellectual) independence of Indies Muslims (see al-Islam, vol. 1, no. 5, 14 October 1916).

Al-Islam first appeared on 15 June 1916. Tjokroaminoto in Surabaya managed subscriptions, while Abdullah Ahmad had editorial control over religious matters from Padang. Theologically guided from Sumatra and anticipating commercial success in the mass movement on Java, the unity of the two islands was expressed by the appeal to the majority faith they both shared. Islam, it was argued, following a well-trodden path, was the great force for progress, and al-Islam’s readership was declared to be ‘the Muslims
of the Indies and all who sympathized with their native movement’ (bangsa Islam penduduk Hindia serta mereka-mereka yang turut bergirang hati atas gerakannya bumi putra). All Muslims, including those members of the Jawi communities in Mecca and Cairo, were seen as having a role to play in the future of the Indies.

We continue to hope for the assistance of our wise and influential teachers of religion who are also raising the level of the bangsa: the Muslim people of the Indies (bangsa Islam tanah Hindia). And together with this aid from [the teachers of] Java and Sumatra [we look] especially to those of our bangsa who live in Mecca and Cairo.

Moreover, their small association (vereeniging) ‘would expand the feeling of [affection for] our kaum and bangsa to form a great association which’, it was hoped, would become ‘a disseminator [pengantar] of religion which will become steadily more empowering . . .’ (al-Islam, vol. 1, no. 1, 15 June 1916).

Yet al-Islam was not a success, and its pretensions of tapping into the Islamic unity of the archipelago through the medium of jawi script seem to have failed to generate enough enthusiasm to support its continuance. Now political leaders and polemicists were to find larger and more engaged audiences in an Indies dominated by communication in the rumi script. Indeed, the decline of jawi as an effective medium had already been ensured by the proliferation of rumi newspapers on Java since 1855 and the rise in Western education among élites (see Ahmat b. Adam 1995:16f.). By the 1910s these educated élites became more organized and gravitated to alternate party structures. Rumi newspaper circulations rose in tandem with these parties, and both were symbols of the emerging professional class. Thus in the early 1910s the fledgling jawi media was already on the wane – although jawi itself remained significant in the realm of ‘Islamic’ publishing (Proudfoot 1993:36).

Reformist education may even be seen as playing an unintended role in the decline of jawi as the script of political action. Reformist schools created graduates able to operate in either script and their students could thus move between the colonial and religious educational networks – while Western-educated secularists were only effectively literate in the one script. When the prominent Sudanese reformer Ahmad Soorkatie (see Chapter 8 below) sought to propagate his message in the Indies in the mid-1920s, his journal, Azzachierah al-Islamijjah (The Islamic Treasury, Weltevreden, 1923–24), was naturally published in rumi with Arabic inserted only for source quotations. By 1924, even the Hadrami-oriented Būrūbūdūr was advertising rumi translations of the Tafsīr al-manār. This choice of script, it was claimed, was ‘so that [indigenous] school students might easily gain benefit from it’ [my emphasis]. This gap would later widen to the extent that only the books used by Kaum Tua in the pesantren came to be distinguished by the term kitab kuning (i.e. ‘yellow books’ written in Arabic script) from those used in the
Kaum Muda madrasas which were known as buku putih (‘white books’ with roman script, see van Bruinessen 1990: 227).

After only seven issues, al-Islam, the last jawi newspaper directly associated with Sarekat Islam, foundered in January 1917. Yet there were still calls made for the reaffirmation of jawi as the script of nativeness. In November 1918, the adviser to Sarekat Islam for Meester Cornelis, Hadji Abdoelrachman, made a call in Neratja for the Sarekat Islam Central headquarters to adopt the Arabic script emphasizing its use in neighbouring Malaya as a symbol of commonality. Moreover, he argued that jawi offered a degree of flexibility not found in rumi. As the short vowels are not usually written, the differences between dialectic pronunciation of Malay in Aceh, Minangkabau, or Johor are thus reduced, empowering and creating a wider readership.¹⁷ His calls did not, it seems, gain a result, or even a response.

The gradual abandonment of jawi by the Kaum Muda, particularly in Java, betrays an increasing orientation towards the all-pervasive and shared discourse of roman-script modernity in the Netherlands Indies. A sense of wider Malay or Islamic identity thus weakened as Indies Muslims became doubly separated from their peninsular brothers by both colonial control and script. What now mattered was how to find a path to reconcile Islamic activism within the new frameworks of the rumi press and Dutch colonial state. And when the impact of reformism and nationalism in the Indies are considered the name of one Minangkabau emerges. It is this individual, Hadji Agoes Salim, whom I wish to discuss in Chapter 8 below.
In this chapter I wish to examine aspects of the Indies reform movement with reference to the Association mode of Agoes Salim, the domestic Hadrami movement, and the events occurring in the Middle East. I shall concentrate on the Hajj as a mirror of Kaum Muda aspirations and then the ideology of the caliphate as propounded by Rashīd Riḍā and shattered by Atatürk. Both Hajj and Caliphate, I shall suggest, helped shape the way Indies Muslims assessed their ‘national’ place in a steadily internationalizing Muslim world.

Hadji Agoes Salim: connecting Western civilization with ‘modernist’ reformism

A later leader of Sarekat Islam known for his commitment to pan-Islam and Islamic reform was Hadji Agoes Salim. Salim is also a man embraced by Indonesian state historiography as a nationalist par excellence. His biography is one of numerous hagiographies circulated in Indonesian government schools, he was the eleventh Indonesian to have been declared a ‘Hero for National Independence’ (see Solichin 1963; Schreiner 1997: 288). In many ways his career reflects the very tangled and tangential relationship between the Ethici, reformism, and nationalism in Indonesia.

At his birth in Kota Gedang on 8 October 1884, Agoes Salim was given the name Masjhoedoelhak. Whilst still young, he was called Agoes by a Javanese nanny, a name which the Dutch later styled easily as August. Salim’s family had been connected to the Dutch for some time and his grandfather had been the Chief Judge (Hoofd-djaksa) of Padang, a position occupied in Riau by his father, Soetan Moehamad Salim. Nonetheless his father attracted his family’s criticism when he decided to send his son to the local Dutch school in 1891 (Noer 1973: 8, n. 9). Masjhoedoelhak, now Agoes, proved to be a gifted student. After further study in Riau and Batavia, where he was a schoolmate of Hoesein Djajadiningrat, the young Minangkabau graduated with the highest honours for the three colleges of Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya. At high school he entertained hopes of pursuing a medical degree in Amsterdam as Abdul Rivai. In this respect he gained the warm admiration of
Raden Adjeng Kartini (1879–1904). On 24 July 1903 she wrote to her own patron, Rosa Manuela Abendanon-Mandri, in the hope that sufficient funding be made available to him just as Abdul Rivai had been supported in Holland by former Minister of Colonies J.Th. Cremer (Côté 1992: 439–40). Snouck Hurgronje stepped in, and dissuaded Agoes Salim from such a course, suggesting instead that he consider a career in the Colonial Service.

Salim also attracted the attention of Bintang Hindia’s Clockener Brousson who even devoted a Dutch feature-article to this young prodigy. Here he described Salim as ‘no stick-in-the mud, but a cheerful lad with a lust for life who has the good fortune to be a quick learner’. Clockener Brousson then expressed the hope that more of his like would follow (Bintang Hindia, vol. 1, no. 20, 3 October 1903). In 1904, Salim enjoyed the further honour of being gelijkgesteld, that is, elevated to the official rank of a European. This was apparently done to increase his chances of obtaining a Dutch scholarship (Kahfi 1997: 8). Nonetheless, like so many graduates of the system, Salim found that opportunities were limited for Native graduates. He anticipated gloomy prospects in the Indies where many of his fellow pupils could only hope for employment as clerks (like himself between 1904 and 1906) or at best as ‘native medics’ (Doktor Jawa) untrusted by their white colleagues (Djajadiningrat 1936: 236–37).

Salim’s family was overjoyed to learn in late 1905 of his appointment as the trainee dragoman at the Jeddah consulate; a post he grudgingly accepted at his late mother’s behest (Kahfi 1997: 14). However this appointment had only come after careful consideration. His nomination, first recommended by Snouck Hurgronje after consultation with Abendanon, was initially questioned by the Resident of West Sumatra who worried that in the Hijaz he would come under the influence of his relative Ahmad Khatib. Only after further interviews on the subject of ‘religion’ did Snouck Hurgronje advise that Salim was the best candidate available for the job and that there was no real worry that he would come under the (negative anti-colonial) influence of his ‘uncle’.\(^1\)

Although Salim was worried by the small wage and the impending retirement of his father, he left Singapore in September 1906 bound for Port Said.\(^2\) However, before embarking, he and his father inspected the recently established premises of al-Imam (see al-Imam, vol. 1, no. 3, 19 September 1906). Al-Imam noted that the young Encik Agoes had been given the best possible European education at the personal expense of his father and expressed the hope that he would be able to serve the pilgrims of ‘our side’ in Jeddah. Evidently some of al-Imam’s readers were asking the same questions as Snouck Hurgronje about Salim’s religiosity, although with wishes quite the opposite of those voiced by the colonial service. Haji Muhammad Nur of Tanjungpura even wrote to ask if Salim was a genuine Muslim (al-Imam, vol. 1, no. 5, 17 November 1906). Al-Imam responded that he most certainly was, and that he displayed all the credentials of one. However, it was also
conceded that many young men who received a Western education did indeed find it difficult to maintain a sincere faith. Nonetheless, the staff of al-Imam was convinced that this Encik Agoes had no such trouble and accordingly nominated him as their agent in Jeddah.

The world that Agoes Salim entered in the Hijaz, in 1906, was vastly different to the privilege and station that he had enjoyed in the Indies. For a start, Arabia would have seemed an inversion of the natural order, with barren rock and desert in place of jungle and fields. Here too, the all-encompassing superiority of the Dutch was absent. The Dutch Consul, who was forced to leave his family in Holland or the Indies, remained a virtual prisoner within the walls of the town. Among the collection of Snouck Hurgronje’s folios are photographs of Salim supervising the distribution of food to marooned pilgrims, sitting in a *shuqdhuf* on the road to Mecca and even toying with a telescope in the consular quarter of Jeddah. Another photo shows Salim seated at a table with Consul Scheltema and the aged Aboe Bakar (see fig. 14). This last image provides a poignant comparison between the two servants of Dutch power, between an established (*priyayi*) and a
member of the emerging (bangsawan pikiran) élite – in this case Javanese and Minangkabau.

In Jeddah, however, the brash Salim was to be brought down to earth. Consul Scheltema was less than impressed by his newest staffer, and Agoes soon found that his being legally European made little difference at the post. For if scholars like Snouck Hurgronje fostered an appreciation of the cultures and achievements of their native subjects, the colonial officials who depended on the research of such scholars usually saw them as fit only for clerical duties. To Snouck Hurgronje, Aboe Bakar was an ʿālim, his friend, and guide. To later consuls he was a dragoman who remained their intellectual subaltern despite being a particularly expert intermediary without whom they could not operate.

In Jeddah Agoes Salim could expect no more than that which Aboe Bakar received. Indeed he was caught between worlds, and there is evidence in a later letter of Aboe Bakar that Salim’s attitude also distanced him from his fellow native staffers and the people of the Hijaz. Indeed it was getting very hard to recruit Aboe Bakar’s successor from among the corps of emancipated Indiers.

Who will this appointee dragoman be to learn by suffering how to be a Secretary? Although there are many in Java who have studied languages at the gymnasium, and who can translate the local idiom to a high standard, none of these boys want to go to the Hijaz. Few ever stay the four years Sālim did, who despite the conditions stayed interpreting between foreign languages and Arabic as well as translating into Arabic. He was a very gifted, intelligent and dedicated man, who by the end had complete mastery [of the language]. We regret the prejudice against him, [but] he felt that with his training as a secretary he was on a par with the Dutch rulers. And with the way of politics outside the Consulate it was very hard for him here. Sometimes he did not discern some of the secrets [of the Hijaz]. The situation is better now. This is all part of being a dragoman.4

Over the four years of disappointment in Jeddah, the actions of the ‘undisciplined’ and ‘arrogant’ Salim became legend. Still he could afford to be so. One story, popular at the post during Daniel van der Meulen’s tenure as Consul (1926–31), related how Scheltema was forced to cease criticizing Salim after pressure from Snouck Hurgronje in Leiden (Abdullah 1984: 207). Although protected by Snouck Hurgronje, Salim began to find solace in his regular visits to Mecca. And as the Resident of West Sumatra had once feared, here he met regularly with Ahmad Khaṭīb (Hamka 1984: 253–54). These meetings had a profound effect on him and he later recalled in Bandera Islam (The Banner of Islam, 2 May 1927) that at the time his faith had been:
merely a kind of nationality and not sincere faith. Yet in the five years in Arabia I made the pilgrimage five times, and my attitude to religion expanded each time – from unbelief to doubt and from doubt to a conviction in the existence of God and His religion.

(Cited by Mochtar 1984: 45)

Here, then, is the source of Salim’s apparent volte-face from emancipated Indiëër to committed Muslim. Indeed his encounters with pilgrims from all parts of the Netherlands Indies, which would have built on his early life as the son of a well-travelled official, must have caused him to ponder the nature of his home community. It is in the Hijaz then that his homeward vision would have been founded, to lie ready for his later role as the leader of an organization which claimed to represent all the Muslims of the Netherlands Indies. Moreover, being a Minangkabau with experience in the wider Indies, his vision of an Islamic homeland would have been broad and inclusive. Yet he was connected to two opposing metropoles – Mecca and Batavia – and his later (nationalist) activities symbolize the coming together of the reformist and secular strands of the national movement.

After his transfer back to the Indies in early 1911, Agoes served, unhappily, as a clerk for the Department of Education and then the Office of Public Works in Batavia. He returned to Kota Gedang in 1912 to found and manage a Native Dutch school (Hollandsch–Inlandsch school) for two years before another stint in Batavia, this time as a translator for Balai Poestaka, the publishing arm of KIZ. Here he also commenced working under Abdoel Moeis (1890–1959) for the daily paper Neratja (The Scales), which had been established with Dutch funding as a Malay voice for the Ethici. Clearly he had not yet severed all connections with the Ethici. Indeed in 1915 he attended a meeting of Sarekat Islam employed as a police informant. It was his mission at the time to meet with Tjokroaminoto and to assess the attitude of the mass-movement towards Germany, as any links with that nation would threaten official Dutch neutrality. There was no evidence of such links. Instead both Salim and Tjokroaminoto were impressed with each other. Tjokroaminoto saw in Salim a valuable ally, and Salim saw in the movement potential to advance his own commitment to Islamic reform and revival, although the messianic status accorded to Tjokroaminoto as a Ratu Adil figure needed to be tempered.

At the Sarekat Islam meeting Salim is said to have become a convert to the native cause bringing with him a commitment to ‘modernism’ and ‘pan-Islamism’ (Ricklefs 1993: 173). This meeting was not so much an experience on the road to Damascus, but rather the confluence of several influences on his life that had already embedded him in the reformo-nationalist discourse. His father was at that time building on his earlier connections with al-Imam as a correspondent for al-Munir, having also served as the editor of the Weltevreden-based Boemiputra (Indigene, 1909) (Ahmat b. Adam 1995:
Moreover, as a servant of colonial power connected to the father figure of Snouck Hurgronje, Salim would not have attended the meeting with his mind set against the ideals of reformist or ‘modernist’ Islam. Snouck Hurgronje and his circle had little objection to the reformist ideas propagated in *al-Imam*. We might recall how that journal had initially enjoyed the approval of Said Oesman, the voice of ‘correct’ Islam in the Netherlands Indies, given that he had visited the offices of the paper in 1906. And *al-Imam* would repay the favour, providing positive reviews of two of Oesman’s works critical of the contemporary Şûfî orders ‘whose books had been ordered burnt in Mecca’ (*al-Imam*, vol. 3, no. 3, 29 August 1908).

In 1914, Snouck Hurgronje informed a United States audience of the need to ‘leave it to the Mohammedans themselves to reconcile the new ideas which they want with the old ones with which they cannot dispense’. This was with the proviso that his government could ‘help them in adapting their educational system to modern requirements’. The content of these lectures repeated, to a large degree, ideas already stated in Leiden and published in his *Nederland en de Islâm* (1911). In these lectures he had noted the many adaptations to ‘modern times’ made by the peoples of Turkey, Egypt, and Syria (Snouck Hurgronje 1915: 79). However, by 1915 the Adviser for Native Affairs, Rinkes, would be sent to Cairo in order to assess the precise nature of the movement and its impact on Southeast Asia (Mr. 1915, no. 2226 and 1916, no. 198). I would suggest then that Snouck Hurgronje and his protégés, including Hazeu and Rinkes, were sympathetic to both ‘modernism’ and a moderate form of Dutch–Indies ‘nationalism’ which they believed they could still channel towards association with The Netherlands. In line with this thesis then, the government blessing bestowed by A.W.F. Idenburg in 1912 upon Sarekat Islam (SI), later known as *salah Idenberg* (Idenberg’s mistake) (Pijper 1977: 100), may also be seen as part of a conscious (Ethical) policy. Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 291) had enunciated an early version of this policy in his *Mekka*, claiming how ‘by skilful handling’ Indies Muslims could be ‘won over to support the Government or at least made harmless’. And again, in 1911, he highlighted the imperative to monitor the national movement in order to control it (Snouck Hurgronje 1915: 92). One might well wonder whether Raden Hasan Djajadiningrat, who became a leader of Sarekat Islam in Serang, was not initially sent, like Agoes Salim, to monitor the body.

At first such monitoring seemed successfully accomplished in the hands of KIZ and the nascent police intelligence service (see Poeze: 1994). In 1916, Snouck Hurgronje even declared Sarekat Islam to be ‘indebted to the colonial government’ claiming that it should be thankful to the Netherlands which had indirectly supplied ‘the youth of Indonesië’ with a mechanism to demonstrate their development (VS: IV, ii: 409–10). In this Snouck Hurgronje had seemed correct. After all, at the opening congress of Sarekat Islam, Tjokroaminoto, like Said Oesman, had stressed the movement’s loyalty to the colonial state. Furthermore that some of his own protégés were involved in
guiding the movement must have affirmed his good opinion. As we have seen, these protégés included Raden Hasan Djajadiningrat, and Agoes Salim.

Once he embraced the cause of Sarekat Islam, then under the co-operative Tjokroaminoto, Agoes Salim set about making a political space for himself, and more particularly for reformism in Indonesia, rather than continuing on the Association path set out for him by Snouck Hurgronje and the Ethici. Still, although Salim and his stubborn opinions were not initially popular, and as Sarekat Islam was still a Java-centred organization, Salim’s own nationalist activism was first focussed on his home island of Sumatra, where it harmonized with existing local sentiment. On 17 December 1917 he presided over the foundation of the Jong Sumatranen Bond (The Association of Young Sumatrans) and later that organization’s first congress held at Padang in July 1919. Nonetheless, there was a sense of wider affiliation for these Sumatrans, and some delegates chose to highlight the role of Sumatrans as Easterners (bangsa Timur) in general and Indiërs in particular. This was an argument that Salim had been advocating in Neratja, where he noted that the ‘white’ and ‘Christian’ Dutch no longer seemed interested in educating the Easterners of Hindia, and were starting to exclude them from clubs and even from independent Catholic schools (Roem 1954: 15–18). Schrieke, who attended the Padang congress, nonetheless noted strong antagonisms between Minangkabau, Acehnese, and Tapanuli Sumatran delegates at the 1919 congress, demonstrating that Jawi ambiguity was still alive among the Sumatrans at least. Moreover, the idea of an Indies bangsa still seemed distant. In 1918, a contributor to Jong Sumatra (Young Sumatra, June–August 1918/IPO 1918, 50), described the Javanese as being more Indianized than Islamized and expressed pride in the fact that proportionally far more Sumatrans made the pilgrimage than Javanese.

Despite such tensions, Salim, following the line advanced by Abdullah Ahmad and Tjokroaminoto in al-Islam, continued to advocate the idea of an independent Hindia united primarily by Islam. This time though, the message, largely spread on the many new roman-script presses, had greater resonance. And, in his Weltevreden-based Neratja, Salim became a dogged champion of the rights of the people of ‘Hindia’, often featuring articles on colonial oppression of Muslims in the Outer Islands, or differentiating the national movement and those of the Hadrami Shaykhs and Sayyids (see below; Neratja/IPO 1918, 44–48). It was also at this time that the tenor of the Sarekat Islam meetings began to change. When, at the third National Congress in Surabaya (29 September–6 October 1918), one Dutch attendee suggested that the ‘benevolent Dutch’ enjoyed the favour of their native subjects he was greeted by derisive laughter. Hazeu and Rinkes, who were in attendance, perceived the general shift in the attitude of the movement noting the absence of the declarations of loyalty to the government as expressed at the Bandung conference of 1916 (Hazeu and Rinkes 1919).
This shift was also marked by increasing violence against the Chinese. Late October 1918 saw anti-Chinese riots in Kudus. In the aftermath of that event many Javanese were arrested, and so Salim began to defend the rights of Muslims in light of perceived favouritism shown by the authorities for this largest group of Foreign Orientals. At the same time Tjokroaminoto became more explicit in enunciating indigenous rancour towards the Dutch. On 3 November 1918 he ended a speech to the Cirebon branch of the Sarekat Islam with the observation that the paragon of Javanese Islamic history, Sultan Agung, had ‘never built a factory nor levied taxes in another man’s land’ (Kaoem Moeda, 9 November 1918, No. 204/IPO 1918, 44).

Of course I do not wish to hold to the blinkered view that Islam as an expression of race was the only glue holding these natives in opposition to the Dutch and their Chinese clients at the end of 1918. Delegates to many Sarekat Islam meetings were now in general agreement that Government-sponsored capitalism was the enemy of ‘natives’ as a class, particularly in light of the spectre of a looming famine on Java. It soon became clear that many of the various Sarekat Islam branches were heavily stacked in favour of their ‘red’ card-holders (see Shiraishi 1990: 216f.). Hence, what would serve to keep Agoes Salim in governmental favour – at least initially – was his opposition to the leftist wing of the movement under Raden Darsono and Semaoen (1899–1971). Certainly Darsono believed Salim still to be in the Dutch camp, and remained convinced that Neratja was a government organ (see Soeara Ra’jat, 6 December 1918, No. 39/IPO 1918, 50).

Darsono may have been right about the origins of Neratja, but Agoes Salim became increasingly outspoken in his editorials and, in one long series entitled ‘Hindia and Nederland’, he critiqued the old Ethici ideals of Snouck Hurgronje (see especially Neratja, 23 April 1919, No. 80/IPO 1919, 17). Herein he pointed out that Snouck Hurgronje had announced that the Indies people could not remain ruled by others for ever. The Ethici had misinterpreted his ideas over time, and whereas Snouck Hurgronje and his followers, such as Rinkes and Hazeu, had argued for the raising of the Indies people from above by Association, it was now time for them to do something for themselves from below. Snouck Hurgronje, argued Salim, was a highly-educated Netherlander whose great love for his people and homeland had seen him work for the benefit of his country and a friendly relationship between colonizers and colonized. Unfortunately the Ethici still saw the people of the Indies as children, unready for true independence or democracy. The salient features of the relationship now remained the racism of the colonizers and the nationalism of the colonized.

The scene was slowly building for conflict. And when, after a firefight in June 1919 in the vicinity of Cimareme, Garut, the Dutch authorities uncovered a revolutionary Sarekat Islam cell – the ‘Afdeeling-B’ established by Sosrokardono of the Centraal Sarekat Islam in 1917 – Agoes Salim instituted a political hijra. Thereafter the movement lost much of the
remaining momentum that had been developed under Tjokroaminoto and became focussed less on political agitation than one which championed the rights of Muslims and the role of Islam in the (future and independent) state. Indeed it was largely due to Salim’s insistence that the communists were expelled by Party Discipline forcing all members – with the temporary exception of Moehammadijah members – to renounce their affiliation with other organizations. Thereafter the once invincible Sarekat Islam would lose its membership and radicalism to an ascendant Left.

In these circumstances Salim remained true to his Ethici past. He continued to correspond with Snouck Hurgronje, and in 1925 the Jong Islamieten Bond (for which Salim was adviser) used Snouck Hurgronje’s published work (and that of his student Th.W. Juynboll) to push their own reformist agenda (Steenbrink 1993: 137). Nonetheless, it is apparent from the transcript of a speech to the Jong Islamieten Bond, on the subject of the veil, that a gap had widened between Salim and his former patron even on questions of religion although he continued to have a deep respect for the latter.⁶

If the radical methodology of the Left was not to Salim’s liking, nor that of the Christian Colonial government, there can be no denying his nationalist credentials and vision of an independent Indies that was increasingly shared by the indigenous Muslims of the Indies. That vision was given impetus from events in the Middle East that impacted upon both the Jawa and all Muslims. These were the deteriorating situation in the Hijaz; the final collapse of the fictive Ottoman Caliphate in March 1924; and the Sa‘üdī occupation of Mecca that October. But, in order to understand the impact of these events on the formation of an Indies identity, it is necessary to consider another national movement in the Indies which was to play a role in how these disputes were viewed.

**A foreign movement within the bilād al-jāwa: the Hadrami awakening (nahḍa) and its impact on Indies identity**

You are the best umma that has sprung forth for mankind, enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong.  
(see Qur’ān 3: 110)

By the 1920s, Jawi Muslims were increasingly accepting that ethnic differences underpinned their relations with each other and needed to be defined in a new set of nationalities. As Mandal (1994) and Mobini-Kesheh (1999) have shown independently, Indies Hadramis had shifted from focussing upon the issue of the Caliphate in the 1890s and had become activated in the 1910s for the cause of their own idealized wātān – Hadramaut – and its nahda or ‘awakening’.

This nahda was one of the few areas where all Hadrami activists found common ground as, during the 1900s and 1910s, they had become, like their Jawi coreligionists, divided among traditionalists (the ‘Alawiyyūn Sāda
and reformists (the Irshādiyyūn, hereafter Irshādis). The latter faction was founded by the Sudanese ‘ālim Ahmad Soorkatie (Aḥmad Surkittī al-Anšārī, 1872–1943). At the age of twenty-four, Soorkatie went to the Hijaz and studied in Medina (1896–1900) and Mecca (1900–08). In Mecca he had been a student of Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn bin Yūṣuf Khayyāṭ who had lived in Malaya and visited Sumatra. In the Hijaz, Soorkatie is said to have read old copies of al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā, corresponded with Riḍā, and subscribed to al-Manār (Bluhm-Warn 1997: 303). And, in 1908, having obtained what was the highest diploma awarded within the Ottoman lands (the ‘ālimīya degree), Soorkatie commenced teaching in Mecca. His fame soon spread, and in 1911 he was recruited by the Shāfī‘ī Muftī of the Haram, Ḥusayn bin Muḥammad al-Ḫibshī (d.1912), and sent to Batavia to teach at the school founded by the Jam‘īyat Khayr. This body (more correctly: Jam‘īyat al-Khayr, the Association for Welfare) was the modernist-oriented organization of the Arab community of Batavia. It had been founded around 1901 in response to the offer of scholarships made by the then Ottoman consul Kāmil Bey. It soon had affiliated branches in other major cities in Java, such as Surabaya, and was registered officially with the colonial government in 1905. According to some Arab observers, the Jam‘īyat Khayr was inspired by the activities of Muṣṭafā Kāmīl’s party in Egypt and, later, the Ottoman Committee for Union and Progress (Freitag, forthcoming: 185). It was also within this organization on Java that Soorkatie formed alliances with other like-minded reformers, including Achmad Dachlan, whom he first noticed sitting on a train reading al-Manār (Noer 1973: 76, n. 132; Bluhm-Warn 1997: 306).

In September 1914, Soorkatie broke from the Jam‘īyat al-Khayr after their rejection of his criticism of the customary kissing (taqbiḥ) of the Sayyids’ hands and, more especially, for suggesting that a non-Sayyid – in this case an Indian – could marry a Muslim woman of noble birth (sharīfa). In the latter case he offended the ever hallowed issue of ‘suitability’ (kafā‘a) which had already been debated heatedly in the pages of al-Manār from 1905 (see Bluhm 1983: 37; Ho 1997: 3–7). And while such Hadrami luminaries as the ancient Ṣaid Oesman could support his attack on taqbiḥ, neither he nor some of his modernist rivals among the ‘Alawiyyūn (such as Muḥammad bin Aqīl) could stomach an attack on their pre-eminence as descendants of the Prophet (Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 93ff.).

Despite his parting from the Jam‘īyat al-Khayr, Soorkatie remained in the Indies, apparently on the urging of several like-minded activists. These included Ṭjokroaminoto, Achmad Dachlan, Agoes Salim and the wealthy – but lowly born – Ḥadrami ‘Umar Manqūṣ. In 1915, he founded his own Arabic reformist school (The Madrasat al-Irshād al-Islāmīya) which acted as a catalyst for the creation of a movement for reformist Hadramis. This movement, the Jam‘īyat al-Īslāh wa al-Irshād al-‘Arabīya (The Arab Association for Reform and Guidance), was established with government approval. While
al-Irshād (Mal. al-Irsjad) was open to all Muslims, with the proviso that Sayyids could not sit on the executive, its aims were primarily the propagation of Arabic and Arab norms among locally born Arabs (al-muwalladūn) first and their Jawi coreligionists second. And despite their own disputes over the leadership of the expatriate Hadramis, both ‘Alawīs and Irshādīs became committed to an identity fixed upon their distant waṭan (Mobini-Kesheh 1999).

As in Mecca there appears to have been a contest between Arabs and Jawa as to their Islamic credentials, and many of the societies formed within both the Arab and Jawi movements laid claim to Islam as their identity. And, while emphasizing the confraternity of Islam, other ethnic groupings could be attacked as being lesser, or imperfect Muslims. With this rationale Javanese would attack Arabs as loan sharks, while Arabs could depict Jawa as only nominal believers. Still the trend towards the ethnic diversification of Muslim organizations attracted criticism. In 1918 S.S. Gito would lament this foregrounding of nationality, making it possible to have such entities as ‘Arab Muslims’, ‘Javanese Muslims’ and even ‘Dutch Muslims’. ‘This’, he said, ‘could not be, as Islam knows no difference in nationality’ (Oetoesan Islam, 16 December 1918/IPO 1918, 52). But so it was, and in Neratja (3 February 1919), Agoes Salim would criticize the patronizing attitude of Indies Arabs and invoke the Qur’ānic verse: ‘Indeed all believers are brothers!’ (Qur’ān 49: 10). In order therefore to understand what made Salim emphasize the absolute confraternity of Islam and condemn Arab patronism, I shall discuss a small sample of the Indies–Hadrami press.

The very first journal of the Hadrami awakening was al-Bashīr (The Harbinger), initially published in Palembang. It was later brought to Batavia by the Jam‘īyat al-Khayr, together with its editors, Sayyid Muhammad bin Hashim (1882–1960) and Abd al-Khaliq bin Muhammad Sa‘īd, in order to be associated with Soorkatie’s school in Pekojan. This bilingual periodical addressed itself to two audiences, with separate issues debated in its Arabic and (primarily roman-script) Malay pages (cf. Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 40–41). Even its respective subtitles declared two different messages. In Malay al-Bashīr was ‘the organ of the Muslim people and other peoples’ (orgaan kaoem Moe slimin dan lain-lain bangsa) while in Arabic it was ‘a magazine serving Arabs, Arabic and the [religious] community’ (majalla takhdum al-‘arab wa al-‘arbīya wa al-milla). Indeed the Arabic pages were largely taken up with news of the Arab world and Hadramaut in particular. After all, as al-Bashīr declared in a feature article on waṭanīya in April 1915 (vol. 2, no. 22), ‘we are Hadramis first and foremost’ (nahnu hadramiyyīn qabla kulli shay’). Hadramis – men and women – were therefore urged to work for the reform (iṣlāḥ) of their distant waṭan and people, thus becoming separated from the mainstream Indies movement on Java led by Sarekat Islam.

Further, in 1915 the cause of the Hadrami people was identified with that of Turkey, now allied with Germany. For this reason al-Bashīr, publishing in
technically neutral Dutch territory, felt free to extol the virtues of a power that promised to liberate the Muslim colonies of its enemy, Great Britain (\textit{al-Bashîr}, vol. 2, no. 19, 29 January 1915). In its (roman-script) Malay pages \textit{al-Bashîr} announced the foundation of the Red Crescent to aid the Turkish government, with expressions of loyalty to the Ottoman caliph. ‘Come on Sarekat Islam!’ it called, ‘Where are those thousands of dollars? Use them now to help the head of the Islamic faith!’ Such prospecting for Constantinople was soon tempered after the editors were advised officially to tone down their rhetoric, ostensibly for fear of bringing neutral Holland into the war (\textit{al-Bashîr}, vol. 2, no. 22, April 1915).

Neither were \textit{al-Bashîr}’s Malay pages as patriotically charged as the Arabic sections. These were written by editors who felt that they had less of a role to play in the Indies movement other than as its leaders – a role from which they were increasingly being excluded. In 1915, Sarekat Islam went so far as to bar Arabs from its executive, having outgrown the need for Arab financial backing and being well aware of the Arabs affection for their own homeland as well as their leadership pretensions. Here we may recall the attitude of Muhammad bin Aqil of \textit{al-Imam} in regard to his vision of an Arab leadership for Southeast Asian Islam.

While the Hadramis continued to cultivate an affection for their foreign shores, they continued to exude claims to Islamic superiority. Once again, the very patronizing tone adopted by \textit{al-Bashîr} was made explicit in the brief \textit{jawi} section in January 1915 (vol. 2, no. 18). Here the writer dwelt on the perfection of Islam in former times when all once understood the true message of Islam. By comparison the Muslims of the day were Muslims in name alone. ‘How can we understand [Islam]?’ he asked his Jawi audience, ‘if we don’t even know the language of the Qur’ân? Because of this, it is incumbent upon us Muslims, both men and women, and especially on us Eastern people, to study and understand Arabic so that we can become true Muslims and people of sincere faith.’ Here the writer echoes the sentiments of Rashîd Ridâ, who had been shocked by the lack of proficiency in Arabic among the Jawa he encountered in Cairo (\textit{al-Munir}, vol. 1, no. 2, 15 April 1911).

Like the very active Chinese nationalists in Indonesia, the Hadramis propagated affection for a homeland outside the Indies. Nevertheless, the Irshâdî movement remained intimately linked to Moehammadijah. Its patron and doyen, Ahmad Soorkatie, acted as Dachlan’s mentor in matters of reform. In the years to come, many Irshâdî graduates would serve as teachers in Moehammadijah schools, much as graduates of Rashîd Ridâ’s circle would be recruited for al-Irshâd (Mobini-Kesheh 1997: 240). Both Moehammadijah and al-Irshâd, moreover, enjoyed good relations with the representatives of the Office for Native Affairs. The overall mood of the Ethici was initially positive towards the place of so-called Foreign Orientals as model Muslims – provided that they stuck to religion and left politics alone (de Jonge 1997: 104;
Mobini-Kesheh 1997: 237). They would no doubt have approved of the sentiment voiced by al-Irshād, when it was claimed that Muslims in the Indies had far more to gain by studying Islam at home than trekking off to the ‘universities’ of Baghdad or Damascus (see Brochure ‘Djamaijah al-Irsjad’, IPO 1919, 11). When the leadership of al-Irshād changed in 1921 to the more radical, and internationalist, muwalladūn there was also a corresponding shift in attitude to the colonial government.

As we have seen, by maintaining the sanctity of kafā’a, the ‘Alawiyūn Sayyids in particular stressed their Arab superiority before the Jawa. Yet even in the more egalitarian Irshādī schools there was a degree of Arab-paternalism to be found. Armed with hadīth, and an Arab-centric reading of the Qurʾān, al-Irshād (23 September 1920) referred to the Arabs as ‘the best umma to bring forth a people to enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong’ (Qurʾān 3:110). It then declared to its readers that ‘the Javanese admitted to your schools have placed great hopes in you’ (al-Irshād, 5 May 1921). Nonetheless, al-Irshād also presented an explicit enunciation of patriotism geared towards the awakening of the Javanese nation (al-umma al-jawīya). On 13 January 1921, a young student at the al-Irshād school in Batavia, Muhammad Yunus Anis (M. Junus Anies) – who would study in Cairo and later lead Moehammadijah (1959–68) – referred specifically to his umma. As in most reformist writing, Anis, writing here in Arabic, presented the Islamization of the Archipelago as a golden age.

The island of Java was once afflicted by troubles and turmoil. Within it were spread religions of which man has no need. However there was no denying it right guidance and true reform and the great system of advancement. Fortunately, in order to provide this guidance, the Islamic religion came, spread among its peoples (umam) and became established here. Its centres grew powerful and its settlement grew strong. The people learned that it was the true religion and every sound mind accepted it. It is the religion of reform which calls [all] to the felicity of this world and the afterlife. They entered it in droves and it spread until it became the faith of the masses. The East Indian Isles [jazāʾir al-hind al-sharqīya] became [thus] enlightened by the Islamic religion. However, sectarians and selfish men did not want to let their people live while they enjoyed a luxurious existence. So they brought upon [the people] every trial and tribulation and infected Islam with the superstitions which are the cause of the backwardness of the Muslims in general and the Javanese [al-jawiyīn] in particular.

(al-Irshād, 13 January 1921)

As with the letters of Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, the problem of translating the term al-jawiyīn presents itself (see Laffan 1999a: 529–30). Like
Aboe Bakar’s *Tarājim*, Anis’ narrative was focussed on the Javanese, rather than the Jawa in total. Thus he addressed his call to ‘all of the ‘*ulamā’* in general and those called by the (Javanese) title of *kiai-kiai* in particular’. According to Anis, the Javanese *umma* had become ‘the play-thing of the Antichrist (*Dajjāl*) occupiers . . . their spirits are dead, their minds frozen and their thoughts quiescent.’ He therefore asked:

> Is there not anyone to raise [the Javanese nation] from its lethargy? Is there no doctor to treat its illness and dress its wounds? Is there no ‘*ālim* to direct it upon the straight path of religion or guide it truly and cleanse its thoughts of superstition and idolatry? When will it rise from its sleep? [When will it] become aware of its forgetfulness and shake off its indolence? When will it race upon the road of industry for life and advancement? Will this nation be blessed with a vessel to navigate these seas of ignorance and superstition? Where are its wise ‘*ulamā’*? Where are its medical leaders?

For Anis the truth was that:

> The Javanese nation suffers no lack of ‘*ulamā’*, wise men or doctors. However most of them work for their own benefit and don’t want to spread their learning nor unfurl the truths of their religion among the sons of their race (*abnā* *jinsihim*) nor expend their time for the life of their nation (*ummatihim*). They avert their eyes and leave the ignorant and negligent in the prison of superstition . . .

> It is necessary for us, that is the illustrious nation (*umma*), to awaken from this terrible lassitude and strive, work, toil and expend every effort to attain the truths of our Islamic religion in the rush to achieve what God Almighty commanded . . . so that we might celebrate our future and win the victory of our forebears, living as they once lived.

In the cases of Jawi identity in Mecca (and Cairo), ethnic particularities were clearly enunciated in the presence of a Muslim Other. Muhammad Yunus Anis’ article also falls into this category. Although addressed to the (Arabic literate) *kiai* of Java it is embedded in a Hadrami-focussed discourse that also placed the Jawa, whether Javanese or Malay, as Others. In this sense Muhammad Yunus Anis’ article falls more in the tradition of Jawi activity abroad rather than local Javanese reformism. He was, by his language and sentiment, writing from the Hadrami *umma* down to the Jawi *umma*. His, too, is the homeward vision. By contrast, when Agoes Salim, writing in his Indies-wide *Neratja*, reacted to local Arab claims of moral superiority, he stood in *his* home world claiming Islam as the equal property of his own Indies *bangsa*, not just a Javanese *umma*. What that *bangsa* needed then in
order to become an Indies umma was a perception of difference grounded against other Muslim ummas.

Life in the Hijaz under Sharif Husayn and the pilgrimage as a mirror of Indies’ aspirations

The Ḥajj remained a primary mechanism engendering consciousness of both the Umma and other Muslim ummas. In what follows I shall address the concerns of the Jawa in the Hijaz and, more specifically, how the Ḥajj, while under Ḥusayn’s administration, became for many Kaum Muda a specifically Indies concern. Indeed, during the turbulent reign of Sharif Ḥusayn as Amīr of Mecca (1908–24), some Jawi activists began to write more insistently of a specifically ‘Indies’ Islamic community set in opposition to an Arab one. And, more so, one that was set in terms of an opposition between Kaum Muda Jawa and Kaum Tua Arabs, although this obscured the fact that there were Arabs active on both sides of the debate.

After the unlamented death of ‘Awn al-Rafīq in 1905, and the banishment to Egypt of his successor ‘Alī, ‘Awn’s exiled nephew, Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī returned from Constantinople in December 1908 to take his place as Sharif of Mecca. These were heady days in Constantinople as Sultan Abdülhamid struggled to maintain his authority in the face of the new revolutionary government of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which had seized power in a coup in July (Ahmad 1978: 284–86). Abdülhamid remained briefly a symbol of the unity of the Ottoman state for the conservative opposition, including Sharif Ḥusayn, who was strongly committed to the old Ottoman vision of an empire united primarily by religion. Husayn’s appointment by Abdülhamid was resented by the Young Turk leadership, which knew both of his opposition to their reformist and centralizing policies (Dawn 1973: 1–54). Still, despite his opposition to the Young Turks and strong personal ambitions for the Arabian peninsula (Teitelbaum 1998), Husayn set about reasserting Ottoman control of the Hijaz in the name of his Sultan.

In 1903, Dja Endar Moeda had noted how, once in Jeddah, the aspirant hadji faced the hundreds of touts who competed for pilgrims like ‘tigers on the prowl’ (Bintang Hindia, vol. 1, no. 21, 17 October 1903). In 1908 the CUP promulgated new laws concerning the conduct of the Ḥajj and the licensing of the guides. These were intended to protect the pilgrims, but Husayn’s allegiance to the old order and vested interests with the Bedouin ensured that they were not effectuated (Anon 1910: 1639). Matters continued thus into the 1910s. At the Dutch consulate, Aboe Bakar remained concerned by the rising prices and the increasing rapacity of ‘the Hijazi tyrants’ and ‘big shots’ who seemed ‘to hate the [new Ottoman] law as a matter of principle’. When the Great War stopped any Jawi pilgrims reaching the Hijaz in 1915, the needs of the two-hundred guides became dire. Matters were made more precarious when Sharif Ḥusayn threw in his lot with Great Britain and withdrew the
Hijaz from the Ottoman Empire in 1916. In so doing Husayn lost the last of the dwindling Ottoman subsidies. More than ever the Sharif depended on the constant flow of pilgrims who would find heavier and heavier taxes levied upon them in Jeddah before having to face the dangerous roads to Mecca and Medina. In early 1919, Husayn had a telegram sent to Bombay advising all the peoples of India that his government would expend every effort in the protection of pilgrims (see Utusan Melayu, 31 March 1919, No. 2266/IPO 1919, 14). Still, this was a promise to defend them from the Bedouin, and not their own guides. And when a substantial body of Indies pilgrims made their return to Arabia in 1920 (after a trickle in 1918–19), the tigers were particularly ravenous.

Such issues, which affected the Jawa at large, were of major interest in Kaum Muda journals of the Indies. Al-Imam (vol. 3, no. 6, 25 November 1908), for example, had once bemoaned the oppression of pilgrims by both the authorities in the Hijaz and the European shipping companies, claiming that such practices were unthinkable in ‘this age of civilization’ (masa tamadun ini). By the 1920s, issues relating to the Hajj were regularly taken up in the correspondence pages of Bintang Islam, a Malay organ of Sarekat Islam published by a team including two leaders of Moehammadijah, Fachroeddin (1890–1929) and Mohtar Boechari (d.1926). In its first issue (vol. 1, no. 1, 10 January 1923), Hatief (a pseudonym for ‘a voice from afar’) made the startling claim that many Indies Muslims made the pilgrimage in the ‘erroneous belief’ that it was a religious obligation.

Hatief claimed that ‘for Muslims who understand the religious law of our true Islamic faith’ the Muslims of Hindia had been ‘released from any duty to perform the Hajj due to the existence of a number of impediments which invalidate that duty.’ Hatief moreover claimed that this was not merely his opinion, but that of a dozen (unnamed) ‘ulamâ’ in Java and Mecca as, according to fiqh, the way to the Haram must be safe from such threats as disease, harassment, treachery, and wasted expense. Therefore, given the political climate of the Hijaz, there was no question of going to Mecca. ‘Yet why do we go, impoverished, in our thousands?’ he asked, ‘[given that] our religion [here] is afflicted by decline and poverty’. Hatief therefore urged Muslims to spend their money to found schools and assembly halls and care for their own brothers and sisters.

Such means as these have become our duty as Muslims of a given country (negeri), especially this homeland (negeri woetah darah) of ours. The movement for our nation and people (bangsa dan kaoem) which has now been active for some years, is yet to bear fruit commensurate with its gestation.

For Hatief, and others of Sarekat Islam, the achievement of national sovereignty now ranked as a duty of their Islam and the acceptance of
patriotism was ensconced as an aspect of belief. Another writer, S. Dirdjo, having made the usual call for the establishment of Islamic schools throughout Hindia, dwelt on the importance of politics for raising the patriotic consciousness. Similarly ‘Troeno’, in his exposition on ‘true progress’, noted that although some Muslims felt that progress was ‘socialism’, ‘internationalism’ or ‘nationalism’, Islam was the key to national progress. He then listed a number of criteria, based on the Qur’an, hadith, and ‘general agreement’, that ‘love of the homeland is an article of faith’ (Bintang Islam, vol. 1, no. 3, 10 February 1923).

The Hajj was seen by these patriotic reformists as a mechanism weakening the capacity of Indies Muslims to undertake the more important task of reform in their own lands. They therefore attacked the general depravity of life in the Hijaz (and by implication attacked the Arabs). For example ‘S’, who described his five-month stay in Mecca, claimed that he always made a point of preventing a single cent of his own falling into the coffers of a ‘king’ who had not aided Muslim unity but hastened its disintegration by breaking away from the Ottoman Caliphate (Bintang Islam, vol. 1, no. 3, 10 February 1923). Here a litany of woe was recited – from emerging from the quarantine ‘prison’ on Qamaran island, to landing at Jeddah with belongings smashed on the quay and personal food being withheld by greedy officials. In his account, the Jawa were humiliated by local Arabs, harassed constantly by cheats and patronized by officials. It was only in the Haram itself that they gained any solace, for their accommodation in the Holy City was ‘only fit for ducks’, with men and women crammed together in tiny rooms.

Themes of hardship in Mecca were also taken up by Jawi correspondents in Jeddah who wrote describing the increasingly tense atmosphere and relayed stories of atrocities committed by the Bedouin. These were seldom reined in by Husayn who, it was alleged, had even fined one caravan in 1921 for using the safer coastal route which circumvented his protection racket (Bintang Islam, vol. 1, no. 17, 10 September 1923)! One writer even urged that the Dutch government – through its consular staff in Jeddah and Mecca – should take a firmer attitude with the king of the Hijaz.

Yet perhaps the most heartfelt complaint was that voiced by a pilgrim who had sailed in March 1923. Having arrived in Jeddah and after being told that ‘non-Arabs’ were forbidden ‘by law’ independently to contract transport or accommodation, ‘Moehammad’ was shocked on disembarking to see the stripped corpse of a fellow Jawi lying in the streets (Bintang Islam, vol. 1, no. 20, 25 September 1923). This article – entitled ‘Terrifying news’ – engendered an immediate reaction and ‘W.S.G.’ summed up the opinion of many correspondents when he enlarged on an alleged Arab plot claiming that some consular staff had even been murdered when they uncovered it!

How many millions of goods, and how many thousands of souls have been surrendered in the Arab land by our Javanese people? How
Figure 15 The ‘professor’ of Mecca, Shaykh ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī (Or. 12.288 CSM I.18)
safe have these Arab lands been up until now – let alone how many millions have gone to the steamship companies? This is the question for our people at large... Truly it is we Javanese who advance the religion of Islam, whereas Arabs see in us fattened cows ready for the slaughter. Thousands are taken by the guides to follow their religion and enjoy the blessings of the Holy Land which the guides dare not partake of as they are too weak, or too unwilling, to aid those who have been plundered or murdered in the Holy Land by these tigers.’

(Bintang Islam, vol. 1, no. 21, 10 November 1923)

Having described the extraordinary prices in the Hijaz – made extortionate when Husayn introduced his own currency – ‘M.B.H.’ now alleged that many people hoped for the restoration of Turkish rule (Bintang Islam, vol. 1, no. 11, 10 June 1923). Husayn himself was painted as a pawn of the British subject to the advice of three British crypto-Muslims staying with his son ‘Abd Allāh. ‘M.B.H.’ claimed that the English had encouraged Husayn’s pretensions to the Caliphate, which was an issue that would occupy many Kaum Muda when critiquing the newly declared King of the Hijaz.

The intensity of these attacks in the Kaum Muda press obscures the fact that relations between Husayn and the reformists had not always been so acrimonious. After his visit to the Hijaz in 1916, Rashīd Riḍā had been impressed by the latter, even accepting a gratuity from him (Kramer 1986: 81). And when Moehammadijah first engaged in welfare activities for the pilgrims in 1921 (now King) Husayn made no move to hinder their actions, although he did not suffer any interference with his established networks controlling the guides. The origins of this cooperation may lie in the presence in the Hijaz of ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī (see fig. 15), whose return from exile in 1908 had ironically been secured by Husayn’s appointment. Zawāwī then claimed the position held so long before by Aḥmad bin Zaynī Dahālīn, and settled his family, including relatives from Pontianak, in al-Ta’īf.10

From this time too, and perhaps under Zawāwī’s influence – for he continued supporting al-Munīr with letters and articles – there had been the stirrings of modernist educational reform in the Hijaz that would have been attractive to some Kaum Muda. Indeed Zawāwī was a patron within the Haram to Jawi ‘ulamā like Muḥammad Nūr Faṭānī, who had allegedly studied at al-Azhar under Muḥammad ‘Abduh (‘Abd al-Jabbār 1982: 279–80). Similarly, some Egyptian-trained teachers were attracted to the Hijaz, and sought to capitalize on an opening educational market. This was in keeping with the strategies of the CUP, which sought to realize in the Hijaz the reforms made elsewhere in the Empire since the 1870s (Davis 1998). And, although many schools were opened, state education did not go beyond the secondary level. Thus, in 1909, Aboe Bakar reported that local conservatism had halted the establishment of any ‘colleges’ in the Hijaz.12

But, despite Husayn’s conservatism and earlier resistance to CUP
programmes, many private institutes continued to prosper in the Hijaz. These included Raḥmat Allāh’s famous Ṣawlatīya madrasa which, in 1912, continued to enjoy the support of the Jawa, with on average 30 per cent of its five hundred students coming from Southeast Asia (Azra 1999a: 155). Another popular institution was the Madrasat al-Falāḥ, established in Jeddah in 1903 by Muḥammad ʿAlī bin ʿAlī Riḍā (Mohammad Alireza, d. 1948). Alireza was an aspirant Azharite whose family had active business interests in Bombay and Calcutta and who, by a quirk of fate, rented his Jeddah property to the Dutch consulate (Field 1985: 13–24). Modern schools like the Madrasat al-Falāḥ remained a magnet for Jawi students. And while these institutions often had the financial backing of Indian merchants and were staffed by Egyptians or Egyptian-trained teachers, they did not necessarily maintain any direct connections with Rashīd Riḍā or even al-Manār.13 Rather, their modern appeal took the form of Western-style classrooms and curricula. For example, Abdulhalim of Majalengka (1887–1962), who studied in Mecca between 1909 and 1911, and who was critical of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, found inspiration in two new institutes, one in Jeddah and the other in Mecca, which sported chairs and desks (Noer 1973: 69).

Under ʿHuṣayn then, chairs and desks were not controversial. After his 1916 revolt, he even set up a training academy for his own forces similarly staffed by Egyptians and backed by money from India.14 But, in an echo of the initiatives of Muḥammad ʿAlī in Egypt, the modernity of its curriculum was to extend only to the useful arts of warfare. So it was that Ameen Rihani, who visited the Hijaz in 1922, noted that:

Ḥuṣayn opened a military college but not one public school to teach new sciences and sound knowledge . . . [he] could not tolerate at all such aspects of knowledge ‘as would confuse the mind and corrupt the heart’.

(quoted by Hajjar 1991: 286)

Thus, despite the appearance of Western-style classrooms and regimentation in the Hijaz, ‘modernist’ books were viewed with suspicion under ʿHuṣayn. Moreover, his revolt appears to have caused him to break, temporarily, with Zawāwī (Hogarth 1917: 59).15 A later attempt by Moehammadijah to found a school in Mecca similarly floundered when it was shut down by ʿHuṣayn – most likely as a reaction to Kaum Muda rejections of his legitimacy. Ḥuṣayn also put pressure on reformist dissenters in general, banning the works of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya which were now favoured by their propagandists Rashīd Riḍā in Cairo and Hadji Rasoe in Sumatra (see Riḍā 1923: 75; Hamka 1958: 75). In Mecca, moreover, established Kaum Tua, like K.H. Nahrawi, Kyai Ḥasjim of Jombang, and the ancient ʿAbd al-Shakūr Sūrabāya, were less than enthusiastic about Moehammadijah and its attempts to make its presence felt in the Hijaz. We may recall that a group of Meccan
Kaum Tua had drafted a *fatwâ* in 1916 condemning Hadji Rasoel and his followers as apostates. In their turn the Kaum Muda alleged that their schools had been closed by ‘Arabs’ because Ḵūṣayn disapproved of such worldly subjects as agriculture and geography. ‘Arabs’, ‘S’ mused, ‘do not like such things’ and added that it seemed that ‘the progress of Islam in the lands of the Arabs is different from that in Java or Egypt’ (*Bintang Islam*, vol. 1, no. 7, 10 April 1923).

Mounting criticism from some Jawa evidently galvanized Ḵūṣayn. In late September 1923, he convened a meeting with all the Javanese, Malays, Palembangese, and Minangkabau of Mecca. There he warned them not to emulate the Kaum Muda of Egypt and likewise hoped that his warning would be relayed to their countrymen at home (*Bintang Islam*, vol. 1, no. 22, 25 November 1923). Mahmud Yunus (1899–1982) claimed that at this meeting the Minangkabau in particular were called to account for their alleged sympathy for the Wahhâbîya and the teachings of Muhammad ‘Abduh (Hadler 1998: 130, n. 19). Most likely a concerned traditionalist had spoken with Ḵūṣayn in an effort to unseat his Kaum Muda opponents and, as a result of the meeting, the Meccan Jawi community split sharply along factional lines. Moreover, in a later letter from Mecca (dated 15 July 1924), M. Djoenaid (alias A. Saleh) wrote of rumours that Ḵūṣayn had finally forced Moehammadijah members underground.

Under Ḵūṣayn then Mecca remained a Kaum Tua enclave. The Sharîf continued to receive support from Kaum Tua both there and in the Indies where their constituencies lay. The Dutch were well aware of these sentiments. In 1921, Consul Gobée recommended to his superiors that the Jeddah post maintain close scrutiny in order to vitiate against any Sharifan ‘propaganda’. The Kaum Tua monopoly of Mecca remained intact and, for the moment, unassailable by Kaum Muda claims to the leadership of Jawi Islam. For example, when one Moehammadijah emissary described a failed meeting with the Kaum Tua head of the Javanese community in Mecca, K.H. Nahrawi Purbolinggo, on 21 April 1922, he preferred to claim that the Kaum Tua Jawa of Mecca seemed cut off from developments in Java. However this sense of isolation was more truly felt by the Kaum Muda in Mecca and is confirmed by a Hadji Anwar, who wrote from the Hijaz to *Bintang Islam* (vol. 1, no. 12, 25 June 1923). In his letter, written in Arabic, Anwar asked regarding the general opinion about the pledge of allegiance (*bay’ā*) to the Ottoman ‘Caliph’ Abdîlmecid Khan (r. 1922–24) for ‘we have lived so long here now that we do not know what our fellow countrymen in Hindia think’. It seems that the heart of Jawi Islam was now cut adrift.

With the revival in Najd of the Saʿūdî dynasty, Ḵūṣayn could continue to rely on support from the Kaum Tua anxious about a return of the Wahhâbîya. Ḵūṣayn was also keen to augment his prestige through the visits of Kaum Tua dignitaries. In July 1924, the Indies–Hadrami journal *Būrūbūdūr* devoted great attention to the visit to Mecca of ‘Alî bin ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Ḥībshî, an
'Alawī Sayyid of great prestige. It was alleged that Ḥusayn had read this as a quasi-official attempt by the government of the Netherlands Indies to recognize his claim to the Caliphate, declared on 5 March after Atatürk’s extinction of the office on 3 March. It was also claimed that should al-Ḥibshī declare his loyalty to Ḥusayn, most Jawa would follow (Būrubūdūr, 5 July 1924). Regardless of the kudos of al-Ḥibshī, the Dutch Consul reported that telegrams of recognition were sent from Kaum Tua in Java (Schmidt 1992: 51, n. 5). And when the Regent of Bandung, R.A.A. Wiranatakoesoema (b.1888), became the first salaried Native official to be allowed to perform the pilgrimage in 1924 (see Wiranatakoesoema 1925), Ḥusayn seized on the potential of his visit, and awarded him the Hijazi Order of Independence. Wiranatakoesoema himself claimed to be bemused. One writer for Bintang Islam (vol. 2, no. 16, 25 August 1924) was dismissive of this alleged altruism, and sarcastically lambasted the man ‘whom the Sundanese called khalifa without ever having given him a bay'ā!’ ‘What’, the writer asked, ‘has he ever done for the Muslims in Hindia?’

As things got worse for Ḥusayn with the rise of Ibn Saʿūd (1880–1953), there was an increase in Kaum Muda invective launched from the Indies and Cairo. In short, for Sarekat Islam members like Hatief, the pilgrimage was a grand conspiracy hatched by Kaum Tua ‘ulamā’ in league with their Meccan masters and the European shipping companies. The colonial government was even implicated by association. Troeno, for example, threatened civil disobedience if the pilgrims were not protected, and made scandalous (and unsubstantiated) claims about the conduct of the Sabang quarantine station which processed returning pilgrims (see Bintang Islam, vol. 1, no. 17, 10 September 1923 and vol. 2, no. 1, 10 January 1924). These accusations were later retracted, but not until after the reader’s skin was made to crawl by descriptions of female pilgrims being forced to march naked into the sea to wash, or submit to their breasts being fondled by Dutch medical staff.

Such combined assaults and attempted assaults on ‘our pilgrims’ both by the colonial state and a ‘renegade’ dictator played a part in generating a wider Indies consciousness among the members of Moehammadijah and Sarekat Islam. Moreover, to stand against the colonial state, Kaum Muda needed to be mobilized by the conviction that their religion was little respected by officialdom and that their education was being debased by a sinister Christian plot which stretched even to the client state of the Hijaz. Pan-Islam once again entered the arena of political symbols, particularly in light of the Caliphate crisis of 1924. For this was a crisis shared by all Muslims.

Rashīd Riḍā’s ideas on the neo-Caliphate and their impact on the Kaum Muda

Given the strident attacks of the Kaum Muda, the Kaum Tua came to feel a sense of allegiance to Ḥusayn and the old order of things. Many Kaum Tua
saw the King of the Hijaz as an ally against a reformist movement drawing closer by the day to the bigoted proscriptions of the Wahhābīya. Certainly in their constant attacks on Indies Kaum Tua and claims to a more genuine understanding of Islam, the reformist movement had shifted markedly from the open and eclectic attitude of Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Achmad Dachlan to the rigidity of Rashīd Riḍā and Hadji Rasoel. Yet all were committed to the ideal of a unitary Caliphate. It was Ḥusayn’s apparent abrogation of this ideal in 1916 that gave the Kaum Muda one more charge to level at him.

As we have already seen, there was little concrete loyalty to Abdülhamid’s dynasty among Southeast Asians. Moreover, in the years after his death, pan-Islam in the Indies was further compromised by the rise of nationalism and communism – particularly in the weakened body of Sarekat Islam in the 1920s. Hence, Sarekat Islam would seek to rebuild its Islamic base by using the language of opposition to the West under the distant influence of Riḍā’s al-Manār grouping. One strategy they shared was to seek the revival of one Muslim umma under a single Caliph. Yet not all reformists followed al-Afghānī’s belief in the necessity of the Caliphate as the logical summit of Muslim social organization. The Muslim community was indeed united in the bonds of faith, yet there was no denying the socio-linguistic and national barriers that divided Muslim societies alluded to by al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh in al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā.

In Cairo the Caliphate crisis, set in train when the Turkish National Assembly stripped the sultan of all executive roles in 1922, set Riḍā to work on his appeal to ‘the noble Turkish people, the reformist parties of the Arab and Indian lands and Muslim peoples in general’. Al-Khilāfa aw al-imāma al-‘uzmā (The Caliphate or the Great Imamate, Cairo, 1923) was first serialized in al-Manār. In this work he attributed the decline of that institution on men like Abdülhamid whom Riḍā (1923: 61) asserted had ‘put himself above the Sharī‘a and the law’ (cf. Kerr 1966: 153–86). In Riḍā’s view, the rot had set in when the first of the Umayyads, Mu‘āwiya bin Abī Sufyān (d. 680), made the Caliphate a dynastic succession. Following al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh, Riḍā then argued that the following centuries had seen Islam entering a state of inertia and ossification. The succeeding dynasties were therefore no better, and the Ottoman claim to the Caliphate was equally spurious, although it should ideally have been accepted in the interest of Muslim unity. Recent developments had exposed this scandalous state of affairs with the clear emergence of national – not caliphal – movements such as those popularized by Westernized élite. Al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh had termed this élite ‘materialists’. On 21 May 1904, al-Liwā had echoed al-Afghānī’s language, accusing Snouck Hurgonje (Duktür Snûk) – ‘whose hatred for Arabs and Turks is well known’ – and ‘the treacherous Hasan Muṣṭafā’, of leading the Sundanese into ‘their madhhab of materialism’.17

According to Riḍā, the materialists had embedded nationalism in the public system of education where students learnt of foreign idols and ideals
to the detriment of the inculcation of proper Islamic morals (*akhlāq*). Although he may not have known of the policy of Association, he could not have described it better. In response, Islam was to be reasserted as the only conceivable uniter of the Islamic *umma* and not the collection of nation-states – now also called *ummas* – that had been assembled to replace it. For example, when Atatürk divested the Caliph of his last temporal functions, he declared that sovereignty belonged to the Turkish *umma* (Kerr 1966: 164–65). Indeed Rıdā’s frustration is evident in his reportage of such issues as nationality (*jinsiya*) and his longing for the Turk of the past. According to Rıdā (1923: 63), ‘[W]hen a Turk was asked what his nation (*jinsihi*) was, he would say, ‘Muslim, praise be to God!’ By comparison, in 1920, Ameen Rihani would urge people to exchange their emphasis on religious identity for patriotism. He claimed that ‘most Syrians would first identify themselves with their religion, then with their place of birth and then with their region’. Rihani proudly declared himself ‘a Syrian first, Lebanese second and Maronite after that’ (Hajjar 1991: 193, 203).

Rıdā’s critique of the new currents of nationalism did not, however, mean that he wished to replace the various Muslim rulers. In fact his earlier activities had most probably served to heighten a sense of division between Turks and Arabs already played upon by the CUP with its pan-Turanist policies (Tauber 1993: 3). Clearly the reformists needed to take sides. Hence Rıdā (1923: 67–75) reserved his strongest invective for Husayn who had seceded from the Ottoman Empire and Caliphate, asserting that ‘[M]ost of the Muslim world detests the current government of the Hijaz and we see its calumny in the pages of journals from Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, Java, Turkey, and India’. Similarly in Java the *Irshādis* made no secret of their hatred for ʻUsayn. The pro-Kemalist editors of *Būrubūdūr* (5 July 1924) thus reviled the then editor of the *ʻAlawi* paper *Haframawt*, Muhammad bin Hashim, accusing him of being an ‘abettor of British propaganda with his support for ʻUsayn the secessionist (*al-khārijī*) . . . for we all know of his enmity for the noble [Turkish] race’. The writers then went even further than Rashīd Rıdā, declaring that, ‘in the opinion of the ‘ulamā’, ʻUsayn was ‘a tyrant who should be killed’.

Although Rıdā’s pan-Islamism was not necessarily focussed on the revitalization of Ottoman authority, Turks, due to their greater organizational abilities, were nonetheless to join with Arabs, the source of Islam as the religion of integrating force. Thereafter they would create a new world order under the headship of a candidate ideally from the Arabian Peninsula and free of foreign influence. And through the correct application of modern learning and *ijtihād* (reformed) Muslims were to elect from among themselves a new caliph. This election would finally remove the need for a Caliphate of usurpation (*khilāfat al-taghallūb*) as had been embodied by the Ottoman Empire. According to Rıdā, the caliph was to ensure that the Sharī‘a was being enacted in these rulers’ domains. Islamic feeling was thus ‘the strongest
Nonetheless, if Riḍā was opposed to secular nationalism, he remained a fan of the Modern. The rise of new technologies allowed Riḍā (1923: 51) to predict that the new Caliphate of total unity was to be attainable in this age of possibilities.

The time is upon us in our age as was faithfully foretold in many hadith, . . . countries (aqṭār) are linked to each other, by land and sea, with steam-ships and railroads. Airships have begun to transport mail and people hundreds and thousands of miles within an hour or a few hours. News is carried through the power of electricity from the beginning to the ends of the earth in a few seconds. Had our ancestors possessed these means in their day, then they would have gained possession of the entire world!

This passage may also be read as a critique of the de facto conquest of the world by Western power. What Rashid Riḍā urged, though, was the activation of Muslims in their various countries – Turkey, Egypt, India, or ‘Jāwa’ – to make use of the very same technologies for the advancement of all Muslims. And to advance, Muslims required first and foremost freedom of action. Hence, under the general rubric of the freedom of Muslim nations one may detect the traces of a line of thought followed by those reformers who worked within the discourse of nationalist agitation throughout the Muslim world. In order to effectuate the ideal universal Umma, with or without a caliph, Muslim lands needed first and foremost independence. To avoid anything analogous to the undesirable ‘Caliphate of usurpation’, Muslims needed to construct an independent state in some form before being able to create an Islamic state. Reformists held that once power had been achieved, then it could be purified of the corruptions caused by necessity. After all, ‘The caliphate of usurpation is like eating carrion or pork in the case of necessity. It is imposed by force of arms, but it is better than anarchy’ (Riḍā 1923: 38). A Jawi reading al-Khilāfa would understand that any form of independent Muslim homeland – as had seemingly emerged in Egypt (1919) and Modern Turkey (1922) – would surely evolve to become an Islamic state.

Yet if Riḍā’s Caliphate was to be formed with an Arab mujtahid (an exponent of ijtihād) at its head, then Arabic was to be reasserted as the language of the Umma. And while Riḍā did not hold the extreme view that Arabic should be the first language of all Muslims, he emphasized, like ‘Abduh before him, its importance as the language of religious scholarship and unity (cf. Adams 1968: 85; Dawn 1973: 135f.). And although, in Riḍā’s view, Islam is a force for equality between peoples, the first Arabs had been the best Muslims, and non-Arabic speaking Muslims were still inadequate ones. Hence he applauded the ‘learned scholars of Java’ who corresponded with
al-Manār and took to task those of Bangkok for their inability to go beyond a few lines of al-fātiha due to their lack of Arabic (Riḍā 1923: 104).

Practicality was one thing, but Riḍā, using the example of the moribund Ottoman state, argued that the adoption of a laissez faire attitude towards other languages – and thus linguistic affinities – led to greater tribalism (‘aṣabīya) within Muslim communities and fostered the fracturing of the Umma. Again, following al-Afghanī, and like the Syrian nationalist Ameen Rihani, he felt that a key cause of the failure of the Ottoman state was the fact that Arabic was not the language of state (Hourani 1983: 118; Hajjar 1991: 172). Hence ethnic minorities remained speaking their own languages, and Arabs suffered the disdain of the now pan-Turanian élite, and were able through links of religion to break from the empire.

Riḍā seemed to have been proved right. By 1922 many significant minorities – such as the Bulgars and Greeks – had, with the help of the European powers, attained their independence or a wider recognition of their right to it. Moreover, Riḍā’s reaction to the rise of nationalism in the form of what he called Westernized tribalism entailed a reassertion of Arabic and Arab cultural values as primal in Islam. Whereas Riḍā affirms that Islam sees no distinction between races, the choice of a Qurayshī as caliph, and Arabic as the language of unity entails a certain inequality of which his Jawi followers would again be made conscious. As I have shown above, it was also a view that they received from Indies Hadramis.

**Doenia Islam and Noesa Hindia: placing the Indies in a Muslim world**

After the first stages of ideological development, Sarekat Islam began a programme of national centralisation. Its ideological position then began to shift as a result of several organizational changes. It continued to maintain strong links with Moehammadadijah, despite the fact that Sarekat Islam was open to Muslims in general rather than reformists in particular. Gradually, too, it linked up with the more attenuated reformism of Sumatra, and under the influence of Agoes Salim, ‘Party discipline’ was applied against the communist membership which had sought to take control of the mass movement from within. In the process Sarekat Islam also became more anti-colonial and pan-Islamic in its general utterances. The question of the Caliphate was by no means dead for Indies Muslims, despite their never having been under its direct political influence. Still, as a symbol of international Muslim unity, it became briefly a source of solidarity between Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua.

In the 1920s Sarekat Islam took to a more overt adoption of pan-Islamic symbolism, which helped sustain the outward unity of Indies Muslims. In the early years of Sarekat Islam, the very sumptuary nature of the Caliphate had been symbolized by pseudo-Turkish symbols; such as the Ottoman sigil
(tughrā) and crescent (hilāl). However, suggestions by Agoes Salim in 1916 to invite the Şeyhülislam from Constantinople to lecture on ‘modern Islam’ had, at that time, inspired little interest, as had his motion to send a letter protesting Atatürk’s proposed relocation of the caliph (Schmidt 1992: 54). This suggests that pan-Islam served then as a symbolic armory which allowed activists to wed Islam to their very national organization. Even the more concrete pan-Islam espoused by Agoes Salim was quite different to the Hamidian form so feared in colonial circles. It cannot, at this time, be seen as a programme generated in Constantinople to harness the disparate anti-colonial movements of the Muslim world. Rather, it was a plea for unity directed from the outermost ‘periphery’ to a centre in turmoil. In the 1920s, then, pan-Islam was to reflect and underscore, rather than overshadow, the national aspirations of Indies Muslims. This revised direction is encapsulated in a collaboration between Agoes Salim and the Tunisian Mohammad Hachemi of the Būrūbūdūr press. In late 1922, the first sample issues of their new rumi periodical appeared, entitled Doenia Islam (The World of Islam).

It appears that this title reflects the desire of Salim and Hachemi to place their activities in the context of the wider Islamic world. It is in a sense ironic then that they chose not to use the sacred script that united them. Still, the editors felt obliged to explain their choice of script, although they seemed more concerned with the issue of pronunciation across colonial territories than any expression of identity tied to faith. As Salim put it, the difference between Indies and Peninsular Malay was simply a question of a few ‘a’s and ‘e’s (Doenia Islam, vol. 1 example, 8 December 1922).

Based on the choice of Dutch–Malay orthography, it is clear Doenia Islam’s audience was intended primarily for the Indies bangsa. But the rationale for this choice was not explicitly affirmed in terms of bangsa. Instead, religion was highlighted, and with it territory. As the founding principle of the journal stated:

Hindia is a Muslim land (Tanah Hindia tanah Islam). The vast majority of the people of Hindia are Muslims. Every effort to maintain and protect the country (negeri), to promote and care for the needs of the populace, to advance the people and country, to reap an income and generate wealth; all must make use of the effort, goods, and produce of Muslims.

(Doenia Islam, vol. 1 example, 8 December 1922)

No longer was there an identification in terms of bangsa – whether bangsa Jawi, bangsa Melayu or bangsa Jawa. Instead the idea of tanah (land) is foregrounded and conflated with faith. The concept of a discrete territory had been added to the arsenal of Indies Muslims. As we have seen in some of the letters concerning the Hajj, Hindia was accepted by the leadership of Sarekat Islam, and the correspondents to Sarekat Islam journals, as the territorial
basis of a future Muslim country which would take over the centres, institutions, and borders left to it by the Dutch. The default ethnicity of its inhabitants could only be bangsa Islam.

By expressing its platform in such Islamic terms tied to a discrete field of operation, Doenia Islam continued Salim’s assault on ‘the doppelganger soul of the PKI’ to reassert ‘the pure soul of Sarekat Islam’ (Doenia Islam, vol. 1 example, 8 December 1922). Yet that impure soul had already had its impact on the political language of the national movement, as may be seen in the activities of the pesantren-educated ‘red hadji’ Mohammad Misbach (1876–1926), who had left Sarekat Islam and who now tried to synthesize the tenets of Islam and communism (see Shiraishi 1990: passim). Even Salim had argued (in 1921) that Muhammad had anticipated Marx by thirteen centuries (Vlekke 1959: 358). After the removal of PKI membership, Sarekat Islam still sought to emphasize that its struggle was one of an ‘Eastern proletariat’ (proletariërs . . . dari azas njra’ jat timoer) which maintained its own national character.

It also seems that Salim tried to coin a new expression for that uniqueness. In the same article he declared that the members of Sarekat Islam knew that the character and struggle of ‘the people of the Indies archipelago’ (ra’jat noesa Hindia) could not be compared with that of ‘other peoples such as those of Europe and Arabia’ (Doenia Islam, vol. 1, no. 1, 5 January 1923). Crucially this vision was shared by some of the élite Indies students studying in The Netherlands, among them Mohammad Hatta, an admirer both of Mus'tafä Kâmil and Atatürk, and a regular correspondent with the Jawa of Cairo (see below). For such students, too, the Dutch word Indië was increasingly unpalatable. So, like their fellows in the Indies, they briefly adopted the name of Noesa Hindia. For example, in an article relating to the Caliphate and Turkish politics in 1924, Hatta used the term freely to describe the future Indonesia (Bintang Islam, vol. 2, no. 8, 25 April 1924).

Had Salim launched Doenia Islam in January 1923 rather than in the preceding month, he may well have declared that Noesa Hindia, rather than Tanah Hindia, was a Muslim land. Certainly the actual term Noesa Hindia preserves a different resonance to Tanah Hindia and serves as a bridge to the wider acceptance of ‘Indonesia’. Unlike the Malay tanah, the Javanese nusa (‘island’) would have created a more favourable resonance for the Western coinage Indonesia, which also expressed the concept of an Indian archipelago and was in vogue with both élite Western scholarship and those Indonesians exposed to it. In 1850, one of the first propagators of the term Indonesia, James Logan, had predicted just such resonance between nusa and nèses, while implying a false etymological link between the Javanese and Greek terms (see Jones 1973: 103). Jones has observed that in the Indies the term Indonesia appears to have been first appropriated as indigenous property by the Communists in 1921. Hatta (1952: 345), who was well aware of Logan and the origins of the term, pointed out that it been used by the nationalists in
Holland from 1922 when they changed the name of their association to the Perhimpoenan Indonesië. Still, given his own experimentation with ‘Noesa’ Hindia in his writings directed to an audience in the Indies, and the limited circulation of the term at the time, ‘Indonesia’ had, for the moment, more validity in the élite schools of Leiden and Batavia than on the streets of Padang, Bandung, or Kutai.

For the members of Sarekat Islam, the people of Noesa Hindia remained Muslims by default. For this reason the idea of the Christian West as a hostile Other was also targeted in Doenia Islam. One editorial made the bizarre claim that this was a plot stretching back to the thirteenth century when Christian monks perfected the arts of fermentation. After all, claimed the writer, were not the powers both Christian states and also the ultimate beneficiaries of the global trade in alcohol? Indeed ‘hundreds of thousands of Europeans make a living selling alcohol by which they have accomplished Europe’s power over millions of Africans, Americans, Asians, and Australians or removed them from the face of the earth!’ Such a depraved plot, it was argued, could only be countered by the Qur’ān (see Doenia Islam, vol. 1, no. 4, 26 January 1924). At first it seems curious that the Western-educated Salim countenanced articles which alleged a global plot to estrange Indiërs from their own culture. Yet based on his turn in Mecca, his reaction to the official support of Christian missions and schools during the tenure of A.W.F. Idenberg – ‘the first Christian on the throne of Buitenzorg’ (van der Meulen 1981: 10) – and a growing realization that the old Ethical Policy was dead, it can be seen that Salim could identify with both spheres and use their terminologies interchangeably. After all, he had so nearly been made a brown Dutchman himself.

So it was that in Doenia Islam, not only was Christianity seen as a threat, the very Dutchness of the government school system was attacked and was represented as leading to the ‘Dutchification of the Indies’ (kebelandaan Hindia). Sarekat Islam schools were therefore seen as vehicles of the national activation of Indies Muslims. These Islamic schools were urged to develop in their students ‘Indies-ness or citizenship’ (kehindiaan atau keanaknegerian), based on the conviction that ‘for the Muslims here, the religion of Islam can strengthen the very important sense of citizenship’. Such attacks on Dutchification or Christianization voiced in Doenia Islam did not mean that Sarekat Islam sought to dislodge all of its Western baggage. Many Muslim schools still promoted the study of Dutch and the Western idea of nationality. Indeed, the modern concept of citizenship is grounded in the Western tradition and was a new way of configuring the subjects of a Muslim ruler. As we have seen, Indies Muslims were expected to understand that they were all the children (anak-anak) of a single polity (negeri) – and not just a ruler – in much the sense that Abdul Rahman of Muar had tried to communicate Mustafā Kāmil’s vision of watanīya in 1906, or how al-Imam and al-Munir had focussed on the importance of education to elevate the
cause of the watan. It had been only natural that when a new Sarekat Islam pesantren was established in Banyuwangi in early 1919 it would be entitled the pesantren for ‘the elevation of the homeland’ (Ar. li i’alā al-watan), the watan in question then being Java (see Oetoesan Hindia, 17 January 1919, Extra/IPO 1919, 3).

However in Doenia Islam, and with Sarekat Islam under the influence of pan-Islamists like Salim, the default watan of affection had become the colonial entity of the Netherlands Indies, and Muslims were thus the rakyat of Hindia. And, so it was that with calls to accentuate Indies-ness and citizenship, Islamic education was being explicitly marshalled to bolster the search for an increasingly tangible nationhood among a student body located throughout the one colonial state. In modern Sarekat Islam and Moehammadiyah schools students studied the same texts and gained a mutual sense not of their local culture or the Jawi ecumene, as they once had through the pesantren networks, but of an Indies identity, grounded against the Christian state that had established its borders and which now seemed determined to alter the faith of its inhabitants. Their imagined negeri had expanded, having swollen from the estuarine settlements of the Malay world or the singular entity of the Tanah Jawa, to the recognizable archipelagic state momentarily called Noesa Hindia by people like Agoes Salim and Hatta.

Meanwhile, the Kaum Muda within Noesa Hindia was continuing to present the Modern as being best enacted by a proper understanding of Islam. There thus remained the perceived need to make Islam consonant with Western ideals of democracy. Organs like Doenia Islam thus presented the Rightly Guided Caliphs as natural democrats whose use of consultation (shūrā) anticipated by thirteen centuries the parliamentary process. In this way they echoed Muhammad ‘Abduh, for whom Hourani (1983: 144) wrote that maslaḥa had gradually turned into ‘utility’, shūra into ‘parliamentary democracy’, ijmā‘ into ‘public opinion’. In short ‘Islam itself became identical with civilization and activity, the norms of nineteenth-century social thought.’ This was also a theme taken up by Tjokroaminoto in his own attempt to synthesize the ideals of Islam and socialism (Islam dan Sosialisme, 1923). Such an accommodation between Islam and secular Western democracy, as established in Kemalist Turkey, was therefore seen as the ideal platform for future government in the Indies.

Atatürk in Indië

On the international stage, Atatürk was often evoked in the reformist press as ‘the champion of Islam’ following his military successes of 1922 (e.g., Doenia Islam, vol. 1, no. 2, 12 January 1923). At the first al-Islam congress (see below), delegates even resolved to send a congratulatory telegram to Atatürk for his victory over the Greeks. Here was the ideal leader who had set his modern and Muslim country on the road to future prosperity. Bintang Islam
(vol. 1, no. 7, 10 April 1923) went even further and declared him to be ‘the sword of Islam and renovator of the caliphate’ (sayf al-islām wa mujaddid al-khilāfa). Doenia Islam lauded his military victories and, as Muṣṭafā Kāmil had done for the Japanese, claimed them for Islam and Easterners.

Here is the example that Easterners (orang timoer) have gained from Turkey’s victory! There has been no more influential event in the East than this apart from Japan’s victory over Russia. That victory has already redirected the West’s attitude to the East and has proven to Westerners that the supposedly indolent Easterners are also capable of performing great feats if only they are prepared to. One of Japan’s leaders once said that ‘Europe’s politicians did not want to pay heed to our words or regard us as a great and advanced kingdom until we had vanquished the Russians’. Consequently, the Turkish victory has affirmed the truth of this, which in turn is an instructive lesson for Easterners and bolsters their faith!

(Doenia Islam, vol. 1, no. 4, 26 January 1924)

Bintang Islam also featured articles, penned by Hatta in Rotterdam, on the rise of the Young Turks, the history of the modern Caliphate, and the importance of Atatürk’s affirmation of Turkey’s independence (Bintang Islam, vol. 1, no. 22, 25 October; and vol. 2, no. 8, 25 April 1924). And in the months leading up to Atatürk’s dismissal of Abdülmecid III on 1 March 1924, both Doenia Islam and Bintang Islam featured photographs of Atatürk and the caliph. Along with its presentation of Abdülmecid as the leader of the world’s Muslims, the issue of allegiance (bay’a) to him was a focal point to expose the pretensions of King Husayn to the office. According to Doenia Islam only the peoples of the Hijaz and Iraq had failed to give the bay’a to Abdülmecid and they urged the still silent peoples of the Indies to make their wishes known.

No voice remains silent except in Noesa Hindia, our homeland (tanah air kita). This is not because it is not Islamic territory (dar al-Islam), and not because . . . we should want to acknowledge another caliph. [It is] because it seems that we are yet to believe firmly that we are free in matters of religion . . . Let us not be left behind in the global Islamic community (kalangan bangsa Islam sedoenia) and let us aspire to self-respect!

(Doenia Islam, vol. 1, no. 4, 26 January 1924)

These Muslims of Noesa Hindia saw themselves as part of a wider Muslim world in which their own land stood in support of Modern Turkey as a recognized entity, even if they voiced that support in terms of respect for the tottering Caliphate. Indeed there seems to have been a naïve ignorance of
Atatürk’s secularism and his dismissal of the Caliph in 1924 was greeted with apologetics rather than outrage (*Bintang Islam*, vol. 2, no. 7, 10 April 1924). When Hatta detailed the awful truth in April, he urged that Muslims act urgently to formulate a united response to the crisis, reminding *Bintang Islam*’s readers that the Caliphate was not the responsibility of Turkey alone. According to Hatta, the people of Noesa Hindia had to strive to find a new caliph, in much the same way as the people of Egypt had struggled for real independence, and ‘must not be left behind in discussions regarding the caliphate!’ (*Bintang Islam*, vol. 2, no. 8, 25 April 1924). He observed indignantly that Husayn’s claim to the Caliphate had been recognized by the peoples of ‘Mesopotamia, Transjordan, and the Hijaz’, thus ignoring ‘the voice of other Muslim peoples’. The Muslims of Hindia clearly needed to emphasize their unity and find their own voice at this time of international crisis for Islam.

In 1922, Sarekat Islam had first sponsored a public attempt to bridge the gap between Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua and present a united front. The first al-Islam Congress was held at Cirebon from 31 October to 2 November 1922, with representatives present from such diverse organizations as Sarekat Islam, Moehammadijah, al-Irsh¯ād, Perserikatan Oelama, Moesjawaratoel Oelama, Tasjwiroel Afkar, Jam‘iyat al-Khayr, Sjamail Hoeda, and Nahdlatoeel Wathon. This series of meetings resulted in the formation of the Majlis al-Islam Hindia (The Islamic Council of the Indies). Its members included Bratanata of Cirebon and Sayyid Alwi Ali Aydrus, Hadji Asnawi (a traditionalist from Kudus), Ahmad Soorkatie, Fachroeddin, Hadji Abdulwahhab of Surabaya, and Mohamad Fadloellah of Banjarnegara (*Doenia Islam*, vol. 1, no. 5, 2 February 1923). From such stirrings of unity, Islamic activism on Java was now assembled in Western-style political frameworks as organizations with objectives to be voiced on behalf of the people of Hindia to the entire Muslim world.

It is thus clear then that Indies Muslims, whether Kaum Muda or Kaum Tua, felt the need for representation, at both the local level and before their fellow believers throughout the world. There was also an enduring sense of disempowerment engendered not only by colonial rule, but by the experiences of exploitation of the Hajj and ongoing patronizing at the hands of local Arab ‘ulamā’. This sense of unity and pride was expressed at the third al-Islam Congress convened at Surabaya on 4–5 October 1924. When the recently formed Caliphate Committee raised the matter of sending delegates to the Cairo Congress, an Indian Muslim present claimed that the Javanese would be treated like flies. This roused an indignant response from Fachroeddin, who emphatically declared that ‘we are neither flies nor inferior to the Egyptians’! Van Bruinessen (1995: 131) observes that this congress ‘showed Indonesian Muslims at their most united and their most self-confident’ and quotes a Dutch official observer as saying that the congress was ‘more than a discussion of the caliphate . . . it was above all a demonstration of Islam as a
political power’. At the meeting in question then we can also observe the assertion of native pride as equal members of the global Umma.

The Surabaya al-Islam Congress also adopted a resolution which asserted the need for the establishment of a Caliphate Council with multinational membership which would elect, on independent soil, a candidate to the office responsible initially for religious matters within the Islamic Umma. Van Bruinessen (1995: 131) suggests that this programme may have been inspired by al-Kawākibī’s (c.1849–1902) Umm al-qurā (The Mother of Towns [Mecca], 1899), which was serialized in al-Manār between April 1902 and February 1903. According to Teitelbaum (1998: 104), this work of fiction ‘purports to be the minutes of the meeting of a secret Muslim society in Mecca to work for a spiritual Qurayshī caliphate to be headquartered in the holy city’. Haim (1978: 775–76) states that this book ‘makes the first sure and permanent transition in Arabic from Panislamism to Panarabism’. She has also argued that it is based on Wilfred Blunt’s The Future of Islam (London, 1882), which Blunt in turn presented as being the very words of ‘Abduh (Hourani 1983: 155). Certainly in Cairo the editors of Seruan Azhar (vol. 1, no. 3, December 1925) believed that Sa‘ūdī policy was based on this work. However, given that Rıḍā’s al-Khilāfa was much more recently serialized in al-Manār and published only a year earlier, a more direct influence may be seen stemming from contemporary pro-Wahhābī reformist discourse and the Kaum Muda reaction to King Husayn’s régime. It was for reasons such as these therefore that the al-Islam Congress did not then nominate Mecca as the seat of the Caliphate, and why it rejected Husayn’s claims to the office. In any case the last days of the Hashimites were fast dwindling.

It is also no surprise that the failed, and rival, Caliphate congresses later held in Mecca and Cairo were a disappointment to the Jawa; Tjokroaminoto was already disillusioned in Arabia and did not proceed to the Cairene event. Even at the event hosted by Ibn Sa‘ūd, his party either made no favourable impression or was too despondent to try. According to one Egyptian at the Meccan event, Muḥammad al-Aḥmadī al-Zawahīrī:

[The Javanese] are a weak people in every matter. They were like a gasping, drowning person, wishing to find something to support them, and able to move neither hand nor tongue. They did not say a word, and avoided any commitment.

(as quoted in Kramer 1986: 109–10)

Meanwhile in Cairo, and if we take the words of Hamka as true, Hadji Rasoel had some impact, though that event too miscarried. Hamka sought to capture this disappointment by his description of the Cairo conference of May 1926. Here he portrays the new Jawi sense of self-worth when his father, Hadji Rasoel, interrupts the traditionalist Muftī Shaykh Bakhīt. Rasoel is supposed to have been annoyed at the ponderous manner of Bakhīt’s speech,
and the fact that most speakers had dwelt on the juridical rather than the practical aspects of caliphal theory. Rasoel, he claims, interjected loudly and asked if indeed the conference was going to deal with the Caliphate crisis. As Hamka paints matters, the conservatives of al-Azhar, who allegedly dominated proceedings, had little practical interest in the Caliphate, or indeed in the opinions of upstart ‘intellectuals’. This supposedly led Rasoel to declare that even the most conservative of the Kaum Tua was a modernist compared to the shaykhs of Cairo (Hamka 1957: 128–30).

Regardless of the demise of the Caliphate, there were also Muslims in the Indies who still placed high hopes in the new Turkish government as a Muslim state independent of both foreign control and encumbered by a defunct ideal. What Atatürk had done was appropriate – the true Caliphate was not a purely Ottoman or even Hijazi concern. The Caliph should serve all Muslims free of the national interests that they themselves were developing. To this end, the Caliphate, while it lingered, remained a symbol of Islamic internationalism daily losing ground to the competing ideologies of nationalism and communism. At least the nationalists still believed in God, and in de facto union with them both Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua squared off against atheistic communism.

At the time, too, colonial observers believed that the Indian khilafat movement was having a deleterious effect on their Indies subjects. If we recall the nature of the pan-Islamic movement of the early 1910s, we may see once again that activities listed by Dutch officials under the rubric of ‘pan-Islamic agitation’ (pan-Islamitische woelingen) might just as readily have been noted as acts within the ‘nationalist movement’ (nationalistische beweging). Those few agitators of former years who had sought to cultivate links with the Sublime Porte had not tried solely to place themselves as vassals under the Ottoman Sultan but were rather seeking a way to retain, or regain, their sovereignty. Nonetheless, the learning they offered still kept an attachment to the idea of Islam being in its purest state in the ‘Central’ and ‘Arab’ lands. Dawn (1973: 134–47) has even argued that it was Muhammad ‘Abdulhalim’s highlighting of a pure Arab past that inadvertently created the nationalistic phenomenon of Arabism. This Arabism remained a facet of their programme, liable to be misinterpreted by the Dutch, and a source of worry for Kaum Tua. This was especially so when they faced a new crop of students from Cairo. These students were heavily involved in the attacks on the gasping Ḥusaynid régime while imbuing the spirit of anti-colonial nationalism.
Had your Lord willed it, then He would have made humanity one umma, yet still they are in disagreement, save those on whom He has bestowed His mercy.

(Qurʾān 11:118–19)

A new vision of the bilād al-jāwa from Cairo

The unity of the Jawa in the Central Lands was most explicitly enunciated after the Great War and the regeneration of their communities abroad. The Cairene community has already been discussed by Roff (1970) in his examination of ‘The Welfare Association of Azhari Jawi Students’ (al-Jamʿīya al-Khayrīya li al-Ṭalaba al-Azharīya al-Jāwīya) and its two associated papers Seruan Azhar (Call of the Azhar) and Pilihan Timoer (Choice of the East). However, in light of the earlier Jamiah Setia Pelajar, discussed above in Chapter 6, Roff’s (1970: 73) statement that ‘it was apparently not until 1922 that they became sufficiently numerous, or sufficiently conscious of themselves as a group, to organize an association’ is deserving of revision.

Certainly the Jawa of Cairo were more numerous. Uthman Abd Allah of Kuala Lumpur (1905–1968) estimated that in 1925 there were around one hundred and fifty Jawi students at al-Azhar (Seruan Azhar, vol. 1, no. 1, October 1925). The already overcrowded riwāq al-jāwa could not accommodate all those who were studying at Cairo’s diverse institutes, such as the Dār al-ʿUlūm. Many found lodgings at the boarding houses established by two Southeast Asia-based Hadramis, Muhammad bin Hashim and Husayn bin Abd Allah al-Attas. The first was a leading member of the Jamʿīyat al-Khayr and editor of the journals al-Bashīr and Hadramawt, while al-Attas was a well-known activist from Singapore (Roff 1970: 81, n. 25; Schmidt 1992: 81, n. 171; Othman 2002).

On 10 September 1923, Bintang Islam (vol. 1, no. 17) noted the arrival in Cairo on 19 June of two Javanese students, Raden Fatchurrahman
(Fath al-Rahman Kafrawi) of Tuban and Mas Moehamad Bakri. Both had spent two years studying in Mecca. This had led to a deep sense of dissatisfaction and they formed the impression that their Kaum Tua teachers in Mecca were only concerned with enriching themselves and heedless of the life to come. Both men had matriculated from the Madrasah Islamiyah of Pasar Kliwon, Pondok Termas in East Java. Evidently the dynamic programmes of that school heightened the disappointment that these two activists felt in the Hijaz. By comparison, at al-Azhar, the programme was so involved that it was claimed it would take fifteen years to master all the subjects on offer. The highest degree then offered, the doctoral shahāda ʿālimiya, was designed to take twelve years of study. When it was first officially tested in 1912, only twenty six students passed out of three hundred and sixty two who sat the examinations. By 1923, however, the number of graduates rose significantly (see Dika 1990: 113, 124).

Indeed, the al-Azhar of 1925 was a different institution from that of the 1890s, having been forced, despite sometimes violent student protests, to undergo a series of organizational changes. These ranged from the abortive centralizing reforms of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, to the unpopular state interventions of 1908 and 1911 (Dika 1990: 111–15). Certainly the scope and depth of al-Azhar was a feature remarked on by Uthman Abd Allah, who noted that whereas there was once little organization (nizam) at al-Azhar, the education on offer in 1925 was of a highly structured nature (Seruan Azhar, vol. 1, no. 1, October 1925; cf. Mitchell 1988).

Upon gaining their feet in Cairo, students like Fath al-Rahman became involved in the student movement then forming anew.

Thus on Friday 3 Safar 1342, corresponding with 14 September 1923, all of us from Tanah Djawa (Malajoe) seeking knowledge at al-Azhar in Cairo assembled to consider and debate how we seek knowledge as compared with other peoples. As we looked about us, we saw that for those of different cultures [jang bahasa di bangsa lain] – such as Maghrebie, Sjam, Toerkie, Hindoestan etc. – each maintained a foundation [wakaf] established by their bangsa in order to aid any of their bangsa living in Cairo or studying at the Azhar. Yet we Djawa (Malajoe) alone did not have anything established for those studying in Cairo like a foundation or charity whereas other bangsas, such as Toerkie and Egypt [Mesir], have established a foundation for the Djawa (Malajoe). Nevertheless, we felt that our culture (bahasa negeri kami) was not inferior to theirs with its achievements and large and famous Muslim population. Indeed this negeri of ours excelled those of other bangsas in this respect. In this light we call upon our bangsa in Djawa (Malajoe) [to emulate] the other bangsas. Hopefully the blessing of our mutual strength [will] dispel our deficiencies before the other bangsas studying in the courtyard of al-Azhar and
it will encourage our increased diligence and effort in what we study.

(Bintang Islam, vol. 2, no. 10, 25 May 1924; 
round brackets as in original)

The all-inclusive concept of a Jawi community, while being reinforced by the fact that the letter is addressed to a range of people in the wider Indies – from rajas to teachers – has undergone a shift with the writer feeling it necessary to pair the word ‘Djawa’ with ‘Malajoe’ in parentheses. Jawa was thus Java, and Malajoe the Malay World, a definition in keeping with contemporary usage in Cairo’s al-Manār (see Abaza: 1999).

Clearly the members of the riwāq mentally divided the bilād al-jāwa between two zones of mutual importance. Indeed the students solicited support from among the Jawa of both ‘Melayu’ and ‘Hindia Nederland’. However, this did not devalue their sense of unity, which the Jawa of Cairo still expressed in their shared religion, geography, and language. And while the students could write to two different homelands, the term jawi was retained in the organization founded by the meeting of 14 September 1923, ‘The Welfare Association of Azhari Jawi Students’. But, as can be seen in the Bintang Islam article quoted above, there is a mixing of terms for the idea of nation. Thus the modern name of bangsa Türkie (rather than the older bangsa Rum) sits beside the cultural blocs of Maghrebie (North African) and Sjam (Levantine) – each represented by the student lodges. Hindia was clearly a name with some meaning for them, and, as I shall show below, many of the Jawa of Cairo were quick to adopt the new name of Indonesia.

The Jawi association of Cairo also attracted interest among Indies Arabs, and was discussed in the journal Ḥadramawt in 1925. Based on Dutch reports of these articles, the association was tied to the teaching activities of Ṭaṭawī Jawhārī, whose house was situated near al-Azhar, and whose works were then prohibited in the Netherlands Indies, apparently because they had inflamed conflicts between Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua (de Jong 1982: 263; Kern papers, series 797: 338).2 According to Ḥadramawt (6 December 1924), this grouping made up the core of another philanthropic body, ‘The Educational Committee for the Islamic East’ (Lajnat Tā‘lim al-Sharq al-Islāmī). This committee was supported financially by Husayn bin Ahmad al-Attas, and had thirty-three members, including several members of the royal family of Johor (Kern papers, series 797: 338). It was later to establish a waqf devoted to the support of newly arrived Jawi students. There were also plans for the establishment of a six-month preparatory course in Arabic to be taught by Ṭaṭawī Jawhārī Bey.

Ṭaṭawī Jawhārī later publicized his school in Ḥadramawt, on 1 May 1925, encouraging students to come to Cairo ‘in order to become teachers in their own country’. According to Ṭaṭawī, his school had the support of the Rector of al-Azhar, parliamentary members, ministers, and even King Fu‘ād
– not to mention Sa’d Zaghlūl. It was also made clear that Ṭāntāwī Jawhārī’s agent in Java, ‘Abd al-‘Āzīz al-Shūmī, had not been sent covertly to collect funds for the school, but to publicize it among the Jawa.

The Adviser for Native Affairs, R.A. Kern, interpreted the activities of Ṭāntāwī and his school as an attempt by Cairo-based teachers to supplant Mecca as the foremost destination of Indies students. Kern’s report says a lot about the conventional Dutch stereotyping of the Jawa as passive victims and Arabs as aggressive proselytizers, but the pre-eminence gained by Egypt as an educational metropole cannot be denied. By the end of the Great War, Indies reformist schools, with their Sumatra Thawalib-, Irshādī- or Moehammadijah-trained teachers, were using Egyptian textbooks. Enche Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman of Muar, the translator of al-Shams al-mushriqa, was one such figure now engaged in the profitable business of importing Egyptian texts for the expanding Jawi market which would accelerate in the 1930s (van Bruinessen: 1990).

Egypt had thus re-emerged as a focal point for the Jawi ecumene. But even this relatively small outpost of ecumenism was showing a set of fractures. On 14 May 1925, an open letter appeared in Hadramawt. This was signed by thirty students of al-Azhar supporting the establishment of a separate waqf for their Siamese brethren. This need for a waqf for Siamese separate from a Jawi- or indeed a Malayu-waqf, leads one to consider how specific the needs of such students would have been. Given that there were only two hundred and forty-five Siamese pilgrims in Mecca for the season of 1898 (van Delden 1898: 645), the Cairene community of Siamese Muslims in 1925 could only have numbered a bare dozen students at best. It is also not clear whether the students concerned were Malay- or Thai-speaking Muslims (Sam Sam), although the former are more likely given that the Sam Sam enjoyed few economic advantages in their homelands and thus had little access to the Hajj or life in Cairo. Nevertheless, even if these Muslims were Malays from Siam, their case serves to demonstrate that even with heightened pan-Jawi ecumenism abroad, ethnic ambiguity still coexisted, only now it was increasingly phrased in terms of national parameters: Javan (or Indies?), Malay and Siamese.

**Janan Tayyib, Ilyas Ya’qub, and Seruan Azhar**

*Walaupun jauh di luar Hindia*  
Although far from Hindia

*Walau ke Eropa dan Australia*  
Whether to Europe or Australia

*Watan majukan dengan setia*  
Advance the homeland loyally

*Waktu sekarang patut sedia*  
Now is the time to be ready

*(Seruan Azhar, vol. 1, no. 1, October 1925)*

After the first call for donations by the Jam‘īya al-Khayrīya in Bintang Islam, Fachroeddin made a request of the Cairo-based students:
in order to prove your loyalty to us in the Indies . . . [kindly] let us know who you are [as] . . . many people are unaware of their brethren studying in Cairo . . . and by so doing our brothers in Hindia may put their trust in [you] students.

The students in turn decided to go one better and, in October 1925 they produced the second jawi paper in Cairo, Seruan Azhar.

The director of the journal was the recently arrived Raden Fath al-Rahman of the riwāq al-jāwa and it was administered by Uthman Abd Allah (Othman Abdullah). The nominated editor in charge was the Minangkabau Janan Tayyib (Djanan Tajib) — then a lecturer residing in the riwāq. His staff included Ilyas Ya’qub (Ilias Ja’coub, 1903–58), Muhammad Idris [Abd al-Ra’uf] al-Marbawi (b. 1895),6 Abd al-Wahhab Abd Allah (Abdul Wahab Abdullah)7 and Mahmud Yunus (Mahmoud el-Jounousi), who would become the first Indonesian to graduate from Dār al-‘Ulūm.8 Indeed, a photograph taken in July of that year makes it plain what standing Janan Tayyib, Ilyas Ya’qub, and Fath al-Rahman enjoyed within the community as they took centre stage beside the eminent Shaykh Ismā’īl (Yunus 1979: 3). It is also interesting to note the obvious ‘modernist’ nature of the community as they flank their teachers largely dressed in the garb of the Egyptian intelligentsia, the affandiya, wearing Turco–European suits and the low tarbūsh.

Although posing to be photographed in the robes of an ‘ālim for the opening issue of Seruan Azhar, Janan Tayyib also more usually wore a suit and fez. The photo was intended to accompany a feature article on the young scholar. Born in Bukittinggi, Janan Tayyib had achieved the distinction of being the first ‘Indonesian’ (anak Indonesia) to have obtained the ‘ālimīya degree from al-Azhar where he was subsequently admitted as a lecturer. That Janan Tayyib was defined so clearly as ‘an Indonesian’ within the riwāq al-jāwa is of great importance to an understanding of the acceptance of the very idea of Indonesia in Muslim circles. Indeed, in 1925, the Jam’īya appended an alternative, and more localized, Malay title, as the Persatuan Penuntut-penuntut Semenanjung Tanah Melayu dan Indonesia (The Union of Peninsular Malay and Indonesian Students) (Roff: 1966: 64).

At the time of the printing of the first issue of Seruan Azhar, in October 1925, Janan Tayyib had set out ‘to broaden his horizons and complete his lofty intentions’ in Paris. Janan Tayyib’s orientation to Paris is also a tribute to the Cairene milieu. In that same milieu, many Azharite students were involved in political agitation, forcing the Egyptian government to pass legislation in 1926 banning students from being members of political parties. Some Jawa, including two writers of Seruan Azhar, Ilyas Ya’qub and Mukhtar Lutfi (b. c.1900), were active in the political party founded by Muṣṭafā Kāmil: al-Hizb al-Waṭānī (Noer 1973: 153).9 And, although then served by the Tunisian-born Islamist ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Shāwīsh (1876–1929), and
languishing far behind Sa‘d Zaghlu‘l’s Wafd party, the fame of the ardent nationalist Muṣṭafā Kāmil had caused students like Ya‘qub and Lutfi to gravitate to his organization and to configure their own imaginations on similarly radical lines. No longer was this a Muslim world uniting several cultural blocs – whether Jawi, Takruri, or Hindi – but a mapped globe populated by many nations. And these nations, whether Egyptian, Turkish, or Indonesian, were all involved in the same discourse of the 1920s, treading the path of national ‘progress’ and ‘development’.

Although the idea of an Indonesian identity was now clearly planted in Cairo in 1925 as much as in Leiden (Ingleson 1975), Seruan Azhar still employed the pan-Malay imagery of its precursor al-Ittihad. And whereas other Islamic journals of the day, like Bintang Islam, featured maps which combined images of a Muslim world juxtaposed with pseudo Ottoman images – such as the star and crescent – Seruan Azhar still pushed the idea of a Jawi homeland. Below the journal’s jawi and rumi titles, an enlarged archipelago sits astride a globe of the world illuminated from the East by ‘the light of unity’ (cahaya persatuan) with a second ray emanating from Cairo in the West (see cover). This, the left margin avers, is ‘the united world of our beloved people’ (alam persatuan bangsa kita yang dikasihi). Its major Islamic zones are highlighted and named: Siam, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, and Borneo. Significantly Mecca is not indicated. As Mukhtar Lutfi was to point out to the assembled Jawa of Cairo in 1927, Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula, like Egypt and the Sudan, were one – a unity Mahmud Yunus felt to be grounded in their mutual ‘tradition’, ‘way of life’ and ‘religion’ (Roff 1970: 73, 84).

As with previous reformist journals, Seruan Azhar reflected the students, predilection for both Islamic and Eastern unity. The opening issue would thus assert with a play on words that ‘this journal, like the sun, arises/is published (terbit) in the East in order to give light (cahaya dan sinar) to the homeland (tanah air)’ (Seruan Azhar, vol. 1, no. 1, October 1925). Uthman Abd Allah also noted that the title of Seruan Azhar was itself a play on ‘light’, with al-azhar not only being the name of the university but the Arabic superlative ‘most radiant’. Thus Seruan Azhar joined in the calls of its Indies partners. Muslims were to make an investment in education for the future of their bangsa and tanah air so that they could stand beside the other nations of the modern world. Love of the homeland was enshrined implicitly thereby as an article of faith.

Similarly Muhammad Qasim Bakri of Padang (d. c.1965) urged the ‘Muslims of my bangsa – our Indonesia’ to recall the golden age of Islam. Yet this was not specifically the golden age of the early caliphs, but that of the great Islamic imperium sourced not only from the classical Arabic works, but Western scholarship. Fath al-Rahman would thus quote the French philosopher Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) – who had claimed that the Muslims had civilized Europe – while Abd al-Wahhab Abd Allah could
happily indulge his passion for Pharaonic history sourced from the Western-language text books in use in Cairo. In so doing, Fath al-Rahman and Abd al-Wahhab reflected the current discourse of the Egyptian intelligentsia trying to wed the glories of a Pharaonic past to an Islamic present. The imagery was not lost on the Indonesians in Cairo. Thus provided with a knowledge of a glorious past that could be both Islamic and Eastern, colonized Muslims ‘could reinforce and strengthen Islam, our fortress, and with all of us so empowered, struggle to demand our lost and mighty power!’ (Seruan Azhar, vol. 1, no. 2, November 1925).

In contrast with the co-operative tone of earlier papers like al-Munir and, probably al-Ittiihad, Seruan Azhar identified the year of 1925 as the time of politics. According to the opening verse of Seruan Azhar (vol. 1, no. 1) ‘Now is a beautiful time. Now is the time to study the science of politics!’ The Muslims of the day needed only to look at the examples being set in Turkey, Afghanistan, Syria, Mauritania, and Morocco where in each case a strong national leadership had emerged to defend its bangsa and homeland (tempat tumpah darah). And in order to be truly independent (mardahika) all foreign aggressors were to be expelled from the land. Thus when recalling the (temporary) Spanish defeat at the hands of ‘the native sons of the Rif’ (anak bumiputra al-Rif), Ilyas Ya’qub – who would become the principal editor and voice of Seruan Azhar – would ask his own Indonesian readers to look to themselves (Seruan Azhar, vol. 1, no. 3, December 1925). No longer is there a tone of respectful co-operation expressed in terms of self-betterment. Jawi reformism had stepped over the boundary of humble collaboration to a call for active resistance. Independence (kemerdekaan/istiqlāl) must be the ultimate goal of all action through the art of co-operation (fann al-ta’āwn) employed by all sons of the watān, as evinced by the peoples of Japan and Europe (Seruan Azhar, vol. 1, no. 3, December 1925).

With the new (Western) year, Ilyas Ya’qub continued his call for the Malayo–Indonesians (as Asians) to co-operate by paying attention to how, after years of bitter conflict, Europe was once more uniting. ‘What steps’, he asked, ‘have been taken by the bangsa of Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula?’ Still the Jawi bangsa remained backward compared to foreigners, and needed to unite in the way of nationhood (kebangsaan) and peace (keselamatan) to pull the people from the depths of negligence (kelalaian). Surely 1925 had brought nothing of benefit to the Indonesian and Malay nation (umat Indonesia dan semenanjung Melayu)! (Seruan Azhar, vol. 1, no. 4, January 1926). The peoples of the Muslim East were thus aware that the struggle for independence and nationhood was to be waged in earnest, and no longer through words alone. Ilyas Ya’qub would therefore continue to illustrate his arguments with reference to the armed national struggles of the wider Muslim world. If 1925 was a year of frustration, then 1926 was to be the year of action. In this Ilyas Ya’qub would prove half-right when ill-co-ordinated and premature rebellions would break out under the banner of communism.
in Banten (November 1926) and West Sumatra (January 1927). This in turn would lead to an even harsher crackdown by the Dutch, including the banning of the increasingly strident *Seruan Azhar* (Roff 1970: 78).

In most other respects there is little to separate *Seruan Azhar* from many of its fellow reformist papers, with its emphasis on the perfect Islam of the golden age, on modern education, progress, and empowerment through study abroad – particularly in Cairo and then perhaps Paris. What is specifically interesting is the sense of identification voiced by its editors – now distinguishing themselves not as Javanese and Sumatrans, but as Malays and Indonesians longing for a united homeland. This homeland they described interchangeably throughout *Seruan Azhar* as a *watan* and *tanah air*. It would seem that the secular discourse of colonial regionality had now penetrated the *riwāq* of al-Azhar. And at the time of Hendrik Kraemer’s visit to al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī’s bookshop in 1922, he had remarked that each day a Malay or Javanese student of al-Azhar would come who was employed as a translator and corrector of Malay printed material.11 This may well have been a certain Muhammad Tahir, who, around 1925, began to add the adjectival *al-Indonāsī* – not *al-Jawāfī* – to his name as the corrector (*muṣahhīh / tukang tashih*) of an edition of the *Qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ* (Stories of the Prophets).12

Another key to the acceptance of an Indonesian identity may also be traced through Cairo, although it was a reaction to events in secular Japan that encouraged Muslims additionally to conceive of themselves as Easterners. The terminology in use throughout the region and abroad became suitably broad to underline the existing East–West opposition. Indonesia thus became *al-sharq al-islāmī*; the Islamic East. Here Roff’s description of a meeting to commemorate the second anniversary of *Seruan Azhar* is illuminating. It was on this occasion then that Mukhtar Lutfi had made his remark about Malayo–Indonesian cultural unity. He then thanked the Egyptian government for giving the Indonesian, Malay, and Siamese students the opportunity to study and live in Egypt, concluding with the observation that: ‘Egypt is an Eastern country and we are Easterners, and as long as we are in the East, we are not strangers’ (Roff 1970: 84).

Nonetheless, their understanding of the East remained more contiguous with an Islamic East. And in line with the formulation of *watānīya* developed by al-Taḥṭāwī, inadvertently advanced by ‘Abduh and Riḍā, and proudly advocated by Kāmil and Zāghlūl, they were peoples of separate Eastern Muslim homelands joined to their fellow Muslims above the winds by the experience of Western colonialism.

The commencement of Saʿūdī rule in Mecca and heightened divisions in Indonesia

After a protracted struggle, Saʿūdī forces occupied al-Taʾīf and then Mecca in October of 1924 forcing Ḫūsayn to abdicate in favour of his son ‘Alī.
The Kaum Muda of Cairo met these events with genuine pleasure (see *Seruan Azhar*, vol. 1, nos. 3 and 4, December 1925 and January 1926). This vanquishing of the fledgling Ḥāshimite kingdom would once more demonstrate that events in the Hijaz were to have an impact on Southeast Asia.

On 25 October 1924, *Bintang Islam* (vol. 2, no. 20) reported the siege of Mecca. Moreover, it was announced that several Jawa, together with Muftī ʿAbd Allāh Zawāwī, had died in the fighting in al-Taʿīf. In the following issue (vol. 2, no. 21, 10 November 1924), further news was relayed from Mecca based on the report of the Javanese Vice-Consul, Raden Prawira Dinata, who clarified that among the eight Jawa killed was Sajid Mahmoed of Pontianak, Zawāwī’s brother-in-law. News of Saʿūdī atrocities was first greeted with suspicion by the Kaum Muda editors of *Bintang Islam*. The basis for their suspicions lay in the person of the Vice-Consul, whom they linked to Ḥūsayn. They then lampooned both the Vice-Consul and an old target, the Regent of Bandung Wiranatakoesoema, with the observation that:

> Prawiro’s reports are perhaps influenced by the star of Hoesein which adorns his throat whenever his photograph is taken these days. Hmmm. The star. So what about that star in Mr. Wiranatakoesoema’s cupboard? It has yet to be seen . . .

With the surrender of Mecca, Ibn Taymīya’s ideas were once again given the support of political authority. Raden Prawira now speculated on the impact of a new, and entirely independent régime in Mecca as a ‘model state for the Islamic world . . . where Islam finds protection as the religion of state’.[13] However, that state was not encouraging of any form of Islam that diverged from the Wahhābī vision, and the Meccan traditions held to be heretical were rigorously suppressed. Thus the Ṣūfī networks were under threat of dispersal as the Wahhābis began to harass ‘unorthodox’ teachers and teachings. For instance, within weeks many of the famous tombs that served as gathering points for the ṭarīqas – such as those of the famous cemetery of Medina (the baqīʿ *al-gharqad*) – were obliterated as they had been over one hundred years before. What may at first have seemed a temporary cessation of the traditional order was instead to lay the foundation of the kingdom of Saʿūdī Arabia. Any Jawa once threatened by, or quiescent under, Ḥūsayn could emerge in safety. This included the son of a Sundanese teacher in Mecca, Hadji Ahmad, famous locally as an ‘adventurous’ young man who had once lived with the Bedouin in the mountains and who had ‘become like a brother to the Wahhabis’. Another Jawī ʿālim, Muḥammad Nūr Ṭaṭānī, the lineal descendant of the famous Patani scholars in Mecca, was now freer to teach and publish his Salafī views, first awakened at al-Azhar under Muḥammad ʿAbduh, and encouraged by Zawāwī. In time he rose to lead the Jawī community in Mecca and disseminate his Kaum Muda views there and in Southeast Asia (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1982: 270).
By contrast, many Kaum Tua Jawa chose not to take their chances with the new régime and returned to the Indies on four relief vessels chartered by the colonial government. Still these only brought back fifteen hundred of an estimated four thousand Indies subjects living in the Hijaz (Anon 1925: 161–63). Among the evacuees interviewed in Batavia, two Javanese described a city where Wahhābī soldiers abused and beat those who smoked or who recited the Qur¯ān in a melodious way. For this reason they claimed that ‘we who stay in Mecca feel that it is now useless to live there as the reason for our residing there is to study religion’.15 As Dja Endar Moeda had noted in 1903, the visitation of the many sacred tombs of the Hijaz were seen by many (Kaum Tua) Jawa as much a part of religion as the Hajj itself. According to the two refugees:

Apart from such harassment there is something which is most painful for the Meccans and the Javanese [orang-orang Djawa] living there; being the destruction of the graves and holy tombs, such as that of Our lady Chadidja and other graves in Moe‘alla. Moreover the birthplace of the Prophet has been levelled to the ground! As they destroyed them [the Wahhābīs] sang invoking Almighty God’s reward for such work as theirs, as, to their minds, the destruction of tombs and the birthplace of the Prophet is a great act of devotion akin to destroying idols!

It is worth noting that the birthplace of the Prophet actually survived for some decades as a madrasa and was only finally razed in the 1980s. The Wahhābīya were only a part of the crisis in Mecca, and many Jawa felt compelled to abandon the Hijaz due to the lack of food and money. For example, Hadji Hamda of Palembang explained that when he left Jeddah on 20 March 1925, there were still five thousand Jawa living under harsh conditions and that the Sa‘īdīs were reluctant to distribute the very scarce supplies of food. He nonetheless anticipated a return to Mecca:

We hope that after the end of the pilgrimage all the Netherlands Indies pilgrims will return from Mecca to their homeland as they are fearful of being contaminated by the beliefs of the Wahhabis. Yet through fear of harassment, in the long term people might well go along with them in matters of religion as has happened among the Meccans themselves.16

Following the conquest, the sense of concern among Kaum Tua was naturally high as the majority of their ‘ulamā‘ were forced from the Haram for the ‘heresies’ they taught.17 One resourceful Sundanese (Raden Moehamad Moechtar) was said to have been allowed to remain, though without his books, as he only responded to interrogation in (very disrespectful)
Sundanese. However, if this Moehamad Moechtar was the same son of the former commander of Batavia’s Manggapasar described by Aboe Bakar in 1915, then he may at first have been seen by the Wahhābīya as an ally, given that he had previously been involved in establishing a Sarekat Islam branch in Mecca closed by Husayn. Other refugees could even concede that the Wahhābis were ‘indeed Muslims . . . but just Muslims of another kind’ (Anon 1925: 162).

Meanwhile, in the Indies, Fachroeddin could assert that the people of Moehammadijah were no longer afraid nor lacked confidence before their opponents, ‘even in Mecca!’ (Bintang Islam, vol. 2, no. 19, 10 October 1924). The Hadrami journal Būrubūdūr even trumpeted the bond between Kaum Muda and the Wahhābīya that so many Kaum Tua feared. Following statements attributed to Rashīd Ridā in al-Ahrām, Būrubūdūr declared the Wahhābīya to be ‘in terms of ideology the faction of Islam of purest faith and the most unsullied of conviction’. Even the then Shaykh of al-Azhar (Muḥammad al-Gīzawī) was reported as saying that ‘their madhhab and conduct [was] the madhhab and conduct of the Sunna’.19 Kaum Tua emigrés from Mecca were doubtless incensed by such statements, and when Kaum Muda returned to the archipelago from the Hijaz and Cairo, they were often branded with the epithet wahabi. Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda, so recently united over the Caliphate crisis, fell out openly as rival congresses were planned for both Cairo and Mecca.

I have already mentioned that the third al-Islam Congress, held in Surabaya in December 1924, had planned to send a united delegation to a Caliphate-summit at al-Azhar under the aegis of King Fuḥad in 1925. This all-Indonesian delegation was to include representatives from Moehammadijah (Fachroeddin), Sarekat Islam (Surjopranato), and the Kaum Tua (Wahab Chasbullah). Although the Kaum Muda of Sumatra were not represented at Surabaya, they planned to send a parallel mission under Ḥadījī Rasool and both parties communicated their intentions by mail (Hamka 1958: 123). Mobini-Kesheh (1997: 244–45) also notes that although Arabs were deliberately excluded from the mission, the al-ʾIrshād committee for Surabaya still contributed five hundred guilders. Yet when the Cairo Congress failed to eventuate due to the collapse of Saʿd Zaghlūl’s ministry, Indonesian consensus foundered. And arrangements for a second congress to be held in Mecca under Ibn Saʿūd saw the reformists completely ignore the Kaum Tua, and, in a meeting held at Cianjur in January 1926, arrange to send their own candidates, Tjokroaminoto and Mas Mansoer. Meanwhile, in Cairo the students assembled their own (exclusively Kaum Muda) delegation headed by Jānan Tāyyīb – the Dīfāʾ al-Watān (‘Defence of the Homeland’).

The fact that Tjokroaminoto was chosen to attend the Mecca conference on behalf of Moehammadijah, and indeed all Muslims of Indonesia, confirmed Kaum Tua fears. A major break between Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda was imminent. Moreover, relations between Sarekat Islam and Moehammadijah
were further damaged by this mission when Tjokroaminoto was criticized for his supposedly shallow understanding of ritual and for his wife’s allegedly scandalous behaviour in Mecca (see fig. 16, which shows Tjokroaminoto and family en route to Jeddah). This was in part due to the purported leanings of the Sarekat Islam leadership toward the widely condemned Indian sect, the Ahmadiya, recently established on Java. Tjokroaminoto was even engaged in translating a highly controversial exegesis of the Qur’an written by the Ahmadi leader Muḥammad ‘Alī (see Ichwan: 2001).

The formation of Nahdlatul Oelama

As a result of the Kaum Muda dominance of organized Islamic propagation and education in Java, and increasingly throughout Indonesia, fifteen Kaum Tua ‘ulamā’ – including Wahab Chasbullah, and the doyen of East Java’s Kaum Tua, Haşim Aş’ari (1875–1947) – met in Surabaya in mid-January 1926 to discuss plans to send an alternative mission to Mecca. The upshot of that meeting was not only the formation of the intended Kaum Tua delegation, but also Nahdlatul Oelama (Ar. nahḍat al-‘ulamā’, the
Awakening of the ‘Ulamā’), the most important organization to aspire to the leadership of the Kaum Tua in Java. And whilst local conditions must be seen as primary in the generation of a desire for such a Kaum Tua body, the international aspect of the representation of Javanese Islam to the Muslim world should not be forgotten. After all, the body had been formed amid plans to send a delegation to the Middle East. The very banner adopted as the symbol of Nahdlatul Ulama even displays a map of the Muslim world that is remarkably similar to that featured on the cover of Seruan Azhar in Cairo one year before.

To appreciate the dynamics behind the foundation of Nahdlatul Ulama, it is worthwhile looking more closely at Abdul Wahab Chasbullah. Chasbullah was born into wealth and station as the grandson of the founder of the pesantren of Tambakberas, Jombang, East Java c.1883. After his pesantren beginnings, he studied for fifteen years under a variety of teachers in Central and East Java, the most important of whom were Kiai Cholil of Kademangan and Hasjim Asj’ari of Tebuireng. Early on, like Hadji Rasoel, Wahab would gain a reputation for erudition and an ability to argue his case doggedly. He was soon noted as a champion of an interpretation of religious law that was ‘not based solely on jurisprudential texts’ but which was also ‘sensitive to social conditions’ (Fealy 1996:5). Such an apparent affinity with the general thrust of *ijtihād* would lend one to believe that there may have existed some measure of common ground between Chasbullah and Hadji Rasoel. Certainly Chasbullah was in agreement with the principles of modern education and Islamic revival through structured organizations like Sarekat Islam, much as the opposing camps of the Hadrami movement were united by the principle of modernization and national advancement (cf. Mobini-Kesheh 1999).

In his late twenties, Chasbullah studied in Mecca under Mahfudz Termas, Baqir Yogya, Muchtarom Banyumas, and Ahmd Khatib. As a member of the Kaum Tua élite with connections to the trade networks of Java and, moreover, because of his inherent predilection for politics, Chasbullah started an association with Sarekat Islam that would last until the early 1920s. Following his return to the Indies, Chasbullah elected not to rejoin his rural pesantren but rather headed for Surabaya where he frequented the home of Tjokroaminoto. There an eclectic assortment of communists, nationalists, and reformists met, including Agoes Salim, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (Soewardi Soerjaningrat, 1889–1959), Hendrik Sneevliet (1883–1942), Alimin (1891–1964), and a very young Soekarno. If anything here was the antidote to Snouck Hurgronje’s morning teas.

Socialization with both the Meccan community of the 1910s and the growing reformist-nationalist movement on Java clearly affected Chasbullah in reinforcing two key revivalist concepts. These were the ideas of awakening (*nahda*) and homeland (*watan*). In Surabaya in 1916 he founded, with his business partner Mas Mansoer, the Nahdlatul Wathon *madrasa*. Unlike
the traditional pesantren, his school emulated those established by both Moehammadijah and the Kaum Muda of Sumatra except that it emphasized traditionalist works in its religious curriculum. Such a school answered an emerging local need for an education that was both traditionalist in content yet modern in method. By now Kaum Tua seemed to be forsaking their aversion to the forms of the ‘infidel schools’. At institutions like the Nahdlatouel Wathon madrasa, senior students and ‘ulamā’ were equipped with the rhetorical skills needed to refute their Kaum Muda opponents in disputes on the Sunna which were now being conducted in open forums such as those convened by the Tasjwiroel Afkar – (Ar. tashwīr al-afkār, ‘the exchange of ideas’) – a grouping founded by Chasbullah under the umbrella of Sarekat Islam in 1918.20

The loosely organized Kaum Tua also felt threatened by the increasing usurpation of their trading networks by the Kaum Muda. This was a marked feature of West Sumatran conditions as well at the time, described by Schrieke (1955: 83–166). There inroads had been made in Minangkabau society by both the wider colonial economy, represented by cash crops, and the increasing influence of the ‘modernism’ of returned pilgrims and teachers who were also involved in these networks of capital. In Java Chasbullah responded to such a similar challenge with his Nahdlatotoet Toejar (‘Awakening of the Merchants’, founded 1918), which he conceived of as a rival to the increasingly Kaum Muda Sarekat Islam. By the mid-1920s, in response to the growing hegemony of Moehammadijah in the fields of education and trade, Kaum Tua ‘ulamā’ felt that they needed a voice and to reassert their authority with a nahḍa of their own. In these circumstances the Nahdlatouel Oelama was born.

Beside the ideological and social impetus for Chasbullah’s involvement with Nahdlatouel Oelama, there was also a personal dimension. His earlier relationships with both Tjokroaminoto and Mas Mansoer were severed when Mansoer joined the Kaum Muda camp (Fealy 1996: 7–10). The increasing prominence of the Kaum Muda within Sarekat Islam, particularly under Agoes Salim, as well as the clear partisanship displayed by Tjokroaminoto for the Moehammadijah must have aroused feelings of personal mistrust and betrayal by an erstwhile political mentor and a former trading partner. Such feelings could only have been heightened further when he saw the Western-trained Tjokroaminoto heading off to the Hijaz to represent his religion and people.

After the war: a model state for independent Islam?

Given anxieties over the Sa’ūdī régime and its effect on Kaum Tua links with Mecca, it is initially surprising to observe that over 52,000 Indonesian pilgrims – including 1 per cent of the population of West Sumatra – arrived in Mecca during the Hajj of 1926. On the ground they accounted for an
unprecedented 42.6 per cent of all participants (Vredenbregt 1962: 146). Nonetheless, that season was considered especially propitious as ʿĪd al-Fiṭr (Lebaran) was due to fall on a Friday. The war was now over, the Hijaz was being rebuilt, and Indonesia – and particularly Sumatra – was then enjoying an economic boom.

Dutch observers in the Hijaz seemed oblivious to this religo–economic confluence and concentrated, as usual, on the political aspects of the explosion of pilgrims. After the communist risings of Banten and West Sumatra, Consul van der Meulen (1981: 88) claimed to have observed ‘a new type of Indonesian fugitive . . . hiding under pilgrim garb’. Although the Communist uprisings had the sympathy of a great many Indonesians, it was a little paranoid to imagine that all 700 Minangkabau who made the Hajj in 1927 were fleeing colonial justice. Van der Meulen was probably still trying to deal with an embarrassing altercation in Cairo in the months beforehand when he attended a lecture on Java by his friend, the co-operative ʿAlawī newspaper editor and owner of a Cairo guest-house, Muhammad bin Hashim. In this lecture bin Hashim had dwelt on the positive aspects of Dutch colonial rule and so was interrupted by a hostile crowd of Indonesians. To the embarrassment of van der Meulen, one student ‘condemned Dutch colonial policy, and insisted that the Communist agitation was supported by the mass of the indigenous population and had been prepared by Sarekat Islam’ (Schmidt 1992: 82). The Egyptian Minister for Education, Ahmad Zākī Pāshā (1866–1934), was forced to intercede on bin Hashim’s behalf, and praised the Dutch government’s intentions which he believed to be based on the wise advice of his personal friend Snouck Hurgronje (van der Meulen 1981: 79–80).

Van der Meulen’s concern about the new politicized Indonesians of Cairo and Mecca is also reflected in a later circular distributed by the First Secretary of the Netherlands Indies Government to all Administrative Heads in the Indies on 18 May 1927.

The G[overnor]-G[eneral] understands that there are extremists of various kinds among the pilgrims this year. These people are trying to use the pilgrimage as a means of escaping further pursuit. The Governor-General thinks it is necessary to supervise the returning pilgrims, for it is obvious that they are establishing organizations in Mecca, and trying to revive their propaganda activities through contact with [other] pilgrims.

(Nagazumi 1980: 118)

These fugitives, the problems they brought with them for Ibn Saʿūd and Consul van der Meulen alike, and the solution adopted by both their governments finally galvanized the Indonesian community in Mecca against their local Dutch representatives.
Following the advice of Snouck Hurgronje, the Netherlands was one of the first states to recognize Ibn Sa’ūd’s régime, thus paving the way for friendly relations between the two nations. Hence the Dutch were granted exceptional consideration by Ibn Sa’ūd and were able to strengthen their economic relationship with the Hijaz and expand the consulate in Jeddah while retaining a Javanese vice-consul, Raden Prawira, in Mecca. This political amity was, however, short-lived. In January 1927, the Dutch were concerned about the dissemination of Soviet propaganda among Indonesian pilgrims. They therefore threatened the Sa’ūdis with economic strangulation, claiming that pilgrims could be prevented from entering the Hijaz should such a situation be allowed to continue (Nagazumi 1980: 116).

Matters escalated further with the discovery of two shadowy organizations linked by their memberships to the Communist uprisings. Both of these organizations, the Sjeich Bond Indonesië (SBI), and its religious wing, the Perserikatan Islam Indonesië (PII), were led by a certain Mahdar from Garut who had been active in the uprising in Ciamis in West Java. Another collaborator in the Perserikatan Islam Indonesië was Janan Tayyib. Both Mahdar and Tayyib were also alleged to have planned to set up an all-Jawa pilgrimage agency to counteract the excesses of the established Arab agencies (Nagazumi 1980: 116–17). For their part the Sa’ūdis determined to act against the two organizations only if they fomented trouble against their own rule. The opportunity for prosecution soon presented itself in June 1927 after the PII criticized Sa’ūdī policy. Two series of arrests netted five Sumatrans and three Javanese – but not the elusive Mahdar (Nagazumi 1980: 120). After several days in Sa’ūdī custody these men proved to be largely demoralized and told van der Meulen of their disillusionment with Mahdar. They also seemed ill-informed on the doctrines of international communism and were unlikely candidates for genuine political agitation.

Whereas the Perserikatan Islam Indonesië was an ill-co-ordinated grouping that only briefly held official attention, the repercussions of its quashing were significant. The foreign Muslim press harangued the Sa’ūdis for their complicity, as did the Indonesian student community at al-Azhar. Meanwhile, the Indonesians of Mecca began to avoid Raden Prawira. These events therefore mark the final cessation of contacts between the Javanese vice-consul and his Indonesian countrymen in the Hijaz. The role pioneered by Raden Aboe Bakar had now been rendered obsolete.

Remarks made by van der Plas to Kern in 1925 about Prawira’s successor can be seen, with hindsight, to be quite misdirected.

As long as we have among the Indonesians people like Prawira, and hopefully his successors, then we may anticipate the future of a Netherlands Indies, an Indies where we need not despair of having an honourable role to play.

(KITLV, Kern papers, series 797: 270)
The Dutch still had many Prawiras and Aboe Bakars, but these were now well and truly outnumbered by equally educated activists like Agoes Salim, whose sphere of activity was directed to the Indies rather more than among their fellow countrymen abroad. As Nagazumi (1980: 122) notes, now it could be seen that not only was Mecca under the Wahhābīs no longer the inviolable refuge of Islam, its rulers had collaborated with the Dutch against fellow believers. I would add that Cairo totally eclipsed Mecca as a free centre for political agitation by Indonesians in the Middle East. Still, by this time even the students of Cairo followed, rather than led an Indonesian national movement. And much like the declining student movement in Leiden (Ingleson 1975: 44–63), all turned to watch events take place in their mutual homeland.
After twelve days and nights of heat, and through three days and nights of huge waves, we arrived at Colombo and then, after another four days, at Sabang. At that time we felt as if we were already home. After four years, and newly arrived at Sabang, we ate *gulai paku* and *rendang* again having been met by a relative from Padang who had heard that we would be coming from Europe on that ship. Aah! How delicious is the food of one’s own people after so many years! Then we felt the truth of the saying: ‘If it rains gold abroad, and stones at home, it is still better at home’.

(Zain 1948:147)

The Minangkabau Soetan Mohamed Zain included this experience of 1928 in a text intended for the school students of a homeland he called Tanah Indonesia. He later became a professor at the Universitas Nasional and wrote a ‘modern’ dictionary of Indonesian (*Kamus Moderen Bahasa Indonesia*). And whilst in the 1910s and 1920s Zain was an Indonesian aligned with the Ethici vision – having worked for Balai Poestaka and having served on the Gemeenteraad for Batavia before being engaged by Leiden University as a teacher of Malay – his experience recounted above would have been shared by many of the Indonesians returning home after months or years in Mecca, Cairo, or Europe.

Coupled with the events taking place in the Hijaz and Cairo, the creation of Nahdlatul Oelama which, like Moehammadijah and Sarekat Islam, had pretensions of speaking for all Indies Muslims, also played a role in refocussing the old ecumenical networks away from Mecca. Kaum Tua Muslims would be forced to look at themselves in isolation from their spiritual heart in Arabia and finally to adopt the strategies and national conceptions of their Kaum Muda rivals. Following the events of 1927, it had
become clear that Muslim activists of all stripes needed to focus on events in Indonesia and, in this new environment, Nahdlatoe Oelama became yet another local component in the generation of an Indonesian consciousness. Aceh, so long the Forecourt of Mecca, now became the forecourt of the homeland of Indonesia. And, for men like Agoes Salim, Mecca and Cairo were now secondary centres. Indeed Agoes Salim reportedly told Hamka that although Mecca and Cairo were ‘suited for worship’ he should not look for science ‘or even wisdom’ there. Rather Salim advised Hamka to look for education and self-development in his ‘own country’ (Steenbrink 1994:131).

Meanwhile Cairo, with its flowering student community and well established links to the communities of Sumatra and the Malay world, was able to take advantage of the chaos in the Hijaz to shore up its position as the pre-eminent place of study for (Kaum Muda) Indonesians. And, although Cairo could never place Mecca in its shadow as a spiritual centre, as an intellectual capital its diverse institutions dominated. The Kaum Muda now enjoyed almost exclusive rights to the linkage between the lands on either side of the winds, and their history of connection with the nationalist movement held them in good stead to gain a place at the forefront of the new Indonesia, which they did.

In this book I have charted the shift from a nineteenth-century (Meccan) discourse of ecumenism to a twentieth-century (Cairene) model of nationhood. As I have shown, the foundations of the Jawi ecumene rested in part on the experience of alterity grounded against both foreign Muslims and European colonizers. This alterity was created by the scholarly networks of the ‘ulamā’ and reinforced on the Hajj, where pilgrims would experience the multivalent claims of local, Jawi, and wider Islamic identity. It was these claims that were later to occupy Muslim reformists as they campaigned for a homeland that was both indigenous and genuinely Islamic.

With the final phases of colonization in the late nineteenth century, the territorial imagining of that Jawi ecumene was slowly being transposed onto the newly defined Netherlands Indies. The Dutch, ever anxious about the political manifestations of Islam, sourced these influences to Mecca, as a Muslim sanctuary they could not visit, from whence they imagined hostile Arab political ideas and propaganda to be interacting with Ottoman claims to the Caliphate. The Dutch therefore tightened their monitoring of the Hajj from the 1850s, establishing a consulate on Hijazi soil in the 1870s, and sending Snouck Hurgronje to get to the heart of the Meccan community and observe its actors from within in the 1880s. However Snouck Hurgronje’s experience, enacted through the filter of local Javanese knowledge, also played a role in shaping the future Dutch conception of ‘their’ archipelago.

Once in the Indies, Snouck Hurgronje and his associates among the Ethici were united by a vision of a future Netherlands Indies where indigenous Muslims would recognize their commonality under Dutch rule, the leadership

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of the Javanese traditional élite, and Malay as a means of expression. Through Association natives would aspire to Dutch models of civilization and by Emancipation they would seek to enact a new form of Islam consonant with Western modernity and continue in a national partnership with their Dutch benefactors.

Nonetheless, many Jawa had other ideas about their corporate future, and the rise in Mecca in the 1890s of Aḥmad Ḵaṭīb is emblematic of a commonality that remained grounded in opposition to a Christian colonizer. However, Mecca was not the only external site of Islamic alterity. Now some Jawa were also starting to gravitate to Cairo as a new style of Islamic metropole. It is this Cairene milieu then that is the key to understanding the new Islamic conceptions of community. In particular, many Jawi students came into contact with the activist and publisher Rashīd Rīḍā, who championed the seemingly contradictory goals of both a Muslim community undivided and a new world of independent Muslim countries. While the retrospective influence of the revivalism of al-Afghānī and the reformism of ʿAbduh should not be doubted, it should also be considered as being a part of the broader experience of life in Cairo where a very strong sense of united Egyptian nationhood was taking hold. In this way the essentially different experience of Cairo from Mecca is highlighted.

Once returned to the archipelago, where there were several indigenous movements on the rise, these largely Kaum Muda Jawa exposed to the Cairene discourse began to harmonize their vision of the modern ecumene to the increasingly national movement in the Indies. But whereas in 1906 al-Imam could only theorize the benefits of Islamic solidarity among the umat Melayu, or in 1911 al-Munir could see the benefits of developing the Minangkabau by connecting with Cairo, it is in 1918 with the informal union of the Sumatran Kaum Muda and their fellow travellers of Moehammadijah on Java that the crucial step was taken towards the construction of a united Indonesian movement. The only basis of such solidarity could be Islam, and an Islam that recognized the changing face of the global community, aligning itself in terms of nation-states, and no longer relying on the older amorphous linguistic and ethnic categories of the ecumenes.

In this sense then it is interesting to see the further fusion of the increasingly national reformist movement with some of the Jawa exposed to Dutch culture, such as Agoes Salim. Whereas Salim had not studied in Cairo, his own readings of this new and modern rethinking of Islam contributed to shaping within him the desire to create a modern Islamic nation. He, and many others like him, then realized that the vision of the Ethici was Utopian, and therefore joined in with the other strands of the national movement while drawing the line at the atheist Communists. In their shared national cause they also adopted the overarching unity of Islam as an important symbol of their commonality. This was expressed most powerfully in the struggle to find a place for the institution of the Caliphate in the modern world, and the shared
experience of Indonesia’s pilgrims to the Hijaz. When the Caliphate was finally extinguished, and a new régime installed in the Hijaz, that consensus between political and religious objectives dissipated.

Nonetheless, the Kaum Muda were not the sole agents of an Islamic Indonesian nationalism. In their attempts to take on the leadership of the umma in Indonesia, whether in representing it to Western or Islamic audiences, they alienated their Kaum Tua opponents who took up the same weapons of modernity: schools, newspapers, and associations. And while both Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua continued to argue over ‘true’ Islamic practice, they nonetheless accepted the very national framework within which that Islam was to be enacted under the opposing symbols of the crescent and the Dutch flag.

### Further reflections

With the final phase of colonialism in the nineteenth century, more and more of the subjects of now moribund rajas and sultans with experience of the Islamic Holy Land came to institute the practices of Islam they saw in the Hijaz in their daily lives. At the level where daily life intersected with religion, Muslim societies, such as those of Minangkabau, Banten, and Aceh, were being proactively led by the ‘ulamā’, who were also becoming increasingly aware of their fellow Muslims throughout the archipelago united now not only in Islam, but under Dutch colonial rule.

Meanwhile the Dutch, by their reduction of these sultanates, removed an impediment to realizable and centralized rule as an alternative basis for modern nationalism. This in part explains the long delay in the development of a nationalist movement in neighbouring Malaysia where the traditional aristocracies maintained the outward signs of their rule and were even able to tighten their grip on the reins of ‘Malay custom’ and ‘religion’. And, although Javanese and ‘outer island’ cultures remained significantly different, Islamic identity as expressed in terms consonant with colonial borders could be more freely asserted by the 1920s due to the mutual co-operation of reformist movements. This was especially the case when Islam was associated with an outward modernism that sought to define exactly who Muslims were. While Dutch scholarship indirectly backed such attempts to define correct Muslims, Dutch power continued to define all Indonesians – Muslim or not – as subjects. Both definitions intersected in the office established to handle ‘native affairs’, the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken, which later evolved into the modern Indonesian Department of Religious Affairs.

Nevertheless, it is simplistic to separate such distinctions of national and religious identity upon purely reformist/traditionalist lines. In Mecca and Cairo, traditionalists and reformists of all shades coexisted more often than they clashed, and the reformist movement should be seen as a natural development from within traditional Islam in various regional contexts, and
not as a wholly modern or Western import. Southeast Asian Muslims as a whole were still not only joined with the wider Muslim world through their education in the Qur’ān and its exegesis, but also still marked apart by their regionality. The very fact that they formed distinct, and important, communities in Mecca and Cairo strengthened feelings both of specificity and unity.

Jawi pilgrims were simultaneously joined and separated by language. They experienced the absolute unity of Islam as they circled around the Ka’ba and were yet isolated from their fellow pilgrims by their lack of a common language, fluent Arabic being the preserve of only a minority of the ‘ulamā’. Yet even these ‘ulamā’, both Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda, were Jawa when they met Arabs, Indians, and Africans. Later they were Indonesians in the company of Egyptians, Pakistanis, and Syrians. It must be said though that Kaum Muda participants in Andersonian print capitalism did tend more explicitly to attach themselves to the global umma. They often sought either to place the Malay world as a periphery in relation to what they believed was the true centre of Islamic orthodoxy (al-Imam), or to posit the Indies as a Muslim nation within a commonwealth of states under the nominal headship of a hypothetical Caliph (Bintang Islam). At the same time the ‘Indonesian’ nationhood voiced by the Kaum Muda involved a fragmentation of the bilād al-jāwa and the appropriation of an existing colonial state. In their emphasis on modernity and education – especially in the teaching of geography and history – implicit divisions within the whole Muslim world were manifested. In the Indies, students at Kaum Muda schools became aware of other Muslim nations, such as India, Egypt, and Turkey, and not the old cultural blocs of Hind or Jāwa.

A major issue to be faced by the Kaum Muda exposed to the Cairo milieu, and who were often connected with the national struggle at home in some way, was the choice of language. Muḥammad ‘Abduh had recognized the connection between language and social change, and had called for an increase in literacy among Egyptians in order to enact religious reform. Yet this was a call for Arabic speakers that could not truly address the needs of speakers of other Islamic languages like Turkish or Malay. Pragmatically, the selection of a language for the press and of education must necessarily be one that could adequately express the needs of the peoples of the region and be readily understood by them. Hence the logical choice for Indonesian Muslims was Malay as the language most associated with Islam and its dissemination throughout the lands below the winds. To some extent this choice represented a continuation of the tradition of Islamic scholarship in the region and in turn reaffirmed the ecumenism of Islamic Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, men like Rashīd Riḍā insisted on the imperative for Arabic among all true Muslims. Perhaps it was the Arab-centric emphasis of the Cairene Kaum Muda which emphasized the divide between themselves and their Kaum Tua brethren in Indonesia who (ironically) referred to Kaum Muda as ‘Mecca people’.
'Arabs', or even 'Wahabis'. The Jawa were already Muslims. Did they have to be Arabs too?

In a sense this is a question of far wider relevance to the field of Islamic studies, and issues of globalization and insulation in general. That is, to what extent does religious revival or change bring with it the baggage of foreign cultural norms deemed to be implicitly a part of true practice? For the Jawa this choice could not be overridden by an idealized image of the Muslim world united by the Arabic language. This was even accepted in the 1930s by hard-liners of the radical Kaum Muda movement Persatuan Islam, when their leader, Ahmad Hassan, acknowledged that Arabic was impractical as the language of international Muslim unity. Hassan could only speculate that if a single Muslim umma existed, then ‘Arabic would undoubtedly be its official language, and the recitation of the khutba in Arabic would then be logical’ (Federspiel 1970a: 59). Such matters had already been raised well beforehand in the pages of al-Munir, where Abdullah Ahmad and his supporters had emphasized that the khutba could be given in the vernacular.

It is therefore interesting to observe this Jawi abrogation of Rashid Rida’s stressing of Arabic as the ultimate language of international communication.

Nonetheless, the ultimate failure of the Kaum Muda to achieve an Islamic state in Indonesia was prefigured by their choice of script. In the race to the press and a modern education, they had lost a calligraphic hegemony to a Western-dominated modernity, and one in which their own schools had participated. Roman-script Malay had become accepted as the language of communication between all the various groups in the Indies. And, as many natives were seeking recognition for their causes from both their fellow-natives and the Dutch rulers, roman-script was the logical vehicle for expression. As time went on, fewer Indonesians were able to read jawi and may well have found the ideas expressed in the kitab kuning dour by comparison to the offerings of the Dutch-educated Communists and nationalists. The Kaum Tua, moreover, were latecomers in either script when it came to contesting the colonial state. It had taken the needling of the Kaum Muda and the divisions they engendered for the Kaum Tua to even start thinking about writing back against the state or arranging themselves on quasi-Western lines as clubs, societies, unions and, ultimately political movements.

It was the subversion of the Kaum Muda waṭan by the less overtly Islamic tanah air nationalism that saw the disenfranchise of such organizations as Sarekat Islam and the reinforcement of the new Indonesian community. Thus, in the 1930s, even some members of Persatuan Islam could question whether or not one could in fact talk of an umma larger than one’s nation (Federspiel 1970a). On 5 March 1931, Shakib Arslan (1869–1946) in Cairo could even receive a letter from a Southeast Asian at al-Azhar signed not al-Minankabawi, or al-Jawi, but Mašur Ahmād al-Indunisi.1
This new Indonesian nationhood was not, however, absolutely contiguous with Islam. Indeed, in the post-colonial era, Indonesian nationhood became a source of conflict for Islamist activists. Some scripturalists, like Ahmad Hassan, fully expected that independence would see the effectuation of an Islamic state (negara Islam). For these activists, the first step in creating an Islamic state was, like Rashīd Riḍā’s Caliphate of usurpation, to create an independent state of any form. If the inhabitants of that state were overwhelmingly Muslims, then the negara Islam would prove to be a natural consequence: even if this might alienate the substantial non-Muslim communities within the archipelago. Perhaps, in retrospect, one of the great failures of the reformist movement in its agitation for an independent and united Indies nation was that it did not ever develop a name for that community which signified a link with Islam. Instead, Indies Jawa made do with the terms developed as a legacy of the colonial system and accepted its borders, bureaucracies, and conceptualizations of unity.

Between 1948 and 1965 Indonesia would be led by its first Muslim President, yet he was a man who wore his Islam like his black felt hat. It was an underlying symbol of Indonesian unity, which he could put on or take off as he chose. Under Soekarno a new, and ostensibly less divisive doctrine, Pancasila, was presented to the Indonesian people as the basis of their unity and, under his successor Soeharto, political Islam would be cast further into the wilderness. National belief was affirmed not in Allāh, but in one God (Tuhan); state religion was a matter of monotheism, not Islam. Ahmad Hassan would not live to see the evolution of a negara Islam. One should never forget – as people like Ahmad Hassan often appeared to – that Indonesia is a far more complex nation than the Muslim umma that lives both within, and beyond, its colonial borders.
GLOSSARY

‘Alawī, pl. ‘Alawīyūn  Ar. Patronymic indicating descent from the son-in-law of the Prophet, ‘Alī bin Abī Ṭālib
‘ālām  Ar. (Mal. alam). World
‘ālim, pl. ‘ulamā’  Ar. A learned person, a Muslim scholar
‘ālimiya The highest degree awarded by an Islamic institution under Ottoman (or Egyptian) rule
amīr  Prince, ruler, leader
anak negeri  Mal. An inhabitant of a Malay polity, cf. negeri
‘Arafat  Plain outside Mecca where the ritual of ‘standing’ is observed within the ceremonies of the Hajj
‘ašabīya  Ar. Clan or group solidarity
abangan  Jav. ‘The red ones’: Javanese Muslims who reject scripturalist prescriptions
Associatie  Du. The policy of creating a lasting cultural bond between Indonesia’s élites and the Netherlands
adat  Mal. (Ar. ādā). Indigenous traditions often respected or tolerated in Islamic societies
agama (ugama)  Mal. Religion
ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd  Ar. ‘Those who loose and bind’, the ‘ulamā’
al-fātiha  Ar. The opening verse of the Qur’ān, recited at the commencement of prayers (salāt)
al-insān al-kāmil  Ar. ‘The perfect man’, the ideal of Ṣūfī cosmography

bangsa  Mal., Jav. A grouping of sentient beings, nation
bangsawan  Mal. A man of the state, a patriot
baraka  Ar., Mal. Divine blessings often imparted at holy sites or in the presence of Ṣūfī divines
batik  Mal., Jav. Traditional Southeast fabric patterned by layering of wax and then dyed repeatedly
batin  Mal., Jav. (Ar. batin). The inner nature of things
bay’ā  Ar. Traditional declaration of allegiance to the Caliph
beweging  Du. Movement, i.e., de nationalistische beweging
beschaving Du. Culture, civilization

bid’a Ar. Innovation

bilād al-jāwa Ar. The lands of the Jāwa; Southeast Asia

bumi Mal., Jav. Land

bupati Jav. A regent, the highest ranking native in the Dutch bureaucratic hierarchy

Caliphate (Ar. khilāfa, ‘succession’). The office empowered, after the death of the Prophet, with jurisdiction over the entire community of believers

concentratie-stelsel Du. System of systematic containment of Acehnese adopted by the Dutch forces

controleur Du. An inspector of the Dutch colonial service

dakwah Mal. (Ar. da’wa). Islamic propagation

al-dahrīya Ar. Materialism; secularism
dahrīyūn Ar. Materialists; secularists
dalang Mal. (Jav. dhalang). A puppeteer, most usually of traditional shadow-puppets
dār al-ḥarb Ar. ‘The abode of war’, the lands opposed to, or outside, the Muslim world
dār al-islām Ar. ‘The abode of Islam’, the Muslim world
dawla Ar. State; Mal. Divine power of kingship
derhaka, durhaka Mal. Treason
dhikr Ar. The ritual ‘recollection’ of divinity through mental or physical régimes prescribed by a given Ṣufī order
dhimni, dhimma Ar. Those non-Muslims afforded protection within an Islamic state by virtue of their previous receipt of revelation; most usually Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians
dunnia Mal. (Ar. dunyā) The temporal world

Ethici Du. The Ethicists, mostly Christian reformers concerned for the welfare of Holland’s ‘native’ subjects

fatwā, pl. fatāwā Ar. A juridical opinion voiced by a Muslim scholar with reference to the sources of Islam

fiqh Ar. The science of Islamic jurisprudence

al-Gharb Ar. The West

ḥabīb Ar. ‘Beloved [of God]’, a cognate for Sharīf adopted by some Hadrami ‘Alawīyūn

ḥadīth, pl. ahādīth Ar. Tradition related by the Prophet and relayed to the Muslim community. While not considered direct revelation by the Islamic community, the compendia of hadīth form the largest, and most contested, body of Islamic practice (Sunna) that define Islamic orthodoxy
haji Mal. (Ar. ḥajjī, pl. ḥuṣjaj; Du. hadji). A pilgrim who has completed the Ḥajj

ḥaḍj Ar. The visitation of the Kaʿba in Mecca and its associated ceremonies performed at the beginning of the Holy month of Dhū al-Ḥijja

ḥalaqa Ar. A ‘circle’ formed by the teaching of a recognized ‘ālim surrounded by his students

Ḥanbalī Ar. A member of the Ḥanbalite juridical school

Ḥanifī Ar. A member of the Ḥanifī juridical school

ḥaram Ar. Holy territory off-limits to non-Muslims

ḥarām Ar. That which is forbidden to Muslims (pork etc.)

Ḥaramayn Ar. The two holy sites, Mecca and Medina

ḥashiya Ar. A tale or account, often used to describe Malay dynastic claims

hikayat Mal. (Ar. hikāya). A tale or account, often used to describe Malay dynastic claims

hilāl Ar. The crescent moon

Hindi, pl. Hunūd Ar. An inhabitant of the Indian subcontinent

ḥizb, pl. aḥzāb Ar. A faction or grouping, a (political) party

ḥubb al-waṭān Ar. ‘Love of the homeland’, patriotism, cf. waṭānīya

ḥudūd Ar. Boundaries, those punishments decreed by the Sharīʿa

ḥurrīya Ar. Freedom

‘Īd al-Ḥiṭr Ar. The feast celebrating the end of Ramaḍān, the month of fasting

ijāza Ar. A document given by an ‘ālim to his pupil granting authority to teach a particular text or give instruction in a particular ritual

ijmāʿ Ar. Consensus, regarded as one of the sources of authority when formulated by the early Muslim community

ijtihād Ar. Independent interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence based on a thorough knowledge of the Qurʾān and Sunna

ihrām Ar. The state of ritual purity necessary to undertake the Ḥajj

‘ilm Ar. (Mal. ilimu, Jav. ngilmu). Science or knowledge, most often a branch of Islamic knowledge.

‘ilm al-falak Ar. Astronomy, used to calculate and fix times for the correct observance of ceremonies such as salāt

imām Ar. A leader, most often of communal prayers

īmān Ar. Faith, inner belief

imāma Ar. The imamate or leadership of the Muslim community, cf. Caliphate

imtiyāzāt Ar. ‘Preferences’, the Capitulations allowing commercial privileges to non-Muslim merchants in Ottoman territories

Indologie Du. The study of Indic civilizations

inlander Du. Native
Irshādī, pl. Irshādiyūn  Ar. A follower of the al-Irshād movement, founded on Java by Ahmad Soorkatie

istiqlāl  Ar. Independence

ittiḥād  Ar. Unity, union, unification

izhār  Ar. Manifestation

jago  Jav. Champion, strong man

jāhilīya  Ar. ‘The time of ignorance [of Islam]’; the time before the revelation of the Qur’ān through the prophethood of Muhammad

jaksa  Mal. A native judge

jamīah  Mal. (Ar. jam‘īya) An association or society

Jāwa  Ar. Java, Southeast Asia

Jāwī, pl. Jāwa  Ar. (Mal. Jawi) An inhabitant of Southeast Asia

jawi  Mal. Southeast Asian; the modified Arabic script employed to write Malay

jihād  Ar. Religious struggle, often used in a military sense

jins, ajnās  Ar. Race or grouping. Related to the Latin ‘genus’ and Malay ‘jenis’

jinsīya  Ar. Ethnicity, nationality

jubba  Ar. The voluminous cloak often worn by the ‘ulamā’ or holders of authority

jumūd  Ar. Ossification, stultification

Ka’ba  Ar. The central shrine of Mecca and focal point for Muslim prayers, it is reputedly the house first constructed by Abraham

kāfir, pl. kuffār  Ar. Unbeliever

kaum  Mal. (Ar. qawm) A grouping of people

Kaum Muda  Mal. The young faction, reformists

Kaum Tua  Mal. The old faction, traditionalists

kauman  Jav. The district surrounding the principal mosque of a Javanese town, usually occupied by the santri

kafā’a  Ar. Parity, equality of rank

kāfir, pl. kuffār  Ar. Unbeliever

kepala desa  Mal. Village head

kepala juma’ah (kepala djoemaäh)  Mal. Group leader, most often the pilgrim guide

kiāi (kijaji)  Jav. An Islamic scholar, an ʿālim

kraton  Jav. Royal enclosure

Khedive  The nominal representative of the Ottoman Sultan in Egypt

khilāfa  See Caliphate

khilāfat al-ḍarūra  Ar. The Caliphate of necessity whereby an inferior candidate occupies the position in the public interest (maṣlaḥa)

khutba  Ar. The address given by the imām at Friday’s congregational prayer
kitab kuning  Mal. The corpus of Islamic knowledge once symbolized by the aged pages of the ‘yellow books’
kris, keris  Mal., Jav. Traditional Southeast Asian dagger, often believed to be a potent receptacle of mystical power
kufri  Ar. Unbelief
kuttāb, pl. katātīb  Ar. Traditional school providing elementary instruction in the Qur‘ān

lahir  Mal., Jav. (Ar. ẓāhir). The esoteric aspects of Islamic practice

madhhab, pl. madhāhib  Ar. Juridical school of Islam
madrasa, pl. madāris  Ar. Islamic school offering higher education in Islamic disciplines. See pesantren
magang  Jav. A clerk, the lowest priyayi echelon in the Dutch administrative system
Mālikī  Ar. A member of the Mālikite juridical school
mansak, pl. manāsik  Ar. A guide-book for the conduct of the Ḥajj
al-Masjid al-Ḥarām  Ar.; The sacred mosque enclosing the Ka‘ba in Mecca
mašlaḥa  Ar. The public interest
milla  Ar. A people or nation
Moros  The Muslims of the Southern Philippines, originally called ‘Moors’ by the Spanish
mufti  Ar. A consultant engaged to give a juridical opinion or fatwā
muhājir, pl. muhājirūn  Ar. Emigrants, most usually Muslims emigrating from oppression as Muḥammad and the community did from Mecca in 620
mujtahid, pl. mujtahidūn  Ar. An exponent of ijtihād
muqīm, pl. muqīmūn  Ar. A long-term foreigner resident in the Ḥaramayn
Mu’tazilī  Ar. A member of an early breakaway sect within Islam, the Mu’tazila
muṭawwif, pl. muṭawwifūn  Ar. The guides employed in the Ḥijaz to conduct pilgrims between the ritual sites of Mecca
muwallad, pl. muwalladūn  Ar. A locally-born person, most usually a Hadrami born in Southeast Asia
muẓawwir, pl. muẓawwirūn  Ar. The guides employed to conduct pilgrims between the ritual sites of Medina, site of the tomb of the Prophet

nahda  Ar. Arising, renaissance
Nasari  Mal. Christians
negara Islam  Mal. An Islamic state
negeri  Mal. A key entrepôt and its surrounding territory, a Malay polity
nusa (noesa)  Jav. Island, land
nyai (njai)  Jav. Housekeeper, consort
Pacificatie Du. The Dutch policy of aggressive military suppression of native insurgencies
penghulu Mal. A leader or authority, in Indonesia the title of a religious official supported by stipend from the Dutch government
peranakan Mal. A locally born person of foreign extraction (cf. muwallad)
pergerakan Mal. Movement, rising
pesantren Jav. A boarding college for religious instruction, cf. madrasa
prang sabit Mal. Holy war, jihād
priesters Du. Priests, a misnomer for the ‘ulamā’
priesteraad Du. Council convened by the Dutch to have authority over matters of Islamic law where it had no bearing on Dutch colonial law
priyayi Jav. The Javanese élite comprising both the aristocracy and native officialdom
qādī Ar. A judge
qawm Ar. A community, cf. kaum
qawmīya Ar. Nationalism
qibla Ar. The direction of the Ka‘ba in Mecca to which all mosques are oriented
raja Mal. A king
rakyat Mal. (Ar. ra‘īya) The subjects of a raja
Ramadān Ar. The fasting month
rihla Ar. A travel account most often including a description of the Hajj
riwāq, pl. arwiqa Ar. The halls of residence at al-Azhar and other major teaching mosques
Rūm Ar. (Mal. Rum) The Ottoman Empire
rumi Mal. Roman script
rust en orde Du. Peace and tranquillity
ṣalāt Ar. The five daily prayers enjoined upon Muslims
santri Jav. A scripturalist Javanese Muslim
ṣawm Ar. Fasting
sayyid, pl. sāda Ar. A descendant of the Prophet
sha‘b, pl. shu‘ūb Ar. A people
Shāfi‘ī Ar. A member of the Shāfi‘ite juridical school
shahāda Ar. The declaration of belief in God and Muḥammad as his Prophet
shuqdhuf Ar. A wooden frame carried on the back of a camel that accommodates two passengers
shari‘a Ar. The Holy Law as revealed to Muḥammad and interpreted by the ‘ulamā’
sharīf, pl. shurafā’ Ar. A direct lineal descendant of the Prophet through the line of his son-in-law ʿAlī
al-Sharq  Ar. The East

shaykh, pl. shuyūkh  Ar. An elder or leader, most often a senior ʿālim

Ṣūfī  Ar. An Islamic mystic

Sunna  Ar. The traditional body of orthodoxy built on the emulation of the life and conduct of the Prophet

Sunnī  Ar. A member of the orthodox community of Islam

taʿāṣub  Ar. Solidarity, fanaticism
tablīgh  Ar. Preaching
tafsīr  Ar. Exegesis
taghallub  Ar. Usurpation, force

Takrūrī, pl. Takayrna  Ar. An African Muslim
talfiq  Ar. The selective consideration of a matter at law with reference to more than one juridical school
talkin  Mal. (Ar. talqīn). The custom of whispering reminders in the ear of the dead so that they might answer their interrogation correctly on the Day of Judgement
tamaddun  Ar. (Mal. tamadun). Civilization
tanah  Mal. Land, earth
tanah air  Mal. Homeland
taqbīl  Ar. Paying one’s respects to a superior by kissing the hand
taqlīd  Ar. The pious emulation of the practices of one’s elders and predecessors

ṭarbūsh  Ar. Fez

ṭarīqa, pl. ṭuruq  Ar. A mystical order
tarjama, pl. tarājim  Ar. A biography

taṣawwuf  Ar. Mysticism
tashabbuh  Ar. Emulation, most often of non-Islamic practices

teuku, teungku  Mal., Aceh. A religious leader, and ʿālim of authority

ṭughrāʾ  Tur. The calligraphic sigil of the Ottoman Sultan

umat beragama  Mal. The religious community

umma, pl. umam  Ar. (Mal. umat). Community, nation

vālī  Tur. (Ar. wālī). Governor

vorstenlanden  Du. The princely states of Surakarta and Yogyakarta

vreemde oosterlingen  Du. ‘Foreign orientals’, most often Chinese and Arab residents and their families living in the Dutch East Indies

Wahhābī  Ar. A follower of the teachings of the Wahhābīya; more correctly the Muwahhidūn

Wahhābīya  Ar. Pietist movement founded in Arabia by Muḥammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1703–87)
wahy  Ar. (Mal. Jav. wahyu). Divine inspiration

wakīl, pl. wukalāʾ  Ar. A representative
**GLOSSARY**

 wannā, pl. awliyā’  Ar. A Ṣūfī saint, someone ‘close to God’

 waqf, pl. awqāf  Ar. A charitable endowment pledged in perpetuity for either personal or public use

 watān, pl. awtān  Ar. Homeland

 wataniyya  Ar. Patriotic affection, patriotism

 waqf, pl. awqāf  Ar. Pious endowment

 wayang  Mal. Puppets employed by a Dalang to relate traditional Indic and Southeast Asian epics

 wedono  Jav. A low-ranking Javanese official charged with the supervision of a small township

 wudu’  Ar. The ritual washing prior to the performance of prayers

 Zābaj  Ar. Archaic name for Southeast Asia

 ḥāhir  Ar. see lahir

 zakāt  Ar. Ritual alms

 ziyāra  Ar. (Mal. Ziarat) A visit, more specifically the visitation of a holy tomb or the Prophet’s mosque in Medina, often performed in addition to the Ḥajj
NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 The thoughts of Robert Cribb and Goenawan Mohamad were presented to a roundtable discussion in answer to the question ‘What is Indonesia?’ convened at the American Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Washington DC, 4–7 April 2002.

2 More correctly, the central mosque of Mecca which encloses the Ka’ba is referred to as al-Masjid al-Ḥarām (‘the sacred mosque’), while ‘the Haram’ is the holy territory that surrounds both Mecca and Medina. Both cities are often referred to as ‘the two sanctuaries’ (al-ḥaramayn) (see Peters 1994b: 21).

1 AN ECUMENE IN ‘THE LAND BELOW THE WINDS’

1 The earlier Ibn Khurdadhbih (844–48) had written variously of ‘the realm of Jāba the Indian’, or that of ‘the Maharaja’ (al-mahrāj) or ‘the isles of Zābaj’ (the empire of Śrīvijaya, 7th–13th centuries?) – all lying at ‘the ends of the world’ (hudūd al-ʿalam) (Schrieke 1957: 257–66). Works from the tenth century onwards also speak of the ‘wonders’ of Zābaj, its great Maharaja, spices, peoples, flora and fauna (Tibbetts 1979: 37–59). For an account of very similar writings in Medieval Christian descriptions of Southeast Asia, and Sumatra in particular, see Braginsky 1998.

2 For a discussion of the evolution and impact of the category Melayu, see the articles of Reid, Andaya, Barnard, and Shamsul in the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 32, no. 3 (2001).

3 Snouck Hurgronje did not specify in which work ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf wrote this line. I suspect that, working from memory, he was referring to the Mir’at al-tullāb. In this work, commissioned by the Sultana Taj al-ʿAlam Šafiyat al-Din (1641–75), ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf pauses to write in Arabic that ‘due to the strength of her aspiration for religion, I have composed what is needed with regard to matters of judgement and the rules of the šarīʿa as employed by the Šafiʿite ulamāʿ in the Sumatran Jawi tongue (bi al-lisān al-jāwīya al-sumatrāʾiyya)’. See Cod. Or. 1633, pp. 4–5.

4 As quoted by Peters (1994a: 96–97). Burkhardt was incorrect in his claim that there was no such entity as Takrūr. Takrūr (Tukolor), a town in the Senegal valley, had been the centre of a major Islamic kingdom in the eleventh century. In the seventeenth century Takrūr was taken to include both sides of the Niger river between Hausa and Gurma and was widely used as a term for Africa (see Levtzion 1975).

5 See Azra 1992: 116; Ricklefs 1993: 47. These missions appear to be anticipated by the semi-legendary journey of the Malay Sunan Gunung Jati to the Javanese court.
of Banten c.1525 with a letter of investiture from the Sharīf of Mecca for Sultan Trenggana (r.1504–46) (Reid 1993c: 146, 175).

6 According to Pigeaud, there had been a clique of ‘ulamā’ seeking to replace Amangkurat with his brother (see De Graaf and Pigeaud 1976: 55). One might speculate that this could have been to quieten dissent following Amangkurat’s conclusion of a treaty with the Dutch at Batavia on his ascension to the throne (De Graaf and Pigeaud 1976: 58).


8 This last work was extremely popular among the Jawi community of the Hijaz by virtue of its marginal commentary the I'ānat al-tālibīn (The Seeker’s Aid) – published in Cairo in 1883. The commentary was written by Abū Bakr Shaṭṭā (Sayyid Bakrī al-Dimyāṭī, d. 1893), who had a large Jawi following (see Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 188–89). In a reprint issued after Abū Bakar’s death, Shaykh Muḥammad Zayn bin Muşṭafā bin Idrīs al-Faṭānī even devoted a panegyric to the author.

9 There is also the possibility that this work mentioned by Imam Ahmad was another by Yūsuf al-Maqaṣṣārī (cf. Azra 1992: 374).

10 For a brief summary of the very active life of the scholar Aḥmad bin Muḥammad Zayn, who influenced many Muslim teachers throughout Mainland Southeast Asia, see Matheson and Hooker (1988: 28–30).

11 Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 287) notes that an identically entitled work by an Acehnese (another Muḥammad Zayn) was then in print in Mecca. Al-Ghazālī’s Bidāyat al-hidāya was a short work on the principles of normative ‘external’ piety containing details on how to perform prayers and what ‘sins of the heart’ to avoid (Watt 1963: 86–152). According to al-Ghazālī, the ‘beginning of guidance’ lay in external piety and its end was to be found in internal piety – embodied in mysticism (Gibb 1963: 90).

12 Kruijt to Ministry of Colonies, Jeddah, 18 December 1882, ARA, A.74 box. 148.

13 It has been suggested by Feener (1999: 120–21), following the dissertation of Abu Hamid (Shaykh Yusuf Tajul Khalwati, Universitas Hasanuddin, 1990), that al-Maqassārī continued to advocate resistance to the Dutch in letters sent from Ceylon.

14 I am indebted to Bill Roff for drawing my attention to more focussed understandings of sociological understandings of the Hajj. For a more nuanced exploration of the ideas of Van Gennep and Turner and their application to the study of Muslim ritual, see Roff’s forthcoming paper ‘Sociological interpretations of Hajj ritual’ to be included in a festschrift to be presented to Clive Kessler.

2 ARAB PRIESTS AND PLIANT PILGRIMS

1 There had been pressure on the Dutch from commercial interests to move into Aceh for some time, but Dutch ambitions had been stymied by the Anglo–Dutch treaty of 1824 which had recognized Acehnese independence. However a deal
to exchange Dutch holdings in Ghana and promises of trade liberalization in Sumatra and Borneo made for the agreement of 1871. Unless otherwise noted, the account of the war in Aceh is drawn from Reid (1969), van ’t Veer (1969) and Snouck Hurgronje (1906). The ‘afronding’ is a term that has been employed by Dutch historians.

2 Letter personally delivered by the British ambassador to The Hague, Cabinet Paper No. 8, 12 March 1881, ARA, A.74 box 148.

3 Such a view was echoed later by the Bantenese dragoman at the Dutch consulate in Jeddah. See Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 9 May 1896, Cod. Or. 8952.

4 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 9 May 1896, Cod. Or. 8952.

5 W.H. Read to de Bylandt, Durham Terrace, 19 March 1881, ARA, A.74 box 148.

6 The dragoman Aboe Bakar also referred to the arrival of a fleet of eight warships from the aggrieved nations of Britain, Russia, and France. See Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 9 May 1896, Cod. Or. 8952.

7 See Kruijt at Jeddah, 16 May 1881, Mr. 1881, no. 978; Kruijt to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jeddah, 15 Aug. 1883, ARA, A.74 box 148. Kruijt was Consul (1878–83) and Consul General (1883–85) in Jeddah following experience as an official in the Indies. The Sanûsîya, founded by Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Sanûsî (1791–1859), was then active both in the Hijaz and engaged against the French in North Africa (O’Fahey and Radke 1993).

3 THE HIJAZI EXPERIENCE AND DIRECT COLONIAL VISIONS OF THE HEART OF THE ECUMENE

1 Two examples of such maps are to be found in Snouck Hurgronje’s papers at Leiden University. One, published by Muḥammad Mājid al-Kurdī al-Shāmī and his student Ḥusayn al-Jāwī in 1914, features a map of the world, the second is of the Hijaz; Cod. Or. 18097 file 40.

2 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 3 March 1892, Cod. Or. 8952.

3 From 1871, the al-Saqqāf family had been involved in the transportation of pilgrims from Singapore with a small fleet of steamers (Clarence-Smith 1997:300). ʿUmar al-Saqqāf was a leading light in the Jeddah community. It was with his agency that most Jawi pilgrims banked their money in the Hijaz.

4 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 4 November 1895, Cod. Or. 8952.

5 Snouck Hurgronje to Governor General (van Heutsz), Batavia, 22 October 1904, AA: II, 1476–85.

6 It should not be forgotten that Siam also had Jawi possessions in the Malay Peninsula. Four of these states – Perlis, Kedah, Trengganu, and Kelantan – were only ceded to British control in 1909. A fifth, Patani, remains within Thailand’s borders today.

7 Rinkes to Ministry of Colonies, The Hague, 16 May 1918: 151, Cod. Or. 18097 file 40.

8 See van Lennep to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 28 June 1909 and Snouck Hurgronje to Minister of Colonies, Leiden, 30 January 1915, ARA, A.190 box 453–54: 255 and 310. Matters continued thus into the 1920s when Consul Ch.O. van der Plas complained of the number of pilgrims who, having booked return passage to the Indies, would disappear in the Hijaz while other, until then un-noted, individuals would appear to claim their passage (Ch.O. van der Plas to Governor General, KITLV, Kern papers, series 797: 262).

9 In 1910, the Jawī Muqımūn were required to register for stays of over three months and anyone remaining after the Ḥajj would lose the protection of the Dutch
Consulate and be regarded as Ottoman residents. See Snouck Hurgronje to Minister of Colonies, Leiden, 5 September 1910, AA: II, 1506–07.


11 Minister of Colonies (Sprenger van Eyck) to Kruijt, The Hague, 14 May 1884. Letter A3 No. 12, ARA, A.74 box 148.

12 Van der Chijs to van Wamel, Wageningen, 23 June 1879, ARA, A.74 box 148.

13 Van der Chijs to Minister of Colonies, Jeddah, 25 August 1877, ARA, A.74 box 148: 7418. Van der Chijs wrote asking that the Governor General be advised to set aside public funds in future to free other subjects of the Netherlands Indies; Van der Chijs to Ministry of Colonies, Jeddah, 25 August 1877, ARA, A.74 box 148. The Minister for Colonies replied that such instances were most likely the result of pilgrims willingly entering into debt-bondage in order to perform the pilgrimage and that ‘the Netherlands Government could not imagine that these people would be released for nothing, nor yet that it should buy them’; Minister of Colonies to Hanegraaf, The Hague, 12 October 1877, ARA, A.74 box 148).

14 These letters are found in Cod. Or. 7111 and Cod. Or. 18097 file 32.

15 Ḥādhrūmān was born in the Hadramaut and spent his childhood in Malabar before moving to Mecca and Medina for his studies. In 1864 he arrived in Aceh and instituted strict reforms like al-Rānîrî over two hundred years before him. With the approach of war he left the weakened court for Constantinople via Mecca to seek aid from the Ottoman sultan. This failed and he returned, by way of Penang in 1874, to Aceh in 1876. He then led the resistance before surrendering in 1878 in exchange for safe passage to Mecca and a large pension. He died there in 1896, impoverished and apparently despised by the Acehnese (see Reid 1972).

16 Snouck Hurgronje to Nöldeke, Jeddah, 25 October 1884; van Koningsveld 1985a: 5.


19 Snouck Hurgronje’s Jeddah diary, Cod. Or. 7112: 10–11.

20 It appears quite likely that a photograph taken in the Dutch consulate in 1884 is of Ḥādhrūmān. It shows a man of similar age to Snouck Hurgronje wearing an Ottoman fez and holding a set of prayer-beads. The caption of the photo simply declares him to be ‘one of the sons of the Qāḍī of Jeddah’. See NINO 1.43.

21 It is not clear whether Snouck Hurgronje adopted this name in deference to his physician friend. I am inclined to suspect that they had not yet met at this stage.

22 Snouck Hurgronje to Nöldeke, [Jeddah], 1 August 1885, van Koningsveld 1985a: 8–10.

23 Based on information discovered by Jeroen Peeters (1996), Abd Allah may be identified as the son of Kemas Haji Muhammad b. Abd Allah Azhari al-Palimbani. The latter studied in Mecca c.1843 and was responsible for establishing the first Islamic printing press in Southeast Asia, producing lithographed Qur’āns at Palembang in 1848. The Azhari family was connected to the Sammānīya order and had mediated between the court of Palembang and its most famous scholar in the Hijaz and member of that order, ‘Abd al-Ṣamad al-Fālimbānī.

24 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, no date, Cod. Or. 7111.
NOTES

25 Ahmad Dahlan to Snouck Hurgronje, Mecca, no date, Cod. Or. 7111.
26 Internal evidence from Aboe Bakar's correspondence also suggests that he viewed the ecumene in similar terms, see Laffan 1999a: 530.
27 This *fatwa*, written by the Mufti for Snouck on a loose scrap of paper and dated March 1885, is found in a small envelope within Cod. Or. 7111. Snouck continued to have an interest in the Mahdi, publishing an article on him and relaying the popular sentiment in the Hijaz which described him, like many of the revivalist *`ulama`* discussed by Voll (1987) and Azra (1992), as a 'renovator [mujaddid] of Muslim religion' (see VS: I, 145–82; Drewes 1957: 10).
28 See Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 260–61). Ahmad Lampung was later referred to in Aboe Bakar's correspondence as having sent Snouck the gift of a box of dates. Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 14 September 1891, Cod. Or. 8952. Ahmad Lampung's photo is included among Snouck Hurgronje's papers. See Cod. Or. 18097 s67 no. 17.
29 *`Tarajim`* *`ulama`* al-jawa*, Cod. Or. 7111.
30 *`Tarajim`* *`ulama`* al-jawa*, Cod. Or. 7111.
31 Aboe Bakar to Consul Wolff, Mecca, 12 December 1913, Cod. Or. 18097, file 48. *Maksur al-qadah*. ('broken cup', or perhaps 'broken bag') was perhaps an epithet for 'beggar' while the expression 'snake-eater' was evidently in use in the 1880s with Snouck (1931: 225, n. 4) noting that it was probably due to the Sundanese passion for eating eels.
32 By 1913, Bugis usually joined the Sanusiya, Sundanese the Naqshbandiya and Bantenese the Qadiriya wa Naqshbandiya. Aboe Bakar to Consul Wolff, Mecca, 12 December 1913, Cod. Or. 18097, file 48.

4 COLONIZING ISLAM AND THE WESTERN-ORIENTED PROJECT OF INDIES NATIONHOOD

1 According to Fasseur (1986: 141), in 1850 the Dutch administration maintained between 150 and 200 officials to supervise plantations in the whole of Java, which then had a population estimated at 10 million. By 1870, a population that had risen to 17 million was supervised by less than 100 Dutch officials with the aid of 80 Bupatis and an army of 35,000 (Steinberg 1987: 193).
2 See Mr. 1885, nos 642A, 647A, and 647C and 1886, nos 90A, 262, 295 and 362; cf. van Bruinessen (1992: 109–10) and Steenbrink (1993: 80–81). Peltzer even suggested that disgruntled members of the Shatariya and Qadiriya orders may have been behind the campaign to unseat the order that was successfully undermining them in the Priangan.
3 Said Oesman to Snouck Hurgronje, Batavia, 4 January 1887, Cod. Or. 18097 file 32. It is possible that the books sent by Said Oesman, and his letters to Snouck regarding the practice of Islam on Java, formed the basis of the transaction for which he was allotted fl 100 on 20 June 1889 (see Steenbrink 1984: 60).
4 Snouck Hurgronje to Director of Education, Batavia, 20 June 1889, AA: II, 1510–11.
5 This was based on his research report to the Governor General. It was translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan in 1906 as *The Achehnese* (1906).
6 See Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 31 March 1896, Cod. Or. 8952.
7 Snouck Hurgronje to Governor General, Batavia, 25 October 1904, AA: II 1485–94.
8 See, for example, his recommendations to the Director of Education (Batavia, 25 May 1889) and the Governor General (Batavia, 22 October 1904 and 3 July 1905) in AA: II, 1466–69, 1476–85 and 1494–1500.
NOTES

9 See also Snouck Hurgronje to Nöldeke, Leiden, 10 February 1907, 18 August 1908 and 13 June 1909, van Koningsveld 1985a: 121, 139–40, 146–48.
10 Hazeu to Governor General Idenburg, Weltevreden, 7 March 1911, Cod. Or. 18097 file 40.
11 Achmad Djajadiningrat to Resident of Banten (N. van Rinsem), Serang, 7 August 1912, Cod. Or. 18097 file 40.
13 Instructie voor den Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken, 1907, Cod. Or. 18097 file 40. Having arrived in the Indies as an ‘Indonesian language official’ in 1904, Hazeu would first serve in Snouck Hurgronje’s stead from 1907 to 1913, whereafter he joined the latter’s Leiden team as professor of Javanese. In 1917, after the rise of Sarekat Islam, he would return to replace the discredited Rinkes (see Jedamski 1992: 25).

5 REORIENTATION AMONG THE JAWA OF MECCA

1 Rinkes to Ministry of Colonies, The Hague, 16 May 1918: 151, Cod. Or. 18097 file 40.
2 Van der Chijs to Snouck Hurgronje, 22 February 1889, Cod. Or. 8097 file 32.
3 See Snouck to the General Secretary, Batavia, 19 January 1895 and 5 February 1895, AA: II, 1600–08.
4 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 4 November 1895, Cod. Or. 8952.
5 Snouck Hurgronje (1931: 288) noted that there was already a strong connection between the court of Pontianak and the Zawāwīs. What may also have served to facilitate such a transfer below the winds was Snouck Hurgronje’s own friendship with the Sultan’s nephew – Ja’far – whom he had met in Jeddah in 1884 and to whom he gave instructions in photography, see Cod. Or. 7112: 11–12. In 1908, the Singaporean journal al-Imam (vol. 3, no. 6, 25 November 1908; see Chapter 7) described his activities among the Jawa of Malaya, Sumatra, and Java, and also mentioned his trips to China, Japan, India, and Syria. On Zawāwī’s travels see also Snouck Hurgronje to Governor General, Batavia, 14 July 1904, AA: II, 1608–11, and Snouck Hurgronje: 1942.

6 Herklots was an Indo–European pilgrimage agent based in Batavia whose activities put pressure on the vested interests of both Dutch and British companies. See especially Snouck Hurgronje to Director of Justice, Weltevreden, 17 March 1893 and to Director of Education, Batavia, 19 July 1895, AA: II, 1381–82 and 1405–19; and Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 9 August 1893, Cod. Or. 8952.

7 They may also have been safely away from certain members of the consular staff whom Aboe Bakar suspected of complicity in the duping of pilgrims. See Aboe
8 Samkārī – who was actually of Meccan extraction – later caused a stir in the Indies in 1902 when he re-entered as an Ottoman subject claiming – with the backing of the Ottoman consul – that his grandfather was Albanian and that he was thus entitled to European rights. See Snouck Hurgronje to Governor General (W. Rooseboom), Kota Raja, 11 October 1902, AA: II, 1717.

9 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 19 July 1896, Cod. Or. 8952.

10 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 6 August 1896, Cod. Or. 8952.

11 Sayyid Ahmad As'ad had passed away in Constantinople while Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahmān Serang died in Cairo – each said to have ‘gone mad’ in the days leading up to their deaths. See Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 19 March 1897, Cod. Or. 8952.

12 See also Spakler to Governor General, 25 November 1891, no. 700, ARA, A.74 file 148.

13 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 14 February 1898, Cod. Or. 8952.

14 Snouck Hurgronje to General Secretary, Batavia, 25 February 1892, AA: II, 1471–72. The original muhājirūn were those of Muḥammad's followers who had made their way to Medina after their persecution by the Meccans. Thereafter they were given a favoured position in the early Muslim community.

15 Aboe Bakar wrote to Snouck Hurgronje about ‘sayratukum al-dākhilīya’. An alternate reading as ‘ṣīratukum’ may well imply ‘your inner conduct’ or even ‘your secret journey’. All three would seem to fit Aboe Bakar's characterization of Snouck Hurgronje’s izhār al-islām. See Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 19 March 1897, Cod. Or. 8952.

16 See Snouck Hurgronje to Director of Education, Batavia, 29 September 1894 and to First Government Secretary, Batavia, 18 November 1895, AA: III, 1845–51 and 1914–16.

17 See Snouck Hurgronje to Assistant Resident of Surabaya, Batavia, 19 August 1895, AA: III, 1928–31. All this grated on Snouck Hurgronje's sensibilities and he pointed out the relatively unimportant nature of Khatāb's position conceding that ‘to the ears of the Mohammedans of the Netherlands Indies [his title] had an entirely different ring’. See Snouck Hurgronje to Assistant Resident of Surabaya, ibid.


19 Abd. Rachman (1996: 92) recently claimed that Nawāwī taught at an institute within the Ḥaram called the Ma‘had Nashr al-Ma’ārif al-Dīniyya (Institute for the Dissemination of the Religious Sciences). This remains to be verified. I am also doubtful that such an institute existed within the Holy Mosque, although it may well have existed in Mecca.


21 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 11 June 1895, Cod. Or. 8952; and AA: III, 1846, 1853, 1914–16.

22 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 14 September 1895, Cod. Or. 8952.

23 Snouck Hurgronje to First Government Secretary, Batavia, 18 November 1895, AA: III, 1913–17.

24 Abd. Rachman (1996: 94–95) claims that Nawāwī made these pronouncements in a book entitled Sullām al-tawfīq [sic]. I have found no reference to such a work in lists of works attributed to him. There is, however, a book entitled the Sullām al-tawfīq by ‘Abd Allāh bin Husayn bin Tāhir Bā‘Alawī (d. 1855), on which
Nawāwī wrote a commentary, the *Mirqā suʿūd al-taṣdīq* (see van Bruinessen 1990: 248).

25 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 4 November 1895, Cod. Or. 8952.

26 Snouck Hurgronje to Director of Justice, Batavia, 18 August 1904, AA: I, 716–21.

### 6 THE JAWA AND CAIRO

1 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā was born in Qalamun, Lebanon, and attended the Ottoman government school in Tripoli and then ‘a national Islamic school’ under Shaykh Ḥusayn al-Jisr (1845–1909), a confidante of Sultan Abdūlhamid. He joined ‘Abduh in Cairo in the 1890s, remaining his most devoted follower and, after ‘Abduh’s death, propagandist (see Kerr 1966: 154f.). On the origins, spread, and objectives of the Salāfīya, see Ende 1995.

2 Hereafter I shall refer to the 1957 reprint of *al-ʻUrwa al-wuthqā* edited by Salāḥ al-Dīn al-Bustānī. In this edition the articles, originally presented in series, were joined. Hence original volume and issue number cannot be given.

3 Abdou Filali-Ansary (1999) has recently argued that al-Afghānī’s usage was actually intended to describe a form of secularism, and that Western glossings of the term as ‘materialism’ has had unfortunate repercussions. However, given that al-Afghānī was critiquing this aspect of his contemporary milieu, his *dahr*, and further given its negative connotations in the Qurʾān, I have opted to maintain this definition.

4 In this regard ‘Abduh appears to have advocated the highly controversial doctrine of a created rather than eternal Qurʾān. Statements alluding to this in the first impression of his *Risālat al-tawḥīd* were removed from subsequent editions on the advice of his supporters.


6 See Snouck Hurgronje to Governor General (W. Rooseboom), Batavia, 16 January 1900, AA: II, 1628–30. Muhammad bin Aqil was born in Masila (Hadramaut) and regularly travelled between Southeast Asia and the Middle East. He was a personal friend of ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwī and is even said to have been invited by Amīr Ḥusayn to reside in Mecca with him after the Arab Revolt. For a recent study of the life and times of bin Aqil, see Brunswig (1998).

7 Snouck Hurgronje to Governor General (W. Rooseboom), Batavia, 26 April 1904, AA: II, 1737–41.

8 Spakler (Dutch Consul at Jeddah 1889–92) to Snouck Hurgronje, Singapore, 9 August 1906, ARA A.74 box 148, cf. Schmidt 1992: 77. Van Köningsveld (1990: 89–91) has reproduced a copy of a letter written by the Acehnese guerillas at that time to the ‘sayyids, ‘ulamāʾ and pious men of Mecca’ which most likely resulted in this rendition.

9 Snouck Hurgronje to Governor General (W. Rooseboom), Batavia, 9 January 1901, AA: II, 1647–52.


11 In 1887 Aboe Bakar observed that the elderly Shaykh Junayd was a recipient of a stipend of grain from Egypt, claiming that it stemmed from the days of Muḥammad ‘Alī Pāshā (*Tārājim ‘ulamāʾ al-jāwaʿ; Cod. Or. 7111).

12 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 24 September 1896, Cod. Or. 8952. The original attached list is now lost. It may be compared however with two earlier lists of books purchased in Mecca with the prices marked in piastres and riyals, the bulk
of which were written by ʿAbd Allāh bin ʿAbd Allāh bin ʿAbd Allāh (see Cod. Or. 7111).

13 Abdel Wahid was born in Padang (Sidimpuan) in 1894, the son of Abdallah, a pensioned official. He arrived in Cairo in 1911 and enrolled at the Agency in 1912. Still present in December 1913 he was not noted the following December (see student lists, ARA A.190: box 453–54).

14 There was, curiously, one Javanese teaching at al-Azhar from 1900, Shaykh Omar Tabrani, although he seems not to have attracted a Javanese following. Tabrani was the son of Ḥādī Nawāwī, a merchant of Tegal, Batavia and was born in 1878. He arrived in Cairo in 1900 after four years in Mecca and was still teaching al-Azhar in June 1915. It is unlikely that there was any connection to the late Nawāwī Banten.

15 Van Lennep to Minister for Foreign Affairs (de Marees van Swinderen), Cairo, 10 February 1912, ARA, A.190, box 453–4: 300.

16 Snouck Hurgronje to Minister of Colonies, Leiden, 23 April 1914, ARA, A.190, box 453–54: 297.

17 Muhammad Basyuni is best known for sending the question about national progress – which he linked to Japan – to Shākīb Arslān (1869–1946). This in turn resulted in Arslān’s Li mādīhā taʾakhkhar al-muslimūn? (Why are the Muslims in Decline?) which had a chapter on the progress of the Japanese (see Pijper 1977: 141; Arslān 1990).

18 These three set out on a French steamer in November 1910. According to the Dutch Agency files ‘Mohamed Basoeni’ was born in Sambas in 1885, arrived in Cairo in 1910. He was still present in December 1913, leaving some time the following year to take up an appointment as the Imam of Sambas after the death of his father (see student lists, ARA A.190, box 453–54).


21 See KITLV, series 797, 375.

7 ISLAMIC VOICES FROM SINGAPORE, JAVA, AND SUMATRA

1 This was a translation of his Risālat al-fawāʾid al-wāfīya fī sharḥ maʿnī al-tahīya (Epistle on the Benefits of the Explanation of the Meanings of Salutation) (Abu Hassan Sham 1979: 36; Barnard 1994: 26, n. 35). Van Bruinessen (1990: 231) states that this press was also active in producing works by ʿAbd Allāh’s father Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, the Naqshbandī shaykh and preceptor to the Raja Muda of Riau.

2 See Andaya 1977: 138. In articles to al-Muʿayyad, which appeared on 20, 25 and 26 May 1896, bin Aqil described ‘the injustice of the Dutch in Java’ towards the Foreign Orientals and dwelt on the ‘limitless sucking of the population’s blood’. Likewise on 28, 29 and 30 April 1896 he had penned an article on ‘the situation of the Muslims of Sumatra’ detailing the Aceh War and the relationship between the Sublime Porte and the Acehnese sultanate (see Snouck Hurgronje to Governor General, Batavia, 4 May 1898, AA: II, 1531–40).

3 On this school and ‘Uthmān Raf’a, see al-Imam, vol. 21 nos. 3, 4, 7 and 8; 9 September and 7 October 1907, 5 January and 4 February 1908. Zawāwī had visited the journal’s offices together with ‘Uthmān Raf’a in September of 1907 and the journal accordingly had announced the planned foundation of a school teaching Arabic and English. By November 1908 the school relocated to the Riau
archipelago, after opposition from local Kaum Tua. There it was renamed the Madrasa al-Ahmadiya and administered by Teungku Uthman, a son of Sultan Abd al-Rahman of Lingga (see al-Imam, vol. 3, no. 6, 25 November 1908). The Madrasa al-Ahmadiya foundered in 1909 after the dissolution of its parent journal.

4 Spakler to Snouck Hurgronje, Singapore, 9 August 1906; ARA, A.190 box 451.
5 Spakler to Snouck Hurgronje, Singapore, 9 August 1906; ARA, A.190 box 451.
6 This is not the only book composed in Malay about Japan. I have recently been made aware of an unpublished manuscript (the Syair Perang Ruslan dan Jepang c.1905) held by the Oriental Institute in St Petersburg. See Braginsky and Boldyreva (1990: 176). With thanks to A.K. Oglobin.

7 Apparently the Turkish mission was first mooted in al-Mu’ayyad in May 1906. There are a number of intriguing links to be made with regard to the willingness of al-Imam to consider the potential for a Japanese conversion. The editors may well have been inspired by the stories of bin Aqil and Zawâwî, who had travelled there in the late 1890s. On the other hand there are indications that a New Zealand convert called Abd al-Rahman Thompson travelled to Japan c. 1906 with the intent to gain further converts. To this end he took with him a book by ‘Mufti Osman of Java’ which he had translated into English. Thomas Eich, personal communication, 8 March 2002.

8 ‘Japan and Islam; Eastern’s wish for militant over-lord’, ARA, A.190 box 451: 59.
9 Governor of West Coast of Sumatra (F.A. Heckler) to Government Secretary (De Graeff), Padang, 19 October and 3 November 1908, ARA, A.190 box 451: 19, 20.
10 Governor of West Coast of Sumatra (F.A. Heckler) to Government Secretary (De Graeff), Padang, 19 October 1908, ARA A.190, box 451: 20.
11 An alternate reading for this sentence based on the religious usage for rukun (Ar. rukn) as ‘a pillar of faith’ would be ‘societies and leagues are a founding principle (rukun) of the civilised world (alam tamadun)’.

12 See Djawi Hisworo 20 December 1918, No. 144/IPO 1918, 51. There had long been disputes in the Muslim world as to whether God indeed had the anthropomorphic attributes (ṣifāt) ascribed to him in the Qur’ān. Others, like ‘Abduh, have denied some of the miraculous powers of the Prophets, concentrating instead on their monotheistic mission. As far as I am aware, the article by Tjekroek Troeno is the first written by a Javanese for the popular press that makes an explicit distinction between the categories of putihan and abangan. This issue will be addressed in greater depth in a forthcoming work by Merle Ricklefs dealing with the emergence of social categories on Java.

15 ‘Abd al-Qâdir bin Şâbir al-Mandîlî is noted by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr (1982: 244) as having been a student of Muhammed Sa’îd Bâ Buşayl.
16 Muhammed Nûr al-Faṭânî (1873–1943), the grandson of Da’ûd al-Faṭânî, had studied under his father in Patani before continuing his education at al-Azhar under Muhammed ‘Abduh, Shaykh Bakhît, and Shaykh Shirbînî. In Mecca he also held a post within the local directorate of education chaired, for a time, by ‘Abd Allâh Zawâwî (‘Abd al-Jabbâr 1982: 269–72).

17 Abdoelrachman followed this call up in Oetoesan Hindia, declaring that it was time for the CSI to adopt the Arabic script to encourage the unity of all Muslim parties. See Neratja, 20 November 1918; Oetoesan Hindia, 26 November 1918/IPO 1918, 48. Abdoelrachman was obviously an advocate for a shared Islamic identity, but he was not exclusively a proponent of Islam. In 1918 he urged the formation of a
theatre company to be based in the major cities of Java to help foster national unity – just as Shakespeare had supposedly done in England (see Neratja, 6 November 1918 No. 209/IPO 1918, 46).

8 TOWARDS AN INDIGENOUS AND ISLAMIC INDONESIA

1 Snouck Hurgronje to Governor General, Batavia, 3 July 1905; and to Director of Education, Batavia, 2 December 1905 in AA: II, 1494–1500 and 1503–05.

2 On board he wrote a letter of thanks to Snouck in Leiden for his patronage while relating his concern about the small sum allotted to him as a trainee dragoman. Agoes Salim to Snouck Hurgronje, SS Koning Willem I, 30 September 1906, Cod. Or. 8952.

3 Cod. Or. 18097, files 16, 48. See in particular NINO D 5, 24, 47, and SR 59, no. 21.

4 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 25 September 1912, Cod. Or. 8952.

5 Schrieke to Ministry of Colonies, 21 July 1919, Cod. Or. 18097 file 40. Such ambiguities remained well and truly alive into the 1940s, as Ariffin (1993) has shown.

6 See also two letters from Salim to Snouck Hurgronje of 1929 in Cod. Or. 8952. On Salim’s criticism of Snouck Hurgronje’s negative attitude to Islam, see the last page of his article on the veil, taken from the journal Het Licht (reproduced in Roem 1957: 167–75). In an obituary published in the journal Sadar (vol. 1, no. 3, 10 July 1936) Salim argued that Snouck Hurgronje’s policy of Association was no longer appropriate for the times, but his passing nonetheless meant the loss of ‘a friend and lover of Indonesia’.

7 This was most probably the son of Ghazālī Muḥammad Yūsuf Khayyāt, who was the former Muftī of Kedah and who ran a business in Mecca in the 1910s (Othman 2002). Contradicting this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār (1982: 110, n. 14) states that Yūsuf Khayyāt remained in Southeast Asia and that he died there.

8 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 14 February 1898 and 14 April 1909. As a part of these reforms new mutawwif-contracts appear to have been drafted, whereby the services to be supplied – such as food and accommodation, or even having one’s name changed by the Shāfi’ī Muftī – were listed and agreed from the beginning of the journey. A copy of such a contract, sent from Jeddah in September 1914, may be consulted in the Snouck Hurgronje papers, Cod. Or. 18097 file 40.

9 When Fachroeddin went to Mecca in 1921, as part of a Moehammadijah delegation, he had been given assurances by Husayn and even a present. Consul Gobée to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jeddah, 25 July 1921, Cod. Or. 18097 file 40.

10 See Snouck Hurgronje (1942) and also Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 14 April 1909 and 5 September 1910, Cod. Or. 8952.

11 At this stage it is hard to confirm that Muḥammad Nūr studied at al-Azhar, as a Siamese subject he naturally does not feature in the Dutch lists.

12 Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 14 April 1909, Cod. Or. 8952. In 1885 Doctor Abdul Razzack noted that the first government institution had been founded in Jeddah in 1874. In 1903, Consul Devey reported that although there were indeed many government schools in the Hijaz, he did not retract his observation of the previous year stating that the only education held of any account in the Hijaz remained the limited instruction provided by local Qur’ānic schools (al-Amr 1978: 70–72, 82–83).
13 According to Aboe Bakar, the Egyptians were well known as being the best-educated teachers, yet in the Hijaz it was still wealth and power that counted – even if there seemed then to be less of the old ‘tyranny’ (Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 14 April 1909, Cod. Or. 8952).


15 Under Husayn, Zawāwī held the posts of Head of the Consultative Assembly, and Head of the Council of Shaykhs ('Abd al-Jabbār 1982: 140). He travelled to Constantinople together with the Sharīf, in 1910, in order to attend a meeting of the Turkish National Assembly (see also Aboe Bakar to Snouck Hurgronje, Jeddah, 2 August 1910, Cod. Or. 8952). Although the British officer Hogarth did not specify the cause of Husayn’s break with Zawāwī, it may well have been over an issue of reformism, or perhaps even the increasingly critical attitude of the pilgrims to his régime. Hogarth’s handbook of the Hijaz describes Zawāwī as a rich and influential man of about sixty-five.


17 The Mīsbaḥ al-sharq (Lamp of the East, 29 November 1902) and al-Mu‘ayyad (12 February 1896) had also attacked the teachings of Hasan Moestapa and Said Oesman respectively. See Schmidt (1992: 128) and Snouck to Governor General, Batavia, 23 December 1902, AA: II, 1659–60. Similar claims were made about Said Oesman in al-Manār in 1910, and indeed that Snouck had been sent as a spy to both the Haram and al-Azhar (Abaza 1998: 106–07).

9 INDONESIA VISUALIZED AS A FRACTURED UMMA BELOW THE WINDS

1 The son of a wealthy merchant, Uthman Abd Allah was born in Kuala Lumpur. After an early education in Minangkabau he moved to Mecca in 1920 and then Cairo in 1925 where his connections and finances would serve Seruan Azhar well (see Roff 1966). Unless otherwise noted, bibliographic details for the Jawa of Cairo are largely drawn from Roff (1970) and Yunus (1979).

2 We may recall that Jawhārī had composed a work dedicated to the Japanese emperor in 1906 (see Chapter 6). He is best known today for his 26-volume exegesis (al-Jawahir fī tafsīr al-qur’ān al-ḥakīm [The Jewels of the Exegesis of the Noble Qur’ān], Cairo, 1921/22). In this work he discussed the applicability of tafsīr ‘ilmī or ‘scientific exegesis’ which seeks to account for all rational developments being foreshadowed by the Qur’ān (de Jong 1982: 262; Hanafi 1996: 201, n. 8).


4 On the Sam Sam of the Malay Peninsula and Southern Thailand, see the articles of Suwannathat-Pian (2000) and Nishii (2000).

5 Janan Tayyib was born in Bukittinggi in 1891 and studied in Mecca (1911–19) before moving to Cairo. In 1927 he returned to Mecca where he remained active until his death in 1946 (Azra 1999a: 156). According to Azra, Janan Tayyib founded ‘The Meccan–Indonesian School’ (Madrasa Indunisīya Makkīya) in 1923. This was located in the home of Shaykh Muḥammad Nūr Sa‘īd al-Khālidī in the suburb of Qarara, and taught Malay and religious studies. Given Tayyib’s activities in Cairo, to be discussed in this chapter, the school was likely to have been established under the Sa‘ūdī régime, and after the Meccan Caliphate Congress of June–July 1927.
6 Born in Mecca of Malay parents, he resided there until 1910 when he returned for an education at a Malay and an 'Arab' school. He moved to Cairo in 1924 as the manager of the lodge founded by Husayn bin Abd Allah al-Attas. Al-Marbawi also produced a now famous Arab–Malay dictionary advertised by Seruan Azhar in 1926 (vol. 1, no. 4).

7 Then enrolled at the Prince Fârûq secondary school, Abd al-Wahhab was born in Perak. He moved to Cairo in the early 1920s. He died in the 1940s after a (brief) career in government service.

8 Born in Batoe Singkar, this Minangkabau had commenced his working life as a teacher at the Dinijjah school in Sungayang. He moved to Cairo in 1925, where he remained for five years. His later career was devoted to Islamic education and he is well known as the author of many Indonesian text books and histories, including the valuable Sejarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia (The History of Islamic Education in Indonesia) which, as regards reformist historiography, is more reliable, if less spirited, than Hamka's Ajahku.

9 After two years in Mecca, the former, born in Asam Kumbang, had come to Cairo in 1923 where he audited classes at the Dār al-Ulūm. He was active in both the Jam‘iyya al-Khayriya and the Dif‘a‘ al-Wātan (Defence of the Homeland) – formed in 1926 in support of anti-colonial activities in the Indies. Meanwhile Lutfi, born in Balingka, had fled Minangkabau for publishing an attack on Dutch rule entitled al-Hikmat al-Mukhtar (sic) (The Chosen Wisdom).

10 See Seruan Azhar, vol. 1, nos. 1 and 2, October and November 1925. The influence of Le Bon's writings was also apparent in an article on the subject of polygamy written by Mohammad Issam in 1919. Issam claimed that when he was in Cairo on 22 May 1917, he had spoken about the matter with his friend Abdoerrachman Afandi Al Berkonki (perhaps al-Barqūqī?), as based on information contained in Le Bon's La Civilisation des Arabes.

11 KITLV, Kern papers, series 797: 375.

12 This was later reprinted in Singapore, Penang, and Kota Baru. The colophon ends 'kitab ini dibetulkan oleh Muhammad Tahir al-Indunisi, tukang tashih kitab Melayu di Misr.' A.H. Johns, personal communication, 23 October 1998.

13 Raden Prawira to Jeddah Consul, Mecca, 13 January 1925, no. 83/14; Cod. Or. 18097 file 40.

14 KITLV, Kern papers, series 797: 270.

15 KITLV, Kern papers, series 797: 270.

16 KITLV, Kern papers, series 797: 270.

17 KITLV, Kern papers, series 797: 270.

18 According to Aboe Bakar Djajadiningrat, Moehammad Moechtar studied under Abū Bakr Shaṭṭā and Muh.ammad H.asab Allūh (Anon 1915:539).

19 See Bārūbūdūr, 25 October 1924. There is evidence that Ridā was in receipt of a gratuity from Ibn Sa‘ūd, a matter he would later defend proudly (Kramer 1986: 110).

20 See Fealy 1996: 9. The Tasjwiroel Afkar did not make a very positive debut in Surabaya in late 1918, and was greeted with suspicion by several members of the Kaum Muda who urged Sarekat Islam members to avoid the grouping claiming that its objectives were unIslamic. Certainly the very name of the organization was abrogated by the behaviour of a member of its executive. In 1918, Hadji Aloewi of Surabaya responded to a series of questions put by M. Djais on matters of the post-mortem slametan, talqīn and taqīb by suggesting that his Kaum Muda opponent deserved 'a slap on the head'. See Oetoesan Hindia, 25 November 1918, No. 223/IPO 1918, 48 and Kawan Kita Yang Toeloes, 22 November 1918, No. 4/IPO 1918, 49.
10 FROM THE MECCAN DISCOURSE OF A JAWI ECUMENE TO THE CAIRENE DISCOURSE OF AN INDONESIAN HOMELAND

1 Copy of letter of Mansūr Ahmad al-Indūnīsī to Amīr Shakīb Arslān, Cairo, 15 Shawwāl 1349 AH, Cod. Or. 18097 file 40. This was most likely Ahmad Mansuri, later the director (1940–64) of a primarily Indonesian school in Mecca, the Madrasat Dār al-ʿUlūm. This institute had been founded in 1928 by Sayyid Muḥṣin al-Fālimbānī, a student at the Ṣawlatīya between 1922 and 1928. It is worth noting that the Madrasat Dār al-ʿUlūm remained an independent Indonesian school in Mecca until the early 1990s when it was no longer able to resist the strong centralizing policies of the ʿSaʿūdī government.

Unpublished manuscripts held by the Leiden University Library

Unpublished manuscripts held by the Leiden University Library, including selections from manuscripts, Snouck Hurgronje’s papers, and the photographic collection of the Netherlands Institute for the Near East (NINO) now located within the Oriental Manuscripts Section (OLG):


Cod. Or. 7112. Snouck Hurgronje’s Jeddah diary.

Cod. Or. 8952. Correspondence featuring letters from Raden Aboe Bakar and Hadji Agoes Salim to Snouck Hurgronje.


AR 4773. Includes large reproductions of Jeddah consular staff taken prior to [?]

Snouck Hurgronje’s departure for Mecca.

AR 4774. Small print of Aboe Bakar c.1884.

Cod. Or. 18097.

File 16. Letters relating primarily to the Aceh War and stereograms of consular staff and pilgrims aboard the S.S. Madoera. One letter concerning ‘Abd Allāh Zawāwi and the situation in the Hijaz.

File 32. Correspondence with P.N. van der Chijs at Jeddah.

File 40. Various collected papers dealing with political Islam as forwarded by the Ministry of Colonies in The Hague, 1890s to 1930s.


File 66. Collection of photographs from Aceh and Jeddah including Aboe Bakar. NINO (large boxes) 1 and 2. Collected photographs held by the Netherlands’ Institute for the Near East. Primarily of Mecca, the Sudan (Sawakin) and the Jeddah consulate. Includes other photographs from the Muslim world.

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Series A.74
Box 148 Violence in Jeddah, movement for the revival of the Caliphate in the Hijaz, the slave trade 1871–97

Series A.190
Box 450 Pan-Islamic agitation, Turkish complaints regarding Dutch government of the Indies
Box 451 Pan-Islam, education of ‘Javanese’ students in Constantinople 1898–1909
Box 452 Pan-Islam, closure of the Indies to Arabs
Box 453–54 Pan-Islam, complaints over the treatment of Ottoman citizens in the Indies. Situation of Netherlands Indies’ subjects in Egypt, 1908–17, with additional material from 1884–90
Box 455 Pan-Islam, report from ambassador to Constantinople concerning Islam and the Caliphate (including reports from van Oordt in Cairo)

KITLV Archives

The Royal Dutch Institute for Linguistics and Anthropology (KITLV), Leiden, maintains substantial holdings of photographic and archival material relating to former Dutch colonies in Indonesia, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles. Documentation concerning the Ḥajj, shipping regulations, and students in the Middle East can be found in the papers of R.A. Kern in dossier series 797 which includes folios:

262 Pilgrims ordinance 1920–22, shipping companies, licences for pilgrim-guides (mutawwif¯ın), ticketing, and pilgrims
265 Passport regulations issued from Singapore and their effect on Indies’ pilgrims
270 Report from returned pilgrims on the Lombok concerning the Wahh¯ab¯ī conquest of Mecca. Treatment of Indies’ subjects in the Hijaz. Reference for Raden Prawira
597 Press reports from Ḥadramawt 1925 and the activities of the Lajnat Ta’līm al-Sharq al-Islāmī and al-Jam‘iyat al-Khayrīya al-Jāwīya

Mailrapporten

From 1859 the Governor General was required to send to the Minister of Colonies a summary report of events in the Netherlands Indies. In this book, reports are listed by year and report number. Thus Mr. 1869, no. 20 is report of 1869, number 20.

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